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Abstract 
This PhD thesis is a study of the changing social and industrial conditions under which 
sugar workers in Guyana have worked, and the responses of workers and unions to 
these changes since 1964. It makes extensive use of original trade union and employer 
archives, other public and private documentary evidence and interviews with workers 
and union and state officials. 
The narrative and analysis focuses on the experience of union rivalry and the impact of 
state interventions in wage settlements. The sugar industry has several different unions 
with differing political and ideological positions, .and there have been numerous 
instances of union rivalry and workers' discontent over union representation. 
Inadequate wage offers have often led to disputes, involving antagonisms between 
workers and management but also between workers and their union. In practice the 
majority of wage settlements have resulted from the intervention of a Commission of 
Inquiry or Arbitration Tribunal. In the late 1970s the state's imposition of wage levels 
provoked numerous struggles, often of national proportions, and led to legal 
challenges by workers and one of their unions which resulted in the restoration of 
collective bargaining. Such developments have had major implications for the national 
labour movement. The thesis considers each of these facets of worker and union 
experience, and thus develops an analysis of the relationships between union rivalry, 
workers' resistance and wage settlements in the context of highly politicised trade 
uruorusm. 
In particular it discusses the implications of trade union affiliation to the major political 
parties and shows the extent to which political affiliation helped to destroy the 
collective bargaining process. It argues that while trade unions are involved in political 
struggles, they ought not to be affiliated to political parties, since this is likely to 
compromise the independence of the labour movement and weakens the collective 
bargaining process. 
Dedicated to the 50th Anniversary of NAACIE-
the champion of workers' rights in Guyana. 
1946- 1996 
"Striving Towards Unity" 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This research is about union rivalry, workers' resistance and wage settlements in the 
sugar industry of Guyana. Its aim is to explore industrial relations practices in the 
sugar industry and their relationship to the aforementioned themes. For a significant 
period of the research, the sugar workers were in the vanguard of labour and political 
struggles in the country. As a result, their experience allows me to address these 
issues both descriptively and analytically. Over the last twenty years many industrial 
relations activities, in particular the collective bargaining process, have come under 
attack through state intervention. Although the intention of unions involved in 
workers' struggles were broadly compatible with one another, there were nevertheless 
conflicts within and between them. 
The sugar industry has been in the limelight of these changes and the protestation by 
workers against perceived arbitrary practices attracted national and at times 
international focus. It is for these reasons that an explanation of the national 
movement is given, so that the reader can fully grasp the issues as they are discussed. 
Additionally, background information about Guyana becomes imperative. This 
chapter therefore provides the information necessary to benefit the discussions in the 
ensuing chapters. 
The Conceptual and Analytical Issues 
F or Marxists, trade unions are basic mass organisations of workers, for immediate 
objectives such as better wages, shorter hours of work, and better working conditions. 
They must act consciously as focal points for organising the working class in the 
greater interest of its complete emancipation. The syndicalists according to Cole 
believe that ownership of industry must be vested in the community as a whole. They 
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reject the notion of nationalisation and denounce the state with a "determination to 
sweep it away" (McCarthy 1972:61) The pluralists on the other hand define trade 
unions in the narrowest sense and the Webbs' definition in this regard has the closest 
affinity" ... a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or 
improving the conditions of their (employment) working lives" (Martin: 1989: 15). In 
his work Flanders (1975:41) argues further that unions are not merely bodies which 
are engaged in collective bargaining to improve the workers' well being, they are also 
involved in the processes which determine the rules under which the workers are 
employed. 
There are thus many competing descriptive and analytical understandings of the 
character and role of trade unions. Furthermore the role of trade unions has over the 
years developed to deal with the formulation of national policies and issues of 
international significance. Moreover, the impact of external forces creates an 
atmosphere where the external social and political influences on the unions could be 
felt. The extent to which internal and external forces determine the conduct of unions 
and their national movements is still to be determined in a conceptual and analytical 
framework. One of the major tasks of unions over the years was not to merely serve 
as a partner in "a rule-making process"(ibid) but to seek to stem the tide of discontent 
of workers. 
In almost every society, and especially in Guyana, harsh economic conditions and 
sanctions have been imposed on workers which continue to give rise to dissatisfaction 
and antagonism. And as conflict develops unions are seen very often as the main 
agitators in disputes and not as partners in the resolution process. In every work 
situation there will be conflict and it will be the task of unions as well as the other 
actors in the collective bargaining arrangement to seek to settle the problems with the 
minimum of disruption. As Hyman points out, "no social order can provide perfect 
harmony: whatever the institutional framework, work relations can be expected to 
generate some frustration and discontent and thus give rise to antagonism" 
(1975:202). More and more employers and Governments display a lack of 
understanding of the problems confronting labour. Work regulations and legislation 
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are designed to treat workers as if they are robots who should not express any 
dissatisfaction or take protest action in any manner, for if they do the "pink slip" is 
waiting as the final marching order. 
While solidarity or secondary action is prohibited by law in Britain (as Wedderburn 
points out the "collective strength of workers is to be limited by the boundaries of the 
employment unit", Fosh and Littler 1985: 430) in Guyana, solidarity action has not 
been outlawed. However, during the Burnham era, the government's repressIve 
actions following acts of solidarity effectively proscribed the right to strike. 
Historically Cole argued that intervention which undermines the right to strike or to 
surrender that right will result in the workers becoming "the merest wage slave" 
(1920: 319) while Kahn-Freund put it bluntly, that if the worker has a right to strike 
there should not be administrative interventions and he should be "free from 
criminal or civil liability". It is a "positive right which he cannot bargain away ... The 
exercise of the right has priority over any contractual obligations he may have 
incurred" (1972: 246). But more and more the right to strike is put under legislative 
pressures and company officials are arguing for further legislation, as is the case of 
Britain, "until the tyrants are tamed", proposing to introduce laws which would bind 
employees to employers since collective bargaining is seen as an "inherently 
de stabilizing device" (Hain 1986: 146). As the labour movement tries to grapple with 
the situation its position is undermined by the approaches of some unions, sometimes 
described as 'new realists'. They parade in front of employers as if they are in a 
'beauty contest' and accept single union deals and no strike clauses in recognition 
agreements with even lower rates of pay for workers. There is therefore the need for 
a clearly defined code of conduct debarring unions from entering into sweetheart 
deals with employers. This must be instituted by national movements and supported 
by the international union movement and their respective trade secretariats, with the 
imposition of sanctions against defaulting unions if necessary. 
But employers, trade unions and governments should be warned that in seeking to 
undermine the workers' right to strike this can produce far greater consequences for 
companies and the national economy. As Knowles cautions, the strike must be seen as 
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a "social freedom and a too ready appeal to economic necessity or political 
expediency in order to limit social freedom may produce greater economic (and 
political) evils than strikes" (1952: xii). The Guyana government, prior to 1992, tried 
to impose sanctions on workers and break up demonstrations and protest actions, only 
to discover that repressive activities on their part failed to stem the tide of discontent 
and resulted in a rapid decline of the nation state. 
With respect to the pre-independence period, because of the system of representation, 
the employer and the colonial master were able to play off one union against the 
other, thus engaging in the game of "divide and rule", while at the political level they 
encouraged the "splitting of the working class party into reformist and revolution 
wings ... " in order to blunt "working class revolutionary ardour" (Taylor 1989: 174). 
While Taylor has suggested that employers under those conditions would make 
concessions to the stronger unions, the opposite was taking place in the sugar industry 
in Br~tish Guiana. The employers were negotiating with the weaker union first, and 
then seeking to impose whatever settlement was arrived at on the other unions. 
The structure of the unions in Guyana allows the political parties to play one group of 
workers off against the other, ending in the complete polarisation of the movement. 
Some unions were more concerned with giving support and open affiliation to the 
ruling party at the expense of their members. The so called vanguard party, instead of 
addressing matters of concern to working people, engaged in acts which ensured their 
continuation in office. This confirms the position of Cohen that" any state, 'socialist' 
or not, acts in the interests of state power and cannot put itself at the head of the 
movement of workers. .. with any credibility" (Boyd et al. 1987: 11). While some may 
argue that political affiliation of unions at a certain period might have been desirable 
the experience in the Guyana context suggests otherwise. And as we will see, the 
workers themselves have advocated that unions should be independent of political 
parties. 
Thus an important point to note about the experience of the labour movement in 
Guyana is that, while trade unions are rooted in work places and have offered their 
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members selective incentives such as seniority rights, a procedure of handling of 
disputes, economic and social benefits, the situation in the country allowed for the 
division of the movement along political lines and the emasculation of the collective 
bargaining process. As we will see, the majority of unions were more interested in 
promoting the politics of the ruling party than in defending the rights of workers. 
Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis is divided into nine chapters, inclusive of an introduction and a conclusion. 
The rest of the chapter is a general introduction to Guyana and its labour movement. 
The second chapter focuses on the sugar industry, its development and unionism. The 
research methodology is also addressed in this chapter. The task of Chapter 3 is to 
analyse a major strike, the longest in the country's history, by sugar workers in 1964 
for the recognition of the union of their choice. The resistance by the employers and 
protection of the company favoured union, the MPCA is revealed. The strategy 
adopted by the GIWU and its friends in government at that time is examined, and the 
division of the races is highlighted. Key statements by the then Premier, who was a 
major player in the dispute, are critically examined. The continuation of strikes after 
1964, both for recognition and other issues, is discussed in the following chapter, 
drawing out the ways in which the workers expressed a lack of confidence in the 
l\1PCA in this period. In addition, the mergers and take over of other unions in the 
industry, as well as the winning of recognition by the GA WU, are addressed and 
analysed. This chapter traces the systematic reduction of unions from six to two. 
Chapter 5 discusses a strike of great significance to sugar workers, one for profit 
sharing and against a levy imposed by the government on the industry. The 
government's reaction to the strike is assessed and the shortcomings of the union are 
also analysed. This strike laid the basis for an alliance of four unions, which from 
time to time were engaged in agitation on behalf of workers. The purpose of chapter 
6 is to examine the formation of the four union alliance, the introduction of 
centralised bargaining and imposition of wage increases. The resultant legal 
challenges which NAACIE mounted against the state's wages imposition and against 
subsequent legislative changes by the government are examined. The Court's ruling 
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against the legislation by the government and the workers reaction to the anti-labour 
legislation are highlighted. 
Chapter 7 deals with the workers' resistance which continued in spite of repressive 
measures by the government and the denial of collective bargaining. Workers' 
reactions to factory closures are examined. The expansion of the four union 
movement to include the bauxite and public service unions is evaluated and the 
forging of solidarity between sugar, bauxite and other workers is explained. The 
aspect of forging unity among workers continues as the theme for chapter 8, where a 
major strike of national significance in 1989 is analysed. Both the indecisive conduct 
of union leaders and their failure to give workers leadership are examined. Can the 
Unions produce effective responses to the pressures of the state? Do they have the 
capacity to deal with the state's reaction as a result of the new workers' unity? These 
questions are addressed, and the lack of collective action on the part of union leaders 
in furtherance of their members' economic and political interests is given particular 
attention. Workers' feedback on major issues like privatisation is examined. 
The concluding chapter in this study analyses the findings in the light of the general 
discussions. It argues that, while unions were in the past been openly affiliated to 
political parties and gave support to political decisions which were at times in 
conflict with the views of their members, such practices led to workers' interests 
taking second place. Furthermore, the resulting dissatisfaction led to the weakening of 
the workers' movement and created problems for union leadership. Under such 
circumstances, where the 'race factor' could be used by politicians to undermine the 
solidarity of workers especially in a politically polarised context as in Guyana, the 
workers' interests can best be determined by unions adopting an independent position, 
free from partisan politics, and seeking to forge greater solidarity among themselves. 
Guyana in Perspective 
The outside world learnt of Guyana through a voyage by Christopher Columbus in 
1498. At that time the country was inhabited by Amerindians. Almost a century later 
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Europeans settled in the area. Sir WaIter Raleigh travelled to the territory in 1595 and 
his visit was followed by several unsuccessful attempts to establish permanent 
settlements. In 1616, however, the Dutch finally established a settlement at Kyk-
Over- AI, on an island in the Essequibo River, where to this date the remnants of the 
fort still exist. Eight years later, a second settlement was established in Berbice. It is 
interesting that during the 18th and 19th century the colony changed hands several 
times. By 1781 the British captured the colony from the Dutch, but lost it six months 
later to the French, who restored it in 1783 to the Dutch. The British again in 1796 
seized the colony, ruled it for six years before handing it back in 1802 to the Dutch. 
The following year the colony was again captured by the British, who became the 
rulers. In 1815, the colonies of Essequibo, Demerara and Berbice were officially 
ceded to Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna, and were consolidated as British 
Guiana. It was part of the Empire until May 26, 1966 when British Guiana gained its 
independence to become Guyana. On February 23, 1970 the country converted to 
Republican status to become the " Cooperative Republic of Guyana", within the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Apart from being a member of the Commonwealth, 
Guyana is a member of the Non Aligned Movement, Organization of American 
States, and the regional Caribbean Community (CARICOM) . 
Guyana is situated on the north- eastern coast of South America and is bounded on the 
north by the Atlantic Ocean, on the east by Surinam, on the southwest by Brazil and 
on the northwest by Venezuela. The climate is tropical where temperatures fluctuate 
between 65 to 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The area of Guyana is 83,000 square miles 
(215,000 square kilometres). Its coastline stretches for about 270 miles and the 
country extends inland for about 450 miles. The coastal plain is between 10 to 40 
miles wide while about 85 per cent of the inland area is covered by dense forest. 
There are also grass covered savannahs of some 8,000 square miles in the far south of 
the country. About 35 per cent of the country lies within the Amazon Basin. Guyana, 
unlike many other West Indian countries is not affected by natural disasters, like 
hurricanes, tornadoes or earthquakes. The entire costal belt is below sea level and 
considerable sums have been expended to keep the murky water of the Atlantic away 
from homes and farmlands. However, many areas have been affected from time to 
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time as the high waves of the Atlantic overflow its embankment. 
The population of the country was estimated at 760,400 in June 1995 (Guyana 
Review, February 1996.30) and comprises five main ethnic groups. However, the 
country is often referred to prior to it being independent, as the land of six peoples, 
which is a reflection of the multi-ethnic composition of its population. However, 
almost all of the Europeans departed Guyana after 1966. The East Indians, who are 
descendants of indentured labourers from India constitute about 51 per cent of the 
population. The second largest group is of African descent and comprises a 
population of 35 per cent. There is a mixed population of about 9 per cent, a native 
Amerindian population of about 4 per cent, while European (mostly Portuguese) and 
Chinese make up the additional 2 per cent. About 90 per cent of the people live on 
the narrow coast land where the population density is about 360 persons per square 
mile. At the national level the population density is about 9 persons per square mile of 
land area. The indigenous inhabitants, the Amerindians, continue to live in the 
savannahs and the highland region. Over one third of the population lives in the 
towns. The capital city, Georgetown, has a population of about 200,000, while 
Linden with 27,000, New Amsterdam ,18,000, Rose Hall Town, 12,000, Corriverton, 
15,000, and Anna Regina, 14,000, are the other populated towns. 
Guyana is a secular state and freedom of religion is guaranteed to all under the 
Constitution. The three main religions are Christianity (50%), Hinduism (33%), and 
Islam (9%). The official language is English, while an English based creole se is 
widely used for informal communication. Hindi and Urdu are used almost exclusively 
by Hindus and Muslims respectively for religious ceremonies. The Amerindians have 
a sound grasp of the English language and have maintained their many dialects, while 
the Chinese speak the Chinese language to communicate with each other, but the 
majority speak and write English. It is the only English speaking country in the South 
American continent and has maintained well over 95 per cent rate of literacy smce 
1990. Education is compulsory for everyone between the ages of 5 to 14 years. 
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The Government 
The government is an amalgam of the Westminister, parliamentary and the 
Philadelphia presidential systems. The power to enact legislation rests with a 
unicameral National Assembly of 65 parliamentarians- 53 members are chosen from 
lists submitted by political parties on the basis of proportional representation, while 
12 are elected by the ten regional councils which are chosen at the time of the national 
elections. The minimum voting age is eighteen years, from a register of voters' list of 
all resident Guyanese. The President is elected from the party which secures the 
highest number of votes at the national elections. S/he serves as Head of State and 
presides over the meeting of Cabinet. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who 
is the Head of Government business in the National Assembly, Ministers and 
members of the Cabinet. Ministers can be appointed as non elected technocrats. They 
can participate in debate but cannot vote in Parliament. The leader of the political 
party which secures the second highest vote becomes the Minority (opposition) 
Leader in Parliament. 
The first major political movement was established in 1946 with the formation of the 
Political Affairs Committee (PAC). (1). This eventually led to the creation of the 
Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) in January 1950. At the helm of the Party were 
Cheddi Jagan, his wife Janet, Forbes Burnham, and Ashton Chase. The elections in 
that period were under the first past the post system. The PPP won 18 out of the 24 
seats. Cheddi Jagan became the Chief Minister. The British were uncomfortable with 
the style of Government of the PPP and accused it of trying to make British Guiana a 
Communist State. It sent troops and warships to the country, suspended the 
constitution on October 9, 1953 and set up an interim government. This event took 
place following the passage of the Labour Relations Bill. Burnham eventually parted 
company with Jagan and later created the Peoples National Congress (PNC). At 
elections held in 1957 and 1961, Dr Jagan's ticket won over 50 per cent of the seats, 
on both occasions, with 47.5 and 42.6 per cent of the votes respectively, and he 
became the Premier of British Guiana following the elections. The early 1960's were 
turbulent, as the PPP tried to introduce for the second time a Labour Relations Bill. A 
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general strike, which lasted 80 days was called by the TUC in 1963 against the Bill 
and what is known as the Kaldor Budget. The strike ended after the government 
agreed to shelve the Bill. 
During the Constitutional talks in London in 1963, the British agreed to grant 
independence to Guiana but not until after fresh elections under the system of 
Proportional Representation (PR). This system according to Jagan (1966) was 
designed to block the PPP from a clear cut majority. After some resistance, Dr Jagan 
agreed to the British proposal and after the December 1964 elections, the PPP was 
replaced by a coalition Government of the PNC and United Force (UF). This was 
despite the fact that the PPP received the largest block (45.8 per cent ) of the vote. 
Forbes Burnham became the Prime Minister and led the country to Independence. 
Later in 1980, under a new Constitution, he became the Executive President, and 
ruled the country until his death in 1985 on the basis of questionable elections. 
Following Burnham's death, Desmond Hoyte became President and again the 1985 
elections under his leadership were alleged to have been massively rigged (GHRA 
Reports, British Parliamentary Human Rights Group Reports, Opposition Parties, 
NAACIE and Press Reports ). The period under Burnham's rule was marked by the 
repression of civil and political rights and at least two major political assassinations 
took place, the killings of Jesuit priest Bemard Darke and prominent historian and 
Working Peoples' Alliance (WPA) leader, Walter Rodney. 
As Desmond Hoyte asserted his grip on the PNC, he reversed most of Burnham' s 
policies. He privatised several of the industries which were nationalised by Burnham 
and moved towards a market oriented economy. Additionally, Hoyte allowed for 
some improvement in press freedoms and civil liberties, thus, breaking the 
stranglehold the state had in the media. The tide of discontent also climaxed, as the 
economic recovery programme, introduced with the support of the IMF, brought 
extreme hardships to the vast majority of the population. The worsening crises in the 
country witnessed the emergence of a reform movement, Guyanese Action for 
Reform and Democracy ( GUARD), which took to the streets from 1990 to demand 
electoral reforms and free and fair elections. GUARD was very successful in 
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mobilising thousands of Guyanese from every walk of life at several multiracial 
rallies held throughout the country, thus "awakening the consciousness of the dormant 
city to the realities of the society at large" (NAACIE Report 1992:47) . The 
opposition political parties under the umbrella Patriotic Coalition for Democracy 
(PCD) kept a degree of pressure on the regime, mainly at the international level. Both 
the PCD and GUARD teamed up and held a rally of important political significance 
to coincide with the first visit in March 1992 of Jimmy Carter, former President of 
the USA, to the country. As a result of the pressures from the Guyanese masses and 
the international community, the Hoyte regime conceded major political reforms, 
including the reconstitution of the Elections Commission, the replacement of its much 
criticized Chairman and the compilation of a new and verifiable voters list (ibid). 
Eventually, on October 5, 1992 democracy was restored, under the watchful eyes of 
Jimmy Carter, and a group of international observers, bringing an end to 28 years 
(1964-1992) of PNC misrule in the country. Cheddi Jagan was elected President after 
his party won for the first time, with over 53 per cent of the votes, since the break 
away by Burnham. The PPP secured the endorsement of the Guyana Labour Party 
(GLP) which emerged out of GUARD. The PNC obtained 42 per cent of the votes, 
while the other parties received negligible support. The current representation in 
Parliament is as follows: PPP/Civic 36 seats; PNC 26 seats; WP A 2 seats; and the UF 
1 seat. The highest Judicial body is the Court of Appeal, followed by the High Court 
and they are presided over by the Chancellor and Chief Justice respectively, 
appointed by the President in consultation with the Minority Leader (Guyana 
Constitution 1980). 
The Economy 
Despite industrial instability and acts of destabilisation of the PPP government in 
1963 and 1964 the PNC took over, in December 1964, what was considered to be a 
buoyant economy with foreign currency reserves in the treasury. The main industries 
providing a source of foreign exchange were sugar, bauxite and rice. However, the 
country is bestowed with natural resources, including gold, diamonds and other 
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minerals. The economy continued to show some improvement up to the early 1970s 
especially with the favourable world market prices obtained for raw sugar in 1974 and 
1975. By the mid seventies there was mismanagement of the economy of an 
unprecedented nature (Thomas 1988: 255-268). The oil crises during that period 
added to the woes of the country. The government had also embarked on a 
nationalisation process which had the full support of the PPP. Between 1970 and 
1984 the PNC government under Burnham had nationalised some 41 entities, 
representing over 80 per cent of the economy and placed them under state control. 
During the period 1976 to 1990 the economy recorded catastrophic decline with 
massive devaluation of the Guyana dollar and massive price hikes. The country's 
GDP per person slumped to below US$ 400, which made this once prosperous 
country the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere after Haiti (World 
Bank Report 1990). 
The Economic Recovery Programme introduced in 1988 by the Hoyte regime in 
conjunction with the IMF and other international lending institutions created 
enormous financial difficulties for workers and resulted in major strikes, as we will 
see later. However, by 1991 the economy recorded its first positive growth rate of 6.1 
per cent to be followed by a 7.3 per cent increase in 1992. The positive development 
for the economy continued under the PPP/Civic administration which took office in 
October 1992, with growth rates of 8.2 and 8.4 per cent for 1993 and 1994 
respectively, while for 1995 it was 5.1 per cent. By the end of 1994 Guyana had 
become the Caribbean's fastest growing economy and its performance described as 
"way above the average for developing countries" (Guyana Update: February 1996). 
In 1995 gold had become the second largest foreign exchange earner after sugar. The 
divestment programme pursued under Hoyte since 1989 resulted in 15 of the 41 state 
entities being privatised with management contracts awarded to foreign companies for 
both the sugar and bauxite industries. The J agan administration has listed 16 of the 26 
remaining companies for divestment and has set up a Privatisation Unit to deal with 
the sale of state enterprises (2). It has emphasised greater public accountability in this 
regard and much more information is made available to the public. 
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Guyana's external debt at the end of 1992 was estimated at US$ 2.1 billion of which 
half was owed to multilateral development banks, and over US$ 400m or 20 per cent 
of the debt is owing to our neighbouring CARICOM State, Trinidad and Tobago, 
mainly for the supply of petroleum products up to 1986 (3). The situation would 
have been worse had it not been for debt forgiveness from the United States, Canada 
and Britain on major portions of debts owed to them. The cost to service the debt 
which was almost six times the GDP, is about 46 per cent of export earnings. By the 
end of 1992 the country's foreign exchange reserves stood at nearly US$200m and by 
the end of 1994 it had increased by another US$70m. This must be regarded as very 
favourable when compared to an all time low in 1988 when it was in debt by about 
half a billion US dollars. The exchange rate of the US dollar which was around 
G$125 in 1991 increased to about G$145 to the US dollar by the end of 1995. 
The inflationary trend developed in the Burnham era was drastically reduced to about 
35 per cent in 1991. With constant economic growth under the PPP, it declined to 16 
per cent by the end of 1994 followed by a further reduction to about 8. 1 per cent at 
the end of 1995 (ibid). Unemployment which was estimated at about 25 per cent in 
the mid 1980s dropped to about 16 per cent at the end of 1991 with a further reduction 
of 5 per cent by the end of 1994. This followed the creation of nearly 26,000 new jobs 
since the PPP took office. There was also an upsurge in registration of new companies 
or employers over the last thirty months with nearly 2,000 added to the list of 
companies (Guyana Update :December 1995). 
The workforce at the end of 1994 is estimated at about 270,000 of which 35 per cent 
is unionised (TUC Records). The sector representing industry and commerce 
employed about 45 per cent of the workforce while agriculture provides 35 per cent of 
the jobs, with the state sector employing about 22 per cent. The public sector only 
employed about 30 per cent of the work force (ibid). Although wage increases in 
recent years were greater than the rate of inflation the Guyanese workers were still 
earning below the poverty line based on surveys conducted by both the NAACIE and 
the TUC. The so called improvement -in the economy was not reflected in an overall 
improvement in the standard of living of the workers (N AACIE Report 1994: 2). For 
26 
economic growth to create an impact it must be sustainable and not dependent on 
merely one or two industries as is the case in Guyana. The prosperity resulting from 
the growth must also result in higher incomes and overall improvement in the 
standard of living of the workers. 
Overview of the National Labour Movement 
Research on any aspects of workers' struggles in the sugar industry in Guyana has to 
be set within the wider context of the national labour movement, and thus requires an 
examination of some aspects of the structure and functioning of that movement. Very 
often the resistance by any key section of the workforce would have a bearing on 
what happened at the central level. Because most of the industrial relations problems 
in the sugar industry have national significance, it is crucial that an explanation of the 
national movement is given. This point is reinforced by Ramphal who posits the view 
that "the history of Guyana is largely a history of its sugar industry, and the paucity of 
historical studies on the Guyana sugar industry reflects the great deficiency which 
remains in our country's historical record" (Shahabuddeen 1983: foreword). Before 
proceeding with the analysis of the three issues, touching on union rivalry, workers 
resistance and wage settlements in the sugar industry, which will be the foundation of 
this thesis, it would be useful if a brief overview of the central labour movement is 
gIven. 
The Guyana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) is currently the umbrella organisation 
for twenty two affiliated unions, with a collective membership in excess of seventy 
thousand. There are only three minor unions without any trade union recognition, 
which are outside the TUC. Under current legislation any seven individuals could 
come together and register a trade union, once some other criteria satisfactory to the 
Registrar of Trade Unions are met. Since this process can be the subject of intense 
analysis and debate it is our intention not to be tied to a debate about such a process 
but to instead give the minimum of explanation of the union movement which would 
be helpful to understanding of the research. 
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The Birth of the Labour Movement 
Before the organisation of trade unions in Guyana, workers in many sections of 
British Guiana were engaged in bitter struggles with employers and the colonial 
government. However, the first major unrest took place on 28th November, 1905 
when workers employed at the water front withdrew their labour in protest at 
atrocious working conditions and poor wages (4). They were followed by workers in 
other sections of the capital city and on nearby sugar estates. During this period there 
were clashes between protesters and the police resulting in the shooting to death by 
police of eight persons and the arrests and convictions of several others. The "first 
explosion of resentment. .. " lasted nine days without any of the demands by the 
workers being met. "The workers asked for something more and in place of bread, in 
true colonial style, they were answered with bullets. Many workers were killed. many 
more imprisoned, some were even flogged, and women charged and convicted had 
their hair cut off in addition to terms of imprisonment" (5). Instead of consolidating 
this display of unity the workers became engaged in internal squabbling and pointed 
accusing fingers at each other over the strategy to be adopted and the failure of some 
of their colleagues to be in the forefront of the struggle. 
Again on September 25, 1906 waterfront workers employed at Bookers Wharf took 
strike action for three days during which the employers resorted to strike breaking 
methods and replaced many workers. In May 1916 there was another protest at the 
waterfront which was followed in June by a petition from workers for a shorter work 
day of nine hours and improved wages. There was no response to this petition until 
January 1917 when it was suggested that a delegation should meet with the Chamber 
Of Commerce. By this time the workers had already instituted new hours on their 
own -i.e from 7 am to 5 pm instead of 6.30 am to 5.30 pm. The employers resisted, 
resulting in a strike on January 4, 1917, which was peaceful and orderly. {Chase: 
1964) This strike witnessed the modest beginning of some form of collective 
bargaining, when a delegation of three headed by Critchlow met with the Chamber of 
Commerce. 
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After preparatory work the British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) was founded on 
January 11, 1919 with Critchlow elected as its first General Secretary. Efforts to 
register the union when it was founded proved futile and it was not until one year 
after the passage of the Trade Union Ordinance that, on July 21, 1922, the BGLU was 
registered as the first trade union in British Guiana. 
The advent of the BGLU was at a time when there were numerous problems 
confronting the workers. They faced a cut in wages and increases in the cost of 
living. In response Critchlow fought back and sought reductions in rent, among other 
benefits. By March 31, 1924 the waterfront workers came out on strike. They were 
joined by other sections including the sugar workers, and held a protest demonstration 
in the capital city the next day. On April 2, sugar workers from the East Bank of 
Demerara marched towards the city to meet with Critchlow, but they were stopped at 
Ruimveldt by police and were peacefully dispersed. The next day the sugar workers 
persisted and over 4,000 of them from the East Bank headed for Georgetown. Again 
the police intervened but on this occasion the workers were defiant. A confrontation 
took place and twelve sugar workers were shot dead with several others injured. This 
display of power by the colonial police forced the workers back to work the very next 
day, without success on any of their demands. 
As the workers continued their demands for improvement in wages and working 
conditions, more trade unions began to emerge and by 1939 there were fourteen trade 
unions registered including the Man Power Citizens Association (MPCA), which was 
registered as trade union number three on November 5,1937. The second was the 
British Guiana Workers League (BGWL), which was registered in January 1931, 
headed by A.A.Thome and was involved in representing factory workers in the sugar 
industry, among other sectors. This union had its registration cancelled in 1951. 
Immediately following its registration, the MPCA began to organise in the sugar 
industry. Their appearance on the scene was seen by sugar workers as " ... their long 
awaited saviour" and was an important "victory for the sugar workers and trade 
unionism generally" (Chase, 1964: 85-90). The MPCA created such an impact that in 
its first five years of existence, it had enrolled almost twenty thousand workers. 
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By February 13,1939, the workers at Leonora Estate went on strike over long working 
hours and this resulted in what was known as the Leonara Disturbance in which there 
were casualties. This action resulted in the setting up of a Commission of Enquiry to 
investigate and "report on the circumstances attending the disturbances at Leonora 
and neighbouring areas, which resulted in the death of four persons and injuries to a 
number of others" (ibid:89). Before the conclusion of this enquiry the MPCA secured 
recognition from the sugar planters. However, soon after its recognition, the employer 
made efforts to treat with the union as if recognition was a mere formality. No serious 
consideration was given to representation and this resulted, over a period of time in 
the resignations and expulsions of representatives and members of the union. Reports 
also surfaced that one of the founder members of the MPCA was on the payroll of the 
employer, earning £100. per month and this rocked the confidence of the sugar 
workers in this union (Jagan, 1966:61, Chase, 1964:90). Thus the MPCA, which 
initially had a lot of goodwill from sugar workers and many influential persons in the 
society, soon became an organisation derided by many sugar workers. 
The West Indian Royal Commission, appointed by Her Majesty's Government to 
investigate "social and economic conditions" in several countries in the West Indies 
(Jagan 1966:62), was also in the country at the time of the Leonora disturbance. 
Among the many recommendations was one for the establishment of a Department of 
Labour and the appointment of a Commissioner of Labour. This was put in force in 
194 2 (Chase 1964: 100). These developments marked a significant milestone for 
industrial relations in the country since it became possible for conciliation to take 
place on matters in dispute between labour and management. Just one year prior to 
the establishment of the Department of Labour, four trade unions, BGLU, the British 
Guiana Congress of General Workers, the Moulders and Mechanics Union and the 
British Guiana Sawyers Union came together and registered for the first time in 
British Guiana the Trades Union Council (TUC) on April 8,1941 as the sixteenth 
trade union to be registered. Its first President was T .Lee while the General Secretary 
was Critchlow. The point to note was the absence of the then influential MPCA on the 
TUC which only had 4 out of 15 unions affiliated to it. This was a poor showing 
resulting in the intervention of the Department of Labour. Thus, the TUC was 
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reconstituted and new rules were registered on the 8th June, 1943 with the help of the 
Department of Labour. 
This reorganized body attracted more uruons including the MPCA. There were 
fourteen out of a total of twenty four registered unions at that time, in the reformed 
TUC. The first meeting was held on June 14, and the leading officers were A.A. 
Thorne as President, H.N. Critchlow as his Vice President, H.lM. Hubbard as 
Secretary and D.M. Harper as Treasurer. Some of the twenty four unions registered 
by 1943 were of little consequence and by then the Registrar of Trade Unions was 
taking steps to strike some off the register. It was after its rebirth that the TUC 
became an affiliate of the Fabian Colonial Bureau and in the next year, 1945, 
participated in the very first conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU) through a loan provided by the colonial government. This year also 
witnessed the withdrawal of the MPCA from the TUC thereby reducing drastically 
the total membership of workers in that body. Whereas in 1944 there were over 7,000 
members in TUC affiliation as against 1300 non affiliated members, in 1945 the 
situation was almost the reverse with members affiliated to the TUC amounting to 
nearly 1,800 as against 6,000 outside the fold of the TUC. 
The formation of the Guiana Industrial Workers Union (GIWU) in 1947 was as a 
result of the lack of confidence the sugar workers had in the MPCA. It was registered 
as the 49th union in the country on April 5, 1948. Its architect was Dr. Lachmansingh. 
He was helped by Dr Jagan, who had served as treasurer of the MPCA in 1946. Jagan 
resigned from the MPCA "after his failure to articulate this organisation and to make 
it a militant instrument to struggle for the rights of sugar workers"(Chase, 1964: 126). 
By 1948 the workers at Enmore Estate took strike action against the 'cut and load 
system' and for the recognition of GIWU as their bargaining agent. This strike 
resulted in the death of five sugar workers (the Enmore martyrs) (ibid. 141). The 
GIWU became affiliated to the TUC making total membership of affiliated TUC 
unions nearly 8,000 compared with membership of non affiliated unions around 7000 
(Ministry of Labour Reports) The MPCA was therefore faced with considerable 
opposition in less than a decade after its formation, with its place on the TUC taken 
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by its rival. 
The GlWU, which later changed its name to Guyana Agricultural Workers Union 
(GA WU) became very active in promoting the cause of the sugar workers and "acted 
as a ginger group consistently advocating further improvements in conditions of 
work. . .its membership and strength never wavered between 1948-1953" (ibid:202). It 
was involved in many stoppages on estates including some for union recognition. 
There were strikes lasting as long as 39 days and a general strike in 1953 which lasted 
for 25 days. These struggles "demonstrated the incontrovertible fact that it had the 
support of the overwhelming majority of sugar workers" (ibid: 207). They will be 
examined as we deal with the 1964 strike for recognition in the next chapter. 
The TUC earlier played key roles in hosting a few meetings of Caribbean Union 
leaders resulting in the formation of the Caribbean Labour Congress in 1945 at which 
Grandey Adams of Barbados was elected President and Richard Hart of Jamaica, 
Secretary. It continued to play a leading role at the national level, in the late 1940's 
and up to 1953 in advocating the rights of workers. Following Dr. Jagan's election in 
1947 as a member of the legislature, in which he contested the election as an 
independent candidate and his subsequent formation of the PPP, the TUC 'and the PPP 
took joint actions on a number of issues affecting the workers. As Chase points out 
" ... the TUC and the PPP were collaborating in their respective struggle against 
capitalist oppression and in their struggles to emancipate the working class" (ibid: 
192). There was a cold period between the PPP and the BGTUC when in August 1951 
the latter announced that it had taken a decision to form its own Labour Party similar 
to the arrangement in Britain. It was a crisis period for the TUC since some unions 
had argued that the PPP was in fact the genuine working class party. However, the 
decision was not implemented and differences with the movement and the PPP were 
quickly sorted out. What was significant was the leading role of the GIWU in seeking 
the formation of the Labour Party and for his action in this regard, its President 
Dr.J.P. Lachmansingh was expelled from the PPP but was later reinstated in the Party. 
The PPP which fought the 1953 elections in the colony was successful in winning the 
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majority of seats in Parliament and sought to introduce a Labour Relations Bill under 
pressure from the GIWU. By that time the GIWU had secured massive support from 
unions within the TUC. As we will see later it was following the passage of this Bill 
that the Constitution was suspended, and the then government replaced by an interim 
one, enforced by the colonial masters. Both the British sugar planters and the MPCA 
had opposed the passage of the Bill. The imposition of a regime sympathetic to 
British concerns therefore, was of profound distress to the Labour Movement. 
However, the new administration soon began to sow division among the ranks of the 
TUC. It has also been established that the period following the suspension of the 
constitution was relatively quiet but this was not due to lack of agitation on the part of 
workers: 
Far from it. British brutalities and persecution contained the movement and 
dampened much of the spirit of militancy. Some of the militant trade unionists 
were detained without trial, some were restricted to their places of residence 
and others were served with trespass notices (ibid:221). 
What was also of importance was the involvement of the American Labour movement 
in influencing' changes at the industrial and political level. Both Chase (1964) and 
J agan (1966) argue that the Americans played a decisive role in bringing down the 
PPP government in the 1960s. They explained that their involvement started in 1952 
when the MPCA, which was outside the TUC, became affiliated to the Inter -
American Regional Organisation of Workers (ORIT) which immediately set up 
offices in British Guiana and helped to equip and fund the MPCA in its work. Some 
sugar workers argued that ORIT was instrumental in keeping Lionel Luckhoo as 
President of the MPCA when he was challenged by Nazrudeen, who was nominated 
by the Berbice estates, for the post (Chase 1964:207). They claimed that the 
conference venue was changed from Port Mourant to Georgetown and in the ensuing 
change Nazrudeen's nomination was held to be invalid. 
The rivalry between the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) had by then become fairly 
advanced and when the TUC decided to attend the conference of the latter 
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organisation in 1949 it was clear that affiliation to the ICFTU was only a matter of 
time. With the arrival of ORIT into the country through the aegis of the MPCA it was 
easy to access the entire labour movement, and by May 1953 the General Council of 
the TUC took a decision to affiliate to both the ICFTU and ORIT, implementing the 
decision by September of the same year. From the TUC records it was clear that the 
movement was split between right wingers and left wing unionists with most support 
in the latter grouping coming from those who supported the PPP. The TUC by this 
time was speaking for 12 unions representing some 10,000 members (TUC Records). 
In September 1953, the General Secretary, Brentol Blackman was invited and 
attended the' conference of the WFTU and was elected to a presidium of that body. 
When news surfaced about the election, members of the right of the movement were 
furious. They claimed that Blackman's action was both private and secret and that he 
had embarrassed the BGTUC by his attendance to the Conference (6). Chase (1964) 
and Jagan (1966) however, point out that the area of concern for the TUC had to do 
with the British and American Unions seeking to assert control of the TUC. This 
serious division resulted in a meeting of the General Council in October, just after the 
suspension of the Constitution, and that meeting decided on the dissolution of the 
TUC. 
In December of 1953 six unions representing 5000 members, including the MPCA but 
excluding the GIWU, re-registered the TUC, with A. T. Gibson as President and S.M. 
Shakoor of the :MPCA as Secretary. By February 1954, the MPCA had a new 
President in Richard Ishmael, who was to dominate the labour scene for the next 
twenty five years. He had established very close links with several American Labour 
Unions and their leaders and became the prime mover against the PPP Government in 
the 1960 to 1963 period. At the same time, Cleveland Charran had taken over from 
Shakoor as General Secretary of the :MPCA, and shortly after, Rupert Tello, who had 
been appointed by the British in the interim government was elected as General 
Secretary of the BGTUC. The BGTUC can at that point be seen as a body 
representing a minority faction of the movement. The :MPCA had about 3,500 
members and the other five unions had a total of 1,500 members. The faction outside 
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the TUC who were previously members of the TUC before its dissolution, numbered 
seven with a total membership of 8,500. This did not include the other smaller Unions 
who were outside the TUC before or after the split, numbering another 900. 
It therefore is puzzling to understand how a minority grouping could have been 
allowed to dominate the scene, with the majority of unions and members remaining 
virtually dormant. The answer is brought out in the work of both Chase (1964) and 
Jagan (1966), who have explained the ruthlessness with which the British treated 
militant unions. In addition, the enormous influence of ORIT in Guyana was tied to 
these developments. ORIT in April 1954, organised a conference of the Caribbean 
Area Division (CAD/ORIT) in Port of Spain and a decision was taken to ensure that: 
membership of ICFTU should be sought by national bodies where they 
existed, and are truly representative of the national labour movement and that 
every assistance shall be rendered by all affiliates of ICFTU and ORIT to 
. cause the national body to attain the status of being truly representative of the 
labour movement (TUC 1978) (7). 
ORIT was therefore given a mandate to assist central labour movements in the region 
to mobilise other unions outside their fold. Guyana must have been on the minds of 
the delegates because immediately after the conference, Tello called a meeting of "all 
democratic unions ... with the object of bringing the unions under the banner of the 
TUC" (8). The GIWU and the Saw Mill and Forest Workers Union (SM&FWU) 
unions, which were close to the PPP and had maintained their ties with the WFTU, 
were not invited to that meeting. "Democratic unions" apparently meant those who 
were outside the camp of the WFTU. ORIT played an important role in constructing 
trade unionism in Guyana and at the meeting convinced six additional unions with a 
total membership of 11,000 to join the TUC, bringing its affiliates to 12 with a 
membership of 16,000. There was also a crucial merger between Tello's Berbice Mine 
Workers Union, the BG Mine Workers Union and the Coopers Union. One very 
senior trade union official also explained that pressure was put by the interim 
administration in the country on the Registrar of Trade Unions to clean the slate of 
inactive unions in default of the law so as to prevent them from serving as 
competition of unions within the BGTUC (Interview, August 1994), It was also 
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feared that GIWU might seek to establish its own grouping. Hence, 31 trade unions 
were deregistered within a short space of time leaving 44 on the register, of which 
there were 32 engaged in the recruiting of members. 
As the campaign succeeded in bringing the unions within the fold of the TUC so too 
did the opposition to recognition of the GIWU as the union of the sugar workers. 
The MPCA was given every assistance by the sugar planters to stay on as the 
recognised union in the sugar industry. By 1956, Tello reported that the number of 
affiliates had reached twenty with overall membership of 42,000 (9). This figure 
increased in 1958 to 25 affiliates with a membership of 44,000. Only seven unions 
were outside the fold of the TUC with the GIWU and SM&FWU being virtually 
isolated. The campaign was therefore quite successful. Thus, the TUC became the 
umbrella body for the vast majority of organised workers and unions in the country. 
The tradition of the TUC in being anti- PPP and anti- GIWU continued unabated. 
At the political level the PPP was divided and out of that division came the PNC 
which became a close supporter of the TUC. However, it was the workers who had 
their decisive say at the political level when despite the division of the PPP, it won 
the elections in 1957 and again in 1962. The split at the political level which created 
the PNC was engineered with the help of western governments including those of 
Britain and the USA. It was the widely held view that the Marxist PPP was too much 
for their liking and a countervailing force had to be created, hence the establishment 
of the PNC to contest the 1957 election. Throughout the period of the PPP 
government, up to the time of its demise in 1964, its foremost task was to see through 
a piece of labour legislation which would address the issue of trade union recognition. 
As will be seen in the next chapter it was only in 1953 during the 25 days strike that 
almost the entire movement had taken a position supportive of the GIWU. 
Unfortunately, the legislation failed to take effect following the suspension of the 
constitution. In 1963 it was that Bill along with the Kaldor Budget, which led to the 
technical downfall of the PPP. 
In the 1960s the system of industrial relations and collective bargaining in Guyana 
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was patterned after the British system of industrial relations. The country had also 
developed a mixed economy with a dominant private sector. However, by the early 
1970s there was a major shift in government policies, involving the nationalization of 
the bauxite and sugar industries. Emphasis was placed on state control of the 
economy. By the end of the 1970s over eighty per cent of the economy was under 
state control and ownership, through the process of nationalisation. During this period 
also, the ruling PNC had developed the doctrine of the "paramountcy of the party". 
The TUC which had given support to the PNC and helped to foment civil unrest, 
through strikes, against the previous government of the PPP in the early 1960s was 
always supportive of the PNC. Most of the leaders of the TUC and its affiliates were 
also supportive of and were members of the then ruling party. It means therefore, that 
based on the paramountcy doctrine, these 'party comrades' were given instructions 
by the PNC instead of their members on industrial issues. Many unions had also 
become affiliated to the ruling party and openly campaigned for it's policies and 
programmes which were implemented, even though some were against the interest of 
workers. 
At the same time there was the first sign that the government was likely to lose 
control of the TUC should there be a replacement of the MPCA, the largest union, as 
bargaining agent for several categories of sugar workers. The PPP-backed GA WU, 
which had been challenging the MPCA for union recognition of sugar workers for 
over twenty five years, had stepped up its activities in this period through industrial 
action in the sugar belt. There was widespread support among the sugar workers for 
GA WU. The protest actions severely affected production. The government, therefore, 
agreed that a poll be held on December 31, 1975 to settle the recognition issue. 
Conscious that the MPCA would be replaced at the TUC by the GA WU, and the 
likely consequences this could have for organised labour, the government created two 
small staff associations in the state controlled banking sector, and encouraged other 
unions to falsify their membership to counter GA WU's voting strength. The poll was 
held in the sugar industry and as we see in the result later on, the GA WU won by a 
landslide. It became the recognized union and was also accepted as an affiliate of the 
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TUC. At the congress of the TUC in September of 1976, although the GAWU had the 
single largest bloc of delegates, the results of the elections were decided by the 
government list of candidates. The ruling party was therefore successful in its strategy 
of maintaining control of the TUC. 
Having placed the main sectors of the economy - sugar, bauxite, rice, banking, along 
with the major trading entities - under governmental control, the TUC and the 
Government agreed to centralise collective bargaining. The parties entered into a 
National Minimum Wage Agreement in 1977 for the years 1977-1979. This wage 
immediately became a maximum wage and unions were prevented from negotiating 
with state entities above what was stipulated in the Government/TUC Agreement. By 
1979 the government refused to implement the minimum wage agreement and refused 
to pay increments to workers for that year. 
Four· unions within the fold of the TUC, the Clerical and Commercial Workers Union 
(CCWU), GAWU, the National Association of Agricultural Commercial and 
Industrial Employees (NAACIE) and the University of Guyana Workers Union 
(UGWU) began to intensify their efforts in making the TUC a more independent and 
militant organisation and sought to woo other unions and delegates. But the PNC was 
not backing off and it manipulated the TUC's Rules to the fullest to maintain the 
status quo at the TUC level. A combination of smaller unions were given greater 
voting strength than the larger unions as we see in the table of unions. 
In December of 1980 a Referendum was called to change the Constitution of the 
country and a boycott call was made by political leaders in the opposition, who were 
supported by some trade union and church leaders, civic and professional bodies. 
Although the referendum was rigged, the real support of the regime had been clearly 
established by the poor turnout at the polls. Independent observers put the support at 
between 10 to 14 per cent, with Linden, the bauxite community, having the biggest 
drop in turnout (Committee of Concerned Report 1978). With its support waning, 
especially in its previous stronghold, the four unions and the bauxite workers 
continued to pressure the government. It was no easy task since they also had to face 
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up to the repression of the government. 
The bauxite workers were also taking the struggle a further stage by calling on their 
leaders to convene a conference in keeping with the union's rules. Once that took 
place, not even the might of the government could save the party loyalists, whom the 
workers had as their leaders. A massive shake up took place within the two bauxite 
unions, the Guyana Mine Workers Union (GMWU), and the Guyana Bauxite 
Supervisors Union(GBSU), and new leaders emerged from the branch and shop 
steward level. The new leaders quickly forged links with the four unions mentioned 
above. 
In 1982 another strike hit the bauxite belt and the government response was swift and 
effective. It terminated the services of over 1,700 workers, the majority of whom were 
shop stewards and union officials. An ordinary spectator would never have 
understood this kind of ruthlessness emanating from a government which came to 
power with the full support of this bauxite community. But the die was cast. The 
government, having realised that it had very little support even in its one time 
supportive constituency, began to use harsh means to maintain political power. These 
dismissals in those circumstances, could be regarded as the regime's ultimate option. 
The ground swell was becoming a potent force as the rank and file workers were 
taking the initiative. Thus their leaders were forced to react to the tide of discontent. 
1984: The Turning Point 
Early in 1984, the Guyana Public Service Union (GPSU) was contacted by the 
NAACIE and GBSU General Secretaries. They had already commenced work for the 
TUC elections which was due for September 1984. The GPSU, having indicated to 
the six unions that it will give them support at the elections, brought the total number 
of unions in the militant block to seven as against seventeen on the side of the 
government. Other unions were also contacted by the militant leaders and indications 
were that the stage had been reached for a serious challenge to be made for control of 
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the TUC. Although the seven unions in the militant grouping represented over fifty 
per cent of the TUC membership they nonetheless had just about forty per cent of the 
delegates. Given the type of screening which took place in the selection of delegates 
by the ruling party and the seventeen unions had in the past voted as a bloc, a lot of 
work had to be done quietly within those unions to ensure that the necessary votes 
were obtained. Since nominations were made weeks prior to the congress, the seven 
unions had to ensure that no indication was given to the other side who the real 
contenders would be. The result was that each union put up their own candidates and 
worked quietly on a slate. The voting was done on the last day of congress, a Sunday, 
and withdrawal of candidates not interested in contesting election was done at the 
time of election of a particular post. 
The NAACIE had observed an infringement of the TUC Rules with respect to the 
membership of two of the affiliates which gave them greater voting strength. As a 
consequence, it applied to the High Court and obtained an injunction restraining 
seven delegates from attending the Conference. By the Friday evening it became clear 
that the seven unions would vote as a solid grouping and this created some 
nervousness in the government camp. 
A desperate last minute attempt was made by the Government backed unions to 
disenfranchise some delegates. In this they drew upon their considerable experience 
in electioneering, rigging and scheming. And so on the afternoon of the Saturday 
before elections, some members of the seventeen unions persuaded a High Court 
Judge to discharge the injunction granted against their seven colleagues and restrained 
four members of the GMWU from taking any further part in the Conference. 
Additionally, two members of the GPSU, who were firemen but were on a long period 
of secondment to the union, were immediately recalled for duty, although there was 
no apparent reason to recall them. This meant that six delegates from the militant bloc 
were effectively prevented from taking any further part in the conference, hence the 
loss of those votes. 
The seven uruons could not do anything to counter these developments. The 
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discharging of the injunction as well as the restraining of the four members of the 
GMWU were seen by some union leaders as clear abuses of the judicial process. 
However, it was the recall of the firemen who were leading officers of their union, 
which drew the widest condemnation and made the GPSU even more defiant. 
Delegates who were workers from the seventeen unions' camp openly expressed their 
disgust at what had taken place. The irony of all this was that the firemen were, not 
long before that event, strong advocates of the ruling party. What was thought to be a 
clever stroke by the seventeen unions and their party soon became the single most 
important factor that decided the elections against them. 
The seven unions received the support of independent minded delegates of the pro-
government faction and won all the major officers' positions, defeating candidates 
from the bloc supported by the ruling party. It was clear from the voting pattern that 
the entire slate of the seven union would succeed, but that strategy was likely to split 
the movement. As a consequence, the group shifted gear to allow the election of a 
balanced Executive Council with a slight control in favour of the seven unions. The 
TUC for the first time became a truly representative body. 
Following the elections the TUC tried to improve its image among the workers. 
Meetings were held with workers to decide the way forward. The response of the 
workers was encouraging and just as the TUC was about to seek to secure some 
improvement in wages, the Executive President called the General Secretary of the 
TUC advising him to warn his colleagues that they would be killed if they attempted 
to destabilize his Government. Police surveillance and harassment were stepped up on 
union leaders, as they conducted meetings with workers. The cars of Daniels and 
Gopaul were detained and searched during meetings with workers. This tactic was 
intended to throw meetings behind schedule. 
Just as the situation had started to reach a confrontation point, the Executive President 
died on August 6, 1985. There were some disagreements among members of the 
TUC over the strategy to be adopted following the appointment of a new President, 
Desmond Hoyte. Some TUC leaders were arguing that Hoyte should be given a 
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chance to address the areas of concern to the labour movement, while others were 
urging the continuation of the agenda of the TUC claiming that the new President was 
a long standing member of the Cabinet, Vice President responsible for Finance and 
Economic Development for a number of years, and was responsible for the decline in 
the collective bargaining process. 
The 1986 TUC elections again saw the seven unions in control but this time with a 
slimmer majority. The ruling party was trying desperately to regain control of the 
TUC and of the union leadership in the seventeen unions. Some of these leaders were 
softening their approach in their wage demands for workers, and the workers were 
responding with disgust and frustration. As a result, a number of inter union disputes 
surfaced. Workers in many of the seventeen union grouping (those supportive of the 
ruling party) were resigning and seeking membership with the GAWU and NAACIE. 
The electricity workers, who were represented by the ~CA, were the first to take to 
the streets to demand the recognition of NAACIE as their bargaining agent. The 
government tried to stem the tide of discontent especially since this group had always 
been seen as PNC supporters. When they failed to get the workers to go back to the 
MPCA a senior Government Minister resorted to the use of the race card, a position 
they had effectively used in the past. This time the strategy was unsuccessful. As he 
asked why the workers were supporting an Indian Union as against an African backed 
Union, the workers walked away from him and extended the strike for an additional 
day over the racist remarks. The workers succeeded in their demand for NAACIE to 
represent them. The mood of the workers for change, however, did not prevent the 
government from continuing its quest to regain control of the TUC. 
Government Take Over Of TUC. 
The Birth Of FITUG 
The government kept the pressure on the TUC Executive Council while the workers 
at several enterprises continued to put the pressure on their union leaders for better 
representation or face the possibility of defection. But to change their union would 
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have been a long process. Only real force such as that demonstrated by the electricity 
workers could have succeeded. But all the work places did not have the clout of the 
electricity sector workers. By the 1988 TUC Conference all the rigging tricks by the 
ruling party had been deployed and at the election for all the Officers positions, the 
PNC's slate succeeded. The amazing feature was that while several public sector 
union entities had experienced economic difficulties and there was retrenchment in 
the 1980s of thousands of workers, as we will see later, a number of the unions 
affiliated to the PNC had shown increased members. The 24 affiliates present at the 
conference registered a total membership of 80,648 (TUC Records). 
Both GA WU and NAACIE submitted a much lower membership of 14,205 and 2,103 
respectively as against 15,037 held by GAWU in 1980 and 3,065 held by NAACIE in 
1986, while there were increases for those unions under the ruling party's control. The 
SM&FWU, which was defunct since the 1960s came to life in the 1980s after 
affiliating itself with the ruling party with a membership of 545. This union had no 
recognition agreement with any company and could not explain which company its 
claimed membership was from. It could not have come from the forest sector as its 
name implied since the unions which were operating in that sector were mainly the 
Guyana Labour Union (GLU), the General Workers Union (GWU), and NAACIE. 
The union had no membership register and its income did not support its membership 
claim. The union was admitted to the TUC in 1983 with 545 members and by 1988 it 
boasted 1,146 phantom members (TUC Treasurer's Report to 1988 Conference). 
The GWU in 1984 had written to the TUC explaining that "due to irregularities 
discovered in our union, we were not in a position to submit returns for 1981 and 
1982" (10). It took the opportunity to correct its membership to reflect its true position 
of 2,901. The balance sheet of the union reflect an income of union dues also in 
keeping with that membership. The union was therefore seated at the 1984 conference 
based on their correct returns. Just after the 1984 TUC Conference, the architect of 
the change in the GWU, John Warde, the Treasurer, was sacked and the PNC once 
again took control of the GWU. Before the next conference that union had written to 
the TUC to recant on its 1984 figures and increased the membership to 8,342 instead 
43 
of 2,901 (TUC Records 1985), and it then recorded this inflated figure at the 1988 
TUC Conference. 
The fraud was exposed when the Union submitted an unaudited statement which 
showed total union dues received as $279,000, with dues outstanding as $701,000. 
The statement was prepared to reflect the registered membership but the Debtors 
could not have been identified nor could they have given a satisfactory explanation 
when challenged by the Treasurer. Further, this union made provision for bad debt on 
the union dues outstanding in the same account for the sum of $400,000. And for the 
previous year, where the union showed outstanding dues as $647,000, it showed 
$621,935.45 as "bad debt- Union Dues Written Oft" in the 1985 accounts (11). From 
interviews with the companies where the GWU has bargaining rights it was revealed 
that the membership was in fact 2,900 and the dues received were for those members. 
One Company official pointed out that the union always had problems with finances 
and would regularly seek a cash advance from the company which would be repaid 
when the union dues were deducted from workers. In other words, based on the 
checkoff system in place, the union dues deducted from workers were supposed to be 
remitted to the union very soon after the end of the calendar month but m many 
instances they were paid well ahead of the deduction period. 
The other union which had a scandalous affair with its membership was the Public 
Employees Union (PEU) which became affiliated to the TUC in 1978 on a reported 
membership of613. By 1985 this union boasted a membership of 3023 and by 1988 it 
submitted its membership to the TUC as 3250. The GWU was a credible union 
notwithstanding its membership fraud, as was admitted by its Treasurer John Warde. 
It had members as well as several recognition agreements with workplaces. However, 
there was no evidence that the PEU was an active trade union, rather than a paper 
union. When they were pressed in 1985 by the Treasurer and members of the 
Credentials Committee, to account for their membership and other records, they never 
did and it was established that they never had bargaining rights anywhere. This 
position was reconfirmed while pursuing this research, when a statement of accounts 
for the PEU was discovered for the year 1985 which revealed the following: 
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"Total income- $8277. Total Expenditure- $7988" (TUC Records). 
There was no expenditure for wages, or any running office expenses. The balance 
sheet reflect total assets as $1169 which includes cash on hand of $244. There was no 
Bank account; neither was there any bank balance. When union dues for that year are 
examined, the lowest paid worker was paying $20 per month. The membership the 
PEU claimed was similar to the CCWU. A comparison with that union indicated the 
following: income on Union dues for the CCWU passed the three quarter million 
mark and it employed seven full time staff to administer the affairs of that union. The 
PEU's statement of accounts shown above and its union structure have established 
beyond doubt that it is merely an organisation created to perpetuate voting 
irregularities and should never have been allowed as an affiliate of the TUC. This 
establishes the extent to which the ruling regime could manipulate the trade union 
movement to serve its interest. 
This fraudulent act of a umon projecting membership in excess of 3,000 and 
delegates based on that amount continued unabated for a number of years. It was 
chicanery of this nature which influenced the results of the 1988 elections of the 
TUC, against the interest of workers, which prompted a walkout from the Conference 
by the seven union grouping and resulted in subsequent formation of a second labour 
council- The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Guyana (FITUG) (12). 
There was also widespread support for FITUG among workers and there was hope 
that this body might play a decisive role in bringing about changes. However, the 
ending of a strike in 1989, as we will see later, led to chaos in this organisation. 
TUCIFITUG Unity Talks 
With the formation of FITUG, following the 1988 Conference of the TUC, the latter 
body became a paper entity. The Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) - the central 
labour movement in the Caribbean - was concerned that FITUG was unable to secure 
membership with the CCL since the TUC was already an affiliate and the TUC's 
approval was necessary to allow for FITUG's affiliation. It was difficult to leave out 
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such important sectors of workers, especially since it comprised about forty five per 
cent of organised labour in Guyana. Something had to be done to heal the breach. The 
CCL began to make approaches to both the TUC and FlTUG urging them to heal their 
differences and offered to mediate in the dispute. However, their offer was not 
approved by the TUC, which was equally anxious to get the matter resolved. The 
TUC claimed that they were opposed to external intervention and would like to 
resolve the matter internally. 
The CCWU, which has many international affiliations, believed that it would have 
been in their best interest if the two bodies were reunited and as a result gave a clear 
signal to FITUG that it would like to explore ways and means for talks to commence 
between the two sides. Thus, while differences existed, both sides were interested in 
having a resolution of the impasse. The General Secretary of the TUC, Joseph 
Pollydore, was from the commencement of the split in informal discussions with the 
FITUG grouping. Just after the strike ended, and in the course of one of the informal 
sessions, both sides were asked to nominate a small committee to meet under the 
chairmanship of the General Secretary of the TUC. The decision was ratified at an 
Extra - Ordinary Delegates Conference of the TUC held on January 31,1993 (TUC 
Report 1993: 1) after which talks were formalised. The unofficial meetings between 
Pollydore and leaders of FITUG during the period June 1989 to October 1992 paved 
the way for amendments to the Rules of the TUC at the January conference. 
Once unity talks began, FITUG operated thereafter in an ad hoc manner, as if it had 
lost the will to lead. Its rules were not observed, meetings were rarely held and 
minutes were never kept. It was clear that it would only be time before the 
confederations reunited. The workers were in the meantime left with just a few 
leaders, who were continuing to address their concerns. The concern over FlTUG's 
inactivity was raised several times by NAACIE at meetings of that body. The union 
charged that "FITUG should not have allowed itself to be caught in the web of 
inactivity as the TUC, thereby losing the confidence and respect of the workers" 
(NAACIE Report: 1992.43). At the same time, the Government was continuing to 
offer meagre wage hand outs, and to disregard the collective bargaining process. The 
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NAACIE further accused FITUG of failing to lend support to workers' struggle, 
despite the strike by nurses, teachers and other sectors of the workforce. NAACIE on 
December 19,1990 wrote the President of FITUG, Gordon Todd, informing him that 
"the union had lost confidence in him as head of the Federation .... The time has come 
when the workers will have to struggle unitedly, leaving behind them those leaders 
who are vacillating" (ibid:44). The major preoccupation of the majority of union 
leaders was trade union unity and the allocation of positions at the TUC level. 
The TUC in the meantime, had concluded amendments to its rules and summoned a 
special conference in September 1993 with all the unions participating. The Rules 
catered for an enlarged Executive Council, from twenty seven to forty two members 
with seven vice presidents instead of three. The major problem concerning the 
allocation of delegates to the congress had not been seriously addressed. The only 
consolation for unions is that under the new rules all the unions have the right to 
nominate persons to serve on the Executive Council and it is from those nominated 
that Officers are elected. For now the vast majority of unions in the seven union 
grouping seem partly satisfied with the reunification of the TUC. NAACIE General 
Secretary, Kaisree Takechandra indicated his union's displeasure over the failure to 
address the issue of allocation of delegates in a serious manner. He felt that the seven 
unions should have ensured that the rules were amended to the full satisfaction of 
FITUG unions before their re-entry into the TUC (NAACIE Report 1994). Whether 
the unity can hold and the TUC can restore some respectability among the workers is 
another matter. 
Class, Race and Politics in Guyana 
Prior to the split between Jagan and Burnham, the people of Guyana lived in racial 
harmony. They mixed freely and waged a united struggle for independence following 
the emergence of the nationalist movement in colonial British Guiana. However, the 
colonial administrators tried to divide the races, in terms of employment practices, by 
concentrating Indians in the agricultural sector while placing the Africans in urban 
jobs such as the civil service, the police and skilled craft work. The result was that in 
47 
the two largest industries operating in the country at that time, sugar and bauxite, the 
employment pattern was one in which the Africans were mainly the holders of jobs in 
the mining industry while the Indians were concentrated in the sugar industry. 
Nonetheless, some African workers from nearby villages were employed as craftsmen 
in the sugar factories. These employers had enormous influence on the administration 
of the colony, which incidentally was not made up entirely of expatriates but included 
a few upper class Indians and Africans. Further, some of these indigenous bourgeoisie 
were also employed within the middle level management of the major companies. In 
fact British Guiana was often referred to at that time as Bookers' Guiana. The result 
was a rather complicated racial picture. 
The employment policies, by separating racial or ethnic groups, were intended to curb 
a united nationwide challenge to colonial control. Despite these attempts at division, 
the struggles for trade union rights, which started with the waterfront strikes of 1905 
and culminated with the 1953 GIWU recognition strike, witnessed the involvement of 
urban and rural workers of both the Indian and African races. The combination of the 
races in securing improved wages and working conditions showed clearly how the 
strategy of divide and rule was unsuccessful up to that period. Writers like Rodney 
and Jagan argued that 'divide and rule' was a feature deployed in the post-
emancipation British Guiana to erode the position of the freed African slaves, since 
the Indian immigrant was a source of cheap labour. (Thakur: 1994. Ch.III~ Jagan: 
1966. Ch. XVI) 
However, it could not have been possible that the planters developed that strategy 
immediately after slavery was abolished, since they tried to import indentured 
workers from other countries as we will see in the next chapter. But it was the Indians 
who proved to be most suitable. The problems with race relations seemed to have 
emerged following the split of Burnham and Jagan but it was not a major issue until 
1963 and 1964. J agan argued that the Report of the British Guiana Constitutional 
Commission (HM:SO, London, Cmd.9274:1954) following the suspension of the 
constitution in 1953, set the stage for the split in the PPP. The Report stated that the 
country would continue to face 'constitutional crisis' so long as the PPP retained 'its 
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present leadership and policies' (lIM:SO op.cit:70). Further, the report argued that 
there were socialists in the party who were committed to straightforward and 
peaceful means but there was a likelihood of them being out- manoeuvred by the 
communists. (ibid: 198-199) There is enough evidence produced by several writers to 
suggest that both the American and British governments engineered the split with the 
advent of the cold war. Because Burnham was seen as more of a democrat than the 
communist inclined Jagan, the former was encouraged to break away from the PPP in 
order to undermine the efforts and influence of Jagan and his party. (Despres: 1967; 
Lewis: 1968; Thakur: 1994). 
The split between Burnham and Jagan was moreover, not based on race but on 
ideological thinking and opportunism. Let us examine what took place. Prior to the 
split, there were six persons (three Africans and three Indians) in the Council of 
Ministers in the PPP 1953 government. When the split took place two urban based 
upper class Indians, Jai Narine Singh (lawyer) and J P Latchmansingh (doctor) 
supported Burnham, while Ashton Chase, urban based with heavy trade union 
involvement and Sydney King, a teacher from the village of Buxton, supported 
Jagan. As Thakur noted: 
If we take the 1953 Council of Ministers as an index of the party's leadership, 
then, the split can hardly be seen as a case of segmented cultural alignment 
and ethnic partisanship. Indeed, it would seem to reflect quite the 
opposite.(l994:89) 
The split had very little impact on race relations at that time. Indians and Africans 
were still mixed in several communities and the cordiality, friendship and good 
neighbourliness among the races was not broken (Gopaul: 1994). Moreover, Burnham 
continued to win the support of wealthy urban Indians while Jagan still had the 
support of a portion of the African workforce. On the other hand, Gordon Lewis saw 
it differently: 
The most satisfying theoretical explanation, almost certainly, is that posited on 
the recognition of Guyana as an unintegrated poly-ethnic society. For the split 
of 1955 was a clear -cut racial division, with the PPP base in rice farmers, 
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dissident PNC in African elements of the working class, mostly urban 
workers, and the Negro middle class groups that had supported, often 
clandestinely, the original PPP. (l968:275~ Thakur 1989:89) 
Lewis seemed to have formulated his opinion after the racial upheavals in the 1960s. 
However, it was not until the early 1960s that the situation dramatically changed. On 
February 16, 1962, (Black Friday) following the budget presentation, disturbances 
took place in the capital city when several businesses and homes were set on fire and 
looted. The British Government set up a Commission of Enquiry known as 'The 
Wynn Parry Commission' after its chairman Sir Henry Wynn Parry, to investigate the 
Black Friday disturbances. The Commission (HMSO, London, 1962~ Colonial No. 
354) found that the violence was politically instigated by politicians who were 
attempting to capitalise from these troubles. Further, it was recognised that alignment 
to the political parties was to some extent based on race although the report noted the 
inter changes between the races across the political divide. The report went on to note 
that ~urnham's support came from town dwellers who were not inclined to support 
the socialist politics of Dr Jagan. In turn Jagan's support came from the rural 
agricultural based workers. That the urban support for Burnham was not because he 
was an African but it had to do with economic and vocational interests. On the issue 
of the race factor this is what is stated: 
We found little evidence of racial segregation in the social life of the country 
and in Georgetown East Indians and Africans seem to mix and associate with 
one another on the terms of the greatest cordiality, though it was clear that the 
recent disturbances and the racial twist given to them by some of the 
unprincipled and self- seeking politicians had introduced slight, but it is 
hoped, transient overtones of doubt and reserve. (ibid: 8) 
This rather benign racial situation changed as a result of political manipulation and 
external political influence. In May 1962 just after the disturbances Burnham visited 
Washington and held talks with high ranking officials. It was then that the plot against 
Jagan was intensified. According to President Kennedy's advisor Arthur Schlesinger 
Jf., Burnham's visit left no doubt that an independent British Guiana under Jagan was 
likely to create more problems for the USA than it would under the rule of Burnham, 
provided Burnham committed himself to a multi- racial policy. The voting pattern and 
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support for the PPP was assessed and it was decided by Washington that the solution 
was to establish a voting system based on proportional representation (Thakur 
1994: 172). Following intense discussions between Washington and the British 
Government, the system of proportional representation was introduced and the 1964 
elections produced a coalition government headed by Burnham. 
The point to emphasise is that while this scheming was taking place, the country was 
still enjoying a climate of racial stability although the situation was somewhat tense. 
What remained central were the ideological and political differences between the 
parties. Burnham still maintained his close links within the TUC and an advocate for 
a West Indian federation. He used these links to encourage the TUC to oppose 
government policies and in 1963 there was a TUC led strike of 80 days against the 
policies of the PPP government. This strike was supportted by several influential 
politicians and union leaders in the USA. As Thakur stated: "The cold war provided 
the climate while the CIA supplied the necessary means" (ibid). Nonetheless, this 
remained a political struggle. Several influential Indians in the country were in the 
forefront of the strike against Dr Jagan's PPP government anq their collaboration with 
Burnham and big businesses tend to give some credence that the strike was based 
more on politics than on race. The situation was however, slowly slipping into a 
racial confrontation, which became fully blown during the 1964 sugar strike. The way 
in which industrial and political struggles were increasingly racialised will be 
elaborated on later. 
Endnotes: 
1. A full account of the development of the political movement is given in J agan 's 
West on Trial, 1966. 
2. Government White Paper tabled in the National Assembly, May 1994. 
3. Most of the statistics on the economy have been taken from the Guyana Statistical 
Bulletin, December 1994 and other documents from the Ministry of Finance. 
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4. F or a detailed account of the history of trade unions in Guyana, please see Ashton 
Chase 1964. 
5. Archie Codrington on Hubert Nathaniel Critchlow " The Voice Of Organised 
Labour" A TUC Publication on the 25th Anniversary.(1978). 
6. Rupert Tello gave his account of this event in "The Voice Of Organised Labour" 
op. cit.pp 21-27. 
7. ibid. 
8. ibid. 
9. ibid. 
10. Letter dated 21-9-84 from the GWU to the General Secretary of the TUC with 
membership returns which were submitted to the Registrar of Trade Unions for 1983. 
11. 1984 and 1985 Statement of Accounts of the General Workers Union. 
12. Press Statement dated September 27, 1988 signed by leaders of the seven unions. 
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TABLE 1.1: UNIONS AFFILIATED TO THE GTUC 
UNIONS REG. Members Del. Members Del. Members Del. 
NO. 1970 1976 1980 
MPCA * 3 16300 36 1100 6 1256 6 
GLU 1 6907 17 5727 15 6018 16 
GMWU 68 4881 13 5843 15 5843 15 
GPSU 55 3243 10 6000 16 9519 23 
CCWU 65 3156 10 4098 12 4169 12 
NUPSE 124 2756 9 2048 8 4050 12 
GTA 115 2708 9 3665 11 6040 16 
ATGWU 5 2017 8 4018 12 5017 14 
GWU 94 1800 7 2800 9 8005 20 
MEU * NA 1721 7 Merger = GPSU 
GPTWU 6 865 5 1252 6 1500 6 
NAACIE 40 740 5 1330 6 1458 6 
GEU 9 527 5 580 5 258 4 
PIAWU 72 500 4 540 5 550 5 
GLGOA 90 287 4 250 4 258 4 
GFFSU * 36 218 3 258 4 269 4 
AMM 128 204 3 289 4 179 3 
UGWU 164 151 3 357 4 357 4 
GWISBU * 29 141 3 Defimct = NAACIE -
CWU * NA 62 3 Defimct = CCWU -
PAG * 112 20 3 15 3 15 3 
GAWU 118 - - 15076 34 15037 34 
GBSU 181 
- -
525 5 1013 6 
PEU 179 - - 613 5 2513 9 
UAAW 175 - - 2565 9 4023 12 
GNCBSA 188 - - - - 98 3 
GMFBSA 203 - - - - 40 3 
TOTAL 49,204 167 58,949 198 77,491 240 
Source: TUC Records. 
Notes: 1. lit Unions which no longer exist. 2. The SM&FWU became affiliated in 1983 with a 
membership of 545. 
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Chapter 2 
The Sugar Industry in Guyana 
Sugar is the largest sector of production in Guyana. Christopher Columbus brought 
sugar cane to the "New World" on his second voyage. It is believed that the giant 
grass measuring between 6 to 15 feet at maturity originated in the South Pacific 
islands (Shahabuddeen 1983: .Part One). Different countries over the years developed 
several varieties of plant to suit their own climatic conditions. The plants are grown 
by transplanting small pieces of the stems into neatly defined rows. In 1637 the Dutch 
Authorities in Essequibo authorised an early settler in Berbice, Confrater Van Pere, to 
supply 2 kegs of syrup or sap of sugar, so that a trial could be made to reduce it to 
sugar (ibid: 10). By 1658 the Dutch West India Company founded the sugar industry 
in Guyana. At that time the company sent settlers to establish plantations on the 
Pomeroon River in the colony of Essequibo. Plantations in Berbice and Demerara 
were started later and by 1661 a small consignment of sugar was dispatched to 
Holland. The plantations made slow progress and the wars between the British, Dutch 
and French caused the industry to be unsettled. The estates were also attacked by 
pirates who would sail up the rivers, and demand ransom. 
During the Dutch occupation in 1741, Essequibo was opened for development to all 
nations on very favourable terms, which included free land and tax: holidays for ten 
years. This incentive attracted British sugar cane planters from the West Indian 
islands. By the beginning of the nineteenth century over 400 plantations had been 
established. The industry started to progress after the colonies were ceded to the 
British and by 1824 nearly 42,000 tons of sugar was produced. Under the Dutch 
. 
occupation the maximum production had been 5,000 tons (Sugar in Guyana: 4). The 
sugar plantation has had problems in obtaining labourers from its inception. As a 
consequence, an undertaking was given in 1658 by a Dutch merchant, David Nassy, 
"to transport slaves from Africa to the Pomeroon. It is not clear whether his 
undertaking was in fact fulfilled" (Shahabuddeen 1983: 12). However, the records of 
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the Zeeland Chamber of the Dutch West India Company of August 1669, revealed 
that a shipload of sugar amounting to around 50-60,000 pounds was in fact produced 
by African slaves in the Essequibo. "A fresh supply of slaves reached Essequibo in 
1670. The essentials of a plantation economy based on forced labour were already in 
place" (ibid). 
With the abolition of slavery in 1834, many of the ex-slaves abandoned the 
plantations which created a crisis in acquiring an adequate supply of labour. The 
planters had to resort to the importation of: 
immigrants from the West Indies, Brazil, Sierra Leone, St. Helena, Malta, 
Madeira, Germany, Ireland, China and India. The Indians eventually proved to 
be the most suitable immigrants, and many worked as indentured labourers on 
Guyana's sugar plantations until that system was abolished in 1921( Sugar In 
Guyana: 5). 
Labour shortage, competition with slave- produced sugar, and subsidised European 
beet sugar, created enormous difficulties for the plantations in Guyana from the 
1830's to almost 1914. A number of estates ceased operations and many others 
amalgamated with the more prosperous ones. The number of estates had declined to 
64, and by 1914 Essequibo was no longer a sugar producing territory. The advent of 
the first World War brought a measure of success to the industry with higher prices 
obtained for the commodity. But it was short-lived following a slump after the war. 
Estates were further reduced and relocated in the main on the coast lands. 
By 1939 sugar was still a leading export and "accounted for 75% of the value of the 
country's exports" (ibid:6). The second World War saw a decline in production due 
to a shortage of labour, fertilisers and other essential products, but it had recovered by 
1947 with the lifting of the wartime restrictions, an improvement of labour supply 
with the introduction of the payment of incentive bonuses, "improvement and 
amalgamation of factory operations, and the security provided by the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement"(CSA) signed in 1951 (ibid). The development of Housing 
schemes in what are termed extra-nuclear areas (in close proximity to the plantations) 
became a major venture for the industry with the establishment of the Sugar Industry 
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Labour Welfare Fund in 1949. The building of modem factories helped to a large 
extent to improve the efficiency and prosperity of the industry, and by the time of 
nationalisation in 1976 there were only eleven factories in operation. This was further 
reduced to eight, at the present moment (1995). The production figures given in 
chapter 7, attest to the rapid expansion and progress made by "King Sugar" since 
1948. 
The Role of Sugar in Guyana's Political Economy 
The dominance of sugar in the life of the economy of the colony has been such that 
British Guiana, as was mentioned earlier, was referred to as Bookers Guiana. By the 
end of World War II, the sugar industry had come under the control of two British 
multinational corporations, Booker Brothers McConnel and Company and Sandbach 
Park~r and Company (later sold to Jessel Securities Limited). Between them, these 
two companies produced some 90 per cent of Guyana's sugar, while another 10 per 
cent was produced by small independent cane farmers. This was then a highly 
centralised industry which dominated the colonial economy. 
The sugar industry, then, played a significant role during the war period as well as 
after independence. Earlier it was stated that in 1939 sugar accounted for 75 per cent 
of export earnings. By 1945, it accounted for 60 per cent of the export earnings, and 
17 per cent of the GDP. In 1955, there was a reduction to 56.7 per cent for export 
earnings and 16 per cent for the GDP. This was in spite of an increase in production 
and acreage under cultivation. By 1964, export earnings dropped to 37.1 per cent 
while the contribution to GDP fell to 14.7 per cent. The industry, however, continued 
to play a major role in the Guyanese economy and by 1975, export earnings increased 
to 52 per cent while the GDP increased again to 30.6 per cent. By the end of 1994, 
sugar accounted for 26 per cent of export earnings and 18 per cent of the GDP. In 
addition, the contribution by the sugar industry to the revenue of the country has been 
enormous. By 1994, the government received a levy of $2.0 billion, $262 million in 
taxation, $450 million in consumption tax and duties and $433 million in tax deducted 
56 
from employees. Additionally, the industry has increased its employment since 1990 
to over 23,000 workers, while employment provided by peasant farmers amounted to 
nearly 7,000. There are an additional 8,000 persons estimated to be employed in 
businesses which supply and service the industry (Guysuco Report 1994: 4). 
The export levy on sugar introduced by the PNC administration in 1974 has 
contributed billions of dollars since then to the national treasury and helped to 
significantly reduce the balance of payment deficits of the country. The levy collected 
since 1990 indicated in the table below amply illustrates the point: 
Table 2: 1 Sugar Levy 
Year Levy Collected 
1990 $711.1m 
1991 $4.2 billion 
1992 $4.9 billion 
1993 $3.3 billion 
1994 $2.0 billion 
Sources:Guysuco Reports 
The colonial control of the economy was reflected in the pricing mechanisms applied 
to this dominant sector. Under the CSA, the United Kingdom agreed to purchase 
fixed amounts of sugar at prices reflecting the cost of production. An export tax was 
imposed, divided between the rehabilitation fund, a price stabilization fund and a 
labour welfare fund, for the improvement of housing and social facilities for workers. 
As a result of the capital realized from the export tax, the industry undertook the 
modernization programme which, as we saw earlier, resulted in a marked reduction of 
factories and an increased amount of acreage under cultivation, together with 
increased production. This rehabilitation was in part undertaken to meet some local 
criticism and increase its competitive position in an increasingly global economy. In 
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the estimation of one critic, the rationalization/modernization program literally 
transformed the industry: 
... it has been estimated that as a result of the new investments labour 
requirements in the industry fell from 28,184 in 1949 to 20,480 in 1960, a 
drop of near one-third, while capital per worker increased from $715 to $950, 
an increase of some 170 per cent. This led to a significant increase in the 
productivity of labour. In the ten year period from 1956 - 1965 the output of 
sugar per man day increased from .046 tonne to .068 tonne, an increase of near 
50 per cent (Thakur: 1994, 219-20). 
As productivity rose, employment began to fall off precipitously. Thus, labour 
requirements fell by nearly a third between 1949 and 1960. A further reduction of 
about 3,000 in the labour force took place between 1960 and 1970, left a total of 
17,174 workers employed in the industry. Overall, employment in sugar fell from 
11. 7 per cent of the national labour force to 8.2 per cent between 1960 and 1970. 
There was a slight recovery after the dramatic price increases in 1974, with an 
increase in employment levels to 19,263 in 1976. However, in the following decades, 
other events intervened not only to block the increasing demand for labour but 
perhaps more important its productivity. In 1974, after British entry into the European 
Economic Community (EEC), the CSA was replaced by the Lome Convention 
Protocol Number 3, which regulated the entry of sugar from African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries into the European Community. Under the terms of the Lome 
Convention, Guyana received a quota of 157,000 metric tonnes of sugar. 
Two significant events in the mid 1970s served to change both the character and some 
critics claim, the performance of the industry. The first was the sudden and 
phenomenal increase in the price of sugar between 1974 and 1976. The CSA-EEC 
price, for example, rose from $303 per tonne in 1973 to $604 in 1974 and $1240 in 
1975. In the light of this increase, the government imposed a levy on all exported 
sugar taking a significant portion in the price increases. The contribution to 
government revenue, by the sugar levy increased from $1.4m in 1973 to $211 m In 
1975, an increase in its share from 1 per cent to 44 per cent for that year. As will be 
seen, this policy had major industrial and political consequences. 
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The second and certainly the most significant event in the sugar industry was its 
nationalization which took place in the 1970s. The main multinational operating in 
Guyana, Bookers Brothers and McConnell Limited claimed that the 1974 levy 
imposed by the government was both excessive and punitive and called for its 
removal. A series of public exchanges between the government and the corporation 
only served to harden the divisions between the two parties. The government took the 
view that the only solution was nationalisation. 
The process of nationalization occurred in two stages. First, the smaller of the two 
companies, Jessel Securities Limited was taken over in 1975 at a cost of $20 million, 
$5 million in cash and the rest, $15 million to be paid over the ten years, at an interest 
rate of 7 per cent. The second stage was the nationalization of the larger of the two 
companies, Bookers Brothers McConnell and Company, in 1976 for $102.5 million. 
This amount consisted of $70 million for assets and another $32 million for debts to 
foreign lenders (Shahabuddeen, 1980). However, and despite the sanguine hopes of 
most nationalists, the expectation of the nationalized industry were not realized, 
mainly as a result of conflicts which were generated by autocratic rule, discussed in 
the ensuing chapters. And as tables 7.5 and 7.6 show production fell drastically, 
which resulted in Guyana being unable to reach the EEC quota. 
The provision of housing within the sugar industry is also worth noting at this point. 
With respect to housing development, employees in the industry prior to 1949 lived 
on estate ranges and Logies built around the estates with communal facilities. Several 
studies have been conducted over the atrocious conditions under which the workers 
lived, the most revealing being the report of Dr Giglioli (1938) which made several 
recommendations for improvement. Following the CSA and with funds provided for 
housing and welfare matters a significant transformation in the housing of sugar 
workers took place. Subsequently, several communities were developed, with proper 
roads, water, sports, recreation and health facilities. These communities were referred 
to as 'extra nuclear areas' administered by the Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund 
Committee (SIL WFC) which comprised of representatives from the employers, the 
unions and the government. Plots of land were allocated to workers along with an 
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interest free loan repayable over a 15 to 20 year period, for workers to build their 
houses. There was a marked increase in housing development, so that by the time of 
nationalisation 92 communities had been developed with 12,410 house lots allocated 
to sugar workers. During that period also, 13,473 houses have been built, assisted by 
interest free loans from the 'labour welfare fund' (SILWFC Reports). The house lots 
which were given to workers on a 'lease' basis were handed over to them by 'title' at 
a promised token price of $1.00. The PNC administration at first tried to sell the lots 
at a far higher price, but resistance by the workers and their unions forced the 
administration to shelve its plan. 
Following the nationalisation of the industry the development of housing areas 
decreased considerably. During the period 1976 and 1994, the number of housing 
areas developed was 5, with 428 house lots allocated and 723 buildings erected (ibid). 
Unions blamed this decline, as well as the decrease in sugar production, not on 
nationalisation per se but on problems caused by the delirious excesses of 'party 
paramountcy', in which political considerations replaced demands for efficiency and 
productivity. 
The sugar industry continues to be seen as the lifeline of the Guyanese economy. At 
the same time the taxation and levy have created problems for labour relations 
especially since the level of wages and fringe benefits remained below the poverty 
line. The workers have, therefore, continued to argue that their conditions of 
employment can only be satisfactorily improved if the government removes the levy 
charged on the industry. 
The Division of Labour in the Sugar Industry 
There is a complex division of labour in the sugar industry. The tasks are provided in 
the four areas: field, factory, workshop and the administration department. In field 
operations, the bulk of the workforce comprise of the cane-cutters (harvesters), with 
other ancillary sections, such as the planters, weeders, pest control, shovel men, land 
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preparation, transportation and fertilizer hands. The cane harvesters comprise the 
largest and most strategic section of the field workforce. On each estate location, 
there are cane cutting 'gangs' (groups of between 100 and 220 workers). Each 'gang' 
is broken up into teams of between 3 and 8 persons. The teams are allocated work in 
large areas where canes are burnt before harvesting. The canes are first cut and 
packed in bundles before they are loaded by the workers into 'punts' (steel barges) 
and transported via waterways to the factory for weighing before milling commences. 
The workers are paid on the basis of the amount of canes harvested. The price for 
cutting and loading a ton of cane is determined between union and management 
during negotiations and the agreed rate will be applied throughout the industry. 
Workers would normally earn additional incentives based on their attendance at work. 
In addition, they are paid 'extras' for obstacles. The 'punts' loaded will be recorded 
alongside the names of the persons who performed the task and the amount earned, 
based on the day's performance of the team, is divided equally among the group. 
The harvesting is based on a 'crop' system. Foreign planters used the term 'spring' 
and 'autumn' to describe the two harvesting period, while after nationalisation it has 
been described as 'first' and 'second' crop. The harvesting of the crop is very 
strenuous and is usually regarded as an unskilled task. However, it has been 
demonstrated from the 1977 strike that cane cutting requires a skill which can only be 
obtained through training on the job. When the government deployed scabs to the 
industry in 1977, their poor cutting techniques virtually destroyed the cultivation, thus 
establishing the importance of the skills of the cane harvesters. Sugar cane has to be 
harvested from the lowest point on the ground, since the juice quality (sucrose 
content) is higher at that point than further up the sugar cane joints. Apart from that 
factor, the new ratoon (plant) will die if the cane is cut too far from above the ground, 
resulting in a loss in the yield. A plant will give up to about six ratoons before it is 
necessary to replant, providing care is taken with the cutting during harvesting. It is 
for that reason that the industry has a target of 20 per cent replanting of the annual 
cultivation. Usually, the harvesting period lasts for up to 40 weeks a year. The non-
harvesting period is normally be from mid-December to around the end of January, 
followed by a second break between April and May. The harvesters are given 
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alternative jobs during the 'out of crop period'. Mechanical harvesters have also been 
used but not very successfully. For mechanisation to succeed the industry would have 
to replant the entire cultivation and change the rows to suit the wheels space of the 
tractors. Additionally, the harvesting could only take place under dry conditions so 
that the rainy season would pose enormous problems. 
In the other sections of field operations outside of cane harvesting, the workers are 
placed in gangs and many are working on a 'job rated' (piece-work) basis. As an 
example, some estates may operate two to three 'weeding gangs' depending on the 
size and geographic location of the cultivation. The vast majority of weeders and 
fertilizer hands are female employees. The shovel, planting, and chemical weed 
control gangs are all similarly structured. However, these would comprise of 'able 
bodied' men. All the estates have one transportation gang each, and those workers are 
responsible for transporting empty punts (tractor drawn along waterways) to the back 
lands' and returning them to the factories as they are loaded. Some operators also have 
the responsibility for taking workers to their work locations. 
The workers in the factory are employed in five sections, pre-milling, milling, 
boiling-house, laboratory and an electrical department. Most of them are hourly paid 
and are in the three categories of skilled, semi- skilled, and unskilled. There are, 
however, times when a task is given to workers on a job rated basis. The workers are 
responsible for the maintenance of plant and machinery in the factories and at the 
same time ensure that production takes place without much difficulty. The cane juice 
is extracted by the use of heavy roller mills and then sent to the boiling house where it 
is converted into sugar. The boiling houses in many of the factories are not fully 
automated and heavy reliance is placed on the skills of the sugar boilers to 'strike the 
pan' at the right time to ensure the highest quality of sugar. In this section there are 
the pan attendants (unskilled), the sugar boilers Gunior and senior), and the process 
foremen. The laboratory technicians and unskilled attendants record and ensure 
proper juice quality and keep the grinding and production statistics for evaluation. It 
is from the laboratory that the estates obtain all their statistics on production, 
especially the tons of cane which are ground to make a ton of sugar (tons cane - tons 
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sugar ratio). 
The workers in the Field Workshops are responsible for the proper maintenance of all 
the vehicles on the estates. Like the factory workers they are mostly time rated and 
are placed into three categories - skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labourers. Some 
engage in piece rated work, especially the operators of heavy equipment which is 
used for land preparation. Almost 90 per cent of all those workers who reach the 
skilled bracket, in both the workshops and the factories, are trained from within the 
establishment. The industry operates one of the most successful apprentice training 
centres in the country. In addition, all the sugar boilers are trained and qualified on a 
training programme jointly conducted between the management and the union 
NAACIE. Several of the trained apprentices have risen to the highest positions in the 
factories and workshops. 
The administration departments on the estates consist of the wages, accounts, stores, 
and time keeping sections as well as the personnel department. The wages department 
and time keeping office are responsible for the weekly preparation of workers' pay 
packets. The book keepers prepare the pay lists manually up to the point of 
enveloping the cash for each worker so that payments can be made to them on 
Fridays, while the accounts sections are responsible for supplying vital accounting 
and statistical information to the Estate administrators as well as to the company head 
office. A monthly performance report for each estate is prepared by the accounts 
section. The store keepers are responsible for ensuring that adequate spares are 
available to maintain the fleet of vehicles, plant and equipment. Finally, in the 
personnel departments the clerks assist in the recruitment of certain unskilled 
labourers, keeping the records of every employee in the industry, including their 
medical and national insurance records as well as pension records. The estate security 
guards and dispensaries and their employees are also under the personnel department. 
Each estate has an Administrative Manager as its head, while in each department 
there is a divisional manager. The Field Manager has overall responsibility for the 
entire field operations along with the field workshop. Under him (up to this point in 
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time - 1996 - no female has ever been appointed as head of the field or factory 
departments) there is a Senior Assistant Field Manager. Depending on the needs of 
each location, Assistant Field Managers and Field Superintendents are appointed. 
These are all senior staff (non unionised) appointments. Below them are supervisors 
who are eligible for membership in NAACIE, followed by field foremen! women, and 
charge hands in each gang. Again the number is dependent on the size of the gang. 
Below the charge hands are the checkers (cane cutting gangs only) and then the 
workers. All the workers below the level of supervisors in the field are eligible to be 
members ofGAWU. 
In the factories the Factory Manager is the head of department. He (always male) is 
assisted by two Assistant Factory Managers, one responsible for production while the 
other is responsible for engineering. They are followed by Senior Engineers, 
Engineers, Shift Managers and trainee Shift Managers. The chart of each estate will 
determine the numbers involved. These are all management personnel (monthly staff) 
and do not belong to a union. Below these categories are the NAACIE categories, the 
Supervisors, Senior Factory Foremen, Foremen, and Process Foremen, and Senior 
and Junior Sugar Boilers for the boiling house. In the laboratory there is a Head 
Laboratory Technician who supervises several Senior and Junior Laboratory 
Technicians. These are all considered Junior Staff employees on the monthly payroll. 
Below them are the charge hands, skilled and other workers who are in the GAWU 
bargaining unit. 
The Office and Personnel Managers are heads of the two departments. Under them are 
their Assistants, in the management bracket (non unionised) while in the personnel 
department there is also a Welfare Officer, a junior staff member who does not belong 
to a trade union. The other employees, Stores and office supervisors, Senior and 
Junior Book Keepers and Store Keepers, Senior Dispensers, Dispensers, Nurses and 
Midwives are all designated Junior Staff and are in the NAACIE bargaining unit. The 
other weekly and hourly paid workers in these sections (office Assistants, cleaners, 
janitors, and nursing assistants) all belong to the GA WU categories. At the Head 
Office only the NAACIE is recognised for all the workers below the Executive and 
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other Senior Staff and 'private salaried' employees. They are employed In 
Georgetown and at Ogle, located five miles away. 
The industry at the end of 1994 had over 23,000 workers, of which there were over 
600 Executive and other Senior Staff who do not belong to a union, while there are 
over 1,600 Junior and other monthly staff described above, who are in the bargaining 
unit of NAACIE. The Field Foremen, charge hands and other weekly, daily, hourly, 
and job rated workers, over 21,000 in total, are eligible for GAWU membership. 
( Guysuco Records) 
Why the Sugar Industry? 
Initially my intention was to conduct research on the decline of collective bargaining 
in all sectors of employment in Guyana . However, after several discussions with 
Professor Richard Hyman, it was finally agreed that such a topic would be very wide, 
to the extent it would also be very difficult to manage within the time frame. The 
decision was then made to conduct research on the sugar industry, and again specific 
areas had to be examined given the nature and long history of that industry. In 
switching to the sugar industry it was felt that, because it was the major employer in 
the country with a long history of workers struggles, and it had experienced the 
application of the collective bargaining process since 1939, it provided an opportunity 
to link problems and issues relating to industrial relations in this industry with 
national events. This is ideal since the sugar industry has been the major player on the 
industrial relations scene. As the research established, that over 90 per cent of all 
strikes in the country before, during, and after the thirty year period, took place in this 
industry. 
The well established collective bargaining process which has been introduced and 
developed over the years allowed for issues affecting the parties to be ventilated at the 
highest level where disputes are normally resolved. It is for this reason that this 
industry has had more Commissions of Enquiries and Arbitration tribunals than any 
other industry in the country dealing with almost every facet of industrial relations. 
65 
Some disputes which have ansen were subjected to legislative as well as judicial 
review and have affected industrial relations at the national level. It is for this reason 
that an analysis of some of the issues involved could be linked with what transpired at 
the national level and help the research to focus at times on national events. 
The additional consideration is that an analysis of industrial relations practices in the 
sugar industry has not been done in any detailed manner. Guyanese work on the 
contemporary sugar industry has more of a historic and economic focus. The work of 
Chase (1964) highlights the growth and development of the trade unions up to 1964, 
with important events and struggles of Guyanese workers, including sugar workers 
documented. The account by Jagan (1966) explains some major struggles of the 
sugar workers, highlights their poor working conditions and weak representation 
offered by the l\1PCA. His focus was to show how his government was destabilized 
by Western powers with the support of many unions and their officials in Guyana. 
This account also reflects his stewardship as a politician and public official. Both of 
these texts will have to be examined in the context that the authors were active 
players on the scene and parties to many disputes. They nevertheless provide useful 
background information about certain events in that period of the country's history. 
However, with respect to Jagan's interpretation of the 1964 strike and racial events of 
that period, this research has regrettably to take issue on these matters with the senior 
statesman. 
The work of Thakur (1994) focuses on a more directly political analysis up to the 
period ending 1965. It is useful, however, in documenting some features of political 
developments which had industrial relations repercussions. In particular Thakur 
interviewed leading members of the PPP during that period, including the Deputy 
Leader, B.H Benn, and Moses Bhagwan, Chairman of the youth section, and they 
confirmed that influential wings of the party have advocated racism to the extent of 
calls for partition of the country. At the same time they refused to support 
independence under the PNC in 1966. These positions and subsequent disagreements 
led to their resignation as well as the alienation of influential black leaders in several 
communities. 
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The writing by Shahabuddeen (1983) traces the introduction, growth, exploitation, 
marketing and management of the sugar industry. It examined the supply of labour 
from slavery, indentureship to the pre- independence period. In a detailed manner the 
author records the negotiations and processes leading to the nationalisation of the 
industry. On the other hand, Thomas (1984) deals with the economic aspect of the 
industry, and its exploitative and oppressive nature which continued after 
nationalisation. He was in fact very critical of the continued mode of production 
based on the plantation system after nationalisation and argued that the process was 
merely one of change in ownership, which did not move beyond that point. 
Industrial relations research is a rare feature in the Caribbean and it is hoped that this 
work will stimulate further research and discussions. As was indicated above, the 
period up to 1964 was covered in the work of both Chase and Jagan. While the 
challenge of the MPCA by the GA WU dates back as far as the 1940s, the 
intensification of that struggle took place in 1964 at the time when the PPP was in 
government. It was therefore an appropriate period to start an analysis of union 
rivalry, since this is one of the main themes which the thesis is addressing. There was 
a change in Government in 1964 and two years later independence was granted to the 
country. 
The processes of nationalisation, undemocratic rule, denial of the right to free 
collective bargaining, and wage imposition all took place over the period of post-
independence history which pre-dated the restoration of democracy in 1992. During 
this period the assaults on the industrial relations system raised the level of 
consciousness of the workers and this is captured in the analysis which focuses on this 
critical phase. Also a once united trade union movement became fragmented, both as 
a result of inactivity on the part of some leaders and militant action on the part of 
workers, and again this is a focus of my analysis. The restoration of democracy in 
1992, with the reintroduction to some extent of the collective bargaining process and 
a semblance of unity in the union movement, has since brought further important 
changes which I have also sought to address and analyse. 
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Overall, the thesis seeks to establish that, during this period between 1966 and 1992 
industrial relations had been systematically marginalised under a political directorate 
and a political agenda. An attempt has been made to document the changes which 
have taken place over the years and examine the challenges facing the union 
movement. The different changes in industrial relations through political intervention 
within the period 1964-1994 allow for an assessment of workers reaction to those 
changes which have occurred and the interviews with them gave a clear indication as 
to where their loyalties lie. 
The Research Methodology and Data Collection Process 
This research is restricted to an analysis of union rivalry, workers' resistance and 
wage settlements in the sugar industry of Guyana for the period 1964 to 1994. The 
research is based on documentary analysis and interviews, but is also informed by my 
own 'experience. In all 109 persons have been interviewed over a period of five 
months. They comprised thirteen Union officials and ex-Union officials (five of 
whom are now based in the United States of America), three Ministry of Labour 
officers, seven management personnel (six from estates and one from the Head 
Office) and eighty two workers' representatives or former representatives. Three 
leading members of the business community and a former Minister in the PNC regime 
have also expressed their views on some aspects of the research. The interviews with 
the workers were conducted with a number of shop stewards and employees on all the 
eight Guysuco locations. The most senior employees were selected in the unionized 
categories, and overall the workers' years of service in the industry ranged from thirty 
to eighteen years. Seventeen of those interviewed belong to the staff union, 
NAACIE, while the other sixty five are members of the GAWU, of which eight were 
members of the former field foremen union. 
Interviews with Workers 
The interviews with workers' representatives were conducted in the months of 
August, September, October and the first half of November 1994. The Union, 
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management and Ministry of Labour Officials were also interviewed in October and 
November 1994, while the five ex-union officials in the USA were interviewed in 
April 1995. Initially, I tried to get the workers at the LBI location, where I worked 
between 1969 and 1977, to fill out a questionnaire, since I was well known to almost 
everyone there. I was, however, unable to get them to fulfil my request, since many 
claimed that they had left school many years ago and had given up the pen. Their 
tools were "their forks, cutlasses, shovels and spray cans". They were willing 
therefore to answer any questions but made it clear that they would write nothing. A 
few asked in a jovial manner if I wanted to steal their votes at the next elections. 
Many Guyanese have become apprehensive in signing or writing on any document for 
fear that they will lose their right to vote. This fear developed during the rigged 
elections under the previous regime prior to the October 1992 general elections when 
many voters had been disenfranchised through allegations that they had already voted 
by proxy. This fear has virtually disappeared since the last elections. However, it is 
still difficult to get workers to fill out written questionnaires especially those working 
in the agricultural sector. Other previous attempts to even get teachers and public 
servants to fill out questionnaires failed because of the political fear which had 
gripped the society. 
I therefore, decided to proceed with interviews instead of using any questionnaire and 
to start with the foremen, six of whom had been representatives of the defunct 
Guyana Field Foremen and Supervisors Union ( GF&SU). This was followed by 
separate interviews of the NAACIE and GA WU members with each of the groups 
interviewed on weekends on the Berbice Estates. All the NAACIE members are 
either members of the Executive Council or Branch representatives. I must confess 
that I was not too happy in conducting interviews with these workers, many of whom 
had over twenty years service in the industry and the remainder just under twenty 
years. NAACIE members are close knit and over the last twenty five years I served as 
Chairman of the LBI Branch, and at the national level as Treasurer, General 
Secretary, General President, and Consultant to this union. 
It was because of my relationship over these years, particularly during the period 
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1979 to 1989 when I served as General Secretary of the Union, that I feared that 
interviewing my comrades would have been an act in futility, that they would all tell 
me what they believed I wanted to hear. I toyed with the idea of interviewing the 
junior members but again they would not know the industry as their more senior 
brothers and sisters and in any event they too have become part of the struggle. 
Conscious of this dilemma I proceeded with an abundance of caution to question 
these seasoned campaigners. 
Related issues arose in my discussions with the GA WU members I interviewed at a 
variety of field and factory locations, since they were members of a union which has 
been both a co-operator and a competitor with NAACIE but has had a long political 
affiliation with the PPP. At one of the five Berbice locations where I talked to 
GA WU members the discussions started with a degree of hostility towards me, 
because I was challenged by two seasoned representatives, who are also very 
committed activists of the PPP. I had to clarify my position at a political level. They 
asked their other colleagues if they were not in agreement with them and with some 
coercion they all agreed. Further, they emphasised that the only reason why they were 
entertaining me was because I gave my support at the last elections "to the ole man". 
On a few other locations I had to give reasons why I disagreed with the GA WU 
during the 1989 strike. This was vintage politics from a group of workers who really 
understand struggle on both fronts - on both the political and the industrial level. 
After I had cleared the air on my role in the 1989 strike, which had brought me to a 
head-on confrontation with the "Comrade Leader", the majority were satisfied and we 
proceeded quite nicely. In fact I received a tremendous amount of sympathy from 
almost all of the representatives at the Berbice locations, who intermittently, changed 
the discussions to say how sorry they were, but they were fed the wrong information 
"that you a fight the ole man to put the PNC back in power". They were very free and 
were speaking with ease. The positions which such representatives took on the range 
of issues discussed in this research are reported in the narrative discussion at the 
points where their comments and recollections are most pertinent. This was believed 
to be an appropriate method of reporting the interview indings, rather than grouping 
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them in a single chapter, because it placed workers recollections and reactions in their 
historical contexts and enriched the account of developments at key points in my 
overall narrative .. 
Where applicable the views of the other interviewees have also been reported. Apart 
from the General Secretary of NAACIE all the other union, company and former 
government officials have expressed the desire to remain anonymous. The Ministry of 
Labour officials are still functioning with the fear that the decisions of the politicians 
in power cannot be openly criticised. Nevertheless, at all times they tried to be as 
professional as is expected of persons holding such high office. 
Breakdown of Workers' Representatives Interviewed 
Table 2.2 
Estate Field Factory Foremen Total NAACIE 
Skeldon 5 2 1 8 2 
Albion 5 2 1 8 2 
Rose Hall 5 2 1 8 2 
Blairmont 5 2 1 8 2 
Enmore 4 3 1 8 2 
LBI 5 2 1 8 2 
Wales 6 2 1 9 2 
Uitvlugt 5 2 1 8 3 
Total 40 17 8 65 17 
Documentary Sources 
One very disturbing feature has been the lack of priority being given by organisations 
in Guyana to the keeping of historical records. Even the national archives are in a 
shambles. It is hoped that the debate now taking place in re siting the archives and 
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appointing adequate and trained staff will materialise very soon. Thls should be given 
utmost consideration by the fledging democracy. The much talked about national 
museum for the sugar industry ought to be supplemented with the idea of having an 
historical library for the sugar industry for the benefit of researchers. It is a tragedy 
that useful hlstorical records on industrial relations matters perished in a fire whlch 
gutted the Sugar Producers Association Building in the 1980s. 
The Man Power Citizens Association (MPCA), the thlrd oldest uruon, whlch 
dominated the labour scene with lots of controversy for over fifty years has, 
unfortunately, been unable to provide any help or documentary evidence in thls 
research. After losing to GA WU in sugar it succumbed to NAACIE at the electricity 
corporation in 1990 and died because of non-performance. The main leaders who 
dominated the scene for over a quarter of a century, President Ishmael and General 
Secretary Charran both passed away around the same time that the Union was gasping 
its last breath. Since the loss of recognition in the sugar industry, the union went into 
disarray and most of its records were thrown into the garbage heaps after the offices 
in Hadfield Street had been sold, allegedly through illegal means, to a prominent 
businessman (1). However, a lot of my information on the sugar industry was secured 
from the offices ofNAACIE and the Ministry of Labour. Efforts are currently in place 
by the Chief Labour Officer to make the library at the Ministry operational once 
again. Years of neglect and the change of venue resulted in very useful documents 
being found in roach infested jute bags. It was an unpleasant experience but the useful 
strike data and other records whlch were retrieved made the exercise worthwhlle. The 
GHRA library and the TUC secretariat made available lots of useful information in 
reports, letters and newspaper clippings. Other individuals connected with trade 
unionism made valuable reports on the sugar industry available, whlle the Public 
Records Office in London provided useful records in reports of hlstorical importance 
on Guyana. 
The Researcher as Active Participant 
There is no fixed rule in the conduct of social sciences research especially one that IS 
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based on qualitative methods. The participant observation technique, although unique 
in itself, has been employed by certain researchers in situations where other well-
defined research techniques are not applicable. However, some researchers have used 
unstructured interviews to allow the 'client' some latitude to ramble along with the 
hope that the areas of interest can be brought out at some stage. (Bryman 1988:46) In 
the case of Guyana it was explained earlier that workers were apprehensive in filling 
out questionnaires and as a consequence it was believed that unstructured interviews 
was the best option. A factor of significance which has to be mentioned here was the 
researcher's lengthy involvement as an official of the NAACIE which brought him 
into contact with and provided him with background knowledge of some of the 
interviewees. It would seem that as an active participant, this would create limitations 
as well as derive some advantages. 
There is currently a debate about the problems and possibilities of research as an 
active participant, but like all research there is not a single way of approaching this 
issue. However, one point which should be made is that the research for this thesis 
was conducted at a time when I was no longer an active participant in industrial 
relations in Guyana. I was no longer on the Executive Council of the union and I had 
been away on leave from the union for quite some time. This allowed me time to 
reflect on the issues at a broader level, drawing from my experiences but informed by 
documentary evidence and the views obtained from the cross section of the 
interviewees. 
A critical advantage of conducting the research as an insider, albeit one who was out 
of the industry at the time of the research, was the framework of knowledge and 
understanding that I brought with me. I 'knew' of many events in the industry because 
I had been involved in many of them or because I had been told by others older than 
me and who had participated in these events. As an activist I had a particular 
understanding of the issues, albeit from a developed political perspective. This 
provided me with a way oflooking at events and historical accounts of the industry. 
The danger is that I might deploy this understanding and knowledge in partisan ways. 
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Where possible I have cross checked the narrative I present, with documents, 
interviews, reflection and discussion. While this does not guarantee dispassion in 
presenting this account, I have consciously attempted to consider different 
interpretations and ways of understanding the events reported in this thesis. 
It can also be argued that, in being familiar to the interviewees, I was likely to get 
responses which those interviewed thought I would like to hear. However, this was 
not the case, since sugar workers have been known over the years to act and speak 
independently and freely. The records in the ensuing chapters show the extent to 
which these workers have defied the leaders of unions, even those whom they have 
elected, to pursue their independent course of action. In as much as I was familiar to 
many of the representatives, and worked among some of them, they still refused to 
break their tradition in not filling out the questionnaire. Further, I had to interview 
them on their terms and I was even required to explain my role when I had clashed 
with their political and trade union leaders in one of their struggles, before I was 
given an opportunity to interview some of them. 
With respect to the NAACIE members, while there was an initial apprehension about 
interviewing the senior ones known personally to me, the tradition of NAACIE 
members challenging their Executives and their direct involvement in grassroots 
unionism, allowed them a freedom in answering questions. Their responses and their 
criticisms of their own leaders on matters pertaining to negotiations, demonstrated 
their 'free thinking' approach in dealing with the interviewer. 
Further, on the positive side, if the researcher had been from outside the union 
movement, it would have been unlikely that the documentation, including letters, 
union reports, and minutes, would have been made available to him/her, since unions 
have had to be careful about those with whom they share information. This has been a 
sore problem for researchers operating in a political climate which is divisive, and 
where some are designated spies or informers. Hence, unions and businesses would 
hardly ever allow external access to the documentation of their organisations and 
would rarely share their records. My position has meant that such documents have 
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been made available, and have allowed for a critical analysis to be conducted. It is 
hoped therefore, that this work, having explored 'forgotten' documents, will pave the 
way for future researchers to critically assess it and to examine other areas for 
possible research. 
Endnotes 
1. There is currently a case in the High Courts concerning the sale of the property 
belonging to the MPCA. Workers from the Electricity Corporation are claiming that a 
few union officials, without proper authority and in contravention of the rules of the 
union, sold the building and have been unable to account for the proceeds of the sale. 
. They are seeking to annul the sale and have the property restored to them. 
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Chapter 3 
The Recognition Strike of 1964: choice of union 
membership, union rivalry and national politics 
British Guiana, where half Bookers' Undertakings lie, was near civil war in 
1964. In the tragic wave of violence which swept over the country for six 
months, 176 people were killed. Eleven Booker workers were killed on the 
job. Children of staff were wounded - and one killed - by a bomb attack. Our 
sugar installations were attacked by bombs and fire. 3500 acres of cane were 
burnt. We survived these outrages without any significant damage to our 
plant... (1) 
The Sugar Strike of 1964 started in February. It was not the first called by the GAWU 
to press its demand for recognition from the Sugar Producers' Association (SPA) for 
the majority of field and factory workers in the sugar industry. These workers were 
represented by the :MPCA which gained recognition from the sugar planters in 1939, 
following a disturbance on one of the sugar estates, Leonora, in which four persons 
lost their lives and several others were injured. The 1964 strike ended up as being the 
longest strike in the history of the country - 165 days. Before the commencement of 
the strike, the PPP leader Dr. Jagan, had just returned from a Lancaster House 
Conference between the three main political parties in the country, the PPP, the PNC 
and the UF, and the Colonial Office on the question of a date for British Guiana's 
independence and other constitutional issues. 
At the constitutional talks, the parties failed to arrive at an agreement and Duncan 
Sandys, the Colonial Secretary then, requested to be allowed to formulate a solution. 
To this, Dr Jagan, with a great degree of reluctance, agreed. Sandys disregarded all 
the representations which had been made by the PPP delegation and imposed a system 
of "proportional representation" as against "first past the post" which had been the 
case in elections until this moment. He also decided that independence should only be 
granted after fresh elections. His rationale for deciding this course was influenced by 
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the division of the voters along ethnic lines and the failure of the PPP. in the previous 
elections of 1957 and 1961 to secure over 50 per cent of the votes. In both of these 
elections, the PPP received 47 per cent and 43 per cent respectively but secured 64 
per cent and 57 per cent respectively of the seats in Parliament: 
I have had to consider whether the situation would be improved by the 
introduction of proportional representation .. .I am satisfied that there is 
validity in the argument that in the present circumstances, where no party 
commands an overall majority of votes, proportional representation would be 
likely to result in the formation of a coalition government of parties supported 
by different races, and thus would go some way towards reducing present 
tensions (Reported in Sallahuddin, 1994 :250) 
The PPP leader and his party were furious over this development and: 
... formally rejected the imposition of Sandys with a 'hurricane of protest' 
campaign. This culminated in a country wide Citizens Freedom Rally on 
January 31, 1964. The situation soon deteriorated. Serious clashes developed, 
mainly due to an inter union dispute for recognition in the sugar industry 
(Jagan, 1980: 305). 
The 1964 Sugar Strike started by cane cutters at Plantation Leonora, the estate which 
was famous for many strikes including the one which secured the recognition of the 
MPCA in 1939. When the cane cutters arrived at the "backdam" on Feb 6, 1964, they 
were told that work would only be available to half of them. The local GA WU 
representatives were requested by the workers to represent the case to ensure that 
work was given to all the cane cutters. According to the Minister of Labour: 
The management refused this request and the strike at Leonora developed into 
the demand for recognition for the GA WU as their bargaining agent. This 
demand was taken up by the workers on several other estates (Chase 
1964:298). 
The situation was one m which the uruon, GAWU, was trying to engage the 
management in discussion while maXInllzmg the pressure through the workers' 
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action. It sought from the management a meeting and offered to submit its books with 
union membership records for scrutiny at the Ministry of Labour. However, the SPA 
replied that it was satisfied the recognised union, the !v1PC~ still had majority 
membership. This response ruled out the examination of the books (ibid). 
The Commissioner of Labour thereafter sought to organise a joint meeting of the three 
parties, the SP ~ the !v1PCA and GA WU, but his efforts were futile. The !v1PCA 
refused to attend any meeting while the SPA indicated willingness to meet providing 
the other parties were prepared to attend. The GA WU expressed a willingness to meet 
while the !v1PCA declined the invitation. Therefore, no meeting could have been 
arranged. The Commissioner of Labour also failed to work out any other satisfactory 
solution, including an avenue for the SPA to pursue discussions with the GAWU: 
On March 4, Mr Harry Lall, President of GA WU informed the Commissioner 
that SPA's refusal of his union's request for recognition left him no alternative 
but to call for a general strike in the sugar industry involving all estates to 
demonstrate to the employers the strength of his union in the sugar industry 
(ibid:299). 
However, the general strike was already in progress since "Feb 17, work on all the 
plantations came to a stand still" (Jagan 1980:305). Additionally, the GAWU had 
been complaining over the years that the management was collaborating with the 
MPCA in coercing workers to remain in the !v1PC~ and displayed overt favouritism 
to those workers who showed some loyalty to the !v1PCA. They even refused to act on 
workers' requests to stop deducting union dues on behalf of the !v1PC~ an attitude 
that was associated " ... with characteristic arrogance of centuries of paternal 
disdain ... " (Thakur 1994: 102) 
What was even worse, was the management's refusal to respond to the requests by 
workers to cease the deduction of union dues. As a consequence, the GA WU in 1963 
submitted: 
... notices signed by about 14,000 out of roughly 25,000 workers who 
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requested that union dues no longer be deducted for the :MPCA from their 
wages. The Sugar Producers Association had taken no effective action, stating 
that it already had contractual obligations with the :MPCA (Jagan 1980:305). 
The fact of the matter was that the MPCA did not have a closed shop or agency shop 
arrangement with the SPA governing the deduction of union dues. Nor was there 
enabling legislation for this to occur. The agreement signed between the :MPCA and 
the SPA clearly stipulated that for workers to authorise the deduction of union dues, 
they had to sign a check off membership form, authorising the management of their 
respective estates to deduct a certain sum of money and remit same to the union. 
Equally the workers had the right under the agreement to revoke the deduction by 
signing the Cancellation of Authority to Deduct Union Dues Form and submitting it 
to the management, one month prior to the date they wished to stop the deduction of 
the dues. To continue to deduct dues after a notice had been served on the company 
would be tantamount to a breach of contract between the :MPCA and the workers. 
Moreover, coercing workers to be in a particular union and refusing their requests to 
belong to a union of their choice runs counter to I.L.O. Conventions number 87 and 
98 touching on freedom of association and the right to free collective bargaining. 
Furthermore, the action by the SP A was in violation of the Constitution of the 
Country. The MPCA had been agitating all along for the SPA to grant them the 
agency shop and this request was actively pursued until it was submitted for 
arbitration in 1975. The SPA legal advisor quite rightly argued, during the hearing of 
this matter in front of the Crane Arbitration 1975, that if the agency shop was granted, 
this may have far reaching legal consequences. The Arbitrator ruled against the 
agency shop and outlined his position in so doing: 
Litigation may well be incurred because except for such sums as have been 
lawfully deducted from his pay, the worker is entitled to recover from his 
employer the whole or so much wages earned by him as have not been 
actually paid to him in money by his employer. (Sec 19 of the Labour Act 
Chap 98:01). So if an authority is defective, an employee can properly sue to 
recover what has been deducted ... the consent of the worker must at all times 
be a real consent freely and expressly given, and when so given it must be 
subject to revocation without fear of the consequences of so doing. It cannot 
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be held to be a genuine consent otherwise ... and any attempt to put into effect 
the Union's proposals will only create a constitutional question and ... create a 
constitutional impasse in the face of Article 13 of the Constitution of Guyana 
which provides as follows: 
Except with his own consent no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of 
his freedom of assembly and association, that is to say, his right to assemble 
freely and associate with others (unions) and in particular to form or belong to 
trade unions or other associations for the protection of his interests (Crane 
1975 :97 & 98). 
One must therefore by necessity ask: why did GA WU not assist the workers to 
challenge the refusal to stop deduction of dues in the Courts or move to get an 
injunction restraining the SPA from deducting union dues from these workers who 
had notified management that they did not wish to continue paying union dues to the 
MPCA? Is it possible that, since the British imposed the PR system on Guyana, both 
GA WU and the PPP wanted the issue to drag on and allow the anger of the workers to 
build up so that in the event of the Party and the Union engaging in the "hurricane of 
protest", the recognition issue would be there to fuel the workers into action? 
One has to examine what has taken place earlier to get a full understanding of the 
situation. During the series of strikes in 1953 which ended with the 25 days general 
strike from August 31 to Sept 24, the GIWU received solidarity support in the form of 
strike action from all the unions in the Federation of Unions of Government 
Employees (FUGE), the GLU, the SW'&WU along with some sections of the 
electricity and the members of the Transport Union. These unions had earlier called 
on the SPA to recognise GIWU, failing which they threatened to go on a 24 hour 
protest strike. After the SPA "did not budge" on September 22 some sections of the 
workforce went immediately into strike action and the combined unions all went on a 
4 hour sympathy strike on September 24th: 
... following which they all decided to end all strikes on the undertaking given 
by the PPP Government that it will "proceed" immediately to have introduced 
and passed a Labour Relations. Bill to provide for the compulsory recognition 
of trade unions selected by workers through a secret poll (Chase 1964:208, 
209). 
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The Minister of Labour then, Ashton Chase, had during the course of the 25 days 
strike persuaded the SPA to make some significant movement. As he put it "the 
GlWU came very near to the bull's eye of recognition but there was a slip between the 
cup and the lip" (ibid:208). The SPA, during meetings with the Minister, agreed to 
recognise GIWU for field workers and allow the continuation of the MPCA with 
factory workers but this was rejected by the GIWU. A few industrial relations experts 
in the sugar industry pointed out that the MPCA still had a considerable amount of 
support in the factory hence, the offer. Former Chief Industrial Relations Manager to 
Bookers Sugar Estates, L. I. Naraine, commenting much later, mentioned that this 
rejection by the GIWU was "a grave error". (3) 
A counter proposal was then put that GIWU should accept all the agreements entered 
into between SPA and the MPCA. The GIWU maintained that it would reserve the 
right "to negotiate and settle fresh agreements with the SPA." There was also the 
position of granting recognition to both MPCA and GIWU for the same workers 
"provided they would agree to work jointly with each other with the ultimate aim of 
amalgamating" (ibid:208).With the rejection of these proposals by the GIWU, an 
opportunity for genuine representation for the sugar workers was lost. Anyone of the 
proposals if accepted by the GIWU would have seen the early exit of the MPCA from 
the sugar industry. 
All that was needed was an initial breakthrough for the GIWU. After the recognition 
of GIWU any of the agreements made could have in fact been altered. All GIWU had 
to do was to submit the relevant notice in accordance with those agreements for an 
amendment. And in any event, those agreements had an expiry date which would 
have been two years hence. 
What was even more striking was that this partial recognition would have come about 
during a period which witnessed the most solid multiracial unity in the history of the 
country. In fact, when the other unions supported the GIWU in September 1953, it 
was the most powerful form of unity displayed by the working class since the struggle 
began for national liberation and not witnessed again, until the 1989 strike which will 
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be discussed later. One would have thought the GIWU would have grasped the 
opportunity and continued to forge unity of the workers with the ultimate hope of 
enabling their leader and party (PPP) to consolidate their position for the ultimate 
showdown for independence from the British. However, the events in 1953 meant that 
the PPP was put into a position to introduce the Labour Relations Bill. After 
overcoming some initial hurdles with the Speaker of the House of Assembly and 
opposition from the SPA and MPCA, the Bill was passed on Oct 8th, 1953. The next 
day the Constitution was suspended, British troops took control of the country and an 
interim government was installed (Chase 1964. Jagan 1966). 
The British obviously felt threatened. Booker was a British multinational company 
which was making substantial contribution to the British Treasury, a fact that was 
confirmed by Lord Campbell, the Chairman of The Booker Holdings: 
A great deal of Britain's past wealth came from our ability to deploy and 
dominate the resources of the underdeveloped Commonwealth ... That in recent 
years, the British Exchequer has been collecting about £ 1 Om a year in duty on 
rum from British Guyana. (Booker Report 1964: 17). 
This revenue was in addition to all the other direct taxes and dividends paid to British 
shareholders annually. The British obviously viewed the rejection by the GIWU of 
what was considered by the planters to be reasonable offers and the passage of the 
legislation by the PPP as serious developments. The colonial masters must have been 
scared over the manner in which their authority had been challenged. By fighting 
Bookers, the PPP were also fighting the entire British apparatus. The collaboration 
within this apparatus took place in the following manner: 
Apart from direct representation in the Legislative Council, the sugar interests 
have their representatives in important positions on various statutory boards 
and committees.. The political power permits the sugar planters to determine 
major questions of policy involving their own interests. Once the policy is 
decided, it is inevitably put into effect (Jagan 1954:22). 
The recognition battle having been lost In 1953 with the suspension of the 
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Constitution and other repressive measures by the British, workers struggles were 
severely curtailed during the period of the interim government. Many of their leaders, 
including Dr J agan and his wife, were either under house arrest, or imprisoned (4). 
The Tension Heightened 
On March 4, 1964, the day of the endorsement of the strike by GA WU, a bomb was 
thrown into a bus which was transporting strike breakers to Albion, resulting in the 
death of two persons, Gunraj and Munroe. This was followed two days after by the 
death of a female worker Kowsilla and injury to several others when a "non striker" 
drove a tractor over the Leonora bridge where strikers were squatting peacefully ... and 
picketing the gate at the factory" (Jagan 1966:306). After this incident the police used 
force and tear gas to remove strikers from the area. This incident infuriated the 
strikers and "the situation deteriorated rapidly~ strikers ambushed and fired at 
strikebreakers" (ibid). The death of Kowsilla drew strong condemnation from the 
clerical workers in the industry, who were under a different bargaining unit, the Sugar 
Estates Clerks Association (SECA) which later changed its name to the NAACIE. 
The members of this union immediately proceeded on a protest strike over the killing, 
and while the strike was on, the "Mirror", a PPP owned newspaper, of Sunday March 
8, 1964 reported that the President of the Union, Mr Hiram Persaud, vowed to keep 
his members out on the strike until GA WU was recognized. Persaud claimed that he 
was misquoted and issued a release that: 
The Sugar Estates Clerks Association would like to make it clear that their 
protest strike was called because of the recent unfortunate incident at Leonora 
Estate and did not have any connection with the GA WU efforts to recognition 
(5). 
After the clerks resumed duties, the strikers threatened them on their way to work. 
The strikers made several attempts at Leonora to prevent the clerks from reaching 
work. The SECA and other unions which were not striking were forced to seek the 
protection of the management. Even the Commissioner of Police promised them 
83 
adequate protection. The situation got out of hand on March 13, when cane cutters 
called for their "cutlasses to slaughter the coolies - meaning members of SECA" (6). 
The members were attempting to go home for lunch. As a result of this incident, the 
Leonora Branch of SECA took protest strike action over the intimidation from cane 
cutters and management's refusal to provide adequate protection for members of 
SECA while on the job and on the premises of the employers (7). 
This strike created some bitterness among strikers and SEC A categories, and on a few 
estates some of the clerks and their homes came under attack. The situation at LBI 
Estate was tense when a clerk was viciously chopped and nearly lost one of his hands. 
He had to be flown to Venezuela for emergency medical attention and another 
employee at LBI was physically assaulted by striking workers. The tension reached a 
high point where both of the major political parties, the PPP and the PNC were 
engaged in organised thuggery and violence of the meanest form. Racial conflict had 
engulfed the entire country. But this was not all. Indian workers in the Sugar Industry 
were also under attack from Indian strikers. Their homes were the target of attack and 
glass windows broken. Some of the representatives who were active during this strike 
claimed, when I interviewed them, that they regretted these events, which were full of 
hate generated by "head office leaders". Another representative, who was about to be 
retired claimed that "Pason (Phillip Ganesh) shouldn't a been chop up and Bill should 
never slap Wong after he left the pay office at LBI" (Interview: September 1994). 
Six weeks into the strike, the Minister of Labour made a broadcast to the nation in 
which he sought to put the strike in perspective. He pointed out that after his 
ministry'S initial failure to reach an agreement with the parties and the GA WU's 
decision to officially sanction the general strike, his Commissioner of Labour 
continued to make attempts at resolving the issue. The Deputy Chairman of Bookers, 
Mr Bishop had also visited British Guiana to have a first hand look at the situation. 
He issued a release on March 12, pointing out that the recognition dispute "should be 
resolved through the established machinery of the Labour Department" (Chase 
1964:299). The Minister pointed out that Mr Bishop was quite late as the Department 
had taken an initiative from the outset to resolve the matter. 
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Continuing, the Minister indicated that the Commissioner of Labour met 
representatives again on March 16 and asked if they had any recommendation in 
effecting a settlement to the dispute: 
The gist of SPA's suggestion was that there should be no political agitation: 
violence etc. should be condemned by the Government, that Government and 
the two trade unions should advise the workers to return to work and that a 
Committee or Court of Enquiry be appointed to make recommendations which 
they would be willing to consider seriously if the Committee was a reputable 
one. They would even consider a poll if the two unions agreed. The employers 
said they were agreeable to an examination of the membership of the two 
Unions (Chase 1964:300). 
By their proposals, the SPA was seeking to take the high ground in this dispute. While 
they were not refusing to have steps taken to resolve the dispute, the conditions 
outlined by them gave the MPCA authority to veto any proposal put forward by the 
Ministry. With respect to the surveys of the two unions' books, they did not say what 
their position would be if both unions had a duplication of members. The proposals 
were, however, put to the MPCA and GA WU. On March 17, the Commissioner of 
Labour met the MPCA and they requested that troops be used to patrol the sugar area 
to ensure that workers who were willing to work were not intimidated by strikers, 
they opposed the poll and further proposed the examination of the books of the two 
unions. GA WU was called in the following day and they rejected the survey. They 
claimed that they had asked for a survey earlier but the SPA refused and since they 
have been forced to strike, there can be no resumption of work until recognition was 
granted to the GAWU. This was a mandate given to them by the striking workers 
(ibid). 
Because the GA WU had earlier requested the survey, the Commissioner of Labour 
requested that the union reconsider its position on the survey. The GA WU then 
enquired of the SPA's position in the event that (a) one union has more than 50 per 
cent and the other less than 50 per cent and (b) if both unions had over 50 per cent. 
These questions were put to the SPA by the Commissioner of Labour on the same day 
after the meeting with GA WU. To the first question, they gave a clear cut answer that 
85 
they would recognise the Union with the majority support, but when the second 
question was put, they became hesitant and changed their position with one answer to 
both questions: 
The employers would find great difficulty in refusing to recognise the union 
with the majority provided that the examination is conducted in an atmosphere 
of peace and goodwill (ibid). 
This was obviously not a satisfactory answer in a strike situation especially since 
grave doubts existed in the minds of the workers, because it was clear to them that the 
SP A was in favour of the company union - MPCA. This was what the Minister had to 
say on the latest position of the employers: 
The SPA by attaching a proviso on the possibility of recognition might have 
also opened itself to the charge that of tying up principle with procedure. The 
proviso, which some might have been inclined to call an escape clause, is that 
the examination of the books should be conducted in an atmosphere of "peace 
and goodwill'. Such an atmosphere could conceivably be the subject of 
dispute, unless there was some authority who could be relied upon by all 
parties to determine just when such an atmosphere prevailed (ibid: 3 01). 
In any event, the position was discussed by the Executive Council of GA WU and the 
President indicated that after a lengthy deliberation the proposal "is not acceptable 
since we feel that the majority of the workers who are on strike in the sugar industry 
have demonstrated in no uncertain terms that they want GA WU as their bargaining 
agent" (ibid: 302). The Union firmly believed that the proposal of the SPA would not 
reflect a democratic choice of the workers, hence, they were willing to "examine any 
new proposal that you may wish to put forward to settle the dispute" (ibid). At this 
stage it would appear that the GA WU began taking a tougher position and were 
overlooking areas where they could have negotiated a compromise, since the only 
area in the SPA's response which could be considered contentious was their position 
that the survey had to be conducted in an 'atmosphere of peace and goodwill'. The 
GA WU could have requested clarification on the statement if they seriously wanted to 
settle the issue. They could have proposed that the survey be conducted within a short 
time following the resumption of work. This would have cut the ground from under 
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the feet of both the SPA and the 1\1PCA. 
The l\1PCA was again called to a meeting with the Commissioner of Labour and a 
proposal was put to them which involved representatives of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) going to British Guiana to determine whether conditions were 
ripe for the conduct of a poll. After taking some time to examine this proposal, the 
l\1PCA rejected it and claimed that the Government was out to destroy a democratic 
union and that even if a poll were to be conducted it could not be held under the 
conditions of gross mass intimidation, unprecedented terrorism, arson and murder 
now rampant on the sugar estates. The SPA also indicated that the ILO team would 
have to get the support of the l\1PCA. This seemed to indicate that the MPCA and the 
SP A collaborated on their responses to any suggestion put forward by the 
Department of Labour. It was clear that the MPCA would not agree to any situation 
which would result in that union being de-recognized. They would rather fight it 
down the line. There was still some support for the MPCA as production was not at a 
standstill by that time. With the help of scab labour and some other employees, the 
employers were producing sugar at about between 25 to 35 per cent by mid March. 
Because of economic difficulties some workers were trekking back to work. This is 
the case in many protracted industrial disputes. The attacks on those workers who 
went back to work, by their own colleagues on strike, forced them into the camp of 
the non strikers. This development led the MPCA to believe that they could easily 
woo them into their union. Therefore, the longer the issue was allowed to be dragged 
out, the morale and solidarity of the workers were likely to be put under severe strain 
(Interview: September 1994). 
By the end of March, both of the major races were beginning to draw battle lines. The 
leaders of the PNC and PPP were making no serious attempt to stop what was taking 
place. All sense of reasonableness seems to have disappeared. It is a real irony that 
the government in power could initiate a "hurricane of protests" which was tearing the 
country apart, but would not seek to find an early solution to the problem. Governing 
the country after the Sandys' formula was apparently not of interest to the PPP any 
more. They were desperate to get a withdrawal of the PR system, imposed by Sandys. 
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The question which has to be asked, is why was it that Dr Jagan allowed Sandys to 
impose a solution? Did he not have patience? He weathered the storm in 1963 and 
must have known the British and American Governments did not want him in power. 
They used every means available to them to undermine his administration, to divide 
his party and after that succeeded it was obvious that the British would have decided 
in favour of his rivals. It was Dr. Jagan's opponents who initiated the PR system of 
government. By allowing Sandys to adjudicate, Jagan displayed his weakness as a 
negotiator. Perhaps the answer rests in the PPP's position that while they were in 
Government, they were not in control and only independence could pave the way for 
his Government to manage the country under an ideology to which it subscribed. The 
following statement showed his impatience and frustration: 
Our position as a government had become untenable and humiliating. In actual 
fact, although we were in office, we were without any real power... on this 
situation my attitude was do your damnedest~ we cannot carry on under 
existing conditions ... (Jagan 1980:279-80). 
The strike must therefore be seen in the light of his Government's frustration over 
British imposition and his desire to launch a hurricane of protest to perhaps teach the 
British a lesson and force the withdrawal of the proposed system of PR. But as the 
strike continued, things were getting worse for him. A tactical retreat by early March 
might have been helpful to the workers' cause and his party's position, but with every 
passing day of the strike, GA WO was adamant and extreme in their demand for 
recognition. They apparently did not look at the demoralising effect the continuing 
production was having on strikers, and in addition, their weak financial position. 
Additionally, the armed forces were not on Jagan's side and hardly ever sought to 
defend the strikers and their families. When the Ministry's last proposal was put on 
March 25, that both a membership survey and a poll should be undertaken, this meant 
the membership survey was to be undertaken to determine MPCA membership and 
the poll to be conducted to determine GA WO support (Chase 1964:304). On this last 
proposal the parties failed to arrive at a settlement, and in the meantime, the country 
was divided by civil unrest. It was clear that the strike had lost its industrial 
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intentions and had become a politically charged issue. The Commissioner of Labour, 
according to the Minister, had also gathered that the TUC, which incidentally was not 
supportive of the Government, had expressed a willingness to go along with a poll, 
"but seems to be concerned that a poll must be held in conditions of calm and 
normalcy" (ibid:303). This position, however, seems to run counter to what Jagan 
said, namely that "the MPCA had a vested interest in not agreeing to any 
compromise .. On its rigid stand, it was backed by the TUC" (Jagan 1966:312). 
In any event, after lengthy discussions, the TUC had previously agreed with the 
Government and Employers' Association, on the withdrawal of the Labour Relations 
Bill of 1963, that if a union did not wish to submit its books for a membership check, 
then a poll could be held. In fact polls had been held in 1962 and 1963 to settle inter-
union disputes, resulting in the replacement of recognized unions by challenging 
unions. The TUC no doubt could also have taken the position that the MPCA had 
never refused to submit its books for examination hence the poll was not necessary. 
But their views did not matter. The MPCA was firm, uncompromising and by the end 
of March, was receiving tacit support of not only the employers, but the police, the 
opposition political parties and in the main, the PNC. 
An impasse had definitely been reached by the end of March. While the partial strike 
continued, production passed the 50 per cent level on Estates, and there was 
increased bitterness between the Indians and Africans, so that it was evident that some 
solution must be found. The Council of Ministers advised the Governor that he 
appoint a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the matter (8). He had previously 
rejected requests from the Council of Ministers to order a poll to settle the recognition 
dispute. Consequently, on the 16th May, the Governor on the advice of the Council 
of Ministers appointed a Committee under the provisions of Section 6 of the Labour 
Ordinance, Chapter 103, with the following terms of reference: 
To enquire into the existing dispute in the sugar industry arising out of the 
claim by the Guyana Agricultural Workers' Union for recognition as the sole 
bargaining agent for field and factory workers in the sugar industry, to 
ascertain by whatever method the Committee deems appropriate whether the 
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Guyana Agricultural Workers Union or the Man Power Citizens' Association 
has the support among the field and factory workers, to report thereon and to 
make recommendations for resolving the dispute (Ministry of Labour Report 
1964:30). 
The Chairman of the Committee was B.O. Adams QC, with other members being 
Professor Rorace B. Davis, Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of 
Guyana and the Retired Superintendent of Works, Mr Edric Cecil Brandon, with Mr 
M.G.N. Sankies, Inspector of Labour as Secretary: 
Mr Adams resigned before any sitting took place and the Hon. Mr Justice 
Guya Persaud was appointed as chairman. At the second meeting of the 
committee, the Counsel for the MPCA made certain submissions in view of 
the fact that a writ had been filed by the MPCA against members of the 
Committee on the validity of their appointment. The Chairman upheld the 
submission and adjourned the hearing 'sine die' until the Court had settled the 
issue (ibid). 
The matter was never investigated by this committee, partly due to the change in 
Government in 1964. One would have thought that with the appointment of the 
Committee and given the situation in the country, the GA WU would have called off 
the strike at that time. This would have been seen as a partial victory and it would 
have been in a position to consolidate for a future struggle. But that was not the case. 
No rational position was stated by GA WU for the continuation of the strike after May 
16, except for their agitation "No recognition, no work". If again the objective was to 
maximize the Indian vote, the PPP leader would have known that he could not have 
obtained the votes of wealthy Indians, who were against him and more so the Indian 
sugar workers who went back to work - and who perhaps would have given 
everything else to him except their right to survival, which depended on some work. 
Ridicule and antagonism was hardly the way to win their vote. Lastly, the racial 
antagonism would be seen as a loss to the PPP, judging from the support Dr Jagan 
received from a portion of the working class blacks. He himself acknowledged this 
fact after the split with Burnham (Jagan 1966: 175). 
The continuation of the strike beyond this point must therefore be seen as a 
miscalculation. By its prolongation there were serious developments for the 
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Government. The extension of the sugar strike was sinking Jagan and the country into 
even deeper problems since the bauxite workers, who were mainly supporters of the 
PNC then, were very eager to flex their muscles. The battle lines having been drawn 
and thugs from both parties on the loose, anything was expected. On June 1, over 
3,000 Bauxite workers from Wismarl Mackenzie took strike action alleging that the 
management had made statements that (i) guns were being made on the company's 
premises and (ii) the black people of Wismar had behaved like cannibals. (Ministry 
of Labour Report 1964: 32). 
Following discussions between the officials of the union and the company under the 
Chairmanship of the Deputy Commissioner of Labour, the Management "agreed to 
issue a circular deprecating the use of any remarks calculated to impair good race 
relations or to foster prejudice or antagonism" (ibid). This strike came to an end after 
seven days. The union was obviously seeking to take a high ground on this issue by 
insisting on such a circular from management. The Mine Workers Union intended to 
show that they were not going to tolerate any racial remarks or prejudicial statements. 
They were seeking to distant themselves from the sugar workers. But this obviously 
was not their true intention. The bauxite community was almost cleared of all Indians 
before the strike took place, when "over 1,500 persons almost wholly of East Indian 
origin were rendered homeless in a trail of unprecedented barbarities that erupted in 
the WismarIMackenzie areas in April 1964" (Chase 1964:305). 
The situation was getting out of hand and the PPP leader became aware that he was 
obviously losing ground in the dispute. Just before the declaration of the state of 
emergency the PPP leader, as Premier, dispatched a letter to the leader of the PNC, 
which pointed out that: 
the situation had deteriorated to such a point that something dramatic 
must be done to prevent further racial strife between the two major 
ethnic groups, to unite the working class and to create a stable and 
strong government. I propose, therefore, to invite you to join me in the 
formation of a coalition government between the People's Progressive 
Party and the People's National Congress .. .!t is my considered view 
that in the charged atmosphere of today, a holding government for a 
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short period until the general elections later this year, will not suffice 
to create the unity, peace and hannony which are so necessary today at 
all levels. It is my view that the coalition should continue after the next 
general elections on an agreed basis and that the party leader of the 
majority party should be the Prime Minister and the other leader, the 
Deputy Prime Minister ... (Jagan 1966:318). 
Dr J agan went on to suggest in the letter the composition of the Government, the 
House of Assembly, and the manner in which a programme could be worked out 
"based on a domestic policy of democracy and socialism and a foreign policy of non-
alignment." (ibid). He further requested that the matter be given early attention so as 
to obtain a reply in a day or two. This was not the first time that the PPP tried to 
secure a unity pact with the PNC, in fact since the split in 1955 between Burnham and 
J agan, there were several attempts on the part of the PPP leader to have the problem 
resolved. However, Dr Jagan should have realised by then that in the light of the 
influence of the British and Americans over several personalities in the PNC and 
Burnham's own resolute desire to become Prime Minister, that there was no way 
Burnham would agree without him being given the number one spot. 
To concede this top position would have been expecting too much from Dr Jagan. In 
fact the Chairman ofBookers saw the unity of Jagan and Burnham as the only way in 
which there could be prosperity for the country and a stable climate of industrial 
relations, when he wrote in June 1964: 
New elections under proportional representation are due to be held later this 
year. It would be foolish to speculate on the result: but whatever the outcome, 
it will certainly remain true that the only real way out of the existing conflicts 
lies in some form of coalition or accommodation between the People's 
Progressive Party (mainly Indian and rural) and the People's National 
Congress (mainly African and urban). Meanwhile the people of British Guiana 
need all practical help and sympathetic understanding available to them 
(Booker Report 1963: 19). 
This was Sir Jock, later Lord, Campbell's incisive mind at work - while his interest 
was to ensure higher dividends to the shareholders he had equally expressed concern 
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over the failure of the British Government in making more aid available for the 
development of the colonial countries of the Commonwealth including Guiana. He 
had argued that while the British Exchequer was extracting huge sums from British 
Guiana, all they were putting back was about £3m a year of aid to that country 
including Exchequer loans (Booker Report 1964: 17). He stressed "I believe that the 
British Balance of Payments would suffer if new enterprises in the developing 
Commonwealth were not undertaken or - which perhaps matters even more - if 
existing ones were run down, or got rid of to foreign buyers." (Ibid). Given Sir Jock's 
thinking on these matters and the special relationship he had with Dr Jagan, it was 
unfortunate that these two men could not have met to settle the problem of union 
recognition before it had created such enormous disruptions to the industry and the 
country as a whole. 
In so far as Jagan's appeal to Burnham was concerned, based on what was taking 
place in the country under a Jagan led government, there was no way Burnham was 
going to assist in bailing out Jagan. The intentions of Burnham were very clear since 
during his political meetings he was declaring that the "voters must now decide 
whether they want Jagan or Burnham ... we will take part in no coalition. In England 
they have either Home or Wilson. In British Guiana, it will have to be either Burnham 
or Jagan. " (Jagan 1980:324). 
The Governor Intervened 
A State of Emergency was declared on May 23 and on June 13 the iron fist of the 
British Government was in evidence. The Governor stripped the Government of 
almost all its power. It was a "virtual suspension of the constitution and informal 
dissolution of the legislature" (Chase 1964:305). The Governor assumed wide powers 
and effected the arrest of thirty two political activists including the President and the 
General Secretary of GA WU and the Deputy Premier. Only two PNC members were 
detained. Those in detention were held under an Emergency Legislation, passed on 
that same day. "The British Army was put above the law; its men were made immune 
to arrest" (Jagan 1980:314). 
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On the day of the detention of his colleagues, the Premier went on the air to broadcast 
to the nation about his initiative to unite the two parties, the PNC and the PPP. There 
was absolutely no sign of any consideration given to his pleadings by Burnham, 
whose supporters were engaged in open warfare with little restraint by the security 
forces. With their leaders in detention and the State of Emergency in place, the 
GA WU decided on July 25, 1964 to end the strike without the issue being resolved. 
By the end of the year, the industry produced 258,378 tons of sugar as against 
317,137 tons and 326,023 tons for the years 1963 and 1962 respectively. Despite this 
long strike the industry ended up with a profit for the year. 
The recognition issue could not have been pursued effectively, within a short period 
of time, since the Commission of Enquiry was blocked in the Courts. Parliament was 
also ineffective, following the declaration of the state of emergency and the PPP 
losing its majority support in the National Assembly, due to the detention of some of 
its members. The workers funds were also exhausted and there was no scope for any 
major struggle to take place. 
The only other avenue available to the Union at that time was to move to the Courts 
for a discharge of the injunction to allow the Committee to continue its work. But this 
was not done. July saw the worst clashes seen in the country. "Bombings, shootings 
and savage assaults were the order of the day. Arson was rampant. Hundreds of 
houses were destroyed and maliciously damaged. Physical partition in certain areas 
came into being with the rapidity of lightning." (Chase 1964: 305). By August the 
situation was slowly moving towards peace but the strike and racial upheavals had 
polarized the country. The Colonial Secretary then moved the elections, which had 
been planned for earlier date, to December 7, 1964, under all the conditions 
previously set. 
With the election of a Labour Government in Britain in October 1964, the PPP leader 
held out high hopes for a reversal of the Sandys formula. The Labour Party, when in 
opposition in June 1964 had condemned the imposition of PR on British Guiana 
(lagan 1980: 320-325). But the Harold Wilson administration was already under 
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pressure from Washington and did not vary the Conservative ruling on the elections. 
According to Dr Jagan "it was against this background of Labour's betrayal that we 
decided to contest the 1964 general elections under protest" (ibid: 322). 
At the industrial level, following the ending of the strike, two very unpleasant 
developments took place. At Diamond Estate, 45 East Indian Cane cutters and loaders 
struck for three days from November 2, 1964 for "refusing to work with Negroes for 
alleged discriminatory practice" by the foreman. The management promptly changed 
the foreman and agreed to investigate the charges made. (Ministry of Labour Report 
1964).The other incident took place in Mackenzie on March 2, 1965 when 80 African 
workers in one section struck for one hour in protest "over the placement of an Indian 
employee who returned after the disturbances". The employee was placed in a 
different job after resumption of work (Ministry of Labour Report 1965). 
The pecember elections took place under a State of Emergency, with many major 
party activists of the PPP and few from the PNC still under detention orders. The 
result was the formation of a coalition Government between the PNC and the UF. 
Burnham thereafter took over as Premier and after independence was granted, he 
became Prime Minister. The PPP, which secured the highest per -centage of votes, 
45.8 per cent as against 40.5 per cent and 12.4 per cent for the PNC and UF 
respectively was manipulated out of office. There was no political solution of the sort 
Lord Campbell had envisaged. There is no doubt that the leader of the PPP was given 
a raw deal by both the British and the American Governments. In fact, this was 
acknowledged by American Government functionaries long after the event had taken 
place. The manner in which he was dethroned earned him considerable support 
throughout his political life thereafter, apart from occasions when workers lost their 
patience over his abundance of tactical errors. 
An Analysis of the Strike 
This 1964 strike is worth examining from a critical standpoint. For Jagan to merely 
shout "cheated but not defeated" was not enough. After the deadlock at the 
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November 1963 independence talks, Jagan should never have allowed Sandys to 
arbitrate. It was too important an issue to put into the hands of a diehard conservative. 
In any event, he knew fully well that, since the 1950s, the British government had 
been trying desperately to find someone as a replacement for him and had succeeded 
in splitting his party. Nonetheless, Jagan had gone to London to discuss independence 
and should have ruled out any discussion aimed at varying the electoral system. He 
had just won the 1961 elections convincingly and even completed half his term in 
office. There was widespread support for independence. Even Burnham and d'Aguiar 
publicly said that they supported independence. They could not have done otherwise. 
The nationalist feeling was very strong. This alone was an incentive to hammer away 
for independence, never mind if it had taken several additional meetings to secure a 
satisfactory solution. 
Negotiations can sometimes be tedious. All sorts of red herrings will be put on the 
table. Jagan could have left when the talks broke down, gone back home and 
marshalled his forces for the "hurricane of protest" for independence. This would 
have been a more multiracial and nationalistic struggle and would have put Burnham 
and company in a spot. They would have had to give the struggle backing, leaving 
extraneous matters behind, or they probably would have lost considerable support. 
The countrywide march later in January against the Sandys formula was one sided 
and the racial slurs during the course of the march isolated many Afro Guyanese. In 
fact they saw no need to join in the march since their leader got what he wanted. The 
situation would have been different in an agitation for independence. Many other 
British Colonies were given independence under the same electoral system of first 
past the post. Why not Guyana? There would have been stronger international support 
and maybe the Labour Party might have been in a better position to negotiate with 
Jagan if they had not had to deal with a Conservative imposition and someone who, 
in the eyes of British shareholders, was intent on battering British interests. 
Further, by persisting with the recognition strike just after the 'hurricane of protest' 
march, with divisive chanting (9) the planters were able to deem the strike political. 
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The opposition PNC, and both the TUC and MPCA gained political mileage from the 
strike being dubbed political. The strike started as a genuine grievance. The 
opportunity was, however, ripe for the union and the angry PPP to steer it in the 
political direction. Why was the recognition strike not called in 1963 when over 
14,000 signatures had been handed in? This was after the 1963 general strike, during 
a period of calm, and an ideal time to repay the MPCA leaders for their role in that 
strike. Moreover, why was a committee not set up earlier by the Government to 
investigate the sugar strike? Why did the union not challenge the continued 
deductions of dues in the Courts after the revocation forms were handed in by them 
on behalf of the workers? 
If the motive was not political, why was the strike continued after the employers had 
agreed at its early stage for a survey of the books? After all, this was the request 
made by the union. Even so, why was the strike not discontinued after the striking 
workers, Council of Ministers or Premier got the Governor to set up the Committee of 
Enquiry? When the offer was made by the SPA about a reputable committee to 
investigate the matter, why did the GA WU not seek examples of names and pursue 
the matter along that line? It was likely that the SPA would have made movements 
early in a strike rather than at a later time, especially when workers started to break 
solidarity, with a portion returning to work. In industrial disputes, employers more 
often than not harden their positions in protracted strikes especially when they begin 
recruiting scabs and observe the cracks in the workers' solidarity. 
If the GA WU had shown some goodwill at the initial stages of the strike, there was a 
likelihood of the employers agreeing a compromise. Having displayed their strength, 
if GA WU had called off the strike, and sought dialogue with the SP 1\ with some 
pressure from their Department of Labour, there would have been a possibility also of 
some constructive engagement. No employer likes to negotiate under duress and some 
kind of goodwill from a strong union at times tends to cause some unreasonable 
employers to sit back and rethink their position. 
Therefore, it is submitted that there were instances where the opportunity presented 
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itself for a resumption of work, from an industrial relations standpoint and these were 
not taken up by the GA WU. Looking at the strike in its totality, it would appear that if 
it was not politically motivated, it was wrongly timed, and if it was politically 
motivated to force the British into submission, it was a poor strategy. No government 
in power, whether independent or under a colonial master, would want to govern 
under a situation of civil and political unrest. If the government is managing under the 
wings of a colonial power and cannot function effectively, then it might be a wise act 
to sensitise the people and then seek to muster mass support for final liberation, not to 
take decisions which would divide the country. 
Since Dr J agan was a communist then, and always advocated that the way towards 
revolutionary democracy is alliance and struggle, he must have known that "the 
parties which stand at the head of the people's movement must always be ready to 
take up the decisive struggle whenever it becomes inevitable, they must be in a 
position quickly to switch from one type of method to another in accordance with the 
challenging needs and the conditions of the struggle" (10). The condition in 1964 was 
not ripe for a partisan political struggle, neither was it ripe for an industrial struggle. 
The country, having months before come out of a bitter and divisive general strike, 
was unable to endure yet another one. When the Government initiated the protest then 
it could be seen that rather than fighting the British, they ended up initiating an action 
which backfired on themselves. They played into the hands of the opposition. The 
PPP leader himself said if the strike had not taken place, the ensuing problems would 
not have occurred (Jagan 1966:315). How in the name of good governance could he 
have allowed his own supporters to be goaded or molested into a state of anger and 
to start bombing and attacking others, knowing fully well he did not have the police 
on his side and this was the game his opponents knew best? Bumham finished the job 
and the earlier, rightly celebrated days of a united people thereafter became dark days 
of horror. Gunraj and Munroe and Kowsilla and all the others who were affected 
should not have been made to suffer by a misguided few. In these respects history is 
likely to judge both Jagan and Bumham harshly for the role they played in causing 
such a division of a people (Gopaul 1994). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter discusses what was the longest strike ever to take place in the sugar 
industry, which was conducted for a union of the workers' choice. It started on one 
location as a legitimate industrial dispute but escalated into one making a national 
demand for trade union recognition. However, the development of the strike became 
intertwined with political conflicts. Just prior to the strike, the political leaders were 
in conference at Lancaster House, negotiating independence for British Guiana. At 
this conference the British Government supported the position of the opposition 
parties and agreed to grant independence, but not until after fresh elections under a 
new electoral system of proportional representation. The leader of the party in 
Government was furious over the imposition and called for demonstrations against the 
British Government's decision. The demonstrations were a one-sided affair with only 
supporters of the PPP participating. This created a tension among the races, and the 
sugar strike created fertile grounds for the disturbances which ensued. 
Both the PNC and the PPP used the situation to rally their supporters, but as we have 
seen this left a nation racially divided. The mixture of a political and industrial 
struggle made it difficult for the recognition issue to be resolved. The charged 
situation did not bring forth rational thinking around the bargaining table. Leaders of 
unions became inflexible and extreme in their demands. Moreover, the racial division 
eased the pressure on employers, which an industrial strike of that magnitude ought to 
create, since they could recruit scabs with very little difficulty, especially when they 
were of the opposite race. Workers became demoralised as production was taking 
place. Recommendations from the government's own civil servants at the Ministry of 
Labour were rejected out of hand by the union which was supported by the governing 
party. The end result was that the country became unmanageable, and by the time the 
Premier sought to work out a pact with Burnham, the latter was in no mood to settle 
any differences. 
This strike was therefore aborted and the relationship among the parties remained 
strained. The organisational objectives and industrial interests of the workers had 
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become compromised and unfulfilled because of political imperatives, on the one 
hand those of a colonial state and on the other those of competing components of the 
nationalist movement. However the workers, having sensed that the employers were 
supportive of the MPCA, remained resolute to have a different union and continued in 
their agitation to have a resolution of the issue. The next chapter therefore analyses 
the struggles which ensued thereafter under a new government and discusses also the 
reduction of the number of unions in the industry. 
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1. Statement by Sir Jock Campbell, Chairman of Bookers, appearing in the Booker 
Group Review for the year 1964. 
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6. ibid. 
7. ibid. 
8. Jagan (1980: 312) indicated that on May 23 the Governor acted on his advice, 
while the Ministry of Labour Report for 1964 indicated that the Governor intervened 
on the advice from the council of ministers. Chase (1964: 302) indicates that the 
Government had appointed the Committee. No mention is made in either work that 
the Chairman was B.O. Adams who later resigned, nor was there any mention of the 
attendance of the MPCA at the first sitting of the Commission. It would therefore be 
appropriate to rely on the Report of the Ministry of Labour. 
9. A full account of this march was given by Maurice Mangal, who worked at Enmore 
Estate for in excess of 30 years and was an active union representative. Mangal is 
now in retirement. 
10. Georgi Dimitrov, The September Uprising, November 18, 1923. Reported in PPP 
1977, Attachments. 
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Chapter 4 
RecognitionlWages Struggles 1964-1976 
With the installation of a new government, the recognition issue was not pressed for 
with the vigour one might expect. The focus of attention in the sugar industry 
following the 1964 general strike was towards the resolution of grievances in the 
industry. The GA WU did not even bother to effectively agitate for the Guya Persand 
Committee, set up to investigate the 1964 recognition claim, to deliberate on the 
issue. The union could have tried to persuade the Courts to clear the way for the 
committee to commence hearings, but the matter was never pursued. Sugar workers, 
however, continued to resort to strike action against conditions and pricing which 
they reckoned to be inappropriate. They started as early as February 1965, when 
almost 1,000 workers withheld their labour for four days demanding that unqualified 
workers should receive medical treatment on the estate. Then nearly 1,200 Leonora 
workers struck for six days in March 1965 for payment on Wednesdays. Management 
eventually agreed to pay on Thursdays instead. 
The irony about the inter union rivalry was that some of the same workers who were 
striking and demanding the recognition of GA WU were at times caught up in striking 
on behalf of a MPCA call for improvements in bonus, wages and the like. This was 
evident in the following events. On March 24, 1965 GA WU called a strike lasting 
between 1 and 3 days on several estates for better working conditions, without giving 
specific details. Then a week later, MPCA called a strike for between 1 to 4 days in 
protest against the delay of bonus talks. The support of GA WU was far greater. The 
highest support for GA WU on any location was around 1700 while the MPCA's best 
performance was around 1050. At Enmore, where the workers were on strike for 
both Unions, the GAWU obtained the support of 1588 while MPCA secured 446. 
(Report of the Ministry of Labour 1965). Much later an Enmore representative 
admitted that there were times when workers will strike based on the issue involved 
and overlook the question of which union called the strike. Hence, in the period of 
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the inter-union rivalry, workers do find themselves striking for both unions or end up 
striking by themselves, while at times the dispute was settled by the recognized 
union (Interview: October 1994). On November 2, 1965 almost 2,500 workers at 
Albionl Port Mourant struck for 8 days against independence talks in London. They 
were joined for 2 days by nearly 600 workers at Skeldon and 1 day by 244 workers at 
Leonora. The birthplace (Port Mourant) of the champion of Guyana's independence 
(J agan) struck against the talks when it was clear that the country was going to gain 
independence under the rule of his arch rival. The Country however, secured 
independence from Britain on May 26, 1966. The sugar Chairman, Lord Campbell 
was specially invited by Prime Minister Burnham for the celebrations and the two 
had discussions about putting more emphasis on Guyanese appointments at the senior 
stafflevel (Booker Group Report 1965: 9). 
For 1965, therefore, while both unions continued to flex their muscles in a limited 
way, the evidence reveals that it was the workers which on the various locations 
continued to call strikes in furtherance of their working conditions (Ministry of 
Labour Report : 1965). Since most of the strikes which occurred in the industry 
between 1965 and 1976 were the normal work stoppages typical of the industry, only 
those which are significant to the theme will be dealt with. While the industrial 
relations situation in 1965 had improved significantly over 1964, the industry ended 
with financial losses despite significantly lower production costs and a higher level 
of production. The production level was however affected by drought and the 
profitability affected by: 
the discouragement of a world price stagnating at a level at which nobody can 
make sugar. In 1964, it fell from £88 to £25 a ton. In 1965, it fell to below £18 
a ton. Despite the protection afforded by the Commonwealth Sugar 
Agreement, and the favourable outlet for West Indian Sugar in the United 
States, the average price received by Bookers Sugar Estates for all their sugar 
in 1965 was about £6 a ton lower than in 1964~ and in 1966 it could be lower 
still (The Booker Group Report and Accounts 1965: 10). 
The lack of profit was therefore not of the workers' making. In fact they were praised 
by their employers "for the resolution and new confidence with which they started to 
make good the enforced neglect of 1964" (ibid). 
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For 1966, there were 91 strikes in the industry resulting in 63,776 work days lost with 
wages amounting to $335,789.00 sacrificed (Min of Labour 1966). These were, 
however, short strikes, and on some locations, the workers at varying times demanded 
the recognition of GA WU. As Bookers reported: 
The crop suffered gravely from drought~ and it was also hampered by a series 
of strikes originating in political rivalries rather than industrial disputes. For 
the past five years, all the people who work for Bookers Sugar Estates have 
faced extraordinarily difficult conditions ( Booker Report, 1966:26). 
The agitation in the sugar industry was stepped up during the period before and after 
independence. This trend continued in a limited way but by 1969 there was a 
reduction in the number of disputes (Ministry of Labour 1969:26). Wage settlements 
and conditions of employment were subjected to successive Commission of Enquiries 
and Arbitration Tribunals from 1965 to 1975 as we will see later. The recognized 
union could not settle wages by itself since any negotiated settlement could spur the 
workers into serious agitation. In fact the MPCA often used the breakdown in wages 
talks to call on the workers to take industrial action. However, they had limited 
success in this regard. 
The last agreement that the MPCA signed with the SPA prior to the 1964 strike was 
in March 1963 for the period January 1962 to December 31, 1963. It represented the 
eleventh agreement on wages and other conditions of work which had been negotiated 
by the MPCA since 1945. The minimum wage for unskilled workers was pegged at 
$3.45 per day at the end of 1963. As that union tried to win over the workers by 
taking an aggressive position at negotiations following the 1964 strike, the employer 
took a tougher stance in refusing to offer any increase because of the adverse impact 
the strike had on the industry. The talks were deadlocked at conciliation, presided 
over by a senior official from the Ministry of Labour. The positions of the SPA and 
the MPCA were not close enough to bring about a satisfactory resolution of the 
dispute over wages, profit sharing, and bonus. 
104 
Commission of Inquiry 
The Governor intervened on the advice of the Minister of Labour and appointed on 
June 29, 1965, a high powered commission headed by Justice Percival Cummings, 
with the following terms of reference: 
to enquire into the existing dispute between the British Guiana Sugar 
Producers' Association and the Man Power Citizens' Association in connection 
with (1) wages and conditions of employment in respect of the years 1964 and 
1965~ (2) the payment ofa once -for-all bonus for 1964~ (3) the payment of an 
annual production bonus for 1964 ~ and to report there on, and to make such 
recommendations as it may deem expedient (Cummings 1965: 1). 
In terms of wages, the MPCA was seeking an increase in the minimum wage to $4.00 
for the existing 8 hour work day with consequential adjustments in the other grades. 
Because of the seasonal nature of the work, the union also sought to introduce a 
minimum wage of no less than $20.00 for the week, representing five days pay in 
1964. The SPA and MPCA agreed that the parties should allow the Commission to 
adjudicate on wages for 1965 and, as a consequence, a further 50 cents per day and a 
12.5 per cent increase for all piece rated jobs was sought by the union, in addition to 
the bonus issues. These wage claims for 1964 were still in dispute some eighteen 
months after the rates should have been put into effect. 
However, protracted negotiations and discussions on important issues and grievances 
had been a regular but undesirable feature in the industrial relations practice in the 
sugar industry. In addition, the delay had to do with developments during 1964. The· 
MPCA started negotiations with the SPA in November 1963. During the course of the 
discussions, the GA WU recognition strike commenced, and negotiations were 
thereafter suspended. The MPCA was then struck off the roll of registered trade 
unions in August 1964 for its failure to comply with certain statutory requirements. 
The union challenged the decision of the registrar of trade unions in the Supreme 
Court, which ruled in its favour in September 1964. Discussions with the SPA 
followed this and resulted in an agreement in November 1964 over Once For All 
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Bonus for the year 1963 (ibid.24). 
With respect to 1964 the union argued that the SPA had the ability to pay despite the 
disruptions as a result of the strike. The argument was founded on a formula which 
the union claimed existed and was based on the price it received for sugar sold on the 
open and US markets. The union estimated that the SPA owed the workers $4.2m in 
bonus alone. The SPA denied that any formula existed and maintained its inability to 
pay despite the fact that the industry was able to sustain its profit levels. It took the 
position that the overall profitability of the industry did not justify the payment of a 
bonus. Additionally, the workers did not achieve their target because they failed to 
take up work which was available to them. Further, the wages and other benefits 
which were paid to them compared favourably to wages paid to workers in other 
industries at the national level. Given the poor marketing prospects and drop in 
production, the SPA argued that if an increase in wages was given, it could endanger 
the viability of the industry (ibid: 32). 
At the end of the deliberations the Commission was unarumous In its 
recommendations that the industry was unable to meet any wage increase at that point 
in time. It suggested that the parties should examine the possibility of negotiating 
wage increases for 1966. It also made recommendations for the payment of$451,680 
as production bonus, and $867,252 as 'once for all' bonus, with the introduction of a 
Profit Sharing Scheme to replace the 'once for all' bonus. Other proposals by the 
commission included an increase in the local selling price of sugar, along with the 
withdrawal of nearly $lm from the Price Stabilisation Fund, established in 1947, to 
cushion the shortfall in prices received for sugar sold on the foreign markets outside 
of the NPQ (1) and to compensate for the shortfall in production due to the strike 
(ibid). 
While the SPA accepted most of the recommendations, the MPCA rejected them as 
being insufficient. It must be borne in mind that since this was merely an advisory 
commission as distinct from an arbitration tribunal, there was no way in which the 
MPCA could have been forced into accepting any or all of the recommendations 
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made. With this deadlock, there was the possibility that the workers would express 
their frustration via strike action. This stalemate brought the Prime Minister onto the 
scene. His intervention resulted in an agreement for the payment of a total sum of 
$1,138,932 to all the workers as Annual Production Bonus for 1964. These payments 
were financed by the Price Stabilisation Fund and not from earnings of the industry. 
The Prime Minister also indicated that a Commission would be appointed to inquire 
into all aspects of the sugar industry, with the SPA and MPCA allowed to nominate a 
person each. 
Eventually, on 9th May, 1967, His Excellency, the Governor General appointed 
Justice Guya Persaud as Chairman with six other persons as Commissioners under the 
Commissions of Inquiry Ordinance (Chapter 59) with a mandate: 
to inquire into and report upon all aspects of the sugar industry in Guyana into 
its widest sense with special reference to:-
(a) the general economic situation of the industry taking account of all 
relevant relationship with other industries or undertakings; 
(b) the wage and salary increases paid with effect from 1 st January, 1965, 
the profits of the industry from all its operations in that year and the formula 
recommended by the Cummings' Report for the use of the Price Stabilisation 
Fund; 
( c) the payment of a once for all bonus for 1965; 
(d) the payment of increased wages and salaries for 1966; 
(e) other conditions of employment; and 
(t) its organisation with particular reference to the development of cane 
farming by small operators ; and to make recommendations (Guya Persaud 
1968). 
This Commission had the widest possible scope despite the fact that its findings were 
not binding on any of the parties involved in the sugar industry. The views of all 
interested organisations had been canvassed. The only two unions in the industry 
which declined to give evidence or submit memoranda were the GA WU and 
NAACIE. The NAACIE Officials felt that they had more to benefit if they pursued 
representation by themselves, given the disunity among the other unions and the weak 
positions of some of their leaders. The strategy worked for NAACIE since that union 
secured higher increases in its negotiations during that period. However, the refusal of 
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the GA WU to present its case for recognition to the Persaud's Commission, reputed 
to be one of the most crucial for the industry, can be seen as a tactical error. 
Although the GA WU did not participate in its work, the Commission pronounced that 
MPCA was losing its membership to NAACIE and GA WU and that this defection by 
workers "still nominally represented by the MPCA to NAACIE is also a factor" 
(Guya Persaud 1968: 95) in the instability in the industrial relations climate. Further, 
the Commission recognized that the strenuous efforts made by GA WU since 1963 in 
securing recognition, had a "significant impact on the state of labour- management 
relations in the sugar industry" (ibid: 86). 
From all the evidence available, it is clear that if the GA WU had been more tactical 
between the period 1963-1967, recognition would have been secured much earlier 
than in 1976. Some weaknesses on the part of the GA WU have been discussed in the 
earlier chapter. Their refusal to appear in front of the Commission and to outline their 
case despite being requested to do so, represents a further example of both tactical 
and strategic ineptitude .. It was not the case that the Commission was empowered to 
make a determination on the issue, but the opportunity for GA WU to present its case 
was lost. More public sympathy was likely to have been evident if the case of the 
sugar workers had been taken up at the level of the Commission. At least the 
Commission was heavily used by the MPCA to state its case for the agency shop. It 
also argued that the GA WU's recognition claim was politically motivated and that the 
GA WU was engaged in terror tactics and coercion to secure the support of sugar 
workers. 
On the question of the agency shop, which the MPCA had advocated since 1958, the 
union made a major breakthrough. Although the recommendation was not for the 
application of a full scale agency shop, the Commission recommended that the parties 
should engage in discussions towards implementing "union security provisions based 
on voluntary but irrevocable check-off dues"(ibid:141). What was intended was that 
once a worker agreed to become a member of the union slhe could not revoke union 
membership until the expiration of the life of the agreement. Luckily, the SPA 
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recognised the serious implications, legally and otherwise, and rigidly opposed the 
application of any such system. As we have seen, the Crane arbitration tribunal (1975) 
effectively pronounced against the agency shop, closed shop or any compulsory union 
dues paying scheme, in the sugar industry. To date, no compulsory dues paying 
scheme has been implemented in the sugar industry, despite the fact that there have 
been slight modifications in the law which allowed its application in some 
government agencies in the early 1980s, especially for the unions which were 
supportive of the PNC Government. 
On the question of a wage settlement the Commission recommended a 8.3 per cent 
increase or 30 cents per day on the minimum wage from the 1st January, 1966. That 
increase brought the new minimum wage to $3.90 per day. The implementation of 
this increase followed the signing of an agreement between the :MPCA and SPA on 
October 16, 1968. The 30 cents increase which the workers obtained, brought the total 
wage increase between 1961 and 1967 to 90 cents per day. An examination of nine 
leading companies operating in the country during the same period revealed that the 
sugar workers' wage rates and the awarded pay increases were the lowest. The 
bauxite workers had received $2.00 more on the minimum wage during the same 
period, making their daily minimum wage $9.20. The rice workers had their wages 
moved from $2.84 to $4.00 per day, an increase of $l.16. Leading commercial stores 
had paid their workers between $1.20 to $2.24 more per day and their minimum wage 
in 1967 was between $4.24 and $5.80 per day. At this time, the electricity workers 
received 54 cents more than the sugar workers while their minimum was $5.20 per 
day. 
There was, however, a marked inequality in wages dispensation arising from the 
Increases paid to ancillary firms of the companies operating within the sugar 
industry. For instance, the workers at Sprostons, a subsidiary of Demerara Company, 
secured wage increases of $l.60 as against the 90 cents received by sugar workers. 
The Sprostons minimum wage was $5.36 per day. The workers at Bookers Stores, a 
subsidiary of Bookers Sugar Estates, enjoyed a minimum wage of $5.04 per day and 
were awarded increases more than two times greater- $l.84 - than that given to their 
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counterparts in sugar, while the sugar handlers at the waterfront enjoyed an increase 
of$1.78 with a minimum wage in 1967 of$5.74 (Ministry of Labour Records). 
The representatives were well aware of this disparity in wage awards, and many 
claimed that the compensation took place by virtue of the fact that they were working 
close to home, that they could have done some farming on plots provided by the 
estates and could also fish and cut grass for their cattle at the back lands. In addition 
to these points, they enjoyed overtime payments, and in case of job rated employees, 
they could finish their task and go home early, while bonus and other incentives plus 
house lots and interest free housing loans were important considerations for 
continuing their service to the industry. Most of the points raised about extra benefits 
have often been made by the SPA during negotiations and at enquiries over working 
conditions in the industry. 
The fact remains that the sugar workers were aware of the extent of their exploitation 
and continued to express their dissatisfaction through strike actions. They were 
conscious of their consolidated strength and during the period of union rivalry they 
would often play one union against the other. When I interviewed union 
representatives much later, they explained that because both the GA WU and the 
MPCA would seek to out do each other, the workers would very often make their 
positions known through the use of the strike weapon which would force the unions to 
take up the issue. This method led to a complete breakdown in the industrial relations 
procedure in the sugar industry. As a consequence, the vast majority of the work 
stoppages which took place were categorized as unofficial strikes. The Guya Persaud 
Commission (1968: 91) found that there was a marked breakdown of discipline of the 
organised work force, due the strategy which workers deployed. It recognised that the 
"workers are shrewd enough to realize" that there was not a likelihood of disciplinary 
action being taken against them for their action, given the prevailing climate of inter -
union conflict. Therefore, the workers were not only engaging in protest action at the 
end of the life of the wage agreement but they very often attempted to extract extra 
money for work which they claimed to have involved "obstacles". 
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There were varying claims by workers, especially those on job rates, at different 
locations, and. at different times. As the success story spread to other locations the 
workers carefully timed their action and, very often with the assistance of assessors 
from the Ministry of Labour, secured some additional payment. A representative 
from the former '14b Cane Cutting Gang' at Vryhied's Lust explained that in an effort 
to secure a decent day's pay the workers would strike for two or three days and when 
the cane became 'lighter', they would then get additional money for cutting it. They 
would work hard for three days and found that the wages earned under that system 
would be equivalent to what they would get for work during a normal week. As such 
there was a situation of almost weekly strikes in that gang, during' the late 1960s 
(Interview: August 1994). It is clear from the investigations that workers found ways 
to circumvent what they considered to be inadequate wage settlements. This was the 
situation throughout the period of the ~CAlGA WU conflict and it has continued 
without any sign of a resolution. For piece rated employees any small issue could be 
blown. out of proportion leading to work disruption. While the signing of agreements 
served a useful purpose, that alone was insufficient since it was the local managers 
and representatives who had to work towards the maintenance of a harmonious 
industrial climate. 
NAACIE Attempts At Unity 
It was clear from the 1964 strike that the ~CA still had some support in the Sugar 
factories. But many workers were uneasy at the state of disunity within the sugar 
industry and the demoralising effect of previous strikes. A number of them from the 
factories approached NAACIE ( formerly SECA up to May 1966) seeking 
representation. By the middle of 1966 the union took the decision to accept the 
workers as members. NAACIE Receipt books and membership forms were made 
available to the local Branches of the Union to aid the recruitment drive. This 
decision was taken following a petition by 102 workers from the Area Workshop at 
Albion who were seeking to join NAAC lE , and a report from Rose Hall 
representative John Ali that 80 workers from the Mechanical Tillage and 210 factory 
workers had already taken a decision to become members of NAACIE. S Jokai, Jeet 
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Persaud, T . Ram and Amin Ally also reported that quite a large section of the 
workforce on their locations, especially from the factory and workshop areas, had 
approached them to become members of the union (NAACIE Minutes 1966). Messrs 
Ali and 10kai then moved and seconded respectively that NAACIE accept into its 
membership all workers desirous of becoming members, with special reference to 
sugar workers. The motion was carried by 12 votes with two abstentions. Membership 
fees had also been set at $2.00 per year pending recognition (ibid). 
It became clear to the MPCA that the factory workers in particular were ready to 
break ranks and join NAACIE. The MPCA sought cover from the TUC with whom it 
lodged a complaint against NAACIE. It also sent to the TUC copies of NAACIE 
documents which were in circulation among the sugar workers. This provoked a letter 
from the TUC to NAACIE on 25 November-1966, which urged that the poaching of 
another affiliate should be discontinued. The NAACIE merely acknowledged receipt 
of the letter. The Versailes Branch of NAACIE had submitted a motion to the 
Executive Council urging that the union should invite all the unions in the sugar 
industry to a meeting to explore the possibility of uniting all the workers in the 
industry. The Executive Council agreed that meetings be initiated with the other 
unions. However, in view of the overwhelming requests by the sugar workers for 
N AACIE to represent them, the union decided that it should continue the organising 
programme (NAACIE Minutes December 1966) already initiated. 
The Area Field Workshop was a new entity and was not covered under the MPCA 
recognition agreement. On April 11, 1967 NAACIE dispatched a letter to the SPA 
seeking recognition of the Area Work Shop employees. At that time it had the support 
of over 80 per cent of the workers. The SPA rejected the application the following 
day on the grounds that those workers belonged to the MPCA categories. This was 
followed by an exchange of several letters between the parties. Pressure was also 
mounted by the TUC on NAACIE during the same period, over repeated complaints 
by the MPCA against NAACIE's successful recruitment drive, as confirmed by the 
Guya Persaud Commission (1968: 90). The TUC had pointed out to NAACIE that 
the union's conduct in recruiting members from a sister affiliate was not in keeping 
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with the spirit of solidarity within the TUC. At the same time a NAACIE motion 
failed to attract the order paper for the TUC conference. NAACIE believed that 
Richard Ishmael, the President of the TUC, and also the President of the ~CA had a 
hand in ducking the motion on the issue of Union recognition for sugar workers. The 
union insisted that it would suspend the payment of affiliation fees to the TUC and 
requested a copy of the Rules of that body. The motion was eventually put on the 
order paper but debate on it was denied because the Chairman ruled that it was 
received late. 
The initiative by the NAACIE to invite the other unions to discuss the issue of unity 
was met with hostility by the MPCA and the Headmen Unions. The GA WU 
expressed in no uncertain way that it was still going to pursue the issue of recognition, 
and its political arm, the PPP, launched a counter offensive against the NAACIE's 
campaign, which by the third week had attracted 2,000 new members. As Audrey 
Chase explained : 
the success of the campaign greatly alarmed certain political circles. There 
was positive intervention by them and in order to prevent further division of 
the workers, the campaign was called off to chagrin of many workers, who for 
the first time felt a ray of hope ... To have had to struggle against the SPA, the 
MPCA and at the same time to be under attacks from misguided 
obstructionists, were in the circumstances too much. It was felt that the newly 
fought for recognition of NAACIE had pointed the way to circumventing the 
hurdles which the GA WU ... had for many years been unable to overcome. Yet 
this opportunity was not grasped but was pilloried on the alter of selfishness, a 
far cry from the class consciousness that should have been exhibited in this 
crucial move to unite all sugar workers in one industrial union (1971 :52). 
NAACIE, therefore, made a retreat in order to maintain the fraternal link it enjoyed 
with the GAWU. In fact Bertis Bangaree, NAACIE's General Secretary, appointed to 
that post in July 1965, had returned from a PPP scholarship in Moscow in 1964 and 
soon afterwards was appointed Field Secretary. Ashton Chase, another former PPP 
Labour Minister, became the General President of the union. His appointment created 
quite a stir at the SPA level. He was denied the right to represent workers and it took 
strike action in April 1966 before the SPA finally accorded him the right to be 
present as part of the union's negotiating team. Given the closeness then of both 
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leading officers ofNAACIE to the PPP, the backing away from the organising of the 
field and factory workers was seen by a few representatives as an act of solidarity, 
rather than a strategic move. Before Chase's entry as President it was alleged that 
Bangaree had allowed the Supervisory rank to move away from SEC A to create a new 
Union with the hope that recognition for this group by the SPA would act as a 
precedent for GA WU (SECA Minutes April 1966). The charge was denied by 
Bangaree. However, a perusal of the records showed the ease with which the 
Employer was allowed to accord recognition to the Supervisors' Union . This seemed 
to confirm the allegations. This is what is reported: 
Mr. B. Bangaree said that he believed in the unification of workers in the 
sugar industry, but at the same time it is the democratic right of the 
supervisors to organise or to join a union of their choice; and if the majority of 
the supervisors want to have their own union and to bargain for themselves 
there is nothing we can do about it. He suggested that a letter be sent to the 
SP A requesting that this matter be dealt with according to the SPA's policy 
regarding such matters. This suggestion was unanimously accepted (SECA 
Minutes: May 29, 1965). 
When Chase joined the union there was a rear guard fight by SECAlNAACIE to 
prevent the SPA's recognition of the Supervisors' union, GSESA, but this failed. The 
recognition for supervisors was taken away from NAACIE/SECA on April 2, 1966 
despite the fact that over 51 per cent of that grouping remained in the membership of 
SECA. In response to the de-recognition of the supervisory category, Chase's resolve 
was strengthened to bring all the smaller unions together. The following month the 
Union changed its name from SECA to become NAACIE. In addressing the 
conference which approved the change of name in May 1966, this is what Chase had 
to say: 
Small trade unions have no place in the sugar industry . We are dealing with 
people who have plenty of influence and power and even authority in this 
country. Even though political changes (independence granted from Britain, 
May 26, 1966) are going to take place in two weeks, their influence and power 
and authority will still be manifest and will still be exerted in the new 
society.. .. The only alternative is for all the workers in the sugar industry to 
close their ranks and to get together in one solid organisation in the same way 
as the sugar magnets are organised in the SPA (Audrey Chase 1971: 51). 
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Yet despite this passionate appeal, NAACIE was pressured to walk away from the 
bulk of sugar workers and allow GA WU its way. The Union therefore, was to put its 
energy towards unifying the administrative groups. 
The Absorption of Three Unions 
The SEC A members had since 1963 faced the problem of not being accepted into the 
ranks of the Sugar Boilers Union. The Guyana and West Indies Sugar Boilers Union 
(GWISBU) had taken a decision only to accept qualified sugar boilers into its ranks. 
That union was insisting that only the sugar boilers should be appointed process 
foremen. The SEC A members from the laboratory were competent to fill that 
position and in fact were appointed from time to time to that position. Whenever there 
was a vacancy for the position of Process Foreman, the management would pick a 
suitable candidate from either the laboratory or the pan floor area. This procedure by 
management resulted in a number of process foremen without union representation. In 
one instance, at Wales in 1963, the sugar boilers went on a protest strike over the 
appointment of a SECA member to the position of process foreman. The management 
felt he was the most suitable candidate but the sugar boilers were insisting on having 
one from their ranks appointed. 
This incident resulted in an exchange of letters between the two uruons. The 
GWISBU maintained its position that it could not accept anyone but a qualified sugar 
boiler into its ranks, and that position was in keeping with the constitution of that 
union. SECA took the decision to organise within the ranks of the sugar boilers 
(SECA Minutes, April 1964). But the progress was very slow and at times divisive. It 
was not until the late 1960s that momentum developed. With Chase and Bangaree at 
the helm, the union assumed a militant and progressive role. Chase brought his skills, 
reputation and dynamic leadership to NAACIE. There were several factors which 
influenced the changes which have occurred among the smaller unions. First, at the 
legal level Chase successfully piloted a test case, Boodhoo Dwarka v Demerara Co 
Ltd., for double time payment for work done on Sundays and certain holidays under 
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the factories ordinance. The decision was handed down in March 1969 and had 
retroactive effect to 1961. This was followed by a similar case on behalf of 
supervisors, D R Singh v Enmore Estates, which again secured benefits for the 
workers. Second, the union, after a bitter 38 days general strike, concluded an 
agreement to incorporate the benefits of the legal decision in addition to a five day 40 
hours work week for clerical workers and other substantial fringe benefits to workers. 
Third, the Branches of the union became more combative and organised. In some 
cases they had reached the enviable 100 per cent union membership. Fourth, the union 
itself had become very viable in financial terms. It had wiped out its mortgage on its 
Headquarters from donations by members who had benefitted from retroactive 
payment as a result of negotiations (Audrey Chase 1971: Chapter 9). 
These developments resulted in workers in other sections joining NAACIE. Cane 
weighers, field checkers and security guards were the first groups to approach 
NAACIE. The weighers and checkers belonged to the MPCA category and that union 
was not prepared to release them despite the fact that their work was clerical in 
nature. The security guards, while they had shown some courage in struggle and had 
taken the bold decision to engage Chase to fight their overtime case in court (which 
he won), had nonetheless been manipulated into the police ranks and were told that 
they could not be unionised (NAACIE Minutes: February 7, 1971). Given the 
commitment of NAACIE to unifying the workers, constant contacts had been 
maintained with all the unions despite opposition from some of them. The Guyana 
Sugar Estate Supervisors Association (GSESA) and the Guyana Sicknurses and 
Dispensers Association (GSDA), almost at the same time took the decision to 
amalgamate with NAACIE. 
The absence on leave of the GSDA President prevented the process of amalgamation 
from taking place at the same time with the Supervisors. The GSESA, which was 
registered in 1966 and obtained recognition from the SPA in June 1966, held its 
Annual Conference in early 1971, where delegates discussed a letter from NAACIE 
which invited a merger. There was approval for the merger to take place. NAACIE 
members also gave their approval and the documents for the merger were 
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authenticated by the Registrar of Trade Unions in May 1971. Four days later, on May 
18th, the SPA was notified of the merger and was asked to treat with NAACIE as the 
new bargaining agent. However, the SP A requested a meeting with NAACIE 
following which it set out conditions which were considered to be provocative, as 
terms which would govern the relationship (NAACIE Minutes: 15/6/71). 
The SPA wanted to create a separate bargaining unit for the Supervisors while the 
NAACIE was insisting on a relationship where the union would continue to bargain 
as a single unit, similar to what existed prior to the split. Following some industrial 
strife and the intervention of the Minister of Labour, the NAACIE was accorded 
recognition of the GSESA members on September 30, 1971. The mechanisms for the 
amalgamation between NAACIE and the GSDA were completed almost a year after 
the decision was taken for a merger by the latter body. The Registrar of Trade Unions 
approved the merger on August 3,1972. The SPA was in no mood to readily accept 
NAACIE as the sole bargaining agent for this group of workers. It argued that 
NAACIE should have notified it before the merger took place. This response was no 
doubt intended to curb the wave of requests by other groups. An application for 
recognition had already been forwarded by NAACIE for sugar boilers in November 
1971. 
The leaders of the GWISBU had turned down a request by their members to enter 
into a merger pact with NAACIE. The sugar boilers' union had in fact been well 
established not only in Guyana but was a craft union which had members in other 
Caribbean Sugar Producing Countries. It had recognition rights with the Sugar 
industry since May 1950 and also enjoyed a very close relationship with the 
leadership of the TUC. It always sided with MPCA at the TUC level. Its members 
claimed that the union was ineffective and was not operating in a democratic manner. 
When the NAACIE's request for recognition was made, the GWISBU lodged a 
complaint of poaching against NAACIE to the TUC. 
The parent body requested a meeting of the two unions but many sugar boilers had 
responded to the TUC through a petition stating that it was their desire to become 
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members of NAACIE and that the union was merely responding to their requests. 
NAACIE also denied poaching allegations as malicious and unfounded (NAACIE 
Minutes, December 19, 1971). The SPA also chose the same time to begin 
negotiations with the GWISBU. This prompted NAACIE to lodge a protest to the 
SP A and warn that it would not be bound by any agreement entered into between the 
SP A and the GWISBU (ibid). The SPA also requested a survey to be conducted by 
the Ministry of Labour on NAACIE records to see if its claim could be verified. The 
Ministry found that NAACIE had in fact over 50 per cent of the sugar boiling 
categories as members and notified the SPA accordingly. Pressure by the Union 
compelled the SPA to serve notice terminating the recognition agreement it had with 
the GWISBU. That decision was criticized by the TUC, whose disciplinary committee 
had summoned a meeting of the two unions. NAACIE did not turn up to the meeting. 
The Ministry of Labour was coerced by the TUC, resulting in a letter being 
dispatched to the SPA by the said Ministry. It requested that the SPA stay their hands 
on the matter pending some inquiries into allegations made by the GWISBU over 
misinterpretation of its Rules by the Ministry. The legal advisor of the Ministry was 
called in while the TUC demanded a meeting with that body. The General Secretary 
of the MPCA and the Secretary of the TUC represented the interests of the GWISBU. 
The NAACIE had to shift its pressure on to the Ministry of Labour, and following an 
exchange of letters between the union and the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry 
deemed a NAACIE letter offensive and requested its withdrawal before any further 
action could be taken on the issue. NAACIE insisted that its position was correct and 
the Ministry eventually sent a letter dated June 13, 1972 giving the go ahead to SPA 
to proceed with the matter. However the SPA, while taking action to terminate the 
recognition agreement with GWISBU, was again insisting on separate Bargaining 
Units. The stalemate between the parties came almost at the same time after all 
documentation had been concluded in the merger between NAACIE and GSDA. The 
SPA also took a similar position with respect to the Dispensers grouping. At the same 
time talks between the NAACIE and the SPA for salary increases to clerical and 
supervisory workers had reached a deadlock. It was therefore a ripe moment for 
NAACIE to combine all the issues and launch an offensive against the employer. 
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On September 22, 1972 NAACIE served a seventy-two hour notice on the SPA to 
take industrial action over the breakdown in wages talks and the failure to secure 
recognition for the two groups of workers. A general strike was called by NAACIE 
from September 26. When it ended on October 9,1972, both groups, the Dispersers 
and Sugar Boiling had been given recognition as members of NAACIE. When the 
recognition agreement and the terms of resumption agreement had been signed 
between the NAACIE and the SPA, the number of unions in the industry had been 
reduced to three. The other two were the :MPCA and the Guyana Headmen Union 
(GHU) , which later changed its name to Guyana Field Foremen and Supervisors 
Union (GFF&SU). 
The members of the GHU made repeated requests to become members of NAACIE 
shortly afterwards, but the SP A never allowed the recognition requests to get past 
their offices. The President and Secretary of that union were the same office bearers 
in the MPCA and the offices were all located in one building. Therefore, efforts on 
the part of the employers to preserve them within the industry had to do with those 
unions' willingness to continue to serve as company unions. Only decisive action on 
the part of the foremen would have liberated them, but they were not prepared for 
such a struggle and they were not very popular among the other groups of workers, 
because of their spineless nature in previous struggles. Effective solidarity action was 
not envisaged. The NAACIE decided that it would continue to work among that 
group to sensitise them to the need to struggle. While that process was taking place 
and during the course of NAACIE' s efforts to absorb the other sections of the 
workforce, the field and factory workers were engaging the employers for their right 
to be given a union of their choice. 
The Fresh Wave of Struggles: Field and Factory Workers 
On March 18, 1968, Leonora workers struck for 17 days for increments, before their 
jobs were reclassified. About fifty per cent of the workers benefitted from increases 
due to increments. At the neighbouring Uitvlugt location workers went on strike for 
higher wages from March 19 to April 4 1968. Their demand was rejected on the 
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grounds that they had to await the outcome of the Report of the Guya Persand 
Committee appointed in 1969. The delay of this report resulted in a country wide 
strike on all the Estate locations from August 10, 1968 to August 27, 1968 resulting in 
a loss of 88,000 working days approximately. 
This strike was followed by another one in November for 17 days (November 4-20) 
on eight locations; Albion, Port Mourant, Blairmont, Enmore, LBI, Ogle and 
Versailes, for the fixing of a date for the payout. The Government announced a date 
and the strike was called off (Ministry of Labour Report; 28:29). The year 1969 also 
witnessed the appointment of a trade union leader, Winslow Carrington, as Minister 
of Labour and he conducted numerous reforms at his Ministry. He initiated dialogue 
with all the unions, including GA WU, as well as employers organisations and pursued 
a policy of preventive action as far as industrial disputes were concerned. To this end, 
the Ministry increased the number of officers serving districts in which there were 
sugar' estates. An 'early warning' system was established and special attention paid to 
endemic causes of disputes - for example, there had been a number of disputes 
originating with problems over the weighing of canes. Hence, a system of checking 
weights and scales was established (ibid: 26). 
The Minister intensified discussions with all the unions in the industry, irrespective of 
recognition, on issues affecting workers and held discussions with both the TUC and 
the Consultative Association of Guyanese Industry (CAGI) for the introduction of a 
Trade Disputes Bill which would provide for the establishment of an Industrial Court, 
although these never materialised. He further advocated a greater degree of workers' 
participation in management, with emphasis on the public sector and public 
corporations. He argued that the process of joint consultation must be advanced, 
obviously conscious that the attitude of leaving out the GA WU from vital discussions 
was having a negative impact on the industry. His strategy to involve that union 
seemed to have paid dividend. 
By the end of 1969, there was an overall reduction in the work days lost during strikes 
in the entire country - 38,450 as against 306,009 for 1968 (ibid: 27). Sugar production 
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had also achieved the highest level ever (364,465 tons) only to be overtaken in 1971 
when the highest production achieved was 368,843 tons of sugar. Disputes at 
conciliation were processed much faster and the Minister was also engaged in 
meeting the parties to disputes, whenever there was a deadlock. 1970 was marred by 
three major strikes which were, incidentally, started by the MPCA on 9th March and 
which lasted for six days. The strikes were called following the breakdown in 
negotiations with the SPA for increased wages and profit sharing for 1969 and 1970. 
These strikes were significant in the sense that they happened in a tense period of 
inter-union rivalry. That a union which was being challenged could call a general 
strike and attract the support of 11,463 workers was a very good showing by any 
standard. The days lost as a result numbered 49,177 with wages amounting to 
$261,308 lost. This dispute ended up at the level of Arbitration. 
The Arbitration Tribunal 
The Clifton Lowachee Arbitration Tribunal, consisting of a panel of three, was set up 
in March 1970, during the course of a general strike by workers in the industry. It 
followed the breakdown of negotiations over wages and profit sharing for 1969 and 
1970. The tribunal was established after the intervention of the Prime Minister acting 
on the advice of his Cabinet. Before the setting up of the tribunal, both the MPCA and 
SP A agreed to an interim pay-out of nearly $3m as an inducement for the workers to 
resume work. The ruling of the tribunal came after thirty one meetings, lasting several 
months. During the month of September workers took strike action over the delay in 
securing wage increases. This action encouraged the release of an interim report, on 
September 30, 1970, which was supplemented by a detailed report two weeks later. 
The MPCA, on the one hand, requested an increase from $3.90 per day to $4.25 as 
the minimum wage from January 1, 1969 and $4.50 per day for 1970. These 
increases, they argued, should apply before profit sharing is paid. The SPA, on the 
other hand wanted $4.00 and $4.10 for the same periods in addition to profit sharing , 
(Lowachee 1970: 180). The tribunal ruled in favour of $4.25 per day from 1969 and 
the equivalent of a 8.9743 per cent increase to apply to all piece- or job- rated 
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employees as well as those on time- rate above the rrurnmum rate of pay. The 
September strike resulted in no increase being awarded for 1970 and the tribunal was 
emphatic about not awarding any increase for that reason. It estimated that the strike 
cost the country $4m in revenue, $12m in foreign exchange and loss of wages of 
about $2.5m (ibid: 152). The tribunal was also very critical over what it considered to 
be lack of facilities to speed up the settlement of disputes and the unnecessary use of 
the strike weapon by workers. Parts of its pronouncements are reproduced hereunder: 
Some of these matters may appear trivial, but if the numbers of strikes and of 
committees of enquiry in the past ten years are any testimony of the state of 
affairs existing in the industry then there is something definitely wrong with 
the policies being pursued and/or with the attitudes of those involved. If the 
industry (management and union) is unable to find a solution to the unsettled 
conditions, then it is imperative that governmental action be taken without 
delay to prevent any further waste of the country's resources, by imposing on 
disputants machinery for the speedy and impartial settlement of the 
differences. Trials of strength are wasteful and costly to the economy ... The 
labour movement continues to think that its strength lies in strikes. This may 
be true if strikes were cost free and were labour's only remedy. But, in fact, 
they are not (ibid: 152, 168). 
It was the first such award which directly penalized the workers for taking strike 
action. Unfortunately, the parties to the dispute and the government were apparently 
only interested in the immediate resolution of the conflict. The issues with respect to 
wages and profit sharing were addressed, and the struggles by workers continued, 
with no effort being made to establish proper machinery for the resolution of disputes 
between management and the workers. However, workers suffered by this tribunal 
ruling for 1970 because they were agitating for wage increases which should have 
been implemented twenty one months earlier. The late resolution of wage claims had 
been commented on by previous commission reports (Guya Persaud 1968). If heed 
had been taken of such comments the workers might have been less restive and major 
disruptions might have been avoided. 
The award of the Lowachee tribunal was also in sharp contrast to what the Industrial 
Court awarded the sugar workers of Trinidad for the same period and what was 
agreed upon between the Barbados Workers Union and the sugar planters for workers 
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In Barbados. Both Trinidad and Barbados produced less sugar than Guyana but 
supplied the same markets, purchased spares and other equipment from the same 
suppliers and operated under similar conditions. Yet as we see from table 3.1 below, 
workers in those countries enjoyed greater wage increases and levels than their 
Guyanese counter parts. The progressive wage movements over the years in those 
countries within the Caribbean resulted in superior wages and conditions when 
compared with the Guyanese sugar workers, whose conditions in the 1930s had 
surpassed those in the other West Indian Colonies (Giglioli 1938: 3). 
Lowachee was also appointed sole Arbitrator for the years 1971 to 1973, after the 
MPCA and the GSP A failed to reach an agreement following conciliatory talks at the 
Ministry of Labour. For these three years the workers were awarded increases of 5% 
1971; 5% 1972; and 7% 1973. These increases moved the minimum wage from $4.25 
in 1970 to $5.01 per day in 1973. The significant feature of this tribunal was the 
speed with which it completed its work. What took place was that the MPCA and 
SP A agreed to refer their disputes over wages and profit sharing to Arbitration under 
section 4 (1) (c) of the Labour Ordinance. This enabled the Minister to appoint the 
tribunal, once he was satisfied that the dispute was injurious to the national interest. 
By this process the cost was borne by the Ministry of Labour and not the Parties to 
the dispute. 
Table 4. 1: Wage Increases 
Year Barbados Trinidad Guyana 
1969 10% 10% 8.9% 
1970 12.5% 7% -
1971 15% 5% 5% 
1972 20% 12.5% 5% 
Total 57.5% 34.5% 18.9% 
Sources. Lowachee Reports, 1970; 1972. 
Guya Persaud Report, 1968. 
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The previous Lowachee Tribunal was similarly appointed. If the Tribunal was set up 
in accordance with the provisions of the Collective Agreement between the SPA and 
the MPCA, then the cost had to be shared equally between the parties, and the 
person(s) so appointed had to be agreed upon. The process in which the Minister was 
allowed to select the tribunal was to avoid delay over haggling over names. The 
incentive to the MPCA was its savings in such a costly process. The union was 
already under severe financial constraints with the decline in its membership. 
Lowachee, was once more appointed as lone arbitrator in June 1972, and following 
the exchange of memoranda by the parties on June 20th, a hearing was held the next 
day in private to conclude the matter. There was some additional written information 
supplied to the Arbitrator, who submitted his report on July 7, 1972, exactly one 
month after his appointment. This was the shortest period within which any tribunal 
has ruled on the question of wages and only after one sitting. There were no disputes 
in 1973, for though the wage settlement would normally have been for 1972 the 
parties, at the time they accepted arbitration over their initial dispute, agreed that the 
year 1973 also be decided upon by the tribunal. 
Some representatives were of the view that the SP A, ~CA, and the Government 
were merely going through the motions by allowing third party intervention. This was 
because of the state of industrial relations in the sugar industry and the ~CA'S 
inability to win the confidence of the workers. Moreover, there was no serious 
attempt on the part of the parties to the tribunal to address the issues of the workers in 
a genuine way. However, a management official later explained that it was prudent to 
get an arbitrator who had just concluded an exhaustive investigation into the industry 
to adjudicate over the dispute so as to save time (Interview: October 1994). The 
union representatives, however, reflecting back upon this experience, claimed that 
what was taking place was a cover up and a mere shifting of responsibility to a third 
party. One senior trade union official expressed the view that the collective 
bargaining process was heavily undermined by having a union which did not have the 
respect and confidence of workers to bargain on their behalf Because the recognition 
issue was not resolved, the problem of reaching an agreement around the bargaining 
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table was likely to continue and the servIces of a third party routinely required 
(Interview: August 1994). 
Arbitration Tribunals Under Pressure 
Following the setting up of the Lowachee Arbitration Tribunal in 1970, nearly 6,000 
workers took protest industrial action on August 17, against the delay in the 
proceedings of the Tribunal. This strike resulted "in the loss of 12,636 work days and 
$70,254 in wages" (Ministry of Labour Report 1970:42). The GAWU was not going 
to be left on the sidelines when the MPCA had been able to draw some 11,500 
workers on strike earlier in the year. The rivalry was causing them to seek to outdo 
each other. GA WU therefore decided to show its strength once again, the first on this 
scale since 1964. They had sensed that the workers were in a mood to struggle. They 
therefore prepared the foundation for another general strike by asking their 
representatives to participate fully in the August 17 strike and at the same time 
mobilised the workers for the conflict which they anticipated would follow. 
They did not openly advocate anything in the August strike, since it was not as 
effective as the MPCA organised strike in March, lacking wider organisation as it was 
the workers who were flexing their muscles. It would not have been tactical for 
GA WU to be associated ,with a strike which was less effective than one called by the 
union they were seeking to replace. Their representatives were organising 'bottom 
house' meetings in the extra nuclear areas where sugar workers are consolidated. This 
August mini-general strike influenced the start of the Arbitration tribunal. The 
GA WU mobilization reached its peak during the August strike with several meetings 
throughout the country. Upon the heels of the mini-general strike, the workers came 
out in full force on September 2, with 14,118 on strike demanding the recognition of 
GA WU and the payment of an interim relief. The support was obviously heartening to 
GA WU, who had every reason to be worried that MPCA had been able to influence 
such a large section of the workforce earlier. This strike lasted for a total of 24 days 
and resulted in a loss of 139,374 work days and $799,528 in wages to workers (ibid). 
There was no settlement when the union called off the strike. In fact, the employers or 
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the Ministry of Labour would have found it difficult to intervene since an arbitration 
tribunal was looking into the question of wages. This action could be seen as a 
response to the MPCA strike. 
The anxiously awaited Lowachee Report was out on October 14, 1970. Workers had 
taken time to examine the benefits it brought, while earning some much needed 
dollars. Then on November 13, a few estates had their workers downing tools over the 
inadequacy of the award. Word of this action only had to reach the other estates and 
their workers also joined the strike, making it even larger than the one that was called 
for GAWU's recognition, with 15,988 workers participating. This strike had an even 
more serious effect on production. The Minister of Labour became personally 
involved and since it was a workers' strike he invited the MPCA, GA WU and SPA to 
a series of meeting, following which there was a full resumption on November 26, 
1970. The strike resulted in a loss of 114,308 person days and wages to the sum of 
$647,574 (ibid). 
There were also a number of strikes on various locations where workers, especially 
cane cutters, were alleging that the cane scales were defective. Their demand was for 
an observer from their group to be present at all times to verify the weighing of the 
canes. This demand resulted in the election of representatives to monitor the scale as 
we will see later. What was also of significance was that at AlbionIPort Mourant 
area nearly 2,500 workers took solidarity action for two days over the arrest of two 
PPP members in a shooting incident in which two PNC Councillors from the Sheet 
Anchor village were shot. 
In assessing the industry'S performance at the end of 1970, the Booker Chairman, 
Powell, had this to say "Guyana's sugar industry had a difficult year because of 
serious labour troubles due to rivalry between the two main unions. Both tried to 
show superior support by calling out their respective members, and as a result the 
industry lost 410,000 work days. Untimely rain added to the difficulty" (Booker 
Report 1970: 28). While there was a . loss of production of 50,000 tons and foreign 
exchange loss of £2 Y2m to Guyana, the industry was able to sustain a profit and in 
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fact achieved a production of 3 11, 149 tons of sugar. 
What was also of consequence between 1965 and 1971 was that both uruons 
registered a reduction of paid union members by about 5000. The MPCA reported 
that it membership dropped from 20,000 in 1965 to 15,000 in 1970 while the GAWU 
membership report showed a decline from 14,565 to 10,536 for the same period, at a 
time when the inter union rivalry only once occurred at a national scale on sugar 
estates (Ministry of Labour Reports). Perhaps it was because of this inactivity that 
efforts were not made to go on a full scale membership drive. Under labour legislation 
in Guyana, the trade unions should have their books, including their membership 
register, audited by the Auditor General's Office, and also file Annual Returns with 
the Registrar of Trade Unions. The MPCA have been in default with respect to the 
audit of accounts for a number of years, so there was no independent verification of 
their membership figures. They have often been accused by the GA WU of "cooking 
figures" in terms of membership and when seriously challenged have been unable to 
even produce the check off slips from the employers to justify the 15,000 which they 
have registered. 
The GA WU, on the other hand, is one of the few trade unions which has its books 
audited and because this union did not enjoy the check off system, the 10,000 
financial members was a remarkable achievement. Without formal recognition their 
method of collection was based on the individual worker paying up to organizers and 
representatives at various locations. However, the drop in membership had to be 
worrying to GA WU given the militancy of the workers and their loyalty to this union. 
With respect to the MPCA all that took place was a sudden drop in membership from 
20,000 to 15,000. The 20,000 was recorded for several years and when the reduction 
took place, the 15,000 was also reflected in the records for a few years. It was not 
possible for the MPCA to have that consistent membership figure, while representing 
a seasonal workforce with changes in employment patterns. The GA WU on the other 
hand showed variation in membership, again suggesting the much greater veracity of 
their records. 
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MPCA on the Course of Defeat 
The MPCA, banking on its success in early 1970, tried to organise another general 
strike on February 22, 1971. This strike call was no doubt intended to counter the 
support of GA WU call of late 1970. It ended as a disaster for the MPCA, because it 
demonstrated that they were unable to mobilise action even around the issue of higher 
wages, which they always regarded as that which gave them the best chance of 
success. The battle lines had been drawn. My investigations have disclosed that the 
workers were advised by the leadership of GA WU not to heed any further call by the 
MPCA (Interviews: October 1994). At the same time the workers' problems were 
increasingly given some attention through their representatives, as the Ministry of 
Labour adopted a more 'hands on' approach to tackling disputes in the industry,. 
Additionally, the records show that agricultural assessors were employed by the 
Ministry of Labour, visiting strike areas whenever there were disputes regarding 
pricing and seeking to resolve them with the representatives of the workers and 
management. Inch by inch the power of the MPCA to settle matters for the workers 
was eroded and then finally, in 1971, the cane cutters, after years of agitation, were 
allowed to elect their representatives to be cane scale supervisors for the purpose of 
round the clock checks on the weighing of canes at various factories. 
Genuine workers' representatives won all the positions, thus humiliating the MPCA 
in areas where it was possible for them to put up rival candidates. "We cut dey ass all 
over" was how one representative put it (ibid). The signal was clear that the 
employers would have to deal with a more militant and conscious workforce and 
hence address the issue of recognition in a serious way. The majority of field 
representatives interviewed, claimed that there have been occasions when the 
workers were getting angry with the GA WU because their claim for recognition was 
not pursued in a vigorous· and systematic way. At times they pointed out that the 
GA WU was merely responding to the MPCA and workers militancy (ibid). 
Sensing some discontent, an attempt was made by the government to bring another 
union into the industry, this time one supportive of the ruling PNC. The Union of 
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Agricultural and Allied Workers (UAAW) announced its intention to organise in the 
industry. This union, which was allegedly funded by the ruling party, had at its helm a 
defector from GA WU, its former Assistant General Secretary, Selo Baichan, who 
previously worked in the sugar industry. There was a rude rejection for the union. It 
could not make inroads anywhere, not even at the location, Vryheid's Lust, where 
Baichan previously worked, and it quickly shifted gear to a few Government work 
locations where recognition was granted without the majority of workers' consent. 
The UAAW then exited from the sugar industry. 
Apart from the failed attempt of the MPCA earlier in 1971 to call a general strike, 
there was no other major strike for the year. The GA WU did not have to respond to 
the MPCA, but there were sporadic work stoppages on the estates for a short duration, 
most of them lasting one day. The industry in 1971 recorded its largest production 
ever, 368,843 tons of sugar. Then GAWU again registered its presence in the industry 
with a series of strikes for recognition in February and March 1972 on various 
locations. The strikers were demanding more than recognition. They wanted profit 
sharing for 1971, a 25 per cent increase in wages, house lots and the early setting of 
targets for annual production bonus, with the involvement of GA WU. This was not 
an all out strike at every location at the same time. It was a "hit and run tactic" being 
deployed by GA WU, as was recalled by a number of representatives. The disruption 
in the industry lasted 16 days with the involvement of 11,499 workers at a loss of 
30,062 person days and $188,977 in wages (Report of Ministry of Labour. 1972). 
On this strategy, the representatives asserted that the GA WU was not waiting for an 
answer, neither were there meetings at either the Ministry of Labour or at the SPA 
level to pursue representation on any of the demands. They simply made their point 
and moved on, as an effective underground movement will do. In any event on any 
matter the workers' representatives had access to the Ministry of Labour, while their 
leaders had direct audience with the Minister of Labour. It was heavily rumoured 
around the industry in 1973 that, following some informal discussions between the 
leaders of GA WU and the Minister, arrangements would be put in train for the 
recognition of GA WU (2). Some of the workers I interviewed much later mentioned 
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that GA WO, while not being an affiliate of the TUC, was involved in many meetings 
with the Minister on issues he had to discuss with organized labour (Interview: 
October 1994). This claim is substantiated by the records of the Ministry of Labour 
(Ministry of Labour Report 1970). 
Apparently with the assurances of recognition, the GA WO was requested to display 
some restraint in its action. The year 1973 passed as a relatively quiet one for the 
industry although the minor work stoppages continued. Workers continued to 
experience frustration, with their demands for higher wages and benefits unheeded, 
and all they received were benefits negotiated by the MPCA through the intervention 
of third parties, either an Advisory Committee or Arbitration. At the local level, 
workers banded together to combat any wrong doing by the estate's management, with 
the collaboration of clerks and other junior staff employees, who were members of 
NAAC lE , and the field and factory workers. There was joint solidarity action by all 
those workers for a short duration on various locations against management's arbitrary 
policies (NAACIE Minutes: 1973). In fact, the coordination of solidarity action by 
the several groups of workers at Albion Estate created near chaos at that location in 
1973, to the extent that the Minister of Labour was forced to set up a committee of 
enquiry early in 1974 to investigate charges laid by workers representatives against 
the Personnel Manager, Anthony Downes. There were calls also for his removal from 
the Estate (Semple Report 1974). 
The relative restraint with which the recognition dispute was handled by GA WO 
since 1969 can be examined in the light of (a) the Government's apparent concern for 
workers' rights since the appointment of Carrington as Labour Minister and (b) the 
Government's "anti-imperialist" posturing, despite the fact that it had engaged in 
dubious actions in seeking power at the 1968 General Elections. Then Burnham 
began talking of "ownership and control of our national resources and had served 
notice since 1970 of our intention to miniaturise foreign owned banks and to make the 
Guyana National Co-operative Bank, the bank for mobilising and deploying 
Guyanese savings in Guyana" (Burnham 1974:25). 
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The PNC also tabled a Trade Disputes Bill in 1969, which the Minister claimed was 
"designed to cause management and unions to enter into agreements which provide 
effective collective bargaining procedures." (Carrington. nd: 4) This Bill was, 
however, seen in a different light by the NAACIE which viewed it as a means of 
outlawing strikes and successfully argued at the 1970 TUC Conference for its 
withdrawal (TUC Report 1970, NAACIE General Secretary Report 1969:4). With the 
opposition of the TUC to the Bill, the Government withdrew it and promised a full 
investigation into the laws governing workers' welfare. Five years later the 
government set up a broad based Labour Code Commission for this purpose (Ministry 
of Labour Report 1974. 37) although the recommendations were never implemented. 
The workers continued the pressure on the employers and the MPCA. On March 19, 
1974, almost the entire workforce of cane cutters with the exception of Diamond and 
Wales downed their tools to protest against the quantum allocated as profit sharing. 
This one day strike was endorsed by GA WU. Then on April 22, about 75 per cent of 
the field workers in the industry responded to a call by GA WU for a guaranteed 5 day 
working week; for casual workers with 3 years service to be placed on permanent roll 
and for double time for Sunday and Public holidays. More importantly, workers also 
made a set of national demands. They had heard that the Government had plans to 
institute legislation for the introduction of a levy on the export price of sugar, and on 
May 13 workers at Skeldon, Albion, LBI and Enmore Estates went on a two day 
protest strike against this impending legislation. They also let their concern be known 
about compulsory National Service which was being introduced in the country, and 
against the handing over of Community Centres to local authorities. Word of a strike 
for an interim relief in September reached the ears of the MPCA and having obtained 
the date, they issued an ultimatum to expire on the day of the strike call for September 
21; seeking to appear able to mobilise the workforce. Irrespective of this the workers 
continued with their action and secured a 5 per cent interim relief pending the final 
outcome of the wages negotiations. The workers resumed work on September 30, 
1974. 
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A New Initiative 
Conscious of what was taking place in the industry, the unrest of the workers, the 
increase in the cost of living and the division of the Unions, the NAACIE took the 
initiative to invite the other three unions, MPCA, GA WU and GHU to a conference 
on 27th October 1974 to explore the possibility of a closer collaboration with a view 
to effecting a merger among the unions. This they claimed was intended to "gather 
greater strength to meet the challenges facing sugar workers" (NAACIE General 
Secretary Report: 1975: 19) At the end of the meeting, the unions indicated by way of a 
joint press release that they had met: 
and had full and frank discussion. It was agreed to have a closer co-operation 
in view of the economic plight facing sugar workers. It was also agreed that in 
future united actions will be taken to improve wages and other conditions and 
on other major issues aimed at improving the lot of sugar workers generally 
(ibid:20). 
It was also proposed at the conference that a sub-committee comprising the Presidents 
and Secretaries of all the unions meet to draw up a declaration which would be sent to 
each union for approval. This was approved by all the unions with the exception of 
GA WU which asked for time to consider and to inform the next meeting, which was 
planned for November 2, 1974 (ibid). At that meeting the GAWU agreed to be 
present at a sub-committee meeting fixed for November 4. The :MPCA and the GHU 
did not turn up for that meeting. Then they all agreed to meet ten days later, each 
promising to have a draft declaration for perusal of the other. Only NAACIE turned 
up with a draft, which suggested the setting up of a standing committee and secretariat 
to take action on issues agreed upon from time to time. This proposal was not agreed 
upon by the other unions, which promised to have their own draft ready for a meeting 
to be fixed. "Unfortunately, none of the other unions took any action on this matter 
and the work of the Committee ended in a stalemate" (ibid). 
In the meantime the GA WU had submitted a ten point demand to the Minister and 
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had called an industry wide strike to enforce these demands. The demands included 
the payment of a minimum wage of $11.68 per day, an increase in the cane cutting 
rate from $2.98 to $6.95 per ton, and the immediate release of the Haynes Arbitration 
Tribunal. This was a NAACIE dispute, but GA WU no doubt intended to indicate to 
NAACIE members that they were also fighting the NAACIE members' cause. They 
also demanded a 5 day work week and for casual workers to be given permanent 
employment after having worked three consecutive crops. Women workers should not 
be given more than 8 hours of work per day and there should be transportation from 
home to work areas. The union also requested that the strike days to be treated as 'not 
available days' for all workers, to enable them to qualify for fringe benefits. 
Touching for the first time in a major way on the export levy, the GAWU demanded 
that it must be charged to an excess profits tax, which should be taken after the 
workers were given their 60 per cent profit sharing. Finally they demanded that 
recognition be granted to GAWU (Ministry of Labour Report, 1974:33). None of 
these demands were met nor was there any discussion on them during or immediately 
after the strike was called off. 
Early in the first crop of 1975, the workers dissatisfaction became greater and their 
patience and tolerance gave way. They started a series of strikes on their own on a 
number of estates. NAACIE issued a statement on 22nd February, 1975: 
pledging solidarity and full support for the struggles of the sugar workers. 
Having sensed the fighting spirit of the workers over the delays in settling 
their wage claims by the MPCA, the GA WU called a general strike in the 
industry as of 4th March 1975 (NAACIE General Secretary Report 1975 :20). 
They were seeking to enforce the ten point demands of No v 1974. The SPA forced a 
breakdown at the talks with the MPCA and requested arbitration on the dispute. The 
MPCA, realising that it was bargaining under favourable conditions with the workers 
agitating, refused arbitration and insisted that the dispute should be resolved around 
the bargaining table. In the meantime, on the 7th of March 1975, the GA WU 
requested a meeting of the other three unions in the industry for March 10th, to 
discuss the industrial relations situation in the country. The GA WU representatives 
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informed that meeting that they had met the Minister twice since the strike was called 
, 
and he had notified them that he was satisfied that there were a number of injustices 
meted out to sugar workers and should the GAWU and MPCA put forward a joint 
proposal to alleviate the situation, he would take action by means of "orders of 
Council to correct the situation"( ibid). 
The MPCA representatives then informed the meeting that the Minister had told them 
that should the union continue to oppose arbitration, the Government would enact 
legislation to introduce compulsory arbitration which would force the parties to 
resolve the issue at that level. Having heard those two reports, the unions established 
a sub-committee to prepare a joint memorandum to the Government. With the help of 
economist Clive Thomas of the University of Guyana, the document was ready within 
5 days and dispatched to the Government. The unions also stated their objections to 
any compulsory arbitration legislation (3). Upon receipt of the document, Dr. P.A. 
Reid, Deputy Prime Minister, made a radio broadcast on the evening of March 15, 
1975, that the Government would enact the legislation. 
On 17th March Minister Carrington summoned a meeting of the uruons In the 
industry and instead of addressing the issues raised in their memorandum, he 
informed the unions of the Government's intention to proceed with the legislation for 
compulsory arbitration. This was done on the same day that the Minister denied that 
he had made any promises to GA WU to act on any joint proposals by the rival unions. 
Apparently, he did not expect such a swift response. The united stand of the unions 
and the workers must have scared him and his Government. 
Following the passage of the legislation, the Minister summoned the TUC to a 
meeting on March 19 to inform them of the strike situation in the industry and to seek 
their assistance in finding a solution. The TUC called a meeting of the Executive 
Council the same day and it was decided that the MPCA would be advised to appear 
in front of the Tribunal if the following demands were met: 
1) That an interim relief of 10 per cent for 1974 and a further 10 per cent for 
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1975 based on the 1973 wage rates be paid. 
2) That the SPA agree to implement out of crop guaranteed income for 
workers effective January 1, 1975. 
3) That all strike days be regarded as not available days. 
4) That the employers be compelled by law to make all books and accounts 
and records available to unions. 
5) That the cost of the Tribunal be borne by the Government or the industry or 
both (TUC Minutes). 
These demands were submitted to the Minister by the TUC at a meeting held on the 
following day. The Minister promised to raise all these issues with the appropriate 
bodies. The TUC had previously taken a decision not to have any dialogue with a 
union which was not affiliated to that body and was engaged in rivalry with an 
affiliated union. However, based on the "national interest", and on the insistence of 
NAACIE, the TUC entertained the GAWU representatives at two meetings of the 
Council which discussed the strike situation (4). This was yet another breakthrough 
for GAWU. The Prime Minister, who was acting as Minister of Labour for a short 
while, promptly intervened and referred the dispute to a hat trick of arbitration 
tribunals in March 1975, under s.4(1) (c) of the Labour Act. The Chancellor of the 
Judiciary, V.E. Crane, was appointed sole Arbitrator. 
While the TUC was awaiting a response from the Ministry on their demands, the SPA 
tried to lure workers back on the job by issuing a circular informing them that if they 
were to return to work by April 1 st, all the days that they were on strike would be 
treated as "not available". The workers did not respond to this attempt to undermine 
the strike. The substantive Minister then arranged a joint meeting between the TUC 
and the SPA under his chairmanship for April 3. The talks ended in a deadlock after 
the TUC demands were rejected by the SPA. The NAACIE reviewed the situation and 
issued a 72 hours ultimatum to the SPA on April 7, indicating that if the matter was 
not resolved NAACIE would, after the expiration of the ultimatum, take solidarity 
action with the striking workers (5). The MPCA had by that time broken ranks. They 
decided to appear in front of the Tribunal without any of the TUC demands agreed 
upon and the TUC withdrew from the talks. The management of the various estates 
sought to prevent NAACIE members from joining the strike to the extent that they 
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resorted to acts of intimidation. As a consequence, the LBI Branch came out on strike 
one day before the expiration of the strike notice. The following day, on April 10, the 
entire industry was crippled, as a result of NAACIE joining the strike. Even some 
factory workers who had not responded to the March 4 strike call by GA WU had 
joined the strike. 
The Arbitration Tribunal held its first meeting on April 14, and the SPA offered 
$3,000,000 as an interim relief. The MPCA accepted the offer but the workers were in 
no mood to listen to the MPCA. The TUC again rejoined the discussions following 
the NAACIE strike and again met with the SPA on 17th April: 
The TUC had a more frustrating experience with the attitude and behaviour of 
the SPA. Some TUC executives expressed their unwillingness to meet the 
SP A again. This was good experience for some who thought that the union 
leaders were irresponsible in the sugar industry (6). 
The Minister again met with the TUC, GAWU and NAACIE, along with the SPA on 
April 19, and this time there was a change in attitude of the SPA. The prevailing 
chaotic industrial relations situation forced the SPA to offer another $4 million as an 
advance for 1974 and a 5 per cent increase on the rates from 1st January 1975 as an 
interim relief. "Though all the proposals had not been accepted by the SPA, the 
GAWU decided to call off the strike" (TUC General Secretary Report 1975:20). In 
the light of the GA WU decision, the NAACIE ended their solidarity action. The 
workers resumed work on April 21, 1975 "to be better prepared for the future 
struggles" (7). 
The tribunal submitted an interim report in June 1975, which was followed by a 
comprehensive document two months later. The workers were awarded increased 
wages of 20 per cent for 1974 and a further 10 per cent for 1975, making the new 
minimum wage $6.01 and $6.61 respectively for the two years. The Arbitrator also 
awarded meal allowances to all workers in the MPCA categories to bring them in line 
with what was obtained by the NAACIE categories. 
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What was also significant was the award of compulsory 'out of crop earnings' to the 
sugar workers, based on a set of qualifying criteria. During the non- grinding or non-
harvesting period workers were not guaranteed work, hence no payment was made to 
them. By this award the worker was to be given work to ensure that certain minimum 
sums were received or alternatively should be paid as if s\he worked. The male 
minimum weekly earnings was set at $25.00 while the female was $20.00, provided 
that the employees worked 90 per cent of the days available to them for the last three 
crops. They must be prepared to perform any type of work that could reasonably be 
expected of them and must present themselves daily or as required by the 
management at the 'order line' (place where workers normally meet to receive work 
instructions). Those workers who worked less than the 90 per cent but more than 75 
per cent of the days available to them were given guaranteed weekly 'out of crop 
earnings' of $20.00 and $15.00 for men and women respectively. Guaranteed 
employment for the out of crop period had been a 'sore point' for the sugar workers. 
Their counterparts in Barbados and Trinidad had long obtained such benefits. This 
award, therefore, brought some measure of relief to them. 
However, while increases along the lines of those awarded in Trinidad and Barbados 
were consistently sought by the l\1PCA but were never obtained, on this occasion the 
Arbitrator ruled against taking any consideration of wage increases paid to workers 
outside Guyana. He further ruled out any comparison with the mining and 
agricultural industry. Thus, he ruled out any possibility of increasing wages along the 
lines of bauxite workers. He also did not permit wage comparisons with 
manufacturing industries. "They are poles apart" (Crane Tribunal 1975: 17). While 
the Arbitrator agreed that there was a need to compare like with like to establish a 
reasonable basis for such comparison, he nonetheless ruled out a comparative analysis 
of wage movements and levels of sugar workers elsewhere outside of Guyana. He 
found the SPA's opposition to any such comparison to be more realistic: 
I am rather inclined, however, to the Association's viewpoint that comparing 
levels of wages and remuneration between workers in different countries is a 
most difficult exercise and I fully share their conclusion that the destiny of the 
sugar industry in Guyana must be considered on its own merits and in the light 
of its own problems.... One cannot compare wage levels in West Indian 
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countries without taking full account of assessment of other factors such as net 
revenue, production costs, wage rates, the national economy, the cost of 
living, etc.,etc (ibid: 18). 
Lessons from the Strike 
This strike had an important lesson for trade unionists. With united action the workers 
remained resolute. The employers were effectively pressured into making substantial 
payouts, even before the conclusion of the Tribunal. How is it they suddenly found 
money to pay? Why was this offer not made earlier, thus saving the industry and 
workers from such painful sacrifice? From what transpired and based on past 
experiences it was clear that the employers seldom make reasonable pay offers. They 
did so only when the workers were prepared to engage them in relentless struggles. 
Finally, if the workers were not strong, the vacillation of the leaders, especially those 
of the MPCA, could have had a demoralising effect on their struggles and demands. 
The wavering attitude of the MPCA in the seven week struggle of the workers 
invoked the wrath of the workers. The fact that they ended the strike in unity was a 
good sign for the fresh struggles about to be launched. The NAACIE severely 
criticised the MPCA and publicly called on the workers to disassociate themselves 
from that union (8). 
The Crane Arbitration was the last negotiation conducted by the MPCA, which had 
demonstrated both its inadequacy and its culpability in not promptly presenting the 
wage claim for the 1974-1975 period. When Lowachee made his ruling for 1973 it 
had become apparent that there was enough time, at least seventeen months, for the 
negotiators to do preparatory work and to conduct negotiations with a view to 
concluding an agreement in time for the new application date of January 1, 1974. The 
procedure for beginning negotiations in accordance with the agreement, was for the 
union to submit its claim to the employers at least 90 days before the expiration of the 
agreement. The employer would then examine the union's demands and start 
negotiations. If the procedure was followed with dispatch, and goodwill prevailed on 
both sides, there was no reason why the parties could not arrive at an agreement on 
time. But the records showed that the MPCA was repeatedly guilty in submitting its 
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claim for improved conditions and wages for workers very late. In 1965, the MPCA 
submitted its claim some nine months late; for the 1969-70 negotiations the union was 
again four months late, and in the 1971-72 negotiations, its claim was submitted nine 
months late. In the last instance, there were twenty one meetings directly with the 
employers and a dozen at conciliation, before a deadlock was declared, and arbitration 
agreed (Lowachee 1972). There was no legislative means to settle disputes in a 
uniform way and protracted negotiations did not encourage a climate of harmonious 
industrial relations. 
To the credit of the Ministry of Labour it summoned and held those twelve meetings 
within the space of three weeks from the date on which the request for conciliation 
had been made. This was in sharp contrast to the period of over one year in which 
direct negotiations took place. The problem was that workers had to wait over 
eighteen months after the expiration of a contract before a new one could be put in 
place. This invoked a climate of industrial instability. Further, it was turning the 
collective bargaining process into a vicious cycle of late negotiations. In 1974 the 
MPCA again waited for the agreement to expire by a month before making its 
demand on the sugar producers. This resulted in a four months loss in negotiating 
time - one month after the expiry date, plus three months prior to the expiry of the 
agreement. After failing to put a contract in place within six months of negotiations, 
the MPCA demanded interim relief and sought to enforce its position by calling on 
workers to take industrial action in September 1974. The parties, however, agreed that 
5 per cent interim relief would be paid retrospectively to January 1, pending the 
conclusion of negotiations. The Ministry then intervened by trying to bring about a 
settlement, and held nineteen conciliatory meetings within six months (Crane 
1975:7). But the workers and the GAWU would have none of what the 
representatives described as "pussy footing" and engaged in a spate of work stoppages 
for higher wages, which resulted in the SPA breaking away from conciliatory talks 
with the MPCA as we saw earlier. The SPA then requested the intervention of the 
Minister of Labour, asking it to refer the matter to either Arbitration, an Advisory 
Committee, or to a Commission of Enquiry (Ministry of Labour Report 1975). It was 
then that Crane was appointed. 
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The Final Assault 
Based on the Arbitration Award, the workers received their retroactive payments, 
less the interim payouts. The award gave them a tidy sum to put aside for a further 
mobilisation, which proved to be the final assault. The timing was ripe and the 
weather conditions superb for production when on October 21, 1975 the final assault 
for recognition was launched. The GA WU strike call crippled production. The 
Minister was showing signs of tiredness. As a trade unionist, he knew that the 
workers call had to be answered, but his masters' (PNC) approval had to be given. 
Part of the industry was already nationalized and word was already in the air that the 
Bookers Holdings would also be nationalized. Nothing came out officially from 
Government circles but all the whispers of 'anti-imperialist' and 'socialist' 
transformation of industry during that period had come to fruition. 
With the workers solidly on strike for full recognition, the Government had to act. 
Either it joined forces with the SPA and the MPCA and engaged in an open 
confrontation with the workers with a view to breaking the strike or it allowed the 
recognition of GA WU. The Government agreed to settle the matter. The Minister of 
Labour then met with the SPA and MPCA and requested the SPA to serve notice on 
the MPCA to terminate the recognition agreement which would clear the way for 
GA WU to be recognised without a poll. But the SPA refused to act. 
The Minister then gave GA WU an undertaking in writing that within two weeks from 
the date of full resumption, a poll would be held. Even then, the MPCA tried to delay 
the poll by stating their opposition to it and in fact indicated that they would not 
participate in a poll. However, the Minister went ahead and announced December 31, 
1975 as the day of the poll. The GAWU secured 97.9% of the 21,955 workers who 
voted. The actual result is shown in the table below. After the results were made 
known, the MPCA agreed to have their recognition agreement with the SPA 
terminated, and GA WU entered into a recognition agreement with the SPA on 27th 
February 1976 which took effect from March 1, 1976. Speaking on the GAWU 
victory, the General Secretary ofNAACIE, Bertis Bangaree said: "The GAWU ought 
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to be congratulated on its winning of recognition from the SPA and we hopefully look 
forward to the day when we could effect a merger with it; but in the meantime, we 
expect to enjoy fraternal working relations with the GAWU" (9). The workers were 
jubilant over the signing of the recognition pact. It was won from the planters, who 
had operated in the country, through a system of de facto slavery and misery, which 
had continued centuries of oppression in the industry. 
It was the Chairman, Jock Campbell, who sought to correct some of the harsh 
conditions, who said: "workers are more important than ships and profits" 
(Shahabuddeen 1983:276). Workers in the industry were at long last given serious 
consideration. 
Table 4.2 
Poll Results 
Per centage 
Total number of eligible voters 25,955 Eligible votes Votes cast 
Number of votes cast 21,955 84.59 -
Votes for GA WU 21,487 82.79 97.87 
Votes for :MPCA 376 1.45 1.71 
Spoilt votes 92 0.35 0.42 
The breakdown per estate is recorded in table 4:3: 
Just months after the recognition pact had been concluded with GA WU, the entire 
Booker Empire in Guyana was nationalised on May 26, 1976 with the full support of 
organised labour and vast majority of the Guyanese people. Forbes Burnham, the arch 
rival of Cheddi Jagan, had, for the first time in his political career, almost an entire 
nation behind him over this single act. He asserted "how can a people, bent on owning 
and controlling their resources, pledged to revolutionising their economy and 
economic relations, live with a foreign based corporation which was responsible for 
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over 40 per cent of the country's exports and over 25 per cent of the gross domestic 
product and which, in addition, according to its own admission, brought no new 
capital into Guyana over the last ten years?"(Shahubbudeen 1987:276). 
I 
Table 4.3 
Breakdown of Results 
Estates Votes Cast Spoilt MPCA 
Skeldon 1520 6 26 
Albion 3381 13 41 
Rose Hall 3014 9 51 
Blairmont 2320 8 40 
Enmore 2241 11 27 
LBI 2060 15 25 
Diamond 2128 15 79 
Wales 1548 6 23 
Versailles 695 2 25 
Leonora 1027 3 17 
Uitvlugt 2021 4 22 
Total I 21955 I 92 I 376 I 
Sources: NAACIE General Secretary Report 1976 
Ministry of Labour Report 1975 
GAWU 
1488 
327 
2954 
2272 
2203 
2020 
2034 
1519 
668 
1007 
1995 
21487 I 
The TUC General Secretary, Joseph Pollydore, in welcoming the nationalisation, 
commented: 
Over the years Annual Delegates Conferences of the TUC called for 
nationalisation of the sugar industry. NAACIE should be congratulated as the 
Union which initiated discussion on this matter at a TUC Delegates' 
Conference years ago and its persistent follow up motions for the TUC to call 
on the Government to expedite the nationalisation of the industry. 
The acquisition of this giant concern, which operated in almost every sector of 
the economy, offers a challenge not only to Guyanese management and other 
workers who will run the several new sections into which the business has 
been divided, but it also offers a challenge to every Guyanese to contribute 
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towards ensuring the successful operations of the concern in keeping with the 
country's socialist objective to control and manage its resources. (TUC Report 
1976:18). 
But the nationalisation which was seen as the most definitive act of independence, 
soon became an act of giving more power to the ruling party. The euphoria 
surrounding the nationalisation was only for the moment. 
The GA WU, having replaced the MPCA, showed that it could accomplish what was 
beyond the reach of the MPCA. Within months of gaining recognition, the GA WU 
was able to settle an agreement with the SPA for a 13 per cent increase in wages for 
1976. It then took the bold step of endorsing the scales and increases agreed upon 
between the TUC and the Government for the 1977-79 period, much to the 
disappointment ofNAACIE. 
The Demise of the GFF&SU: The Foremen's Struggles 
1976-1992 
One aftermath of the demise of the MPCA was that the NAACIE was in a position to 
make a serious bid to organise the Field Foremen. There were two previous efforts to 
organise these workers in the 1970's and yet again in the 1980s, involving an 
undertaking by the foremen to join NAACIE. They had signed a collective letter to 
the General Secretary, Mr Charran, to enter discussions with NAACIE in an effort to 
try to effect a merger. The requests by the workers were not entertained and they 
went on a campaign to rid themselves of the GFF&SU. A substantial number of them 
instructed the management of various estates to stop the deduction of union dues 
from their pay packets. That campaign was spearheaded by leading officers of the 
union. They had taken the side of their colleagues after the General Secretary failed to 
act on what they considered to be a reasonable request for a merger with NAACIE. 
The extent of the resignations on the various estates alarmed the management, who 
notified Mr Charran of what was taking place. The foremen had become completely 
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disgruntled. This position IS confirmed by their former representatives whom I 
interviewed in 1994. 
When they were asked if they were satisfied with the representation given to them 
by the GFF&SU, they unanimously claimed that the union was not interested in 
representing their cause with management. It failed to address many grievances 
including the dismissal of a number of their colleagues. They were of the view that all 
the union was interested in was their union dues. They also said that their previous 
General Secretary Mr Charran, now deceased, was a tool of management and 
collaborated with them to deny the workers their fair share for the job they were 
performing. Charran was also a loyal supporter of the former ruling party and because 
of his double loyalty, he was given adequate protection and allowed to coerce 
members into following his line. That was the reason why he did not listen to the 
Executive Members to effect a merger with NAACIE. His was a "one man union" 
(Interview: October 1994). 
When they had enlisted over sixty per cent of the foremen into NAACIE in the 1980s, 
it was then that Charran showed his skills at openly siding with management. He 
made allegations against the acting President of the Union, Mangal Singh, who was 
working at the Diamond location, and the Treasurer, Monty Sukdeo, who was 
working at LBI. Both were disciplined by management and Sukdeo was forced to 
represent himself after he was suspended. The disciplinary measure against him was 
dropped when NAACIE members at LBI threatened to take solidarity action if the 
victimisation did not stop. Sukdeo was subsequently promoted outside the bargaining 
unit. While his promotion was justified, his departure from the ranks and the ever 
present threat of victimisation made the efforts to abandon the GFF&SU a difficult 
proposition. 
The representatives cited two other instances where the former General Secretary 
collaborated with management to prevent the workers from having a union of their 
choice (ibid). The first was in 1977 at the Albion location and the other was in 1985 at 
the Enmore location. On both occasions they succeeded in getting almost all the 
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workers to rejoin the GFF&SU after the workers had resigned en masse (ibid). The 
attempts in the 1980s by NAACIE to organise the foremen were followed by 
discussion between the GA WU and NAACIE in which the GA WU had promised to 
relinquish representational rights for the charge hands and hand them over to 
NAACIE should it succeed in winning recognition for the field foremen. If that had 
been accomplished all the salaried workers would have been under the control of one 
union. The two unions, GA WU and NAACIE could have operated as a federation. 
But that did not materialise and the then GA WU General Secretary, Boysie 
Ramkarran, who was committed to the idea, retired shortly after the discussions 
(NAACIE Report 1983:29). Every time the matter was raised thereafter it was treated 
casually by the GA WU and rejected out of hand by the GFF&SU. As a result the 
NAACIE had, in 1986, taken a decision that the whole question of merger or 
unification of the unions had to come with pressure from local representatives at the 
various locations (NAACIE Report 1986: 39). 
With the death of Charran in 1991, one of the officers was able to secure the services 
of the General Secretary of the U AA W, Selo Baichan, to become the advisor of the 
GFF&SU. It was previously explained that the UAAW was established in an attempt 
to further divide the sugar workers. The members were unhappy over this 
development. Both the GA WU and NAACIE were approached by the workers in this 
grouping, many of whom belonged to both unions prior to their appointment as 
foremen. The NAACIE acted with dispatch and applied for recognition to Guysuco, 
after its Branches had enlisted over fifty per cent of the foremen. Shortly afterwards 
the GA WU also applied for recognition. One official explained that the GA WU was 
not prepared to allow the entry of an ardent critic through the back door onto its turf. 
Hence, every attempt had to made to stop Baichan before he consolidated his position 
in the industry. 
Earlier, the GAWU experienced a degree of poaching in 1980 from the GWU. That 
union had approached several GA WU members and distributed forms to them with 
some success in the factory areas. This attempt by the GWU caused the GA WU to 
request the intervention of the TUC by letter of complaint dated May 14, 1980. It 
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was followed by another letter from the GA WU on July 2, which resulted in a 
meeting of the TUC on July 26, 1980. The meeting was aborted after the GWU 
failed to turn up for the meeting. The campaign was later discontinued (Ministry of 
Labour Report 1980: 16). This incident coupled with widespread dissatisfaction of 
sugar workers over the ending of the 1989 strike in which relations with NAACIE 
became sour, must have influenced the GA WU to try and further consolidate its 
position in the sugar industry. 
Their entry into the race for recognition of the field foremen drew an immediate 
response from the management. Guysuco requested the Ministry of Labour to conduct 
a poll to determine which union has the majority support among that group of 
workers. The poll date was fixed for February 15, 1992. One company official 
explained that a three way contest by the unions was likely to result in the failure of 
any union to secure a clear-cut fifty per cent majority, which would result in the 
removal of trade union representation for this category of workers. The NAACIE had 
recognised this ploy on the part of the employer. Meanwhile, the NAACIE relations 
with GA WU were not anywhere close to the pre-1989 level but were gradually 
improving. The NAACIE decided to request a meeting with the GA WU on the matter. 
During the course of the meetings the GA WU became conscious of the difficulties 
posed by a three corner fight, but was not prepared to back away. It indicated to 
NAACIE that it was going to take a chance at the polls. Continued discussions on the 
issue resulted in the withdrawal of NAACIE which enabled "the GA WU to come out 
with an easy victory" (NAACIE Report 1992 :49). The recognition of the GA WU for 
the field foremen and forewomen ended the existence of a union which was 
registered as the thirty sixth union in the country in 1946. "May its soul rot in hell" 
was how one union official summed up it departure. With the reductions of the unions 
in the industry as a result of NAACIE' s efforts, it would now be for the leaders of 
NAACIE and GA WU, being the remaining unions, to establish a serious working 
relationship as they sought to further improve the working conditions of all those who 
work in the mainstay of the Guyanese economy. 
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Conclusion 
Three themes have been addressed in this chapter, the continued rivalry among the 
unions, the demonstration of worker support for each union through strikes, and the 
settlement of wages through third party intervention. We see how the unions, GA WU 
and l\fPCA, sought to outdo each other by calling strikes on issues to which workers 
were likely to respond. The rivalry also created enormous problems for collective 
bargaining, in that the recognised union was unable to settle any wage package with 
the employers. One of the reasons for this failure was the mistrust of the :MPCA 
which existed among the workforce. Even when the wage dispute was referred to 
arbitration or a commission of enquiry, that did not prevent the workers from taking 
strike action. The situation was therefore one in which procedures were not observed 
by workers, resulting in management's inability to maintain discipline and the lack of 
a stable industrial climate. 
It is difficult to explain why, despite the severe disruptions to production and loss in 
revenue, the employers were adamant in their opposition to recognition of the 
GA WU. Their position seemed to be based on political considerations rather than a 
mere industrial rationale. The employers and the British government, prior to 
independence, collaborated for years to keep the GA WU out. In 1953 the extreme 
position was even taken to suspend the constitution and remove the PPP from office, 
in order to avoid the issue of the workers having a union of their choice. It was the 
closeness of the GA WU with the PPP, the ideological thinking of both organisations 
and the hegemonic control which the PPP sought at both the industrial and political 
level, which the multinational industry and the colonial masters feared most. 
The intentions of the party and union were not disguised at all, since they even 
demonstrated their opposition to NAACIE mobilising the workers into one union, 
when the one-union position was supported by a wide cross section of the workforce. 
When the ruling party adopted an approach to the nationalisation of the commanding 
heights of the economy and got the support of the PPP it became clear that both the 
PNC and PPP came to the realisation that they needed each others support. It was at 
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that time that the decision was taken to have the dispute resolved. The SPA, even at 
that stage, refused to act on the advice of the Minister of Labour, who thus dictated 
the poll and forced the employers to act. The ease with which GA WU was able to 
make the three agreements established that, in times when the relationship of the two 
major parties, PPP and PNC, were not in a sour state, the industrial relations climate 
tended to be less disruptive. The stability was broken on the industrial front shortly 
after the breakdown of unity talks by the two parties in 1977. A long and bitter 
struggle ensued. This strike, with the further interweaving of industrial relations, state 
intervention and political alliances which it involved, is analysed in the next chapter. 
Endnotes: 
1. The NPQ market came about as a result of the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
signed in 1951. It was intended to last up to December 31, 1972 and was executed 
by the Minister of Food on behalf of Her Majesty's Government in the UK and the 
Sugar Producers of Australia, the Union of South Africa, the British West Indies and 
Mauritius. Guyana was allocated a quota of 181,805 tons of sugar. Currently, Guyana 
has a guaranteed market with the EEC of about 182,000 tons at a negotiated price in 
July of each year. Guyana also sells sugar in the USA, Canada, and other Caricom 
countries. 
2. This was disclosed after discussions with former senior officials ofGAWU. 
3. Notes of Meeting held among 4 sugar unions on March 10, 1975, and from 
NAACIE General Secretary Report 1975. 
4. See Reports of TUC and NAACIE for 1975. 
5. Taken from letter by NAACIE to the GSPA dated April 7, 1975. 
6. Address by the General Secretary of NAACIE to its 29th Annual Delegates 
Conference, May 1975. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Press Release by NAACIE, dated 8th April 1975. 
9.Address by the General Secretary of NAACIE to its 29th Annual Delegates 
Conference, May 1975. 
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Chapter 5 
The 1977 Anti Sugar Levy Strike: The unions, 
the state and political alliances 
In the last chapter it was mentioned that the workers on a few locations struck against 
the introduction of a sugar levy imposed by the government in 1974, and this issue 
became even more important in the ensuing years. This chapter investigates the way 
in which the sugar levy became a central issue in relations between the state, 
employers, sugar workers and their unions during the 1970s. In particular it traces the 
constraints which were built into a politicised process of centralised bargaining, the 
increasingly repressive character of state policy, the major problems which workers 
and unions then confronted, but also the efforts to build wider union unity and 
effectiveness in the face of these developments. 
The Sugar Levy Act, No. 22 of 1974, was enacted in Parliament on July 6, 1974. This 
Act imposed a levy, at a graduated scale, on the price received for every ton of sugar 
exported. This decision was influenced by a very marked increase in the price of 
sugar in 1974, following an earlier decline on the world market. In that year, the price 
rose from about £ 140 per ton to £650 per ton for raw sugar on the international 
market. 
The government's justification of the levy was based on its claim that its 
participation in the trade negotiations assisted the sugar companies in obtaining 
higher prices due to changes in market conditions. The companies on the other hand 
claimed that it was their efforts at the negotiations which brought about the change 
in the price obtained and pointed out that the levy was going to have disastrous effect 
on the industry. 
Under the Act the company had to pay to the government tax on the following basis:-
where the price received was in excess of $365 up to $521 per ton, a levy of 55 per 
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cent was applicable~ where the price was in excess of $521 up to $625 per ton, a levy 
of 70 per cent was applicable~ and where the price was in excess of $625 per ton, a 
levy of85 per cent was applicable (sec. 4.1). 
The introduction of this law drew wide condemnation from one of the major unions in 
the industry, the NAACIE. In addition, the tribunal looking into salaries and working 
conditions of workers during that period called on the government to grant as a 
temporary measure some "form of reduction of the rates charged on the levy in the 
event of higher prices for sugar not obtained on the world market ... "(Crane 1975:36). 
The opposition PPP also called on the government to introduce an Excess Profits Tax 
on the industry instead of the levy. However, at meetings with representatives of 
unions, the government argued that the companies could conceal total profit but not 
total production, hence the application of the levy in that form. 
The ·GA WU at that time was not recognised by the sugar producers. However, it 
raised some objections to the levy by linking it to a general strike called to enforce 
recognition. In a ten point demand the levy and profit sharing was highlighted in item 
8, which stated that "the export levy must be charged to an excess profits tax, which 
should be taken after workers were given their 60 percent profit sharing"(Min of 
Labour Report 1974:33). The matter was not vigorously pursued by the GAWU but 
remained a sore point for sugar workers, especially since the employers declared a 
meagre $7.9 m dollars as profit sharing for 1974, in what was considered the best year 
of the industry. 
After the GA WU was recognised in 1976 it had exercised considerable restraint and 
showed goodwill by signing three collective agreements with the sugar companies for 
that year without having to resort to industrial action, commission of enquiry or 
arbitration. This process was a regular feature in the industry prior to the recognition 
of GA WU, as was seen in the previous chapter. The agreements signed included one 
for recognition and the avoidance and settlement of disputes, a wage pact and a 
resolution of the thorny issue of annual production bonus (GA WU/ Guysuco 
Agreements) . 
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This union had, therefore, established an exceptionally good relationship with both 
the former owners and the newly nationalised entity. The year before, the GA WU had 
also worked out a formula with the other unions in the industry, the GHU, the 
NAACIE and its arch enemy the MPCA, on how the levy for 1974 should be 
allocated. They recommended as follows: 
(1 )50 per cent of the levy should apply to increasing wages to sugar workers 
to the level of $91.08 per week. 
(2) 25 per cent of the levy should apply to other workers in the country whose 
wages were below the $91.08 per week to bring their wages up to that level; 
(3) that 12.5 per cent should be put into the price stabilisation fund from which 
money could be drawn to maintain these levels of wages if and when sugar 
prices fell too low and the remaining 12.5 per cent should be placed in the 
Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Fund to speed up housing of sugar workers(I). 
The amount the government collected in levy for 1974 was $130Am, for 1975 it 
collected $225m and for 1976 $66m with substantially higher sums in later years. 
With the extraction of this amount by government from the industry the workers were 
denied about sixty percent of the total sum collected as profit sharing based on 
previous arbitration awards. Therefore, the amount which was proposed by the unions 
as an allocation to workers was less than what they were entitled to under existing 
conditions of service. The government did not listen to the complaints of the sugar 
workers, nor did it heed the proposal put forward by the sugar unions. The GA WU 
then sought and obtained the support of the TUC in its 1976 September congress 
which among other things: 
resolved that this 23rd Annual Delegates Conference of the Guyana Trades 
Union Congress calls on the government of Guyana to adjust the sugar export 
levy, and to establish a new basis for computing profit sharing based on the 
pre levy level of profit (2). 
As on all the other major issues confronting labour, the TUC did very little over the 
next year to find a solution to the vexed question of the levy. The Honorary President 
of the GAWU, Dr C.BJagan, who was also the Leader of the opposition PPP, was 
active in representing the issue with Prime Minister Burnham. During this period, the 
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PPP was in close dialogue with the ruling PNC party and Dr. Jagan personally told 
the: 
... comrade Prime Minister that profit sharing was owed to the sugar workers 
by the former owners for 1974. As a result, the Crane Tribunal was established 
to investigate the issue and to adjudicate GA WU's claim. GA WU was 
represented at the first formal session of the tribunal held on the 20th July 
1976 by its President, Comrade Ramkarran, its General Secretary, Comrade 
Maccie Hamid, and four of its other members. The arbitrator, in accordance 
with the legal procedures of the tribunal requested GA WU to submit a 
memorandum in setting out its case and this the union undertook to do by 
September 1976. (3) 
The GA WU did not continue the representation at that level and apparently did not 
indicate to the tribunal its reasons for not doing so. While representation continued for 
profit sharing between the union and employer, there were also serious discussions 
taking place at the political level between the PPP and PNC. The PPP had initiated 
talks with the PNC for the creation of a national front government. This was a 
changed policy of the party: 
In August 1975 we changed our political line from non cooperation and civil 
resistance to critical support... with the possibility ... to a political 
solution .... Our party's decision to take part in the May Day celebrations 
together with Prime Minister LFS Burnham, and our decision to re-enter 
Parliament no doubt strengthen the resolve (of the government) to go ahead 
with the nationalisation (of the sugar industry).At the same time, the ensuing 
unity of the working class frustrated the plans if any, of the imperialists to 
attack our country (PPP 1977: 29, 30.) 
Although the PNC was an unrepresentative and undemocratic government and had 
not been addressing workers' issues seriously, the PPP, in the light of it's declaration 
of a socialist path of development and the nationalisation of some major business 
entities, felt that it must give its support to the PNC. While the talks were going on it 
appeared that the PPP conceptualised that it would not be prudent for any pressure to 
be put on the government in 1975 and 1976 in the form of strike action over the levy. 
According to the PPP: 
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what is now required is a political solution based on the creation of a National 
Patriotic Front Government including all parties and groups which are 
progressive, anti imperialist and wish to see Guyana take a socialist oriented 
or non capitalist path of development.. .. It will exclude all reactionary, pro-
imperialist, racialist parties or groups (ibid). 
This initiative was intended to push the PNC along the socialist path and at the same 
time blunt any attempt by the "reactionary, bureaucratic bourgeois and petty 
bourgeois classes (which) are exerting their efforts to keep Guyana on a capitalist 
path"(ibid: introduction}. Prior to the launching of the national patriotic front proposal 
on August 9, 1977, the PPP and the PNC were engaged in "unity talks" but these talks 
collapsed in December 1976, over an editorial in the PPP's newspaper, the MIRROR 
on November 28, 1976 captioned" Guns Instead of Bread". The article attacked the 
government over its withdrawal of subsidies on essential food items and increased 
spending on the armed forces. The PNC leader was furious over the article and called 
on the PPP for a retraction of the editorial (ibid.). The PPP refused and the talks 
collapsed. The PPP's concept of unity in struggle seemed not to find favour with 
Burnham. 
The second initiative launched by the PPP after months of consultation with their 
members and their central committee, was through a press conference on August 9. 
This was no doubt intended to capture the attention of PNC delegates who were 
preparing for their second Biennial conference which was held from August 12-20 
1977. The PPP's position was heavily criticised by some sections of the population, 
especially the Indian middle class who saw it as a sell out and total submission to a 
dictator. But the PPP was unmoved, it argued its position from an ideological stand 
point and cited cases where internal divisions in countries pursuing socialism created 
fertile grounds for military take overs which resulted in the setting up of right wing 
dictators: 
Experience has shown in the Dominican Republic at the time of the popularly 
elected Bosch government that imperialism will resort to force when the left is 
permitted democratic freedoms and is growing. In Chile, the imperialists and 
the reactionaries resorted to the military solution after they saw ... Salvador 
Allende, despite all intrigues against it, had increased its electoral strength 
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from 36 per cent... in the 1970 ... to 43 percent... in April 1973 ... In Argentina, 
for instance, after the death of Juan Peron, his wife Isabella Peron took over as 
President and moved to the Right. In the ensuing fierce struggle between the 
left and the right inside and outside the Peronist movement, the anny moved 
in to 'save the nation' and set up a rightist dictator... Imperialists would also 
prefer an outright rightist military dictatorship because it does not completely 
trust the PNC ... One thing that our proposal has clearly demonstrated to the 
peoples who are the ones who are really concerned about solving the 
mounting social and economic crisis (PPP 1977: 26-30,2). 
The major and influential political party outside these two at that time, the WP A, 
known for its Marxist views and strong anti PNC position, had this to say about the 
PPP's proposal: 
The WP A does not go along with the details of the PPP's proposals for a 
national patriotic front but it welcomes the patriotic spirit behind the 
proposals. Only a patriotic party will offer such a fonnula to a minority party 
in a time of crisis (4). 
The TUC also agreed that: 
anti imperialist unity is necessary if Guyana is to succeed in the declared 
objective of pursuing a path leading to socialist development of the 
country ... and ... the polarisation of the vast majority of the people along racial 
and political line is an obstacle to such development ... (5) 
One would expect that a ruling party which is desirous of pursuing socialist 
development would grasp at an offer of unity, especially since it has had the 
acceptance of some of the main political and trade union organisations in the country. 
However, the PPP and those who thought this a possibility soon received a rude 
awakening. The PNC leader, half way through his congress, flatly rejected the PPP's 
proposal and in his usual arrogant manner indicated that it was the duty of the PNC 
"to achieve unity in the socialist sense" and a coalition between leaders is merely 
superficially attractive ... "if the Bolsheviks had sought unity with the Mensheviks on 
coalition tenns the history of the Soviet Union would have been differently written" 
(6). Additionally the PNC congress came up with striking anti-labour positions, aimed 
at Union busting and strike breaking tactics. It recommended: 
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that an Industrial Court be set up by government to revise the labour laws 
governing workers and that penalties be devised for dealing with industrial 
malpractice, particularly those perpetuated by trade unions. In this context 
... government should authorise the formation of another union in the sugar 
industry as a means of allowing sugar workers the opportunity of benefiting 
from a trade union along socialist lines ... and ( a) for a regionalised structure 
of this industry so that the implementation of the party's policies might be 
guaranteed;(b) for the formation by party's comrades of an Agricultural 
Workers Cooperatives Society which contract labour as a means of combatting 
the strike situation (PPP 1977:4). 
The PNC was apparently not interested in unity or the stated objectives of its 
conference theme "Economic Liberation Through Socialism". Having 'rigged' the 
1973 elections and giving itself a two thirds majority in Parliament (a position 
verified by a British Parliamentary Human Rights Group headed by Lord Avebury 
and other Human Rights Organisations) it believed that it could rule the country 
without the PPP or any other group for that matter. It was also clear that the PNC had 
informants planted within the PPP and GA WU, because their congress had put a plan 
in place in anticipation of what would happen in the sugar industry. This suggests that 
the ruling party believed that this industry was the main area that they had to 
neutralise, since this industry was the power base of the PPP. 
The rejection, therefore, of the PPP's proposal by the PNC caused the PPP to become 
very agitated and it urged "the Guyanese people to fight for a political solution as the 
only way to solve the crisis and avert the danger facing the nation"(ibid:2).Within a 
week of the PNC's response, the GA WU served notice on the sugar industry to take 
industrial action over the non payment of profit sharing for 1974. The strike started 
following the expiry of a seventy two hour deadline timed from the receipt of the 
notice. The TUC requested the GA WU to hold its hand so as to allow that body to 
explore the possibility of breaking the deadlock on the levy and profit sharing. 
GAWU was unmoved since the issue had been in the lap of the TUC for nearly a year. 
A crippling strike ensued in the sugar industry, beginning on August 23, 1977. The 
government immediately dubbed the strike political and in a show of force resorted to 
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anti- working class measures. Over six thousand scabs were recruited on a permanent 
basis, and public servants, the army, para- military and prisoners were redirected to 
the cane fields. The government also resorted to repressive measures and scores of 
union representatives were arrested and charged by the police for strike related 
offences. Within a week of the general strike, Parliament was summoned, the 
standing orders suspended, and two pieces of repressive legislation approved. The 
Summary Jurisdiction (Appeals Amendment) Bill was introduced, ostensibly to 
prevent hardened criminals, upon conviction, from abusing the appeal system in a 
way which allowed them to stay out of prison pending the hearing and determination 
of the appeal. The aim, however, was to target leaders of striking workers for unduly 
long detention. Part 2 of the National Security Act was also reactivated. This 
legislation allowed the Government, as was feared, to detain strike activists without 
trial, restrict the movement of individuals and institute curfews. 
Both pIeces of legislation were hurried through all their stages in Parliament on 
September 1, 1977, without the opposition members of parliament having any chance 
to study them. The Guyana Human Rights Association (GHRA) , the Guyana Bar 
Association (GBA) and the major opposition parties were not impressed that the first 
mentioned legislation had anything to do with hardened criminals. Its timing and 
police action spoke volumes. Within two weeks of the strike over "100 activists of 
GA WU have been arrested on flimsy excuses. Most have been charged for 
intimidation"(ibid: 6) The government at that time had tremendous influence over the 
Courts especially the Magistracy, where many magistrates were often referred to as 
"cow boys" by the ordinary man in the street, and they were heavily under the control 
of the ruling party. This was evidenced in the lack of reasoning in decisions given in a 
number of cases which have been decided against anti- government protestors. The 
intention was, therefore, to scare unionists and workers away from demonstrations 
and other peaceful activities permitted in any civilized society. There was the clear 
signal that, once charged, the activists could spend years in prison. So strong was the 
influence of the ruling party on the Courts that it had its flag hoisted in front of the 
Court of Appeal Building and it took mounting pressures from human rights and other 
groups to have it removed. The Court was not the only institution used to put pressure 
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on striking workers. 
The police continually targeted vehicles transporting foodstuff intended to be 
distributed as strike relief, resulting in tons of foodstuff being confiscated. Motor 
vehicles used for strike activities were impounded, including a car which was used by 
the leader of the opposition in the New Amsterdam area, on suspicion of it having 
stolen parts (PPP 1977:7).The government went on an open campaign against the PPP 
and GA WU and accused them of having something to do with fires which occurred at 
two government rice mills and at Demerara Timbers Ltd. complex. It was clear from 
the very beginning that the government was not interested in settling the dispute with 
the GAWU. Instead, it was bent on using strike breaking techniques to crush the 
workers' struggles regardless of the cost and the consequences for the sugar industry. 
The government strategy to deal with GA WU and other militant unions was hatched 
at the ruling party's congress in August. PNC supporters who were mobilised to cut 
canes in the fields ended up collecting free cutlasses, files and water bags at great cost 
to the industry without ever reaching the back-lands. Others who went into the fields 
found the job too daunting and never went back after a day or two, or escaped without 
ever returning their tools (7). The recruitment exercise continued unabated. It was in 
short, the mobilisation of the state apparatus against the striking sugar workers. The 
leadership of GA WU was not prepared for a long struggle and in fact indicated very 
early that they would like to ensure that a suitable machinery be set up to properly 
investigate the issue. But the government was uncompromising and set out "to teach 
the GA WU a lesson"(8). 
A fight of this kind by any union would be a difficult task, since the PNC had almost 
total control, through coercion, of the entire state sector, the military and para-
military. During that same period, sociologist Ken Danns indicated, on the basis of 
research, that one out of every thirty Guyanese was a member of the disciplined 
(military and para - military) service. Additionally, the consolidation of state power 
was rapid and decisive in that: 
bureaucratization has accompanied state penetration into the economy and the 
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increasing necessity of the ruling political elite to regulate on its behalf all life 
in civil society (Thomas 1987: 178). 
The control and muzzling of the mass media, coupled with the denial of any rights of 
union officials to hold public meetings to explain their position on the strike, allowed 
only for the government propaganda against the striking workers and their Union. 
Fortunately, the Guyanese public by then had become accustomed to the repressive 
nature of the regime, both in using and seeking to justify the use of its militia men to 
break strikes which had been legitimately called by workers. 
Previous Attacks On Workers 
These developments cannot be understood in isolation. They must be seen in the 
context of a longer history of repressive actions, and also in relation to the longer-
term political incorporation of many trade unions. During the 1970s several unions 
complained to the TUC about the unnecessary use of PNC thugs and military 
personnel at strike scenes. The repressive intent of the regime was exposed in 1970 
when a draft Trades Disputes Bill aimed at making strikes illegal was circulated to the 
TUC for comment. Pressure by NAACIE forced the TUC to reject the Bill with 
caustic criticism coming from General Secretary, lH.Pollydore: 
No democratic government with genuine socialist objectives would 
consciously enact laws that would abolish or even abridge an important 
fundamental right - such as the right to strike. The government itself by now 
must be convinced of the utter futility of enforcing anti-strike laws as a means 
of improving industrial relations or increasing productivity (TUC Report 
1971: 14). 
The union official had also argued that many countries with anti-strike laws have 
found it impossible to enforce them effectively. Workers at times defy the law, and 
the imprisonment and violence which have been associated with the enforcement of 
such laws have ended with workers strengthening their resolve and in "some cases 
impel[ ed] them into forging new political alignments" (ibid). The criticisms were so 
widespread that the government decided to shelve the Bill. However, the ruling PNC 
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party did not stop their attacks on striking workers. 
During a one week general strike in the Bauxite industry in April 1971, the use of the 
security forces was very evident and threats and intimidation were prevalent, resulting 
in twenty three workers charged for offences allegedly connected with the strike. The 
intervention of the TUC resulted in these workers being released from custody on 
bail. These and other actions by the police and military personnel resulted III a 
meeting with the Prime Minister: 
over the use of troops as strike breakers, and the presence of armed police at 
the locus of strikes. A number of affiliates reported that almost immediately 
strikes involving their members began, armed police besieged the strike 
locations. In other instances troops took up strategic positions, while others 
loaded vessels with cargo (ibid). 
The TUC was not forceful in its demand that the army should not be used as strike 
breakers and the meeting merely confirmed the position of the government that it 
would continue to use the military in trade disputes. This the TUC considered as 
"satisfactory assurances regarding the manner of determining those exigencies which 
may demand the use of troops during industrial disputes ... (and) ... the deployment of 
armed police at strike locations" (ibid). The accommodating manner in which 
negotiations had been conducted between the Government and the TUC on matters 
affecting organised labour allowed for repressive behaviour by the government 
against workers. The situation at strike scenes had not improved and complaints 
continued to be sent to the TUC. 
On May Day 1972 the traditional role of the police, in simply controlling traffic at 
rallies in a relatively orderly way, was broken when workers were tear gassed at Good 
Hope, on the East Coast of Demerara, while on their way to attend a parade organised 
by the GA WU. In other areas workers belonging to the same union were arrested and 
charged by the police for their involvement in marches and meetings (TUC Report 
1972: 19). Despite all the repressive activities by the government against workers, the 
Executive Council of the TUC endorsed the PNC at the elections in July 1973, and 
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their leaders, Messers. Pollydore, Blair, Todd, Ishmeal and Cambridge along with 
Viviene Surrey participated in meetings urging the Guyanese electorate to support the 
PNC at the elections. These leaders may have been able to justify their endorsement 
of the PNC at elections in 1964 and 1968 to some of their members, but based on the 
repressive nature of the PNC before the 1973 elections, the union leaders should have 
been more circumspect. 
During the election, the massive 'rigging', including the seizure of ballot boxes by the 
army and the terror which it had unleashed against the Guyanese public, resulting in 
two deaths and the arrests of several others (PPP 1978), were not condemned by the 
TUC. Instead it applauded the results and pointed out that "the return of the PNC 
Government at the July elections with the overwhelming majority it has achieved 
gives real hope that during the next five years Guyana should witness continued 
progress"(TUC Report 1973: 19) Yet, further on the TUC admitted that the 
"worsening unemployment situation" was a source of concern (ibid). The TUC's 
action was seen as an endorsement of the oppression which had been exerted by the 
government against a people. 
It was not only sugar workers who had come under attack, but every major section of 
the working class. The bauxite workers, however, were the ones who received the 
worst treatment by this regime in as much it is claimed that the bauxite community 
was the strongest base for the PNC. The workers were not led by the union officials 
who caused their union, the GMWU, to be affiliated to the PNC. They were led by a 
militant group of shop stewards and it was this group that came in for special 
treatment. In the midst of a strike in the bauxite industry in December 1976 forty of 
the shop stewards were arrested and tear gassed while they were in the prison cells. 
The strikers were threatened with dismissal and soldiers and police were mobilised to 
perform their duties (NAACIE Reports, 1977/ 1980). It was also the period in which 
a leading academic, Walter Rodney, was denied the right to be employed at the 
University of Guyana. The PNC controlled University Board vetoed the decision of 
the Academic Board, which had supported the application of Rodney to be employed 
at the University (ibid). 
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These despotic actions had taken place during an era when the PNC had transfonned 
itself from a "cooperative socialist party to a Marxist- Leninist party" (TUC Report. 
1975) to coincide with the philosophy of the major party at that time, the PPP. Trade 
Union affiliation to the ruling party was also accelerated and among the unions which 
affiliated were the GLU, Guyana Public Service Union (GPSU), Guyana Teachers 
Union (GTU), Amalgamated Transport and General Workers Union (AT GWU) , 
Guyana Postal and Telecommunication Workers Union (GPTWU), Guyana Mine 
workers Union (GMWU), GWU, UAAW and a few paper unions. The 1975 Congress 
of the ruling party endorsed the following recommendations of one of its workshops 
on the role of labour: 
1. During this period, Unions should make funds available annually for 
education of workers in programmes approved by the state. 
2.Punitive measures should be meted out to party members who support trade 
unions whose aims and objectives are not consistent with the revolutionary 
movement. 
3. Salaried unionists should be phased out because this encourages such 
leaders in supporting any unjust demands by the workers . 
4.Trade Unions operating in the public sector must be affiliated to the party, 
since unions not affiliated can undermine the aims and objectives of the party 
and government. 
5. An industrial relations Bill should be introduced through unions affiliated to 
the party and the party should establish a system to determine the necessity for 
strike action. 
6. It is incumbent on all party members to ensure that the trade unions are 
affiliated to the party. 
7. Non affiliated unions whose members belong to the party should, through 
the executive of that union, urge affiliation (TUC Report 1975: Introduction). 
The Prime Minister was emphatic. His was the paramount party and the public sector 
had to pledge allegiance to the party. The heads of all state agencies and the civil 
service were summoned at short notice to attend any event of the ruling party, 
including General Council meetings. He claimed that: 
a massive campaign has now been launched in which there can be no place for 
the disinterested and non- conformist who envisages freedom in tenns of 
indulging in the practices and attitudes which were part of the colonial order. 
We did not win political freedom from colonialism to protect the freedom of 
colonialism to poison and mislead our society and divert us from our national 
goals (Bumham 1974:26). 
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For Burnham, strikes and other fonns of industrial action had their roots in 
colonialism and ought not take place in his republic. The PNC was therefore ready to 
do battle with all those who sought to question the government, irrespective of race. 
Black workers and academics who opposed the regime were ruthlessly attacked. The 
efforts made by the regime to break the sugar strike in 1977 following the breakdown 
of the unity talks must therefore not be seen in isolation. An important implication of 
these developments was that the claim, made by some politicians, that the PNC 
should be seen as a racist party, could no longer be sustained, since it showed that all 
those who challenged the administration came in for 'special treatment'. 
Attempts At Settling The Strike 
The propaganda waged against GA WU and the striking workers only impressed the 
rapidly declining party supporters. With the early mobilisation of the entire state 
machinery and the harassment of hundreds of GA WU supporters it was evident to the 
workers' leaders that a tactical retreat had to be undertaken, since it was unlikely that 
there would have been a satisfactory outcome. The issue of the strike was therefore 
taken to the level of the TUC within four weeks of its commencement. The NAACIE 
initiated a meeting with the unions operating in the sugar industry as well as the 
UGWU and CCWU to discuss the strike situation, following which a letter was 
dispatched to the TUC which criticised that body for remaining silent while 
repressive activities were conducted by the government against striking workers. The 
five Unions, CCWU, UGWU, GHU, MPCA and NAACIE, urged the TUC to: 
abandon its hopelessly negative attitude and take action to have the strike 
ended on the basis of a just settlement of the sugar workers' grievances ... 
(which) have all been properly laid before the TUC (9). 
The GA WU also notified the TUC then that it was prepared to call off the strike on 
reasonable tenns to be negotiated by the TUC. Since the conference of the TUC was 
about to be held, the matter was given top priority and in his presidential address, 
Basil Blair boasted that: 
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there will be no strike in the current period that the TUC when given the task, 
will fail to settle in the interest of the workers. The strike in the sugar industry 
will be no exception (10). 
Immediately after the opening session of the TUC congress the matter came up for 
discussion. A committee of eleven, headed by Ashton Chase, was appointed and 
included two staunch PNC supporters, former Labour Minister Carrington and K. 
Denny, along with Jagan and Ram Karran of GAWU, to study the circumstances of 
the strike and present proposals for its resolution. The Committee submitted a 
unanimous Report, which called on the TUC to take prompt action to negotiate a 
settlement of the dispute using as a guide the traditional terms of resumption, which 
included 'no victimisation, no break in service, workers on the payroll prior to the 
strike shall resume their normal duties and the strike days to be treated as "not 
available days"'. The TUC should also ensure that "all those persons who were 
deployed or recruited during the strike shall be reverted to their original posts or their 
services terminated" (11) The Committee further recommended that the congress 
should agree to the simultaneous adoption of the following motion: 
Whereas a motion was passed at the last conference giving the TUC the 
authority to pursue representations with the government on the question of the 
sugar levy and profit sharing; 
Resolved that this 24th Annual Delegates Conference recommends to the 
GA WU to call off the strike on the basis that generally accepted terms of 
resumption agreed upon including an interim payment; and that the TUC, in 
concurrence with the GA WU pursue expeditious representations with the 
Government on the issues involved in the strike, in view of the decision taken 
at the last conference, with a view to settling the matter within two weeks 
from the date of resumption of work (12). 
The delegates overwhelmingly approved the report of the Chase committee and the 
TUC made contact with the government to discuss the issue. A meeting was fixed for 
the next day, September 25, between Guysuco and the TUC. However, what seemed 
to have been a very simple issue for the TUC to settle became protracted, with 
Guysuco and Government taking up an adamant approach to the proposals of the 
TUC. The main area of difference between the TUC and Guysuco was the removal of 
the 6,132 scabs, which the industry employed on a permanent basis and called "new 
recruits". By October 6, after six meetings, the parties were unable to reach an accord 
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on the scabbing dispute (NAACIE Records). 
Since this was the issue which the unions identified as a serious bone of contention it , 
was decided by both parties that the Ministry of Labour be requested to set up 
conciliatory mechanisms with a view to arriving at a settlement. A very prompt 
meeting took place between the Minister of Labour and the TUC on October 8, and 
after hearing the case put forward by the labour leaders the Minister promised to meet 
with Guysuco and then the TUC. It took eleven days for the Minister to inform the 
TUC that Guysuco was not prepared to withdraw the scabs. Simultaneously, he 
cancelled another meeting fixed for the next day, October 20, and soon thereafter 
dubbed the strike as politically motivated (ibid). 
The Minister of Labour indicated that the GA WU did not follow the procedures laid 
down in the collective agreement for the avoidance and settlement of disputes and 
therefore it would be wrong for him to chair a meeting between the TUC and 
Guysuco when there was no industrial basis for the strike. By serving notice to call 
the strike and then carrying through the action, the GA WU violated the 
. aforementioned agreement, hence acceptable industrial relations principles could not 
be used as a basis for settling the dispute. The Minister asserted: 
There is no question that GUYSUCO is and has always been willing to 
negotiate with GA WU any claim the union may feel it is justified in making 
on the subject of profit-sharing during the period 26th May 1976 to 31 st 
December 1976 ... and for the period 1975 and up to May 25, 1976 must be 
made against the former owners of the sugar industry (13). 
He urged the TUC to advise the GA WU to end the strike without any terms of 
resumption and indicated that there will be work for everyone in the industry, 
including those who were recruited since the strike started. The strike, the Minister 
emphasised: 
is regarded by my Ministry as a political action taken in the name of a trade 
union under the direction of the opposition Peoples Progressive Party ... you 
realise that GA WUIPPP efforts seek to cut the supply of oil and, by other 
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representations, to prevent the unloading of shipments of sugar in the United 
Kingdom, both efforts designed to cripple the economy and endanger the jobs 
of thousands of workers particularly in the bauxite and other industries(14). 
The TUC and the sugar unions were unimpressed by the Minister's response. The 
TUC took the position that the continuation of the strike was as a result of the 
failure by Guysuco to remove the scabs. As a consequence, the TUC could not 
advise the GA WU to call off any strike without an agreement to such a fundamental 
issue. Further, since September 25, the GA WU agreed to the TUC's position that the 
strike should be ended once an agreement had been arrived at between the TUC and 
Guysuco and in this regard the TUC had shown flexibility while the employer and the 
Government had been intransigent on the issue of scabbing. Moreover, there were 
several cases where strikes have been labelled political in order to evade the real 
issues. Under a PPP government, the 1963 political strike against the Labour 
Relations Bill ended after an agreement had been arrived at with the government for 
the removal of scabs. In the transitional stage from capitalism to socialism the TUC 
averred that: 
the workers never anticipated that they would witness ... a nationalised industry 
would be in a much stronger position than the industry had been under 
capitalist ownership, to show resistance to the acceptance of traditional terms 
of resumption and be allowed to remain steadfast...while the country's 
economy suffers seriously (15). 
It was the TUC's position also that the situation in Guysuco would heighten the 
feeling among workers that the pattern of industrial relations in nationalised industries 
would continue to remain in the antagonistic manner as it was under the capitalist 
owners. Such a situation would lead to: 
frustration, lack of commitment and indifference on the part of workers 
stemming from the fear that if they go on strike, strikebreakers would be 
recruited and offered permanent employment. Such development would 
adversely affect the general economy of the country (16). 
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Following the TUC's letter, Bertis Bangaree, General Secretary of NAACIE, took 
issue with the position of the Minister. He pointed out that profit sharing is a 
negotiable matter between union and management, hence a strike on such an issue 
was industrial. There were instances where the employer violated collective 
agreements and those actions have never been dubbed political. Bangaree also 
mentioned that even the former owners complained that the levy was making it 
difficult for the industry and Guysuco equally urged a modification of it, resulting in 
the remission of $31m of the $58.6m payable under the Act for the year 1976. As to 
the criticism that GA WU did not follow the procedure, Bangaree mentioned that early 
in the spring crop of 1977 the union had served an ultimatum on Guysuco and at the 
request of the TUC the strike action was deferred, but nothing was done to bring the 
issue close to a resolution. As a consequence, the strike was called after months of 
foot dragging. Therefore, the allegations that the strike was political were misplaced: 
The strike you say is political. This is disputed. But assuming it is political -it 
is not illegal. In our view therefore, you cannot abdicate your responsibility to 
work for an honourable resolution of the impasse... . In all the previous 
political strikes the accepted normal resumption terms were subscribed to. 
This is the first such occasion in which the retention of scabs is being insisted 
on - and alas, with a tenacity that seems to know no bounds (17). 
The N AACIE had also placed its members on a state of alert to take solidarity strike 
action if the issue was not resolved. Its executive council meeting of October 16,1977 
made a substantial donation of $50,000. to the strike fund of the GAWU. When it was 
clear to NAACIE that the Government was adopting a dilatory attitude on the scab 
issue, the union called out its entire membership on strike as from November 21st, for 
two weeks. But the solidarity action did very little to change the position of the 
government. Several international trade union organisations wrote to the government 
to express outrage at its action in retaining the scabs. Among them was the Oilfields 
Workers Trade Union of Trinidad, which indicated that so long as the issue remained 
unresolved the embargo placed on oil destined to Guyana from Trinidad would 
continue. Two shop stewards from Tate and Lyle refinery in UK, Terry Hardy and 
John Wheatley, visited Guyana and informed the Guyanese public on their effective 
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blockade of Guyana's sugar at ports in the UK in solidarity with the striking sugar 
workers. Their presence in Guyana forced an admission from the government, which 
had previously denied press reports that ships with sugar from Guyana were held in 
UK ports without being discharged (Minister's Letter to TUC, 27th October 1977). 
The Caribbean Council of Churches, at a meeting in Georgetown, endorsed two 
resolutions calling on the government to listen to the representation of the TUC and 
withdraw the scabs with a view to bringing the issue to an end. They also made a 
financial contribution to the strike fund inclusive of the amount raised from individual 
delegates to the conference (18). 
Despite international pressure and severe damage to the national economy the 
government held finnly to its position. The Minister of Labour met the TUC twice 
after the TUC and NAACIE appeal, on November 11th and 16th. Based on the lack of 
urgency in convening meetings to discuss the scab issue, the government had 
displayed a callous approach in handling an industrial relations dispute and showed its 
intent of forcing the workers into submission. Surely if the government had any 
intention of resolving the issue it would have acted in a more positive manner, rather 
than convening a mere six meetings in 102 days, ie. from September 26 to January 5, 
1978. While dilatory tactics were used by the government, the state media went on 
the offensive against the workers and their union, by accusing union leaders of 
seeking to destabilise the government and encouraging acts of sabotage in the 
country. The TUC did not have the courage to publicly state their position on the 
strike or the scab issue despite the fact that their position was often misrepresented by 
the Government. They had also refused to allow the GA WU to use the weekly "Voice 
of labour programme" allocated to the TUC by the state radio, to discuss the strike 
lssue. 
Having displayed the TUC's lack of courage and inability, for yet another time, to 
force the government into treating organised labour with respect, the sugar workers 
had indeed been forced to retreat after being on strike for 135 days - from August 
23rd 1977 to January 5th 1978. The workers' funds had been depleted, and several of 
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their leaders arrested and charged with strike related offences. A senior manager 
employed at the Blairmont factory, Mahazrudeen, was dismissed for his refusal to 
carry out orders outside his job description - to be engaged in strike breaking 
activities. He later won his case in the Courts based on representation by Ashton 
Chase (NAACIE Report 1980). 
The will to struggle on was visible among many of the strikers but, as some of their 
representatives later claimed, they had to contend with the full force of the state 
apparatus with very little support from other sections of the workforce (Interview: 
October, 1994). In addition, they indicated that the union was not prepared for a long 
struggle and at the initial stage did not anticipate such a vicious response from the 
government. The leaders vowed that the battle against the levy would continue and 
that workers who were entitled to profit sharing would have to be paid their fair 
share. They were therefore "adjourning" the strike (19). 
Following the end of the strike three unions, the CCWU, NAACIE, and UGWU, 
severely criticized the TUC for its failure to give militant support to the strikers and 
for its silence on the number of violations which have been perpetuated by the 
government during the strike. The unions attacked the TUC for its refusal to call a 
twenty four hours' protest strike based on a joint request from the GA WU and 
NAACIE, and for abdicating its responsibilities in carrying out "the letter and spirit of 
the instructions given to it by the 24th Annual Conference ... "(20). The strong feelings 
of these unions are reproduced hereunder: 
The methods used to bust the strike - arrest and prosecution of organisers, 
excessive bail, the banning of public meetings, the seizure of strike relief, the 
use of military and para military forces, as well public servants, to do the work 
of the strikers and the mass recruitment and use of scab labour including child 
labour, from the ranks of the unemployed - recall the worst anti-labour 
practices of the capitalist bosses ... When all these is added the threat of 
detention without trial and of curfew under Part Two of the National Security 
Act, it is clear that we fight against a type of neo-colonial barbarism. The 
failure of the TUC even to issue a public statement to condemn the anti union 
actions must be seen as a direct challenge to those unions which respect and 
honour the long line of world trade union martyrs, which cherish the civil 
rights won by this and previous generations and which refuse to accept a 
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servile status for organised labour in any society .... Our unions will continue 
to consult one another on all matters, whether political or industrial, which 
affect the well being of the working class and will continue to raise issues 
which affect the well being of workers and their families. Our unions will 
oppose discrimination in any form and attempts to divide the working class ... 
will continue to denounce the recruitment of scabs, ... will continue to press 
for a solution of the outstanding issues in the recent strike .... must give a 
suitable response to the industrial politics arising from the new situation and 
would expect the TUC to do likewise (21). 
These very strong declarations by the three unions resulted in the forging of an 
alliance with the GAWU. The "four unions", cynically termed "the big four" in 
government circles and by pro- government trade unionists, continued thereafter to 
agitate for improvement in the standard of living of workers. 
An Analysis of the Strike 
There was an accusation by the government that the strike was political. Was the 
strike a political one? A political strike can best be described as one which seeks 
overtly to change a policy of the government or some other political decision 
(Cole, 1939:87). Given this narrow definition it would be easy to deem a strike as 
political, especially if it is called in a state sector in which decisions are made by the 
state, and there is not a definitive law which clearly explains the difference between a 
political strike and an industrial strike. The contentious character of the notion of a 
'political' strike, and the different ways in which it may be defined, can be illustrated 
from British experience. For example, in 1978 the Court of Appeal in the UK. made a 
specific ruling on what it deemed to be a political strike, when it heard the case of the 
BBC -v- Heam. In this case "the Association of Broadcasting staff threatened to stop 
a transmission of the Cup Final by satellite to South Africa, in protest of alleged 
racist policies of the Government of that country ... the Court held that there was not a 
trade dispute and granted an injunction restraining the union from telling its members 
to break their contract..." (Hain, 1986: 20). On this basis one would therefore have to 
limit the political strike to one which is used as a vehicle for political change and has 
nothing to do with a trade dispute, while Hain also explores the changing definitions 
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of what counts as a political strike in Britain in a way which underlines the 
controversial character of government and judicial decision-making in this area. 
It should also be noted that in the UK supposedly 'political' strikes are now outlawed, 
while in Guyana and several third world countries they are quite common. In the UK 
there are also laws regulating the procedures on the calling of a strike while secondary 
action is prohibited by legislation (Mc Ilroy,1995). In Guyana on the other hand there 
is legislation governing the calling of strikes only in essential services, and even those 
laws have hardly been followed by workers or their unions. Secondary/solidarity 
actions and political strikes are also quite common in Guyana. Why then did the 
government and Guysuco make the charge that the sugar strike was political? 
Apart from the argument by the government that the union flouted the grievance 
procedure there were no other substantial argument to support their claim that the 
strike was political. However, some of the PNC supporters at the September 
conference of the TUC charged that the GA WU and the PPP leadership resorted to 
strike action in the sugar industry because of a breaking down of the unity talks 
between the PPP and PNC. While that interpretation could be attached to the strike to 
reinforce the government's position, there can be no doubt that the issue was a clear-
cut industrial one. The GA WU maintained all along that the strike was over profit 
sharing. They had served an ultimatum to the employers in this connection. They 
showed every intention that they were prepared to end the strike at a very early stage 
once reasonable terms of resumption had been worked out. The violation of an 
agreement by a union on an industrial issue, especially one which is negotiable, does 
not render such action as political. The government's claim, therefore, that the strike 
was political appears to be without foundation. 
Even if there was suspicion that the strike, which was based on an industrial dispute, 
may have been motivated by political considerations, the way to resolve it should 
have been based on industrial relations procedures rather than invoking political 
sanctions. To act on suspicion alone may result in an employer or the state running 
the risk of erasing an opportunity to resolve a conflict in a peaceful and harmonious 
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manner. The 1977 sugar strike should therefore be a lesson to trade uruons , 
governments and employers on how not to settle differences. Industrial relations are 
governed by procedures agreed upon between management and labour and at times 
supported by legislation. If all the parties to the dispute had adopted a more flexible 
approach to the issue, the strike may not have caused the damage done to the industry 
and the nation as a whole and the significant loss in wages and sufferings to thousands 
of workers and their families. 
The GA WU had been accorded recognition just a year before the strike. It had been 
involved in many bitter struggles with the employers and the state over a period of 
twenty five years, during which formal procedures and industrial relations practices 
were not observed by the workers or the union. Wildcat strikes had been routine in 
the industry. It would be inconceivable, then, to expect that a union and workforce 
grown accustomed to unconventional methods of struggles would, within a short 
space of time, be able to exert the necessary discipline to observe every agreement to 
the letter. It has been pointed out before that the union made a very impressive start in 
its relations with the sugar companies by signing three collective labour agreements 
without the recourse to strike action. However, it would be expecting too much from 
the union and the workers to allow an issue like the denial of profit sharing to go 
unchallenged in the midst of the foot dragging approach adopted by the employer, 
supported by the government. 
The union had raised the issue with the employers and the government, albeit too late 
and not in a systematic manner. The leader of the PPP was engaging in discussion 
with the Prime Minister, while the GA WU was pursuing representations at the level 
of the industry. They did not get the satisfaction they were expecting. The 
government, however, set up the Crane Committee to investigate the claim by the 
union. The union participated in the first meeting of the commission in July 1976 but 
did not proceed in their representation at that level. Based on the Minister of Labour's 
letter to the TUC they did not explain their further absence at the Crane Commission. 
What seems to have happened was that, when the PPP leader raised the issue with the 
Prime Minister, the latter skilfully construed the union claim as one for profit sharing 
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from the previous owners and accordingly set up the Commission to investigate the 
claim with respect to that demand. The union, realising that the Commission was a 
waste of time, since the levy would have been sidelined, apparently saw no useful 
purpose in participating in its work. 
What is clear, however, was the inability of the union to decide or influence the terms 
of reference of that Commission. To participate in a Commission, therefore, with 
unclear or unacceptable terms of reference to the union would have been 
legitimising the work of that Commission. Hence, abstention was thought to be in the 
best interest of the union. They apparently only saw the implications after their 
attendance to the first meeting and after they had agreed to submit a memorandum. 
The government continued to conveniently look at the claim by the union as profit 
sharing owed by the previous owners, while the union was very emphatic in its 
demand that the levy has robbed the workers of their profit sharing and should be 
withdrawn. 
It is clear from this analysis that the union showed its inexperience in handling the 
claim within the industrial relations framework and on the procedures for the 
avoidance and settlement of disputes. It displayed its ineffectiveness in using the 
bargaining table to resolve the dispute. That weakness was exploited by both the 
government and the employer. The way out for the union, therefore, was to put the 
issue in the hands of the TUC which, incidentally, was controlled by the PNC. Like 
almost all the other issues which confronted workers, the TUC was quick to support 
the position of the GA WU, only to expose once again its inability to effectively 
represent the cause. When it was clear that frustration was prevalent among workers 
over the delay in finding a just settlement, the union resorted to what it knew best -
the strike weapon - and served notice on the employer for strike action in February 
1977. 
At the behest of the TUC the GA WU shelved its action to allow that body another 
chance to seek to bring about a resolution of the dispute. Nothing positive came 
during the months of inactivity by the TUC, and when the GA WU served its second 
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ultimatum on August 20th, the TUC's request to GA WU to shelve once again its 
action was likely to have had a catastrophic effect on the union. A GA WU official 
explained later, when I interviewed him, that the workers would have seen the 
GA WU as a weak union and were likely to categorise it with the :MPCA, which 
hardly represented their cause once recognition was accorded. This, the GA WU could 
not afford. Having to take the issue again to the employer in accordance with the 
grievance procedure would have resulted in further prolonging it and again exposing 
itself to the militant workforce. The union was forced to act in those circumstances, 
and had to find ways of overcoming the accusations of violation of the grievance 
procedure. One official of GA WU explained that the industry at times allowed 
workers to "let out their steam" and would then continue discussions on the issue 
which gave rise to such action. He explained that the union thought that it could have 
opted for the customary short protest, given the militant attitude of the workers, and 
then got into some sort of discussion with Guysuco thereafter. However, the response 
by the Government to the strike resulted in its protraction. He denied the accusation 
that the strike was called because of the failure of unity talks, but admitted that the 
timing of the strike could have given that impression (Interview :October 1994) . 
The Government Response 
Why did the government respond in the way it did? A former senior Minister of the 
PNC government explained that the sugar industry has always been the base for 
support of the PPP. The PNC was in control of almost all the other sectors and if it 
could neutralise or weaken the PPP base then the PNC would have been in a position 
to control events without having to look over its shoulder: 
The comrade leader you know was a man who never like to seek consent from 
anyone before he acts and Jagan was the only problem for him. He could 
always have outmanoeuvred Jagan, but had always to worry about the PPP 
support in sugar. It was for that reason why several attempts have been made 
at congresses of the PNC and at the Party Industrial Relations 
Committee(pIRC), to formulate a strategy to deal with the GA WU and 
NAACIE. The PNC knew that the strike would have taken place and the 
comrade leader said if this was the way Jagan will respond to his socialist 
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thrust by committing acts of destabilisation then he will have to be taught a 
lesson. The PNC was battle ready, hence, from day one the forces were 
marshalled into the industry ( Interview October: 1994). 
The additional employees recruited in the industry were perceived to be supporters of 
the ruling party. They were expected to join the UAAW along with some of the 
factory workers, thus giving that union a membership of about ten thousand. The 
PNC arrived at this calculation by assuming that most of the 4,000 workers who did 
not participate in the recognition poll were either from the factories or were former 
die- hard MPCA supporters. Therefore, they were likely to move over to the UAA W 
instead of giving their support to the GA WU. Many of these workers did not join the 
strike. Additionally the employment policy was also changed to recruit more workers 
from nearby villages, where the PNC had more support, instead of the housing 
scheme areas where the PPP and GA WU support was consolidated. This plan was 
intend,ed to create a serious division among the sugar workers. It was further 
explained that, when it became clear that the GA WU was in agreement to call off the 
strike very early, the PNC was not prepared to change course. The GAWU had to go 
back to work without any deal. The PNC did not care at that stage about the cost of 
the strike to the economy. To Burnham's mind the investment was worth it (ibid). 
The PNC might have been successful to some extent if its popularity was not waning 
among predominantly black workers, especially in the bauxite industry, and further if 
some of the tasks of sugar workers, especially cane cutting, were not strenuous and 
piece-work based, since many of their supporters were only inclined to be "pen 
pushers". It was not, then, very surprising, given the bad blood which flowed during 
the strike between scabs and strikers, to see the speed with which the new recruits 
joined ranks with their other colleagues to make demands at the local level, to 
improve job rates, extras for cutting bad or overgrown canes and other conditions of 
work, soon after the ending of the strike. Some of the scabs later became 
representatives and joined in other GA WU struggles at a national level. The PNC's 
desire to have the U AA W organising in the sugar industry was sheer wishful thinking. 
The only success story in the PNC's strategy was the fact that they starved the 
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workers and their union into submission without any of their conditions met. To the 
chagrin of many workers' representatives the union leaders never thereafter harboured 
the idea of recommencing the strike after its "adjournment". There were calls 
afterwards by the union for the removal of the levy but at no time was there an 
attempt to engage the workers in any serious and properly coordinated strike action 
over this issue. 
An Analysis of the Disputes Procedure 
Was the GA WO's action in breach of the collective labour agreement? Based on a 
perusal of the agreement between Guysuco and GA WO, it is clear that a breach had 
taken place, that is, the procedures had not been followed to the letter by both sides. 
However when the circumstances surrounding the dispute are examined, along with 
national practices governing industrial relations, it would appear that the action taken 
by the union and the workers was supported by precedents. Hence, the method of 
calling the strike could be considered as normal. It has been explained by the Ministry 
of Labour official (Interview: September 1994) that there were instances where the 
TUC and the Government became involved in disputes before there were serious 
confrontations, and the disputes' procedures in those circumstances were not adhered 
to. The disputes were either settled or referred to some independent body or 
commission of enquiry for adjudication. There were instances where strikes had taken 
place on unresolved matters and accusations of violation of agreements were not 
made. Why should the GA WO have been asked then to follow the procedures when 
the matter was referred to the TUC at least one year prior to the calling of the strike? 
Having waited that long for a settlement to take place it was not a practice for parties 
to fall back on the procedures unless it was to merely iron out an agreement. 
The TUC did, in fact, make representations to the Government on the matter. Even 
when the first ultimatum was served during the first sugar crop of 1977, the TUC 
became involved in the matter and the government entertained representations, but the 
matter was not settled and months elapsed. The additional point which surfaced was 
that the Honorary President of GA WO made representations to the Prime Minister, 
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who entertained such representations. In both instances, there was acceptance of 
some form of representation, which can be considered as higher stages than those in 
the dispute procedures when taken in terms of industrial relations practices in the 
country. 
During the course of these meetings no firm advice was given to the GAWU on 
avenues open to it to have the issue resolved. The parties were seeking a solution but 
failed to arrive at one. The state did not put in train other options available to it in 
order to have the dispute resolved. What seemed to have taken place was open 
"filibustering" as the GA WU official later characterised it (Interview: September 
1994). The government was hoping to kill the dispute under the pretext of continuing 
dialogue with the TUC. Having given the GA WU no guidance during or after those 
discussions, it would have been procedurally wrong to ask them to go back to the 
bargaining table with the employers months after tolerating the unofficial waiver of 
the agreement in the first place. If therefore it was seen as a requirement that the 
matter should be referred to the employer and GA WU to settle, then this request 
should have been made before the matter was represented or during the time it was 
represented at the governmental level by the TUC or at the level of the Prime Minister 
by Dr. Jagan. The information indicates that this was not done. What transpired, 
therefore, could be construed as a technical waiver of the agreement by all the parties. 
Could the employer and union be the competent agencies to discuss a matter which 
had its genesis in legislation enacted by Parliament? Could an employer, especially a 
state employer, arrive at a decision with a union which would vary an Act of 
Parliament? Since Parliament is the supreme law making body in the land it is only 
Parliament which can change the law, unless the legislation is challenged 
successfully in the Courts. Outside a legal challenge only the Parliament could have 
varied its own legislation. The private owners of the industry prior to nationalisation 
had appealed to the government to reduce the levy as it was putting a severe strain on 
the industry. The Crane Tribunal of 1975 made a similar appeal, although the matter 
did not form part of its terms of reference. However, the government did not accede to 
this representation. Therefore, in as much as the dispute was a legitimate industrial 
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one, no employer and umon negotiations could have resulted in a satisfactory 
settlement. The government had either to be coerced by workers or compelled by the 
Courts to change the legislation. 
Based on the foregoing, what might have been a useful venture was for the union to 
challenge the matter in the courts, especially since profit sharing was part and parcel 
of a contract between the employer and the workers. It was and has always been a 
negotiated matter. In the circumstances, the question which was asked in the Teemal 
case might have had some relevance here: could parliament make laws to vary a 
contract entered into between two persons? When this question is discussed later it 
will be shown that a legal challenge could have been attempted. However, if this route 
had been chosen, it might have prevented the union from flexing its muscles on the 
matter, blocked any other avenue opened to it and would have taken years before a 
conclusion was arrived at. This option was therefore not considered by the GA WU. 
Were there other avenue opened to the employer or the state in resolving this dispute? 
The investigations revealed that there were. When the GA WU served the strike 
notice although it was, as the Minister of Labour claimed, in violation of the 
agreement between Guysuco and the union, the corporation could have requested the 
prompt intervention of the Ministry of Labour as is the normal practice. The ministry 
could have called the parties together to try to work out a solution or allow for a 
breakdown at that level. Thereafter, either party to the dispute could have requested 
arbitration on the matter. If this course had been adopted by the employer and the 
GA WU had persisted with the strike action without attending any meeting, then 
Guysuco and the government would have had very strong grounds to accuse the 
union of bargaining in bad faith and transgressing the agreement. 
The Minister also under the Labour Act Chapter 98:01 could have referred the matter 
to Arbitration once he was "satisfied that the dispute was injurious to the national 
interest"(s16). Again this would have either forced the GAWU to proceed to 
arbitration and allowed their members to cool off, or alternatively exposed them to 
criticisms for which they were unlikely to find a proper defence. These procedures 
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had been adopted several times before according to a very highly placed labour 
officer (Interview : September 1994). The failures on the part of the employer or the 
state to go this extra yard allowed for the very wide and costly confrontation which 
we have witnessed. What is clear from the investigations is that for good industrial 
relations to take place or succeed, the parties (that is, the employers, unions and the 
state) must ensure that at all times the intent and spirit of agreements entered into are 
observed by all. Intermittent variations of procedures and interventions by parties 
outside of the agreements, while helpful at times, may result In senous 
misunderstanding and perhaps a breakdown of the systems in place. The profit 
sharing issue and the question of the levy still remain vexed questions for sugar 
workers. Although the PPP in its 1992 election manifesto promised that the levy 
would be removed should that party win the elections, the levy is still in place more 
than two years after winning the elections. The PPP's Minister of Finance just after 
the 1994 Budget presentation told the national media that the sugar levy cannot be 
withdrawn. The GA WU's position on this matter will no doubt have a strong bearing 
on the future role of organised labour as it relates to political affiliation. 
The Consolidation of Unions 
The four-union movement which was formed following the 1977 sugar levy strike 
played a major role on the industrial relations scene in sensitising workers and other 
unions to the problems confronting the working class. These unions, while 
maintaining their membership in the TUC, have been engaged in public campaigns 
against anti-working class measures adopted by the government and against the 
failure of the TUC to address many of those issues in a serious manner. 
It was recognised that, for there to be effective representation and proper coordination 
of activities, the relationship of the four unions had to be formalised and according to 
a senior NAACIE official it was decided to convene a conference of the unions on 
June 24, 1979 at the headquarters of the CCWU to address the economic crisis facing 
the workers, their living standards, and the role of organised labour (Interview: 
October 1994). The keynote address was delivered by Ashton Chase of NAACIE, 
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who pointed to the fact that the TUC had been unrepresentative and unresponsive to 
several representations made by the unions which were organising the conference, on 
behalf of the workers of the country. Chase mentioned that: 
things have reached such a stage now that the government keeps telling the 
workers that they must make sacrifices, and are trying to put the blame on 
workers for the lack of production and productivity. How can one produce 
when one is faced with shortages? The spirit of the workers is not there to 
make them produce(22). 
He argued that there cannot be increased production and productivity when the basis 
to produce was absent, when the unemployment situation had become more acute, and 
emphasized: 
This situation did not come about overnight, and the four unions sponsoring 
this conference take pride in the fact that together they had drawn to the 
attention of the authorities and to the TUC about the economic down slide in 
the country and how it should be handled. Even those proposals were pushed 
aside. The four unions had acted together on a number of matters drawing 
attention of the TUC on what should be done, but in almost every instance the 
Executive of the TUC have not sought vigorously and purposefully to do 
anything (23). 
The TUC also came in for severe criticisms from economist Clive Thomas, who was 
representing the UGWU. He blamed the ruling PNC for the complete mismanagement 
of the economy, and posited the view that in the face of the deteriorating social and 
economic conditions facing working people the TUC had virtually done nothing. He 
denounced the TUC for sitting idly by and allowed the sugar workers to struggle 
alone during the 1977 strike. Thomas took the view that: 
it was important to look at the various developments which took place in the 
period and the way in which the TUC reacted, and whether it is at all possible 
for new leadership to develop in the trade union movement, or whether it was 
at a point of no return ... (24). 
The matters raised at the conference had far reaching importance for the labour 
movement and the following resolution was adopted: 
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Aware that the TUC has betrayed the working people of Guyana by its 
political alignment at the leadership level with the oppressive ruling clique. 
Recognising that the postures and actions of the said leadership are at variance 
with the aspirations and interests of the working people and are a virtual sell 
out. Recognising that the mood of the working people is more faithfully 
reflected in the militancy of the four unions which sponsored this conference ... 
Be it resolved that the four unions establish a permanent Coordinating 
committee to elaborate a programme of action designed to alter the affiliate 
structure of the TUC and the procedures for union elections along democratic 
lines and to ensure that the TUC becomes an institution which would 
uncompromisingly pursue the interests of the working people of Guyana by all 
means within the competence of the Trade Union Movement. Be it further 
resolved, that in the event of failure to achieve the necessary transformation of 
the TUC within a reasonable time, the four unions take immediate action to set 
up appropriate alternative structures to fulfil the aspirations of the working 
people of Guyana (25). 
At the TUC Special Delegates Conference the year before (November 11th and 12th, 
1978), the four unions acting together had pressed delegates successfully to adopt a 
resolution which: 
supports a programme for radical restructuring of the economic organs and 
administrative practices in our society including a defined and dynamic role 
for the Guyanese private sector .... But emphasizes that as a pre-requisite to 
redressing the economic hardships facing the nation a political solution is 
paramount in which all sections of the Guyanese working people would be 
involved in the urgent task of reconstruction (26). 
As part of the follow up action, the TUC invited the leadership of the PPP to a 
meeting of the Executive Council on April 25, 1979 at which Dr. Jagan raised a 
number of important economic, political and social issues. The TUC, in seeking to 
justify its failure to act on the resolution passed and the proposals put forward by 
Jagan, had this to say: 
What did come out finally in Cde. Jagan's presentation to the Executive 
Council was that the Government should be called upon to resign and an 
interim government set up comprising representatives of all progressive 
elements but should not include anti-communists. This point of view was also 
canvassed at a Special Delegates' Conference ... where it was advocated that 
the Government should resign and a caretaker government established. The 
Executive Council felt it was in no position nor was it competent to pursue 
representations concerned with demands for the government's resignation. The 
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Executive Council did however, note a number of important points which it 
felt could be appropriately discussed with the government and the ruling party. 
Since then, the political climate rapidly changed and as a result it was felt that 
the prevailing atmosphere was not conducive to discussions on the points 
noted (TUC Report 1979:22). 
The atmosphere which the TUC was referring to was a general strike called by the 
four unions in August 1979. Before that strike was called there were a number of 
protest actions initiated by the NAACIE and bauxite workers over the non- payment 
of increments. Thus at this stage efforts to build wider trade union unity continued 
between several important unions, but the TUC proved unable to facilitate such 
developments, because of its alignment with the governing party in a context of a 
highly politicised pattern of industrial relations. 
The Government/ TUC Agreement 1977 
Finally, as an important background to an understanding of the 1977 strike, and the 
ways in which the unions, the TUC and the government acted, it is important to say 
something about broader debates and developments in wage bargaining during this 
period. From interviews conducted with senior workers' representatives in the sugar 
industry and the perusal of documents from several unions the following was 
revealed. At the 1976 TUC Delegates Conference a unanimous decision had been 
taken by delegates to authorise the TUC to make representations to the Government 
for an increase in the national minimum wage of $5.50 per day to $75.00 for a 40 
hour work week. A national minimum wage has always been established periodically 
by the government after consultation with the TUC. This was done in order to ensure 
that workers, unionised as well as those without union representation are not paid less 
than the stipulated rate of pay. In several instances unions negotiated wages higher 
than those applicable as the national minimum wage. The bauxite, sugar, electricity, 
telephone and transportation workers, for example, were enjoying far higher wages 
than the applicable minimum wage of$5.50 in 1976. 
The proposal from the TUC conference had to do with the grim economic situation 
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facing the workers in the country at that time and to ensure that every worker was 
paid a wage which was considered to be just above the poverty leveL The TUC, 
consequent upon the conference decision, engaged the government in discussions for 
an increase in the national minimum wage. 
Following the talks which were concluded on 23rd August, 1977, a three year 
agreement was entered into, for a new minimum wage to be paid to public sector 
workers as follows: 
(a) for 1977 - $1.05 per hour/ $ 8.40 per day/$200.00 per month. 
(b) for 1978 - $1.35 per hour/ $11.00 per day/$258.00 per month. 
(c) for 1979 - $1.75 per hour/ $14.00 per day/$333.00 per month. 
It was also agreed that the cut off points for increases should be $600.00 , $925.00 
and $1200.00 per month for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 respectively. The 
agreement also stipulated that for 1977: 
10 percent of the national wage bill up to the cut off point shall be distributed 
to all employees within the organisation/enterprise favouring the lower paid 
employees against those higher up the pegged scale ... for 1978 and 1979, the 
percentages of the wage bill to be used in the formula shall be discussed and 
agreed upon with the TUC ... and negotiations for the new agreement with 
effect from 1980 shall take into account the minimum at 1979, i.e. $14.00 per 
day. 
There was also a provision for tax free incentives to be paid to all employees in every 
state enterprise, following the setting up a central incentive committee, which would 
"work out general principles for incentive schemes". Article 6 of the agreement on 
"Interpretation" indicates: 
This Agreement shall be interpreted as an act of faith, and the Trades Union 
Congress and its affiliates will do everything within their power to ensure that 
in all sections and areas of activity, there is full production and increased 
productivity. 
The TUC, therefore, had moved completely away from the mandate given and entered 
into a different agreement. This agreement was not stipulating a minimum wage at 
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the national level but was only intended for all public sector employees. Further, it 
had severely compromised affiliates who were negotiating separate agreements, since 
all agreements had to be negotiated "within the parameters agreed herein". They had 
to ensure, according to the 'agreement', that they did all within their powers to ensure 
that "there is full production and increased productivity" without any reference to the 
conduct of the state or its managers. This was the one sided nature of the agreement. 
Even the TUC General Secretary conceded that the agreement was a disappointment 
to workers in the private sector when they learnt that the rates would be limited to the 
public sector, and he urged the unions in those areas to open negotiations in order to 
have the rates implemented. He admitted that the agreement could be criticised for 
not containing "an escalatory clause to take care of the prevailing inflationary price 
trends which may even accentuate with the implementation of the new rates" (TUC 
Report 1977: 6). He urged that delegates should not be concerned with the lack of 
such a clause but they should seek to mobilise the necessary commitment and energy 
which will have to be put towards increasing production and productivity in order that 
the negotiated package could be sustained by the country. 
The signing of the agreement received a mixed reaction from affiliated unions, with 
the strongest condemnation coming from the NAACIE which claimed that the 
Government! TUC agreement meant that unions would be denied the right to free 
collective bargaining and that the TUC should have consulted its affiliates before it 
had signed the agreement. It urged the four union alliance not to endorse the 
agreement. During the TUC Conference in September 1977 the alliance unitedly 
opposed the TUC's imposition. The two bauxite unions, GMWU and GBSU along 
with the MPCA and GFF & SU supported the position of the four unions. 
Very soon after the conclusion of the TUC's conference it became clear that public 
sector managers were taking a united position at their negotiations with unions 
operating within that sector. The managers, while not admitting that they had received 
instructions from government, were sending very clear signals by their conduct that 
they could not negotiate outside the Government /TUC Agreement, which was 
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deemed by the employers as the maxtmum position. The umon leaders were 
complaining at the TUC level over what they perceived to be an inflexible position 
taken by the state agencies during negotiations. All the unions were told that they 
must either confirm the agreement or have it imposed on the workers (TUC Minutes 
1977). Because most of the leaders of unions within the TUC were supporters of the 
the ruling party, many of the unions agreed and endorsed the agreement. However, 
much to the disappointment of NAACIE and to the surprise of some of the other 
unions which spoke against the TUC position, the GA WU signed an agreement with 
Guysuco on March 23, 1978 .. It completely endorsed the 197711979 Government! 
TUC pact. The GFF&SU also took a similar position weeks later, which put NAACIE 
in the difficult task of being the only union in the sugar industry continuing the fight 
against the acceptance of an agreement entered into by strangers and without 
consultation. 
The NAACIE's insistence on conducting genume negotiations with the sugar 
companies was greeted by a tough response by Guysuco. At the bargaining table they 
were told "that they were obliged to abide by the National Minimum Wage 
Agreement and would implement same but hoped that an interim agreement would be 
signed before implementation"(NAACIE Minutes, December 11,1977). Following the 
submission of new demands by NAACIE on December 23, 1977, for improved salary 
scales to match the increase in the cost of living, the Guysuco immediately responded 
by copying a circular which it was sending out to all the sugar estates instructing the 
application of the Minimum Wage Agreement. This unilateral action resulted in the 
removal of certain conditions, in particular overtime formula and a Saturday off per 
month, enjoyed by some members of that union. 
The Public Service Ministry on February 10, 1978 issued Circular No.511978 which 
negated a previous Circular No.70/1977 dated 17th December, 1977. The 1977 
circular had been issued following the endorsement of the Government!TUC 
Agreement by unions operating in the public service and had authorised the 
implementation of the 44 hour work week. With the introduction of the new circular, 
workers were required to work beyond 44 hours per week. This action resulted in a 
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meeting between the TUC, the Minister of Labour and a representative of the Public 
Service Ministry. The Minister suggested that the 1978 circular should be withdrawn 
forthwith, to which all the parties agreed. Months passed without any action taken by 
the Public Service Ministry to rectify the situation and several employees were made 
"to work in excess of a 44 hour without receiving overtime on the completion of 44 
hours" (TUC Report 1978:9).This was the beginning of all sorts of violations on 
industrial relations practices in the Public Sector. 
The government's next move was to seek to rationalise the public sector labour force 
under the guise of redeployment. Some sections of the public sector had become over 
staffed in the early 1970s when jobs were created for party comrades. The 
government involved the TUC in the exercise of redeployment, to legitimise the 
policy. The manner in which the TUC was used in the process was evident, since 
representations made by them were not considered by the Government. The 
government gave the TUC the assurances that all the workers would be placed in 
similar positions at other governmental agencies, with no loss in wages. The end 
result was different. Nearly all of the estimated 4000 employees, (skilled and career 
public servants included) were offered cane cutting jobs in the sugar industry as the 
only alternative. About 3500 refused to take on this arduous task and found 
themselves added to the already vast unemployed list. Many of the union leaders of 
the workers interviewed felt that the dramatic decline in almost every section of the 
economy and the hardships which confronted workers, resulting in disguised 
retrenchment were the result of the government's hard-line position on the scab issue 
during the 1977 sugar strike, which had created a substantial loss of foreign exchange 
and revenue to the country. 
The TUC failed to act to correct these situations, but worse yet remained silent while 
the democratic process was heavily undermined by the government's holding of a 
referendum to postpone national elections. This referendum was pronounced 
fraudulent by the Committee of Concerned Citizens (1978) and other international 
bodies. The opposition to the referendum, through a boycott, was in the vicinity of 85 
percent - a position verified by independent observers. Amidst chaos on the industrial 
185 
relations scene and increased poverty in the land, the government had manipulated 
itself into office for yet another two years, through a fraudulent referendum, pending 
the writing of a new constitution. This provided the opportunity for them to destroy 
whatever was left in the Minimum Wage Agreement. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explains the repression of the workers' struggles by the state. It not only 
analyses the 1977 sugar strike but previous strikes by other sections of the work force. 
It seeks to explain the ineffective representation by the TUC on issues confronting 
workers, by showing how the political ties of the unions which dominated the TUC 
compromised their capacity to act to mobilise and unite workers, especially if this 
meant pursuing issues which impinged upon state policy. The 1977 strike, while 
focussing on the industrial issue of the sugar levy, took place against a background of 
a failure by the two main political parties to work out a political consensus against a 
so called imperialist threat, and this political context had important implications for 
the conduct of industrial relations. 
It is established that while the workers were agitating for a decent way of life the 
leaders of the national labour movement were engaged in endorsing and pledging 
support to the ruling party. However, the failure of the TUC to effectively settle the 
1977 sugar strike also resulted in four unions forging an alliance with a view to giving 
direction and solidarity to the workers' cause. Thus the political incorporation of the 
TUC did not effectively incoporate all workers and trade unions, and efforts to 
develop more effective union representation continued, in ways which will be 
explored further in later chapters. 
In as much as strikes were having a detrimental effect on the national economy, and 
especially the sugar industry, the government was not prepared to make any 
compromise and sought, as it did with the 1977 strike, to force workers and their 
unions into submission. Thus it was not simply the politicisation of industrial conflict 
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which marked this period, but also the particular intransigence of the state. Once 
again we see, in a struggle which is perceived to have political overtones, how rigidity 
in attitudes can lead to a breakdown of industrial relations norms and the prolongation 
ofa strike. 
The introduction of centralised bargaining as a result of the negotiations between the 
unions and the government, led to the denial of unions' rights to negotiate individual 
agreements and to a c?mplete breakdown of the collective bargaining process, wage 
impositions and retrenchment. The resulting violation of the national agreement, the 
wages imposition by the government and the further decline in the living standard of 
workers that then led to a bitter legal and industrial struggle by NAACIE, are 
analysed in the ensuing chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Challenge To Wages Imposition 
Dishonouring the 1977 Agreement 
In January of 1979, the government agencies were required to implement the $14.00 
per day as stipulated in the Government/TUC Agreement. This was not done and the 
government was suspiciously silent on the issue, resulting in a letter from the TUC to 
the Prime Minister on February 12, 1979. It urged that action be taken to have the 
agreement implemented without further delay. The Minister of Labour was requested 
to deal with the issue and one labour official who was interviewed much later 
indicated that this was seen as a bad omen, since the Prime Minister always liked to 
be in the company of the labour leaders when there was good news to be shared 
(Interview: October 1994). 
The leading labour official pointed out that several meetings were arranged between 
the government and the TUC under the chairmanship of the Labour Minister. The 
Minister of Economic Development and Planning and the Head of the State Planning 
Secretariat led the government side against all the top leaders in the TUC Executive. 
A general picture of the economy was given, supported by statistical data, which 
pointed to negative growth and the poor state of the economy. The government side 
then took the position that, in the light of the poor state of the economy and the spirit 
of Clause 6 of the Minimum Wage Agreement stated above, there would be no . 
increase in wages to workers for 1979. This decision was not only a violation of the 
aforementioned agreement but it was also in effect invoking a wage freeze for 1979. 
Asked about the TUC's response in the light of this imposition, the official referred to 
Pollydore's statement which he said reflected the feeling of the entire delegation. This 
statement was published in the TUC report in the following terms: 
What the Executive Council could not accept was that the Government's 
inability to implement the $14: per day was due to failure on the part of the 
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workers to increase production and productivity. This is exactly the 
misrepresentation ... of Clause 6 ... which is being deliberately overworked by 
the government to propagate and to stress the culpability on the part of the 
workers. What must be examined in broader perspective beyond the workers' 
failure to increase production and productivity as claimed by the government, 
is what is responsible for this failure. It should not be overlooked that apart 
from strikes, lack of work discipline and other deficiencies on the part of 
workers about which so much is often publicised, there are instances of 
political decisions taken by the government in which the workers have no say 
whatever, but which decisions have a direct adverse bearing on production and 
productivity .... Then what about the apparent general state of malaise among 
workers which could seriously be attributed to the many threats from the 
governmental political hierarchy about closing down of projects, 
retrenchment, threats of, or actual dismissals and resignations not only of 
management but rank and file personnel likewise. 
Even the fantastic energy inflation which subscribes to the higher import 
prices which we have to meet is being underplayed in order to stress the 
failure of the workers to increase production and productivity and 
consequently the justification for the government's decision not to implement 
the $14: per day. In the meanwhile the cost of living continues to move up and 
the demands of the workers for economic relief are becoming more vocal 
(TUC Report 1979:8). 
The official described the above statement as sheer anger coming from a General 
Secretary who is known for his polite and diplomatic language. He was very 
forthright in his condemnation of the government and no doubt would have liked to 
do something to ease the sufferings of the workers but may have been contained by 
the weak leaders who were around him. However, the workers' representatives in the 
sugar industry I talked to, looking back on the events, claimed that the TUC were 
'mere paper tigers' and 'spineless individuals', for whom the government had 
absolutely no respect, since many of them compromised themselves by always 
seeking favours from the government and were involved in corrupt and undemocratic 
behaviour within their unions. They, therefore, could not be expected to fight 
fearlessly and defend the rights of workers (Interview: November 1994). In analysing 
the situation at that time Chase pointed out that the government had no acceptable 
solution to the economic crisis: 
Their answer is to place more and more burdens on the workers and to blame 
everyone other than themselves. They wrongly blame the workers for the low 
productivity. They blame managers whom they appointed for bad management 
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practices, and the shopkeepers and hucksters for black-marketing. Their 
favourite ploy is to toy with the effects rather than tackle the cause of the 
crisis. The removal of subsidies, cuts in public expenditure leading to 
redeployment... increased prices for transport and electricity, and a wage 
freeze are burdens placed on the backs of workers. No other group feels the 
pressure like the workers. The direct impact on the workers' standard of living 
is terrific. The chronic shortages in our community due to the foreign 
exchange situation have made the burdens even greater ... (l). 
While the discussions were taking place between the Government and the TUC, the 
Sugar Corporation had awarded merit increments for 1979 to several of their workers, 
the majority represented by NAACIE, based on their performance over the preceding 
year. This was done following representation by NAACIE which drew attention to the 
existing collective labour agreement and the contract of their members. The 
agreement stipulated that a normal merit increment within the scales should be 
awarded annually to employees who gave satisfactory service over the preceding 
year. Further, the increment or part of it could be withheld only if the employee was 
warned that his conduct or performance was not of the required standard and this had 
to be communicated in writing to him/her at the time of the warning. If a worker was 
given such a letter s/he could make representations individually or through the union 
in accordance with the grievance procedure. 
Workers in other industries, upon learning of the incremental payout in the sugar 
industry began making their demands to their employers. The TUC, during the course 
of its meetings with the government, had made reference to the payout in sugar. The 
Cabinet thereafter instructed the sugar directorate to rescind the payments made and 
they obliged. In a circular letter in June 1979, to all employees concerned, the 
Corporation advised the following: 
The anticipated growth of the economy for 1978 has not occurred ... so far as 
Guysuco is concerned all persons eligible for normal increments within their 
respective scales, have received those increments with effect from January 1, 
1979. It is not the intention to retrieve those payments already made, but we 
have to advise you, that with effect from June, 1979 your 1979 salary 
increment will no longer be paid. This means that your salary from June 1979 
will revert to your December, 1978 salary. 
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Thus it was not only the case that salaries/wages of workers in 1979 remained at the 
1978 level. What was worse was that workers had their increments, which they had 
earned through performance appraisals, taken away. They therefore suffered a double 
blow to their living standards. 
Wages Imposition 
The TUC and the government conducted negotiations on wages and salaries up to 
1987. The next increase the workers received following the 1979 wage freeze, was a 7 
per cent increase for 1980. In 1981, while the TUC was meeting with the government 
to discuss the implementation of the $14.00 per day for 1979, the government offered 
10 per cent from January 1981 and a further 2.5 per cent from July of the same year. 
This was accepted by the TUC and imposed on the sugar workers. For 1982 and 1983 
the government instituted a wage freeze. There was also a circular issued by the Vice 
President of Economic Development, which debarred the public sector managers from 
entering into agreements with unions for wages in excess of what was stipulated in 
the provisions of the national budget. Government Ministries, Corporations, and other 
Public Sector Agencies were informed that while the government was taking an 
integrated approach to the question of wage adjustments, some agenCIes were 
introducing measures aimed at circumventing the guidelines which had been issued. 
The devices used to go outside the wage guidelines included increasing fringe 
benefits, introducing new benefits, reclassifying or redesignating posts and signing 
agreements with retrospective application to previous years. The public sector heads 
were warned that they should not, without written authority from the Minister of 
Finance: 
concur in or sign any agreement which contains salary or wage adjustments, 
fringe benefits or other conditions of service which are outside the terms of, or 
are inconsistent with, the Government guidelines or which will increase its 
budgeted employment costs (2). 
The requests by unions in the sugar industry for higher wages were rejected and the 
employers claimed that they were obliged to follow the instructions issued by the 
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Finance Minister. It was not until November of 1984, when President Burnham 
announced that his government was increasing the minimum wage from $12.71 to 
$15.10 per day or $360.00 per month, that the sugar workers were paid an increase of 
10 per cent for 1984. This was done despite the failure of the TUC and Government to 
arrive at an acceptable increase. 
The government and the TUC continued their dialogue while the workers were having 
the worst of it. Production in the two main sectors, sugar and bauxite, had declined 
considerably. The parties therefore agreed to a slightly higher wage award for these 
two sectors for 1985 and 1986 and announced that 12.5 per cent would be paid for 
each of these years. However, Guysuco did not apply the increases which were agreed 
between the TUC and Government. It insisted that it had already paid increments and 
as such would only increase wages by 10.08 per cent for 1985 and a further 6 percent 
for 1986. Repeated representation by the unions in the industry and by the TUC, up to 
the level of the Minister of Finance, failed to resolve the matter (NAACIE Report 
... 
1986:28). The minimum wage in the industry moved to $16.83 per day or $385.92 
per month for 1985 and for the following year it became $17.84 per day or $409.07 
per month. By that time the increase in the cost of living was taking its toll on the 
workers: 
According to Professor CY Thomas, the real wages of the workers at the end 
of 1985 was about 60 per cent below the 1979 level, this will give you the 
extent to which wages lagged behind the increase in the cost of living (ibid). 
The government and the TUC further agreed that the manner in which the application 
of wage increases was implemented over the years, led to workers with over 10 years 
service receiving the same level of pay as new entrants. Hence, an agreement was 
reached to correct the anomaly: 
Employees who find themselves at the bottom or within a specified range from 
the bottom of the scales, after a number of years of service, will enjoy further 
adjustments which range from 5% for those with 3-5 years' service to as 
much as 80/0 for those with 8 years and above. This is intended to ameliorate 
the problem of long standing and new employees receiving the same salaries 
(Guyana Chronicle, 22. 1l. 85). 
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However, the above adjustment was never implemented by Guysuco. According to 
the package arrived at with the Central Government, the workers were supposed to be 
paid 33 per cent increase in wages for 1984 and 1985, but all the sugar workers 
received was half of this. Despite the continued violations of agreements between the 
TUC and Government, no militant action was taken by the parent body of organised 
labour to rectify the situation. It seemed to enjoy a love affair around the bargaining 
table with the government. When the negotiation for wage increases commenced for 
1987 the TUC held a press conference on February 4, and announced that it proposed 
a minimum wage of $30.00 per day as a concessionary figure. It mentioned that in 
1983 the TUC's Economic and Research Committee had produced figures which 
established the justification of a minimum wage then of $52.00 per day. 
After three meetings with the TUC, the government announced a massIve 127% 
devaluation of the Guyana dollar. This was followed by an offer to the TUC of a new 
minimum wage of $19.40 per day. Some members of the TUC delegation openly 
urged its acceptance when the NAACIE General Secretary and GA WU President 
mounted a vigil for one week in front of the Ministry of Finance while the talks were 
taking place. They denounced $19.40 as way below the level of real wages of workers 
in the year 1940. In other words, the standard of living of workers in 1940 was far 
better than what was obtained in the 1980s. The two rebel leaders demanded that the 
government pay a living wage. Eventually, the government and the TUC agreed to a 
16.37% increase across the board in addition to a flat monthly sum of$100: 
The two-tier adjustment of an across-the-board plus a flat sum of $100. per 
month provided a more equitable means of wages and salaries distribution in 
the prevailing difficult economic situation. It constrained a widening of the 
differentials which resulted from a straight line across -the-board percentage 
adjustment (TUC Report 1987:9). 
A tentative agreement was also arrived at for 1988 which provided for an increase of 
5.5% across-the-board in addition to an appraisal component of between 5.5 and 7% 
of the wages bill as at December 31, 1987. There was a provision for an additional 
1 % increase "for every percentage mcrease in real GDP over 20/0 for 1987" 
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(NAACIE Report 1988:21). Once again the management of the sugar corporation 
imposed its own interpretation of the agreement. It only paid 16.37% increase for 
1987 and 5% for 1988. By 1988 the daily minimum wage moved to $27.24 while the 
monthly minimum was $648.98. 
Struggles Over the Increment 
Upon the notification of the withdrawal of increments by management, the NAACIE 
representatives claimed that the workers were enraged. They immediately sent out 
petitions to all the estate managers notifying them of their disgust and anger over the 
withdrawal of their increments and urged their reinstatement. The Executive of the 
union also met and took the decision to write to the Employers pointing out that the 
arbitrary withdrawal of the increments was in breach of the collective labour 
agreement in force, the contract of the workers and the law. It requested the 
Corporation to rescind the decision taken and further organised protest action on all 
the Estate locations. As one NAACIE official explained: 
We organised a go slow exercise of the entire membership from June 26-30, 
several lightning one day strikes on a few locations, protest strike action for 10 
successive weekends at Albion Estate, where the management had also 
unilaterally changed the Monday to Friday and Tuesday to Saturday stagger 
work week for some workers, and held a national sick out on Tuesday July 
3,1979 to register our protest. We tried to get a feel whether the other Unions 
were interested in taking a united stance on the matter but there was hesitation 
all around. We realised that the matter could only be dealt with through united 
action, since we were fighting against the entire state machinery. It was our 
position not to be engaged in an all out struggle before we can sensitise other 
workers and their leaders. We also asked our delegates to raise the matter at 
the four union conference and got in touch with some militant shop stewards 
in the Bauxite industry since they were showing positive signs of rebellion 
(Interview: November 1994). 
In the midst of the sporadic action in the sugar industry, sections of the workforce in 
the bauxite industry came out on strike on July 12,1979, also over the non-payment of 
increments, and very soon thereafter the strike engulfed the entire industry. The 
leaders immediately sought the TUC's involvement in the dispute. Despite several 
compromise proposals put by the TUC to the government and Guymine officials to 
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restore normalcy, the government took an adamant position that no wage increase nor 
increments could be given. The strike was therefore allowed to drag on and the four 
unions took a position to hold a public rally of workers at the Bourda Mall on 
Tuesday August 7, to decide on a strategy for intensifying the pressure on the 
government and the TUC to achieve a satisfactory solution. The meeting gave their 
wholehearted support to the striking workers and called on the TUC to demand from 
the government increments due to all workers. The conclusion of the resolution read: 
Be it further resolved that failing to achieve these just demands within a week 
(by Tuesday August 14,) that the TUC calls on all its affiliates to take 
industrial action to enforce a settlement of these issues (TUC Report 1979: 22, 
iii; NAACIE Report 1980: 16). 
Following that meeting, on August 10 the police raided the headquarters ofNAACIE 
without a warrant and requested information from the typist about leading officials of 
the union. They seized a number of articles, including a duplicator, letter heads and 
other documents. They then arrested the typist, Miss Bibi Khan, and detained her for 
several hours following which she was released on $500.00 bail, although she had not 
been told what offence was being investigated. The union was forced to move to the 
Courts before the police returned its duplicating machine. They did not return most of 
the other documents which were removed from the premises and during the trial the 
police revealed their reason for the search. They claimed that they had information 
that the union was involved in the publication of illegal literature and a news letter 
called "Yam Vine" which were in circulation within the army urging rebellion of the 
ranks against the government. 
The strike in the bauxite industry attracted the attention of an unusually high security 
presence and there was no movement on the part of the government. The four unions 
dispatched a joint letter to the TUC on August 14th, which stated: 
. .. In terms of the resolution you have failed to resolve the issues arising from 
the current bauxite strike within the time frame given and the workers are now 
undergoing great sufferings. Consequently, unless the matters can be resolved 
within the next twenty four(24) hours, our unions will take solidarity industrial 
action with the mine workers. 
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The unions simultaneously served notice on their employers to take strike action. The 
CCWU, on the other hand, moved away from a four union decision and decided that it 
was not going to call out its members in the private sector and was only going to call 
out its public sector workers for limited solidarity action at the start of the strike on 
August 17. One of the labour officials I interviewed claimed that this type of 
vacillation became a regular feature of the CCWU. He asserted that from the outset of 
the strike the government deemed it political and pursued a course aimed at crushing 
it (Interview October 1994). Several workers were beaten by 'thugs' of the ruling 
party, in the presence of a senior Government Minister, while they were engaged in 
picketing demonstrations outside of Guyana Stores Limited. The police, some without 
numbers, were engaged to break up the demonstration and seize pickets, the 
demonstration having been prohibited despite its legality. Bus loads of strike breakers 
were brought in to take the place of striking workers (NAACIE Report: 1980). In an 
attempt to put further pressure on the CCWU, its General President, Gordon Todd 
was arrested and taken on a helicopter ride to a military outpost at Ogle. His 
whereabouts were unknown to other leaders, who witnessed the ruthless police action. 
After several hours in detention and on the prompt intervention of members of the 
Bar Association and the TUC General Secretary, he was released. Workers on strike 
were threatened with dismissal and foodstuff which had been collected by the four 
unions for striking bauxite workers was seized by the police. Membership forms for a 
PNC affiliated union, the GLU, were introduced at several locations of the militant 
unions with senior management functionaries coercing workers to join that union 
(ibid). 
On August 22nd the CCWU instructed their members to resume duties. They claimed 
that they did so because of threats, intimidation and thuggery. Upon their members 
returning to work eighty of them, employed at Guyana Stores, had their services, 
ranging from 4 to 18 years, terminated(3}. The government claimed that "in keeping 
with its policy of dealing with the political strike at a political level it took control of 
the situation at Guyana stores and had the supermarket reopened for business by 
11.00 hours thereby saving the shopping public severe inconvenience" (Guyana 
Chronicle, August 18, 1979). These actions, along with the clear signal that the TUC 
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was not going to go beyond engaging the government in dialogue, forced the unions 
to review the situation. The bauxite workers who were virtually being starved out, 
met on August 25th, and decided that the strike should be ended, and this decision 
was endorsed by the four unions. 
When the NAACIE members resumed duties on August 27, several of them were 
victimized. Ten were suspended for three days, 21 persons who were acting in higher 
positions had their acting appointments revoked, and this was followed by the 
confirmation of 70 scabs into permanent positions (ibid). While it could be argued 
that the government crushed the strike and forced the four unions to concentrate their 
energies in securing the reinstatement of the dismissed workers and correct the other 
acts of victimization, union officials argued that the strike ended as a moral victory 
for the workers. It laid the foundation on which solid working class unity could be 
built, with the involvement of the two bauxite unions in closer working relationships 
with· the four Unions and the consciousness which had developed among bauxite 
workers. 
There were many criticisms levelled by the four unions, and by many workers, over 
the inactivity and the failure of the TUC to take a decision to call a general strike, 
since the four union strike was intended to enforce the honouring of an agreement 
entered into by the TUC. The failure of the TUC to get the government to honour the 
agreement after months of negotiations, without any firm action being taken, exposed 
the ineffectiveness of this body. In answering these charges, Pollydore claimed that 
speakers of the four unions misrepresented the issue and made unfounded criticisms 
at the meeting of the TUC. By their action they undermined their own strength, by 
dividing themselves instead of seeking to work together notwithstanding whatever 
differences existed. Thus they became exposed to actions designed to exploit that 
division and accelerate the undermining of the process of building unity, and this was 
detrimental to the entire movement. He urged affiliates to understand that the 
overriding considerations for the TUC should be the need to protect fundamental 
trade union rights and freedoms and to address the problems of the dismissed workers 
(TUC Report 1979: 15). The General Secretary stressed that the four unions had 
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served notice to the various employers in support of a sister affiliate which had a 
genuine grievance and therefore the action taken by them was reasonable and fell 
within the ambit of trade union solidarity: 
The dismissal or other punitive action against workers who participated in the 
strike called by their unions, strikes at the very foundation of the trade union 
movement. It seriously undermines the universally accepted principles of trade 
union rights including the right to organise. It is a serious impairment of the 
fundamental principle of freedom of association (ibid). 
While Pollydore was trying to defend workers' right to strike, some of his other 
comrades were forcefully defending the government's action of dismissing workers. 
Ajodia Singh of the UAAW claimed that the four unions' strike was intended to 
overthrow the government and to destroy socialism. He asserted that the workers must 
pay for their "stupidity and counter revolutionary work against the government" 
(TUC Minutes September 28, 1979). A leader of the GWU, Alwin Sinclair, claimed 
that the action by the government in dismissing the workers was justified, since the 
workers had embarked upon political action. He referred to the strike in 1963-64 at 
the Rice Board, where 144 workers were dismissed by the Jagan administration under 
similar circumstances. Therefore, he argued, since workers were engaged in "political 
strikes then they must get political treatment" (ibid). 
What was somewhat faulty with the four unions' strike tactics was the lack of 
coordination among union leaders. Although the strikes in all the sections were over 
the withdrawal of merit increments, the actions taken by the unions did not allow for 
genuine solidarity to be forged. When the ultimatum was served by the unions in 
support of the bauxite workers, only NAACIE observed the decision of the four 
unions in its entirety. The other unions in the grouping varied the decision. As was 
explained earlier, the CCWU called out public sector employees for only one day. 
The UGWU had most of its members on vacation while the GA WU called out only 
four estates, Albion, Rose Hall, Blairmont and Uitvlugt, on strike. It was the intention 
of the GA WU to stagger their strike. However, the workers were in a mood to 
struggle, as can be seen from the figures in table 5. 1. 
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Table 6.1 
Strike Statistics during the Four Union Strike 
UNIONS ON WORKDAYS WAGES LOST DURATION 
STRIKE LOST G$ DAYS 
GAWU 9706 77,377 12,671,167 8 
NAACIE 905 8,145 1,200,013 9 
BAUXITE 4379 97,261 1,968,130 34 
Sources: Ministry of Labour and Union Reports. 
According to representatives of the sugar workers, reflecting on the strike from the 
vantage point of the 1990s, united action by all the unions would surely have had a 
greater impact (Interview: October 1994). The strikes over the increments led to an 
overall increase in the workers involved and loss of work days over the preceding 
year. In 1978 there were 52,060 workers involved in work stoppages compared to 
106,366 for 1979, with work days amounting to 75,971 as against 324,473 (Ministry 
of Labour Reports 1978, 1979). 
Complaints To The ILO 
By September 5th, it was clear to the four unions that the government was not going 
to listen to representations by either the TUC or the four unions on behalf of the 
victimised workers, and they dispatched a complaint to the ILO pointing out the 
unorthodox and unconventional methods used by the government during the strike. 
These tactics were considered to be a violation of conventions 87 and 98 on freedom 
of association and protection of the right to organise and collective bargaining, both 
of which have been ratified by the government. The matter was investigated by the 
Committee on Freedom of Association which requested the government to respond to 
the charges brought by the unions. The government alleged that the unions were 
engaged in a political strike and that they were a faction of the TUC aligned to 
opposition political groups; that they did not avail themselves of discussions with 
their respective employers and engaged in solidarity strike action despite the fact that 
they were not requested to do so by the TUC or the GMWU. 
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In submitting its interim report the committee requested additional information from 
the government since it did not address the issue of violation of the agreement. The 
response by the government was sent on June 3rd, 1980, and it reiterated the charges 
levelled against the four unions and made mention of the Budget Speech by the 
Minister of Economic Development in which the reasons for non-compliance with the 
agreement were explained. It was emphasised that the agreement was an act of faith; 
there was a negative growth in 1978, a failure of the economy to generate earnings, a 
failure of export earnings to improve the balance of payments position and the impact 
of the wage increases. On the withdrawal of the increments the government disclosed 
that since the adjustment for 1979 was either an increment or an increase to the new 
rate, whichever was greater, the same reason for the non-enforcement of the 
agreement would apply. The government also informed the ILO that the workers at 
the May Day parade in 1979 supported the withdrawal of the $14.00 per day. 
In response to allegations that repressive measures were taken against pickets and 
demonstrators, the government claimed that the CCWU President was arrested for 
two hours for attempting to lead a procession for which there was no police 
permission, not even a request was made for such permission as was required by law. 
It denied that Todd was taken to a military outpost but asserted that he was instead 
kept in police custody to preserve law and order and that police baton charges or 
injury to pickets had not taken place. Allegations to the effect that the Minister of 
Labour was present when these violations had taken place were published in a 
newspaper. This was subject to a libel suit filed by the Minister, and as a result the 
government would only comment further on the matter at the conclusion of the case . 
Further, the government asserted that workers were dismissed only after they failed to 
return to work after the union had called off the strike, and that the matter was 
engaging representation from the TUC at governmental level. 
The ILO Committee, in concluding its investigation into the matter with regards to the 
alleged non-implementation of certain collective agreements and the withdrawal of 
increments, found that the agreements were freely entered into by the workers 
organisations concerned and were understood to be interpreted as an act of faith, and 
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hence no violation of trade union rights had been proven. They also found that the 
arrest of a trade union official did not call for further investigation since there was no 
request for authorization to hold a procession. It recalled the principle that, although 
the right to hold trade union meetings is a basic requisite of the free exercise of trade 
union rights, the organisations concerned must observe the general provisions relating 
to public meetings which were applicable to all. The committee also requested to be 
kept informed concerning the outcome of talks between the TUC and Government on 
the dismissed workers and on the Court's decision on the libel suit brought by the 
Minister of Labour and pointed out that: 
... one of the fundamental principles of freedom of association is that workers 
should enjoy adequate protection against all acts of anti-union discrimination 
in respect to their employment such as dismissal, demotion, transfer or other 
prejudicial measures and that this protection is particularly desirable in the 
case of trade union officials because, in order to be able to perform their trade 
union duties in full independence, they must have the guarantee that they will 
not be prejudiced on account of the mandate which they hold from their trade 
unions... the committee considers it appropriate to recall generally the 
principle that pickets acting in accordance with the law should not be subject 
to interference by the public authorities (4). 
In assessing the report in retrospect a senior union official alluded to the fact that it is 
always difficult for trade unions to fight the government at international fora, like the 
ILO, since the government is more structurally and financially equipped to take on the 
trade unions. At times even lies from them can be taken as convincing arguments. In 
this regard, the government was not honest with respect to the dismissal of workers 
and the breaking up of pickets but it had the advantage of sending an emissary to brief 
the committee while the unions were not allowed the opportunity to reply to the 
government's half truths (Interview: October 1994). The ILO committee also 
overlooked a fundamental aspect touching on the right of individual unions to 
negotiate and preserve their agreements and the contractual obligations of employers 
to employees, based on their conditions of service. 
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The Teemal Case 
The N AACIE Executive had also taken a decision in August 1979 to pursue legal 
action on the withdrawal of the increments since its legal advisor had given an 
opinion that a strong case could be made out for a breach of the workers contract by 
the Guysuco. Writs were filed for hundreds of NAACIE members by Attorney at 
Law, Ashton Chase, who in consultation with lawyers for Guysuco decided that one 
of the cases should be pursued as a test case, with the decision for that case to apply 
to the others. The case for Seeram Teemal of the Versailes Branch came up for 
hearing before the late High Court Judge, Justice Francis Vierra. 
The case for Guysuco, argued by senior counsel Lloyd Luckhoo, was based on the 
decision taken by Cabinet and communicated to all state agencies, over the non-
application of the Minimum Wage Agreement, which they contended had replaced all 
other agreements (Trial notes). Chase, on the other hand, had taken the position, 
among other submissions, that a contract entered into by two parties could not be 
unilaterally varied by strangers to the contract and that the decision of the Cabinet 
could not be legally enforceable. The judge in deciding the case against the sugar 
industry was very critical of the decision taken by them and in addressing the issue of 
the authority of the Cabinet, he emphasised that he was unaware of any such 
proposition as a matter of law and no legal authority had been cited to support such a 
novel motion. 
The decision of Vierra 1. was taken up by Guysuco to the Appeal Court. Justices of 
Appeal, R.H. Luckhoo, Charles Fung-A-Fat and Keith S. Massiah who listened to the 
Appeal, upheld the decision of the judge in the first instance. Justice Luckhoo, who 
delivered the main decision pronounced thus: 
I t would be an alarming situation for an employee to be told by his employers 
that no matter what they have set out as their terms of employment they would 
reduce his salary at any time they thought fit and if he did not like what was 
done he could seek employment elsewhere. This would be contrary to all 
ethical, moral, and legal concepts. It is not done in civilised communities (5). 
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Touching on the issue of the common law the judge was forthright: 
The common law governing contracts was, therefore, not to be ignored, but 
was to be applied by the courts in a proper discharge of their functions. A 
denial to a citizen by a court of relief for an infringement of his vested 
contractual rights would be tantamount to a denial of the rule of law. The rule 
of law is the foundation upon which is structured the system of true 
parliamentary democracy. That rule respects as well as protects the rights of 
the citizens granted under the constitution, under the statute law, and under the 
common law and equity ... (6). 
The Appeal Court therefore found that the employers had not honoured their 
obligations under the legally binding contract of service. After years of legal 
wrangling, the workers expected their retroactive payout soon after the Appeal 
Court's decision in October 1983. This was in keeping with an undertaking in writing 
by Guysuco lawyers that any favourable decision for the Union in the courts would 
result in automatic payment for all NAACIE members. The assurance proved to be 
insincere since the union and its lawyer tried every possible way to get the employers 
to pay all outstanding sums of money owing to workers, but failed. Guysuco 
apparently was informed by the government that legislation was on its way to 
override the ruling of the highest court in the land. Hence Guysuco's refusal to 
honour the legal decision. 
The Labour Amendment Act 
On March 1, 1984 the union served notice on the corporation to call its entire 
membership out on strike after the expiration of seventy two hours, if steps were not 
taken to start the payout procedures. A general strike ensued from March 5, 1984. 
Although the majority of NAACIE members were operating in the service sections of 
the industry, the effectiveness of the strike resulted in a decline of production in the 
first week by about 25 percent. The reason behind the industry'S refusal to make the 
payout became clear when, on March 12th, the government tabled the Labour 
Amendment Bill No.5 of 1984 in Parliament. That bill was rushed through all its 
stages in Parliament four days later, without the consultation of the TUC provided for 
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in the constitution and in keeping with normal practice. It was approved by the 
required two thirds majority from the Government side - but this was a majority 
which had been obtained through another fraudulent election in December 1980 - and 
made law. 
The Labour Amendment Act No. 9 of 1984 did three major things with retroactive 
effect to 1977. It altered the fundamental rights clause, Article 142 of the 
Constitution, in which wages were given protection and were regarded as part of a 
person's property. By removing that right, wages were no longer deemed as property 
rights and legislation could be enacted to interfere with workers' wages. Second, it 
reversed the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Teemal -v- The Guyana Sugar 
Corporation Ltd. Finally it made Collective Labour Agreements binding in law, 
including the 1977 Government/TUC Agreement, which took precedence over 
personal and individual union agreements and could override whatever an arbitrator 
might award to workers. 
The Act intended to kill collective bargaining by individual uruons in the public 
sector and replace those arrangements with TUC/ Government negotiations. It was 
therefore an attack on workers' rights to bargain collectively through a trade union of 
their choice. Moreover, it bound workers to whatever was negotiated between the 
government and the TUC but left the government free to renege on any agreement 
reached. The workers and their unions could be sued but the government was 
protected against litigation. The workers' wages were pegged at the 1978 level unless 
the President directed otherwise. Strikes were automatically barred except in cases 
where the unions observed the cumbersome procedures in their agreements for the 
avoidance and settlement of disputes. 
What the legislation did not do was to ensure that the TUC functioned as a democratic 
institution. The undemocratic nature of the TUC had been a source of tremendous 
concern for a number of trade unions, which had been excluded from the decision 
making process of that body. So, whether the TUC's position was supportive of the 
majority or minority, the law allowed that body to bind all the workers in the state 
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sector to whatever decision it took with the government on wages. As Chase 
explained, the legislation took everything away from the workers but gave them 
nothing (NAACIE Report: 1985). 
While the government was rushing through the Bill in Parliament the opposition PPP 
called for time to study the proposed legislation and to allow for the process of 
consultation to take place, but this request was not entertained by the Government. 
The TUC General Secretary, whose comment on the Bill was sought, wrote to the 
Minister of Labour acknowledging the receipt of three copies of the Bill only three 
days before it was due to be debated in Parliament. He therefore regretted the TUC's 
inability to offer any comments or recommendations because of insufficient time 
between the receipt of the Bill and the timing of the debate. The letter stated that the 
Bill had far reaching implications for the TUC, its affiliates and the labour movement 
generally. 
There were demonstrations in front of Parliament by union leaders and workers from 
both the sugar and bauxite industries and other civic minded citizens. The Guyana 
Human Rights Association was critical of the Bill and called for its withdrawal. 
Among the other reputable organisations which condemned the action by the 
government were the Guyana Bar Association, which described the Bill as: 
A bold, shameless and barefaced act to reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeal whose fair and unbiased ruling reiterated the fundamental right of the 
workers to be paid wages as due (7). 
The GA WU members took one-day solidarity strike action on March 16th, and had 
taken a decision not to perform work which fell within the NAACIE categories. With 
the passage of the legislation and the tough stance of the government the NAACIE 
decided to end the strike on March 20th, and to challenge the legislation in the Courts. 
This was yet another example of how the state apparatus could be used to crush 
workers' struggles. According to another workers' representative with experience of 
this period, on this occasion the state did not resort to violence and other repressive 
actions during the demonstration as in the past. It could not have accused the unions 
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of engaging in political strikes, since the workers' union did evetything within the law 
to redress a wrong committed against them by the state. The workers were on this 
occasion greeted by the action of an oppressive Parliament. The union, it was pointed 
out, was not only fighting the employer but also the state, supported by its legislative 
power in a 'rigged' parliament (Interview: November1994). 
However, an area of concern mentioned during the strike had to do with threats made 
to Senior Staff whose children were on strike, to ensure that they go back to work or 
face eviction from the estates' premises. The daughter of the Assistant Office Manager 
at Albion, Miss Rambarose chose to resign her employment rather than break the 
strike. When the strike was over several acts of reprisals took place~ in particular the 
Corporation revoked the acting appointments of several militant union members who 
were acting in higher capacities, some of whom were due for promotion, and refused 
to deduct union and credit union dues from workers' pay based on the check off 
agreement. The union, having been informed of these developments by their 
members, wrote to Guysuco pointing to the breaches which had been occasioned by 
its action. It was then that the corporation gave its first reaction since the union's 
ultimatum, one month after it was served and ten days after the strike ended. This 
accused the union of breaching the procedural agreement for settling disputes and 
confirmed that the deductions of dues for March had not taken place. After several 
exchanges of letters between the parties the deduction of dues re-commenced from 
April 18, 1984 (NAACIE Report 1984: 23). 
The umon also expressed concern over the mysterious fire which extensively 
damaged the car of its General Secretary, the day after the strike was called off and 
five days after the police special branch had made enquiries concerning the model and 
number of his car. The manner in which the fire occurred was unusual, in that the 
gasoline line broke in the area of the driver's seat and fire flared up through that part 
of the car while he was driving, which reinforced the point of the union and FITUG 
that it may not have been an accident (ibid). Another car belonging to the General 
Secretary was also permanently disabled by a sticky substance believed to be sugar, 
which was found in the oil, two days after he spoke at a public meeting (8). Other 
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persons opposed to the regime have had their cars sabotaged as a means of affecting 
their mobility, since new vehicles were not available to the public, only those 
allocated by the government to state and party officials. Spare parts were also 
difficult to obtain due to the chronic shortage offoreign exchange (ibid). 
The Labour Amendment Act Challenged 
The challenge to the legislation was led by NAACIE members Mohamed Ali, 
Roopnauth Durshan and Durbal Budhai. They were represented by Ashton Chase 
associated with C.R. Ramson and others, with Justice Clifford Baburam presiding in 
the High Court. The application to the Court was by way of an originating motion, 
which the lawyers felt was a well established practice of common law and a desirable 
form of procedure which provided a convenient and expeditious way of approaching 
the court. The State's case was presented by the Attorney General, Mohamed 
Shahabuddeen, assisted by the Solicitor General, Julian Nurse and others from the 
Attorney General Chambers. The hearing on the matter commenced on June 27th, 
1984 and ended on September 27th, 1984. However, the decision was not given until 
March 7th 1986. 
After the months of legal arguments supported by affidavits and an agonizing period 
of waiting, the trial Judge ruled in favour of the respondents/applicants. Ali and others 
were elated over the outcome. The Judge struck down two obnoxious pieces of the 
Act as 'colourable legislation' and a denial of natural justice. In his very lengthy 
judgment the judge made some important pronouncements in which he asserted that : 
One cannot but come to the conclusion that the pith and substance of section 7 
was a legislative plan ex post facto to prevent the enforcement of the Teemal -
v- Guysuco judgment and not to enforce the undertaking given by Clarke and 
Martin (Guysuco Lawyers) with respect to the other public sector workers of 
NAACIE in respect of whom such undertaking was given. It seems to be that 
once the Act is used to defeat the Public Sector workers in respect of whom a 
clear undertaking was given, the Act had no more utilitarian value. In my 
judgment, the language of the enactment of Section 7 was such that no other 
conclusion is possible, that was the intention of the legislature. I hold, 
therefore that the plaintiffs! applicants have satisfied the burden of proof 
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which lies on them to show that there was a clear transgression of 
constitutional principle, which is discriminatory in its effect and a violation of 
the Article 149 (9). 
Thus the judge found that section 7 was 'colourable legislation' and noted that, while 
Parliament had acted in exercise of its undoubted power, what it did in reality was to 
disguise and transgress that power. He therefore made a declaration which struck 
down the legislation as being a violation of the Constitution of Guyana. By this 
decision the increments of members of the union were restored. 
The other section which was struck down was 28c of the Act, which gave the TUC 
bargaining rights on behalf of all public sector workers. Counsel for the union had 
argued that this section collided with the freedom of the individual to have a trade 
union of his choice, which in effect is a transgression of the fundamental rights of 
Freedom of Association, calculated to hinder that freedom and therefore in clear 
violation of Article 147 of the Constitution of Guyana. The section also contravened 
ILO Conventions 87 and 98 which have been ratified by the Government. 
Further, the section made a mockery of collective bargaining when the TUC 
Executive comprised of members of the Cabinet, the Ministers of Labour and 
Agriculture and a Parliamentary Secretary, some of whom had been sitting on the 
Government side at times of negotiation and then attending Executive Council 
meetings of the TUC. They were therefore privy to all the strategy and information 
coming from the TUC. The confidentiality which is so necessary in collective 
bargaining could not be maintained in those circumstances. While it was also not 
obligatory for unions to be members of the TUC there was also no proof that the 
individual worker had decided to opt for the TUC to be his bargaining agent. The 
judge upheld the arguments of counsel for the union members and made the 
following ruling: 
Firstly, if the TUC is to pursue collective bargaining as an agent for an 
individual union, can there be meaningful and effective negotiations with the 
government if one or more members of the TUC is also a Government 
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Minister or at least holds an influential position with the government? The 
enormity of the influence that government member can exert on other 
members of the TUC must never be underestimated. A trade union needs not 
only freedom of association but also freedom to organise and to bargain 
effectively and collectively. The element of fraud misconduct or partiality 
cannot be ruled out during the course of such bargaining with the government 
officers being members of the TUC. I rule and hold that the plaintiffs have 
shown affirmatively and have discharged the burden of proof which lies in 
them in showing that section 28C is a breach of natural justice and that it is 
unconstitutional and ultra vires the Constitution of the Cooperative Republic 
of Guyana and is hereby struck down as invalid (10). 
The government appealed the decision on March 10, 1986 and Court of Appeal 
Judges, Chancellor, K.S. Massiah, and Justices of Appeal, C.J.E. Fung-A-Fat and 
R.H. Harper presided at the Appeal which began on October 20, 1986. Counsel for 
the union members raised three preliminary objections. Arguments and deliberations 
on these took almost eight months. The first objection was that the Court of Appeal 
lacked the jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. However, the Court ruled 
otherwise. Then there was the motion that the appeal be struck out because the service 
of the notice of appeal to the union members, who were the respondents in the case, 
did not conform with certain rules of the Court. This motion was also disqualified. 
Finally, there was a motion in which the union members sought to disqualify Justice 
Fung-A-Fat and at the same time set up a panel of five Judges instead of three. 
The reason for the union members seeking to have the judge disqualify himself was 
based on a sworn affidavit by Attorney At Law B.E.Gibson, which stated that in a 
previous trial the "learned Justice of Appeal said and repeated that anyone having 
complaints about any Act of Parliament must make his representations there and 
should not bother to come to the Court of Appeal (11). The case for a panel of five 
Judges was supported by affidavits of leaders of several trade unions, including, the 
NUPSE, CCWU, GA WU, GMWU, GBSU, UGWU and NAAC lE , in which they 
stated that they had been following the case with great interest and in view of its 
importance they were supporting the call for a full bench of five Judges. The Justices 
of Appeal again ruled against the union members and the substantive appeal was 
heard from June 17, 1987. 
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The unusual speed with which this appeal came up for hearing was wonying to the 
union and their lawyers since there have been many bitter experiences on decisions 
handed down in cases against the state. This prompted Senior Counsel for the union, 
Ashton Chase, to write to the Chancellor of the Judiciary to point to the number of 
outstanding cases which were pending for longer periods, some touching on the 
Constitution and Fundamental Rights, yet they had not been listed for hearing nor 
records settled: 
I am sure you will be sensitive to the fact that such unusual haste on the part of 
the judicial machinery in a matter which involves the interest of the 
government can only cause the respondents to become disquieted at the 
neutrality of the judicial process~ coupled with the information that is at large 
as to where the original notes etc. of the hearing have been typed(12). 
There was a measured but what can be considered a comforting response from the 
Chancellor, in which he referred to actions which he had taken to have cases heard 
speedily and informed the union members counsel that it was his perception: 
that rumour feeds on prejudice, and that people will believe what they want to 
believe. Undaunted, I shall continue to direct attention to the scourge of 
delays. That is why I am particularly interested in your reference to your 
constitutional appeals. If you write me about them I shall be pleased to ensure 
that they, like all other constitutional matters, are given priority on the 
calendar (13). 
The fact that counsel for the union sought to register his concerns to the Chancellor 
and the attempts made to have the matter heard by a full Bench of five Judges gave 
an indication of the extent to which fear and uncertainty had gripped the society and 
the prevailing lack of confidence in the judicial system. Several union leaders had 
taken the position that the government's decision could never be challenged 
successfully in the courts and refused to have their unions joining in the matter at its 
early stages in 1979. Their decision was based on the overwhelming examples of 
unsuccessful and costly legal challenges against the State. As one leader later 
emphasised: "We were in Bumham Republic; and whatever Bumham said or do, no 
one would dare to challenge or go against" (Interview, October 1994). They also 
feared that their unions would have risked financially bankruptcy if they were to be 
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engaged in such a challenge. From an examination of the many issues involved and 
days spent in Court, during the duration of the trials which lasted almost a decade 
, 
their fears might have proven correct. 
It was the NAACIE General Secretary who tried to examine what the legal cost might 
have been for the union if they did not have the services of Ashton Chase and his 
committed band of associates. He explained that, luckily, the union did not pay a cent 
as legal fees, but if they had had to, they may have had to sell their Building to 
finance that struggle. That was the enormous sacrifice which Comrade Chase and his 
colleagues made to the struggles of the workers of the country. My informant 
emphasised that Chase's dedication to the cause of the workers has been a source of 
inspiration to others (ibid). He further explained that one of the reasons why unions 
have been unable to genuinely fight the government was because of their weak 
financial situation, which the government has been very much aware of Several trade 
unions operated on a shoe string budget, sometimes having an overdraft and 
mortgages and grossly underpaid officials. 
F or this informant, this issue was directly related to a very serious problem of the 
movement, which has to do with accountability and lack of democracy. Only a few 
trade unions have their accounts up to date. The majority which have been affiliated 
to the ruling party then have often been given favours and financial assistance 
allegedly through the infamous Ministry of National Mobilisation (which was later 
dismantled by the Hoyte regime). That is the reason why, he alluded, in most of the 
struggles in the late 1970s and early 80s, the first thing that came under attack was 
union dues (ibid). 
The fear and uncertainty which had engulfed the minds of many workers and their 
leaders were soon laid to rest when after twenty three days of legal arguments in the 
substantive case, the decision was handed down on October 28,1987. The Justices of 
Appeal unanimously upheld the decision of the trial judge and disallowed the Appeal 
by the Government. In confirming the decision of the judge in the first instance, that 
section 7 of the Act was invalid, the Appellate Judges found that it: 
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sought to keep wages for 1979 at their 1978 level. Thus persons like Teemal 
who were granted increased wages in 1979 could no longer claim them and 
this was so even where, as in the Teemal's case a court had declared th~t the 
person was at law entitled to receive his increased wages. Thus wages were in 
effect seized by the state. Such a position is strange to common law (14). 
With respect to Section 28, the Chancellor and Fung-A-Fat J.A. found by a majority 
decision that it was enacted in clear violation of the constitution. They found that 
there was a failure on the part of the government to consult the TUC or any individual 
union, in clear breach of the important constitutional provisions of Article 11. They 
asserted that the Minister ought to have consulted with those bodies and his failure 
was a grave omission. In the light of their understanding of Article 38 of the 
Constitution, it would be palpably wrong for them to hold that section 28C of the 
Labour Act was valid. 
The extent to which the government moved to block the payment of the increment 
was exposed by Senior Counsel Ashton Chase, representing the workers, when he 
explained that what the government sought to do was to amend the Constitution of 
1980, to seize wages which fell due in 1979 and were protected by the previous 1966 
Constitution. To do so successfully they had to amend Article 8 of the 1966 
Constitution which protected wages and this had to be done before the promulgation 
of the 1980 Constitution (Trial Notes). Their Honours upheld the submission and 
pronounced that they found: 
it difficult to understand how the present constitution could be amended to 
have effect in 1979 when the present constitution was not then in existence. 
You cannot amend a provision which does not exist. That the constitution 
could be amended retrospectively as a far back as the date when it came into 
effect .... But it could go no further .... There is in being no constitutional 
amendment that properly permits the compulsory acquisition in 1979, and 
section 7 of the Act which purported to do so is invalid... and accordingly 
cannot stand (15). 
With the ruling of the courts for the fourth time going in favour of the workers it was 
widely believed that this chapter of workers' struggles, over the payments of 
increments, would have been ended, and the decisions of the Courts would be 
honoured. But again the government moved to Parliament to enact a further piece of 
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legislation. The Constitution Amendment Bill was advertised in the Guyana Chronicle 
of November 29, 1987. The Ministry of Legal Affairs pointed out that the Bill was not 
intended to affect the financial entitlement of any person pursuant to any judgment of 
the Courts (16). What the Bill sought to do was to amend Chapter Two of the 
Constitution, which provided for consultation with trade unions, cooperatives and 
other social and economic organisations prior to the enactment of any new legislation, 
and to make the said chapter legally enforceable only where there is legislation 
enacted for that purpose. The government claimed that the proposed amendment to 
Chapter Two was necessary, since the 1980 provisions led to rigidities which 
impaired the value of consultation. The Bill also sought to prevent any law made 
under the present constitution, which took effect from a date prior to the 
commencement of the new constitution, from being challenged : 
in any court or tribunal on the grounds that it contravenes, or is inconsistent 
with any provision of any constitution which was in force in Guyana at any 
time before the day on which this constitution commenced (17). 
This amendment permitted the government to pass retroactive laws to a date prior to 
the promulgation of the 1980 Constitution, even if those laws were inconsistent with 
provisions of the previous constitutions, without anyone being able to challenge the 
amendments. The right to wages or any other Fundamental Rights could be attacked 
retrospectively. In explaining the serious nature of the Bill, Chase explained to union 
leaders that there must be a repugnance over such wide powers of Parliament, 
particularly since the laws cannot be challenged. A citizen would not be able to sleep 
in peace in such a situation (NAACIE Records). Several organisations from almost 
every section of the Guyanese community came out openly in opposition to the Bill. 
F or the first time in many years the TUC took a very strong position, but again on 
paper, against the government. The Bill had a direct bearing on the relation between 
the government and the TUC because it was removing the right of that body to be 
consulted on legislative matters. While expressing its opposition to the Bill, the TUC 
also called for dialogue between workers and their trade unions and the relevant 
government agencies for the purpose of determining the categories of workers who 
were entitled to the payments in keeping with the decision of the Courts. This, the 
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TUC asserted, should be given priority, not the initiation of amendments to the 
Constitution (18). 
The militant union grouping comprising of the GMWU, GA WU, CCWU, NAACIE 
and UGWU, along with the GHRA and GBA, opposed the Bill and staged 
demonstrations against it. In a joint statement they stated that the bill was seeking to 
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeal, by making Sections 28c and 7 of the 1984 
Labour Amendment Act valid as if they had never been struck down by the Courts, 
and they argued that, by removing the legal right to consultation, Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution "becomes mere verbiage .... The constitution cannot be respected if, 
whenever the government violates it, amendment is sought to legalise its violation" 
(19). The opposition parties in Parliament demanded the withdrawal of the Bill but 
despite the pleadings, wave of protests and widespread opposition, the Bill was 
passed in Parliament on February 15th, 1988. 
The Final Encounter 
Based on the undertaking from the Ministry of Legal affairs that the legislation would 
not affect the workers who had successfully challenged the withdrawal of increments, 
the NAACIE made representations to the sugar company to have meetings arranged 
to work out an agreed formula for the payout. While a meeting was promised by the 
Corporation, weeks passed without any being held, while the corporation was taking 
steps to make the payout based on their perception of the Courts decision. Members 
of NAACIE had reported that the payout, wrongly calculated, was about to take 
place unilaterally and directly to members, unlike in the past when the payments 
would have been made through the workers legal representatives to avoid any 
miscalculations from taking place (NAACIE Report 1988: 35). 
Recognising what was taking place, union representatives explained that the workers 
signed a petition authorising the Corporation to pay over to their legal representatives 
all monies due to them (ibid). Their lawyers were also instructed to issue valid 
discharges in respect of the payments made. The corporation did not adhere to the 
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request of the workers, and their lawyers were forced to seek a restraining order 
which was obtained and entered on 24th May 1988 by Justice Nandram Kissoon, and 
which prevented the Corporation from making payment directly to its employees. The 
Government sought to sow seed of disunity among the rank and file by using the state 
media to accuse the lawyers and union of seeking to rob the workers of their full 
settlement. They claimed that the lawyers were seeking to have the payments made 
through them because they wanted to make deductions from the workers for legal 
representation (ibid: 33). 
The corporation was able to secure the removal of the restraining order, and this was 
followed by months of delay and refusal to meet on the matter, despite repeated 
requests from the Union. It was not until December 1 st, 1988 that the corporation 
responded to a union letter, and explained that the reason for not meeting was because 
the matter was the subject of litigation. However, the union pointed out that the issue 
under-litigation had nothing to do with the working out of a payment fonnula (ibid). 
The corporation was prepared to defy the union on the matter and went ahead to make 
the payout on March 17th 1989. All the Corporation did was to pay the increment 
which was taken away for 1979, although in principle the commitment was for all the 
years that increments were not paid. The union sought the support of the GA WU to 
take strong industrial action against the Corporation to enforce the right calculation, 
since some of their members were also affected, but that union did not agree to take 
any action (ibid). Consequently, the workers were not paid increments for the years 
1982 and 1983 when a wage freeze took place. Workers who were promoted were 
also denied retroactive payments beyond the date of promotion. One year later, some 
workers at the Head Office still had not received their payouts, but the situation was 
remedied through representation by the union. 
The NAACIE, having pursued the matter legally alone and won the case at every 
stage within the legal system, needed the support of other unions to enforce the 
correct interpretation of the Appeal Court's decision in the light of Guysuco's 
imposition. However, it did not receive that support and the workers were 'short 
changed' (ibid). Even the lip service paid by the GA WU did not help the situation. In a 
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critical statement against the government for seeking to deny sugar workers their 
increments arising out of the Teemal case, this is what GAWU had to say: 
This is an attack on democratic and trade union rights. It has become the 
centre of struggle for trade union democracy in Guyana. The battle initiated by 
NAACIE and ably championed by Cde. Ashton Chase, Attorney-At- Law, led 
to a significant victory. It further help to unmask the anti working class 
character of the government (Combat #3: 1988). 
Throughout the duration of the legal battles, the process of free collective bargaining 
in the Public Sector had not taken place. Any union wishing to sign an agreement had 
to do so by endorsing what wage increases were imposed by the Government and 
based on the Finance Minister's Budget provision. There were unions which happily 
accepted the government's handouts. A union official humorously called this process 
"the offer and acceptance rituals - not negotiations". The NAACIE, he explained, 
could not have been a party to such an exercise. Further, the unions were not prepared 
to collectively fight the issue. By contrast NAACIE did not sign any collective 
agreement to incorporate wage increases for over a decade between 1977 and 1987 
(Interview: October 1994). 
From the experiences of the past, this kind of struggle had to be pursued by the entire 
labour movement to be effective. With no sign of unity the workers, included those in 
sugar and bauxite, had to contend with the arbitrary increases imposed by the state, 
and with respect to the years 1982 and 1983 settled for no increase at all. This as how 
Chase summed up the lack of response of the other unions in this struggle, especially 
from NAACIE's sister union: 
It is a matter of considerable satisfaction that our union can hold its head high 
and look back with pride on its singlehanded achievement in defeating aspects 
of the Labour Amendment Act and securing for our members and others in the 
sugar industry the retrospective pay, of which the Act was designed to deny 
them. Several GA WU categories benefitted from the struggles.... It was 
NAACIE's unwavering struggle that made this possible. Despite approaches, 
our sister union did not join in agitating for the correct payout, and this lack 
of interest has resulted in GUYSUCO retaining the fruits of their exploitative 
calculations. Good though this victory has nonetheless been, it is another 
instance that demonstrates the need for unity. It is a pointer to the limitations 
of one sided action (NAACIE Report 1990 :2). 
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There were some forms of resistance during the period of the legal challenges but 
these are discussed in the ensuing chapters. When the decision on the Labour 
Amendment Act was handed down by the Appeal Court, it was clear that centralised 
bargaining was dealt a serious blow. In fact, it was consigned to the cemetery where it 
was given a decent funeral. Following that decision the TUC advised that: 
having regards to the decision of the Appellate Court, they (the unions) were 
in a position to proceed with negotiation conclusively under the existing 
collective Agreement between the unions and employers (TUC Report 
1988: 15). 
This paved the way for some semblance of collective bargaining to resume. The 
oligarchy's control of the bargaining table was slowly being brought to an end. 
Conclusion 
We have seen how the government's rigid position on wages led to the violation of 
the '1977 Agreement' with respect to the year 1979. Despite the fulminations by the 
TUC, there were wages impositions for some years and the freezing of wages for 
other years during the period 1979 to 1988. These tough measures were introduced 
following the economic decline in the country. The wage freeze imposed in 1979 also 
led to the withdrawal of increments earned by and paid to NAACIE members. 
Sporadic protest actions by the workers and their union failed to secure the 
reinstatement of the increments. 
As a result, the NAACIE successfully challenged the government's decision in the 
High Courts of the country. This led to an appeal by the State of the Judge's order in 
the first instance. The ruling of the Appeal Court in favour of NAACIE led to the 
refusal by the government to honour decisions of the Courts, and to the introduction 
of legislation aimed at circumventing those decisions. Although there was an alliance 
of progressive unions in the country, the NAACIE was unable to secure their support 
as well as that of the TUC in coordinating a unified struggle on this issue. Further 
protest action by NAACIE along with un-coordinated action by bauxite workers did 
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not assist in a resolution of the issue. 
After the legislation was rushed through Parliament, the NAACIE once more 
challenged the latest government move in the Courts, where the ruling was favourable 
to the union in both the High Court and the Court of Appeal. Despite the favourable 
decisions by the highest court in the land, the government again displayed its 
stubbornness and failed to give full effect to the award of the Court. This established 
as an incontrovertible fact, that laws and procedures alone do not help in industrial 
relations disputes. At times it might be necessary for workers to be engaged in 
effective and united action to help bring about a resolution of disputes. 
More generally, then, this chapter has traced a further twist in the relations between 
unions and the state, and has shown that legal remedies do not readily resolve the 
dilemmas facing unions and workers in a highly politicised industrial relations 
environment. They underline the power of the state, even a relatively small 
developing state, to repress unions and to circumvent 'due process', and they also 
underline the challenges facing unions in such circumstances. 
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Chapter 7 
Resistance Amidst Repression 
During the period of the legal challenge against the withdrawal of increments, several 
anti-workers' measures were introduced. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
there was the effective blocking of negotiations to the level of wage increases 
announced by the government. The result was that the standard of living of workers 
declined considerably year after year. By the end of 1981 the economic decline had 
reached a catastrophic level. Essential imported food items, for which there were 
inadequate or no local substitutes, were banned and the prices of available food items 
had increased way beyond the purchasing power of the workers. 
Following the presentation of the 1981 Budget, an Economic Committee was 
established by the TUC to investigate the impact of the budget on the workers and to 
report thereon. On March 25,1981, the Committee reported that real wages had 
progressively declined over the period of the late 1970s: 
that the real value of the $200 per month in January, 1977 was $120.77 as 
calculated from the C.P'!. (1978= 100) while its value at September 1980 was 
$102.07 ... The decline in real wages increased progressively from a salary of 
$976.35 per month maximising at 34.47% (TUC Report 1981:7). 
This situation was further compounded on June 1, when the national budget was 
reviewed and new measures were introduced which caused consumer prices to rise 
sharply. Based on a proposal initiated by members of the four unions, the delegates at 
a General Council Meeting of the TUC on June 21, 1981, unanimously agreed to 
make strong representations to the government for an interim increase in wages of 25 
per cent. The Executive Council disregarded that decision and agreed with the 
government an interim relief of twelve and a half per cent, effective from July 1, 
1981. This eventually became the only wage increase the workers secured until 
January of 1984. 
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Workers' representatives claimed that the TUC sided with the government and 
abandoned the workers struggle for a decent living wage. The TUC also readily 
agreed to the government's own admission that the country was bankrupt and failed 
to make an effort to secure the target set by the General Council. However, at the 
General Council meeting on March 28th 1982, the TUC General Secretary pointed 
out that the dominant consideration which persuaded that body to move away from 
the 25 per cent interim relief and settle for half the amount was to avoid the 
retrenchment of thousands of public sector workers (TUC Report 1982). During the 
course of the negotiations the government had warned the TUC that if its demand, 
estimated at $127.6 million, was not reduced then substantial retrenchment of about 
17000 workers or 17.9 percent of public sector employment would take place: 
The TUC quite reluctantly accepted what the Vice President, Economic 
Planning and Finance said was the final amounts of increases which were 
within the financial capabilities of the government to pay without having to 
effect retrenchments (TUC Report March 1982). 
When the TUC and Government had agreed to the wage increases in 1981, assurances 
came from the government in August 1981 and again in January 1982, that there 
would be no retrenchment. These statements by the government once again proved 
empty. On February 6, 1982 the Executive President announced that there would be 
retrenchment in the public sector. Simultaneously, the Guyana Rice Board, without 
any discussion with the recognised union or the TUC, retrenched over 1000 workers 
(NAACIE Report 1982). The government had previously rejected charges from 
opposition quarters and even from the four unions that the economy was in shambles. 
The four unions drew to the attention of the TUC the poor state of the economy and 
offered some solutions to the problems plaguing the country. One of the main areas of 
concern was the mismanagement of the economy, but no initiative was taken by the 
government to correct or address any of the criticisms made by the four unions. The 
TUC could also be blamed for not taking a tough position with the government on 
issues affecting workers. They instead went along with the approach of the 
government. 
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Economic Collapse 
Writing in the Caribbean Contact of January 1982, the economist Clive Thomas, who 
was also the head of the UGWU, stated that there was a collapse in the Guyana 
economy. This analysis invoked the wrath of top PNC officials. One month later the 
ruling party and government decided to "tell it as it is", which prompted the following 
statement from Pollydore: 
When unfolding events give substance to rumours or statements previously 
denied, or followed belatedly by explanations or clarifications which do not 
basically alter the original version, there develops the tendency for credence to 
be given to every rumour concerned with sensitive or topical issues (TUC 
Report September 1982:1). 
It is clear from this statement and the attitude of the TUC Executive members that the 
positions put forward by so-called 'opposition elements'had been put aside for the 
more "accurate" position of the government. Hence, the open admission of the 
Government shook the confidence the TUC had in it. 
The government also persuaded the TUC to become involved in discussions on the 
criteria for retrenchment. The body for organised labour became mute and failed the 
workers on every government initiative. While discussions were taking place between 
the Government and the TUC, workers in several government departments were 
retrenched, without notice or regard for industrial relations practices. The 'four union 
movement' was vocal and held public meetings, as well as making press releases 
calling on the TUC to reject the government argument that retrenchment was a basis 
for the solution to the ills confronting the nation. The four unions also had a 
resolution passed at the General Council meeting in March 1982 calling on the 
government to halt retrenchment, and to restore the status quo by rescinding all letters 
which terminated the services of workers. The government did not accede to the 
TUC's representation as directed by the General Council. However, the General 
Council did not approve a proposal by the four unions for industrial action as a means 
of seeking to block the decisions of the government. 
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A union official explained that, if the TUC had taken the information which was 
supplied by the four unions and had represented those issues to government with the 
seriousness they deserved, the workers would not have been placed in such a 
predicament. The TUC could have blamed the government squarely for wrecking the 
economy. The workers who were already earning at subsistence level should not have 
been exposed to losing their jobs and worse yet, without any notice whatsoever. If 
retrenchment was imperative the government could have started the exercise from the 
top, by retrenching some of the seven Vice Presidents and the more than thirty 
Ministers, ten Regional Chairmen and their Deputies and the countless number of 
party functionaries who were paid from the national treasury. The salaries to party 
functionaries placed a tremendous burden on a small country with a population of less 
than three quarter of a million. The barbarity with which the government handled the 
matter was confirmed later by Pollydore when he wrote: 
The widespread dissatisfaction which developed among workers even among 
some of those who were fortunate to be retained in employment, the ruthless 
manner in which the retrenchment itself was effected in that the termination 
date of employment was instantaneous in most cases, the undisguised and 
inexcusable favouritism shown in identifying persons for retrenchment also 
the total disregard manifested for fundamental industrial relations principles 
are already well known to all affiliates and do not require any repetition in this 
report except to state that the retrenchment had gone far beyond the 6,000 
employees (TUC Report 1982:2) 
The government had announced earlier that 6,000 workers were slated for possible 
retrenchment but they had surpassed that figure. Those workers who were retrenched 
received no severance benefits, such as redundancy payments, or pension payments. 
When the matter was represented by the TUC to the Secretary to the Treasury, the 
answer was that the "questions raised in your letter are now being given careful 
consideration and a reply would soon be sent to you" (1). This answer was considered 
in labour circles as giving the TUC the turn around since the very government official 
had previously authorised between one week and one month's payment to each 
worker - those on weekly roll received one week's pay and those who were on the 
monthly payroll received one month's pay - as compensation for their years of service 
(2). Even this parsimonious amount as compensation took several months before it 
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was paid to the workers. 
The sugar industry, where the government in 1977 had argued that there were 
employment opportunities for all the strike breakers recruited during the strike, was 
also targeted for retrenchment. The leaders of the sugar unions were summoned to a 
meeting with the Corporation on May 24th 1982, where they were notified that in the 
light of the losses suffered by the industry over recent years, the corporation intended 
to take steps to remedy the situation. These included the following: 
1. Employment was to be restricted to essential work which was production 
oriented. 
2. Work related to production that could be deferred would be postponed. 
3. Compassionate employment would be discontinued. 
4. Guaranteed conditions would not be maintained. 
5. Temporary lay offs and retrenchment would be considered. 
6. "Irrelevant" customs and practices, especially those which are contrary to 
agreements with unions, would be ended (NAACIE Report 1982). 
These proposed actions meant that all collective agreements were meaningless. In 
response the unions adopted a united position in rejecting any change to the existing 
working practices or employment levels. Nonetheless, the corporation went ahead and 
started their retrenchment drive at the Head Office, by severing the employment of 
four members of NAACIE, paying them all their benefits. Before representation was 
made by the union, the workers had dispatched a letter stating that they were very 
happy with their emoluments and did not wish to be reinstated (ibid :29). When the 
union insisted on fighting the issue as matter of principle, the workers maintained an 
adamant position and even threatened legal action against the union, since they were 
happy to get out of the system. 
At a follow up meeting with the corporation on June 7,1982, the sugar unions took the 
position that if further action was taken by the industry to retrench any other 
employee, firm industrial action would be taken. There were no further 
retrenchments, although a large number of workers were prepared to settle for 
severance pay, since many had plans to migrate to the United States or Canada which 
were popularly referred to as regions 11 and 12 (3). One union official later explained 
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that no amount of talking or engaging in a paper war would have blocked Guysuco's 
planned action. The unions had to take up a no- nonsense approach and let the 
employers understand that they meant business. In particular strike action would have 
commenced the moment another letter was issued to a worker. The official felt that if 
the TUC had acted in a defiant manner and given sound leadership to workers, the 
regime might have been forced to shelve its plan and work out a better arrangement 
for the workers in the other public sector agencies who were retrenched (Interview: 
October 1994). United action by the workers could have put a halt on the assault by 
government on labour. There were other solutions to the problems, he maintained, but 
those put forward by the four unions and opposition political parties were never 
vigorously pursued by the TUC. What the sugar industry did, nevertheless, was to 
severely restrict overtime work and reduce the working week for some 'piece rated' 
employees outside the harvesting gangs. These cutbacks had a disastrous impact on 
the industry. The neglect of cultivation resulted in poor quality cane, poor ratoon, an 
increase in the amount of cane needed to make sugar (an increased tons cane to tons 
sugar ratio) and an overall decline in production over the ensuing years. 
The workers' representatives in the sugar industry were also bitter over the TUC's 
'lukewarm' approach to an agreed decision by the General Council to protest against 
an increase of 13 percent in electricity rates for 1982. By September 1982 the 
Executive Council of the TUC was stripped of all its militant leaders especially those 
of the four unions and the mine workers union following elections at the Conference. 
The end of involvement of militant leaders on the Executive forced a subsequent 
admission by the TUC General Secretary when he wrote that: 
It is illogical that the TUC could be considered as being fully representative 
when the GA WU with 15000 members in the sugar industry is not represented 
on the Executive Council and the bauxite unions only partially 
representative ... while unions with a few hundred members are represented on 
the Council (TUC Report 1984:Introduction). 
The PNC had taken complete control of the TUC and Minister of Labour, Kenneth 
Denny, was the Organising Secretary of the TUC. The Executive Council, sensing the 
tide of discontent among the rank and file on the increased electricity charges, 
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endorsed the decision of the General Council to hold a march and rally, and fixed the 
date of the protest for December 15, 1982. The unions affiliated to the ruling party 
were given clear instructions by the Executive President not to participate in any anti-
government action. 
Those unions then began to retreat from what was likely to be a militant confrontation 
and instead started to discourage their members from participating in the march and 
rally. The workers in the public sector were threatened by top Government Officials 
that those who were seen at the event would be sent home immediately. The 
Organising Secretary could not be found and a senior union official explained that by 
December 14, no physical arrangement had been put in place (Interview: October, 
1994). This left General Secretary Pollydore in a vulnerable and isolated position. He 
had to seek the help of the four unions to ensure that there was a protest. The fears of 
the workers and non-participation of many unions resulted in a poor turnout of about 
1500 workers. The official explained that Pollydore wanted to engage the workers in 
a confrontation with the government but was only going to do it when he was sure 
that the workers were going to respond in a united manner without fear of reprisals. 
The poor response to the December 15th electricity march put any such plan into 
disarray. Some of the representatives in the sugar industry also gained the impression 
that Pollydore wanted to do something, but he never would take a decisive stand on 
any issue. He allowed decisions to come from the unions and the sad thing was that 
no leadership was given to the workers at the TUC level. 
Analysis of Food and Other Protests 
Because of the grave food shortages, the workers showed their resentment by taking 
intermittent protest action, despite the repressive responses by the government, often 
without official union sanction. Protest over the high cost of living was one of nine 
reasons given for most of the 585 strikes which occurred in the sugar industry in 
1981. This was out of a total of 621 in the entire country (see tables 7.2 and 7.3). 
While 55 per cent of these stoppages were for higher wages in 1981, in 1980 the 
figure had been 41 per cent. Residual causes in 1981 covered 37 per cent of the 
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disputes compared to 41 per cent the previous year. Some of the causes within the 
residual group were clearly non industrial, while others were deemed to be "generally 
trivial and frivolous, a typical trend in the sugar industry, mainly arising over the 
dissatisfaction for pricing of obstacles" (Ministry of Labour Report 1981 :69). 
What was also significant in 1981 was the upsurge in strikes both within and beyond 
sugar. In 1977, apart from the strike of 135 days in the sugar industry there had been 
382 other strikes. For 1978 there were 300 strikes in the country as against 219 for 
1979 and 333 in 1980, bringing the strike rate average for the four years (1977-1980) 
to 309. This means that in 1981 there were over 312 more strike activities in the 
country over the average for the previous four years, an increase of just over 100 per 
cent. The sugar industry has always accounted for most strikes, with figures ranging 
from between 70 to 98 per cent of total national strikes, a continuing trend in the 
industry. In 1981 there was a major increase in strike incidence in both the sugar and 
bauxite industries. These two industries together tally 603 strikes with the other 18 
coming from the other sectors of the country as the figures in table 7. 1, below 
indicate. 
Strikes 
Year 198 
Sugar 276 
Bauxit 17 
Other 40 
Total 333 
1981 
585 
18 
18 
621 
Table 7.1 
Strike Statistics 
WORKERS Work Days 
1980 1981 1980 1981 
3547 8410 60595 11031 
514 2388 426 70003 
4663 1209 6601 8261 
4065 8769 67620 12558 
Source: Ministry of Labour Reports. 
Wages Lost G$ 
1980 1981 
1.09 2.3 
.008 .150 
.072 .094 
1.17 2.544 
This increase in strikes is of significance since throughout the year none assumed 
national proportion, and none was publicly organised by the unions. The spontaneous 
strikes involving rank and file workers reflected their strong feeling against 
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government industrial relations policies. Because of their brevity, the government 
could not have responded to them. According to some of the workers' representatives 
who talked to me in 1994, these actions were intended to highlight the workers' 
discontent over shortages and higher prices, hence the demand for higher wages. They 
considered their action similar to that which is displayed by the "ninja fighters - silent, 
but deadly" (Interview August 1994). The intensification of strike activities 
continued in 1982, as seen in table 7 .2, when there were 32 more strikes than in 1981 
at the national level, making 653, and these involved 81,564 workers at a loss of 
140,744 work days and $3.5m in wages. Again, in 1982, 639 (or 98 per cent) of the 
total strikes were in the sugar industry, representing an increase of 9.2 per cent over 
the preceding year. The number of workers involved in the sugar strikes was 80,373 
with 127,987 and $3.1m as loss of work days and wages respectively. 
The figures reveal that there was a reduction in strike activities elsewhere for 1982. In 
the Bauxite industry there were merely 4 stoppages involving 595 workers with a loss 
of 9,828 work days, while in all the other sections there were 10 strikes involving 596 
workers and a loss of 2,929 working days. These represent a reduction in both areas 
outside of sugar, by 78 per cent and 44 per cent respectively over 1981. 
The strike figures for the sugar industry for 1982 are worth analysing since all the 
strikes were of short duration. Only twice were there strikes which affected all estates 
which lasted between one and two, and they were for non availability of an adequate 
supply of essential food and for increased wages. These strikes attracted an estimated 
9,143 workers with a loss in work days of 28,616 and $566,000 in wages. The other 
point to note is that 81 per cent of all strikes in the sugar industry for 1982 were for a 
period of one to two days, which is within the realm of the average duration of 1.8 
days at the national level. With respect to workers' involvement, while there were 
84,100 involved in 585 strikes in the sugar industry for 1981, there were nearly 4000 
less workers involved, that is 80,373, in the 639 strikes for 1982. However, there was 
an increase of about 16 per cent in work days lost in 1982 (127,987) over 1981 
(110,318) (Ministry of Labour Reports). 
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There was a significant strike, however, in the sugar industry on August 9th, at 
Albion Estate where 2,245 workers in all the sections of the estate's operation 
participated (Ministry of Labour Report: 1981). In a demonstration of utter frustration, 
the workers took strike action over the shortage of essential foodstuff. According to 
representatives the workers were in a near riotous mood and some union officials 
feared that the government might have taken action which could have dragged their 
union into a battle they were not prepared for (Interview: October 1994). 
Hence, there were many approaches made to the representatives to ensure a 
resumption of work to allow for a more coordinated approach to the issue. The 
workers resumed duties after two days of protest resulting in a loss of nearly 4,000 
work days and $70,000. in wages. The representatives were bitter that they were 
ordered to end the strike, as it meant that the fighting mood of the workers withered 
away. They pointed out that it would have been a good thing if the unions had been 
able to put together a strategy for action against the government, since there was 
every indication that the regime was seriously losing its support in areas where it once 
claimed to have massive following, especially since the bauxite communities were in 
turmoil over food shortages (ibid). However, the coordination did not take place and 
the workers were left isolated in their struggles over the shortage of essential food. 
The bauxite community, which had suffered from shortages of almost every food 
item, sought the support of the four unions in working on a strategy to grapple with 
the food crises there. Just before May Day 1983 the unions had called on the 
government to set up some sort of monitoring system to look at the distribution 
system with regard to essential food items like milk, oil, and butter especially in 
bauxite towns. Top government functionaries, including Prime Minister P.A. Reid, 
visited the area but there was no solution to the shortages. 
On May 4th 1983 a meeting was convened by forty-two shop stewards of the bauxite 
workforce and a resolution was adopted to engage in protest demonstrations, once 
weekly, until the food situation was improved. The first protest took place on May 
6th, and had the support of almost the entire community. That resolution was then 
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endorsed by both unions, the GMWU and the GBSU. A subsequent demonstration on 
May 18th brought women and children out on the streets. The Police and Tactical 
Service Unit were moved promptly onto the streets resulting in the arrests of twenty 
four shop stewards, two of whom were beaten and had to seek medical attention. 
A former union official later explained that the detention infuriated the strikers, who 
continued their protest actions until midday the following day, when all those who 
were detained had been released (Interview: March 1995). The four unions also 
issued a supportive statement and held meetings with the leadership of both unions in 
the bauxite community. They indicated that, while they were dissatisfied over the 
inadequate representation at the Executive Council level, they would nevertheless 
give full support to the TUC in any action that body may take in seeking to ease the 
sufferings of the workers (ibid). The union official explained that the management, on 
the instructions of the government, promptly retaliated against the workers and 
reduced the work week from five to three days in 30 sections of the Linden operation. 
This led to a full scale strike which commenced on June 6, 1983 and lasted for six 
weeks. The strike ended as a partial victory for the workers when the management 
agreed to revert to the five day work week pending further discussions. It resulted in a 
loss of 60,152 work days and approximately $1.5m in wages (Ministry of Labour 
Report 1983: 66). 
While the discussions were taking place there was further retaliation by the 
government, resulting in the retrenchment of 1,721 union and branch officials, shop 
stewards and militant leaders of the workers. Outspoken GBSU President, Gordon 
Griffith and GMWU Treasurer, Malcolm Thompson were among those who were 
retrenched. This was the worst display of union persecution by the regime, against a 
group of workers who, until then, had shown complete loyalty and support to it. The 
bauxite unions were unable to respond to such a large scale assault on this section of 
the workforce, having just concluded a six weeks strike. To respond effectively to this 
action by the government they would have needed the support of the entire labour 
movement. The union official claimed that the unions did not anticipate such reaction 
by the government. The workers were lured into resuming duties, thinking that the 
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management were serious in addressing the issue of the reduced work week. They did 
not realise that the response was going to be so merciless, in which the government 
knocked out a major portion of the militant wing of the bauxite workforce (ibid). 
The timing of the government's action has to be examined in the light of two 
developments during that year. First, the government made a tactical retreat in order 
to restore normalcy, since the sugar workers were on the edge over the shortages and 
it did not want to see the involvement of both sugar and bauxite workers at the same 
time on the same issue. Second, the workers in bauxite had already been financially 
crippled as a result of the six weeks strike and the government had enough 
information that solidarity action was very unlikely. Many of the influential shop 
stewards and some officers of the GMWU and GBSU were already in discussions 
with some of the officials of the four unions. Hence, it was an opportune moment for 
the Government to break up this group and place them on the defensive before any 
proper link was forged. 
Let us examine why there was no proper coordination over the dismissals. Many of 
the representatives who were interviewed in sugar explained that when they were 
involved in protests over food shortages there was no support from any other section. 
While sugar workers were in a mood to strike, the representatives were often warned 
by their union officials not to be dragged into any prolonged strike, since the 
Guyanese masses were engulfed in fear and were unlikely to take on the regime in 
any confrontation. During the course of the bauxite strike the sugar workers wanted to 
join in, but were advised by their leaders to stay out since it was necessary to let the 
bauxite workers learn to appreciate real working class struggles (Interview: October, 
1994). They were further told that the bauxite workers had been sitting on the fence 
for a very long time when the battle had to be waged by the sugar workers alone 
(ibid). It was also necessary for the racial division to be overcome and the bauxite 
workers had to attain that level of consciousness in their own time and through 
struggles. Moreover, there was no request for solidarity coming from the bauxite 
workers or their leaders (ibid). 
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Further, the representatives claimed that many union leaders had become indecisive 
and fearful following the government's previous assaults on workers and the 
assassination of renowned historian, Walter Rodney. They claimed that if the 
government was not made to suffer for the death of Rodney, who was very popular, 
then they had a licence to ride over anyone or any organisation. The use of the army 
and police in industrial disputes was also a factor which worried the workers. As a 
result, the leaders had to be cautious in launching any initiative aimed at putting 
pressure on the government (ibid). The government had succeeded in creating a 
nation of fearful and divided people. This of course was not helped by the disunity in 
the opposition camp. 
The comments by those workers' representatives when analysed seem to reflect what 
transpired over the two years 1982 and 1983. As the former PNC Minister remarked, 
the government had infiltrated the opposition parties and unions opposed to it and 
knew that the sugar workers were not going to join in an immediate struggle 
alongside the bauxite workers (Interview: September 1994). Further, the government 
had advanced notice of any major strikes involving the unions and were thus able to 
plan their response. However, they did not anticipate the bauxite strike at that time 
because of its spontaneity, so they had to ensure stability before those workers could 
be given "a dose of Fat Boy's (president Burnham's) medicine"(ibid) . 
In 1983 there was a sizeable increase in strike activities at the national level, with 731 
disputes, and again the sugar industry dominated the scene with 704 strikes. Apart 
from the bauxite strike there were no other strikes which reached national 
proportions. All the strikes were by sections of the estate's operation for very short 
periods. For example, in 1983 there were 556 stoppages which lasted no longer than 
two days, and 98 which lasted for three days, compared with 1982 when 519 lasted up 
to two days and 81 lasted three days. There were a relatively small number which 
lasted over a week and involved only a small section of the workforce on the 
following locations. At LBI a dispute involved just 150 workers in February 1983, 
while 218 workers struck at Leonora in August, and 180 at Uitvlugt in October of the 
same year. There were just a few protest strikes over food shortages in the sugar 
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industry in 1983 and these took place outside the period when the bauxite workers 
were holding their protests. What appears clear from the analysis is that, while 
workers in different sections of operation may have had common problems, the 
workers and their unions did not address them in a unified manner. 
As will be noticed from the strike tables, 1983 was the year with the highest number 
of strikes. There was also a steep increase of strike activities during the period 1981-
1983 when the economic situation of the workers had deteriorated sharply. Although 
there was a drastic decline in strike activities in 1984 this had to do with the fear 
which had been stimulated among several sections of the workforce. In bauxite, for 
example, where the unions were engaged in negotiations over the entitlements of the 
1,721 victimized workers, there was not a single strike for that year. Again 80 per 
cent of the 480 strikes in the sugar industry were for periods up to two days. The 
thirteen other strikes which occurred outside sugar were by a handful of workers and 
were again for short periods, although there was one at the Guyana National 
Engineering Corporation, involving 194 workers, which lasted seven days (Ministry 
of Labour : 1984). The only union that was involved in a significant struggle in 1984 
was the NAACIE, which struck over the introduction of the Labour Amendment Bill, 
(as discussed in the previous chapter). That union had a total of 1,109 clerical workers 
out on strike for 12 days, resulted in a loss of 11,917 work days and $227,452 in 
wages. In fact, the former government Minister explained that in the short term it 
seemed as if the government succeeded in quelling the tide of discontent which was 
rapidly spreading across the country. It was not until 1986 that significant new 
struggles emerged in the sugar industry. 
Rationalisation Process 
At the beginning of 1986 the sugar industry had taken a decision to rationalise its 
operation. It held a meeting with the unions on March 5, 1986 informing them that it 
was going to reduce the acreage under cultivation from 120,000 to 95,000 acres with 
an anticipated production of 250,000 tons of sugar (ibid:33). Further, two sugar 
factories, Leonora on the West Coast of Demerara, and another in the Demerara 
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triangle (later identified as Diamond on the East Bank of Demerara) would be closed. 
The reduction in acreage did not mean that the industry would give up the land which 
would be taken out of production, but it would use it for other activities which were 
already in process. In reducing the acreage under cultivation it was mentioned that the 
remainder would be properly taken care of in terms of husbandry practice to ensure 
maximum yields were obtained. Emphasis would be put on upgrading the dairy farms 
at Rose Hall and Uitvlugt and re-establishing the one at Bel Air on the East Coast. The 
production of fish, rice, and cash crops would be increased. In addition, the industry 
would escalate its examination of other uses of its by-products. The exercise would 
not result in the retrenchment of workers but some displacement of factory hands 
would be necessary (ibid). 
These decisions were opposed by union officials, who mentioned that the Diamond 
factory had just installed a new cane hoist costing millions of dollars and supplied 
molasses for the rum distillery based at that location, so that in their view it was a 
bad decision to close it. The factory had more grinding capacity than any other, 
excepting Albion, and was voted the champion factory in 1985. It was argued that any 
such decision should take into account the cost of moving cane from Diamond to LBI 
for grinding, coupled with the increased expenditure for the maintenance of roads 
and waterways. The decline in the sucrose contents of the sugar cane due to the longer 
time taken for transportation to the factory should also be given consideration. The 
Leonora factory, it was pointed out, was more fuel efficient than the neighbouring 
Uitvlugt factory and produced the best quality of local sales sugar. The cane 
transportation for the longer distances would result in additional expenditure on 
tractors and other vehicles, fuel and maintenance costs. A NAACIE official was also 
of the view that the other crops division should have been made to account separately 
for its operation, since it was clear that growing other crops was at the expense of the 
sugar industry (Interview: October 1994) . 
Additionally, the umon leaders were concerned with the manner in which the 
disclosure was made. It was after the Minister of Finance had presented his national 
budget and announced these changes that Guysuco invited the Unions to inform them 
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of the decisions. Notwithstanding the protestations by the unions over the lack of 
adequate consultation, the industry went ahead to implement the changes. With the 
closure of the Leonora factory at the end of the second crop in 1986, 223 workers had 
to be transferred to new jobs and by the end of the year only seven workers were left 
to be given alternative work. No one was made redundant (Guysuco Report 1986:9). 
The then Corporation Chairman, Harold Davis, later deemed as "rubbish" criticisms 
by persons who attacked the decisions to close the factories, and asserted that "we 
plan still to produce sugar to the level of 250,000 tons which will meet all of our 
marketing demands and will have some sugar to take hold of any bonanza in the 
world market" (Stabroek News, 22-10-87). A union leader who was later asked to 
comment on the chairman's statement said that his words had not matched reality and 
that the leadership he offered the industry was the worst possible. The industry under 
his stewardship went further into decline following the change, instead of advancing 
towards the target of 250,000 tons (Interview: October 1994). 
The union leader's concern that the longer haulage of cane could seriously affect the 
juice quality seemed to have been confirmed. Although the cane had to be transported 
the usual journey, the "corporation's objective of having 90% canes harvested and 
milled within 48 hours after burning was not achieved by any location in 1986, and 
undoubtedly had an adverse effect on juice quality" (ibid: 6). This failure resulted in 
an increase in the tons cane to tons sugar ratio (tc:ts), to about 10 per cent more than 
what was projected. If this had not occurred, production would have resulted in an 
increase of about 20,000 tons of sugar for that year. Letters by the unions to the 
Ministers of Labour and Agriculture and to Guysuco calling for a public enquiry into 
the operation of the sugar industry were not addressed seriously, and as the time was 
fast approaching for the closure of the Diamond factory the unions decided to mount a 
strike and protest march (NAACIE Report, 1988: 10). 
As a consequence, strike action was taken based on calls by both NAACIE and 
GAWU on the 19th March, 1987. The workers staged a march from Diamond to the 
Independence Park in George Town, where a public meeting was held. They covered 
a distance of about 10 miles and received support from residents in the communities 
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who came out of their houses and waved and offered refreshments to the protesters 
throughout the march. The closure nonetheless took place, and all the affected 
workers were transferred to LBI and Wales (NAACIE Report 1988: 10). The 
suggestion by a union official that there should be a takeover of the Diamond factory 
by the workers, as was done by workers at the Upper Clyde Shipyard in Scotland 
(F oster and Woolfson 1986), was not entertained because of fears of the regime. The 
union officials and representatives remained convinced that the closures of the 
factories and the pumping of vast sums of money into 'other crops' were not timely 
and were ill conceived. 
Their position was justified from the stand point of what transpired three years later. 
The new management team from Booker Tate, which contracted to run the industry in 
1990, de-emphasised the other crops and is concentrating its energy only on the 
production of sugar. Sugar output had drastically declined from a position of 245,440 
tons in 1986 to 220,995 tons in 1987 and to the lowest position in living memory, 
129,920 tons, in 1990. Under the Booker Tate management the industry'S production 
by the end of 1992 almost doubled the 1990 figure. The rice complex at Blairmont, 
along with over 1,600 acres of land, was put up for sale in 1991 and was purchased by 
rice magnate Kayman Sankar in 1992 at a cost ofUS$3.5m, with the stock on hand 
yielding an additional G$16m (Guysuco Report 1992: 10). Such developments in 
sugar were not, however, separate from broader pressures and changes in the 
economy. In particular, the second half of the 1980s was characterised by 
international pressures for restructuring, especially from the IMF, and these two had 
repurcussions for workers, unions and industrial relations. 
IMF Medicine At Work 
By 1986 the IMF team had been in constant negotiations with the government and on 
January 16th 1987 the government devalued the currency by 127%, so the exchange 
rate fell from G$4.40 to G$10.00 per US$I.OO. Further, the US dollar was allowed to 
float on the parallel market and soon the rate reached G$40. per US$l. Pollydore 
argued that the devaluation had compounded the economic and social problems in 
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which life had become increasingly difficult for workers over the last ten years. He 
further stated that the rising prices resulted in increases in the cost of living far 
beyond the increases agreed upon between the TUC and the Government (TUC 
Report 1987: 10). 
Although the devaluation resulted in acute wage difficulties for workers, the industrial 
scene was relatively calm with only one major dispute occurring at Albion. On 
August 3, about 4,377 workers went on strike over the non availability of sugar in that 
community, resulting in a loss of 13,119 work days and $461,000. in wages. It is 
ironic that the workers in the largest sugar producing community were unable to 
obtain what they were producing. This became a major problem for the country as a 
whole in the ensuing years, since the corporation was unable to meet it overseas 
commitment because of the drastic decline in production. The government and 
Guysuco had to take the very unpopular decision to import, for the first time in the 
country's history, what workers considered to be substandard quality sugar to meet the 
requirement for local consumption. 
The TUC was also divided over the government's policies, with the militant wing 
calling for involvement in the negotiations with the Th1F and at the same time urging 
the government to reverse some of the decisions taken. Those unions which were 
affiliated to the ruling party were fully supportive of the so-called structural 
adjustment programme. When the Th1F team visited Guyana in March and April 1987 
to sign an agreement with the government, it was greeted by pickets from the 
leadership of the TUC, protesting the harsh conditions implied by the agreement. 
According to one leading union official, the exercise, staged from March 27th, to 
April 2nd, was intended to highlight that the Th1F prescriptions meant more 
devaluation, lower wages, more taxation, more exploitation, starvation, malnutrition, 
poverty, crime and death. They were urging the government to put the people before 
the debt, warning that the Th1F did not have a successful record and that their policies 
have often led to riots, demonstrations, death and destruction in a number of countries 
including neighbouring Venezuela. 
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The picketing exercise was promptly condemned by leaders of the unions affiliated to 
the ruling party, who called for disciplinary action to be taken against the leaders 
involved in the exercise because they had not first sought the approval of the 
Executive Council (TUC Report 1987). When the vote was taken at the Executive 
Council meeting on April 8, the militants survived by one vote. If the motion of the 
dissidents had succeeded then President Daniels, Vice President Chand, General 
Secretary Pollydore, the Treasurer, Gopaul, and all the other participating members of 
the Executive Council might have been removed at the same time. The government 
supporters on the TUC Executive were advised by Pollydore that their action: 
was in sharp contrast with protest action by trade unions everywhere, and even 
by governments of certain developed countries concerning the serious 
economic sufferings of workers .... Trade Unions in Guyana must join with 
their comrades everywhere and seize every opportunity open to them to 
protest those harsh IMF prescriptions which are making life increasingly 
difficult for the workers (ibid:6). 
The ruling party, through the action of its affiliated union leaders, had sent a clear 
signal that it was not going to tolerate opposition at the level of the TUC. It feared 
that the TUC could begin to assert its independence, and as a consequence every 
effort was made thereafter to take control of that body. Hence, the serious division 
which took place in the midst of the September 1988 TUC Conference, resulting in 
the split and the formation of FITUG. The Government/ IMF negotiations and the 
serious decline in the living standards of the workers had been the subject of much 
debate prior to, during and after the conference. Both GA WU and NAACIE submitted 
motions calling on the TUC to oppose the IMF talks. NAACIE argued that the 
devaluation of 127% was having a negative impact on the economy and the working 
class, while the GA WU urged the government to find an alternative arrangement 
which will "serve national development, stimulate production, and enhance the 
interest of the working class ... and to safeguard the interest of Guyanese from the 
serious and adverse consequences of foreign debt charges and its accumulation" 
(Chronicle, 28th September 1988). The GLU, on the other hand, called on delegates 
"to congratulate the government on the initiative taken to improve the economy and 
had pledged its support and solidarity" (ibid). 
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The opposition leader, in his capacity as a delegate of GA WU, launched a fierce 
attack on the negotiations taking place between the Government and the IMF at the 
TUC conference. He "rejected assertions by the President that the IMF was the only 
alternative to take Guyana out of the present crisis ... and pointed to a political 
solution as an alternative" (Mirror, September 25th 1988). Dr. Jagan mentioned that 
for a political solution to succeed there must be "the democratisation of the society, a 
broad based government, suspension of debt payments and reduction of expenditures 
on the military and government bureaucracies"(ibid) and he emphasised that wherever 
IMF conditions had been imposed, grave consequences followed, resulting in riots as 
in the case of Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and other Latin American countries. 
The President of Guyana, Desmond Hoyte, who opened the 1988 TUC conference, 
had promised that greater benefits would flow as a result of the arrangement with the 
IMF and that there would be no retrenchment, no wage freeze, no devaluation in the 
imminent future, and that price control would be retained over only a few essential 
items. The assurances were welcomed by George Daniels, the outgoing President of 
the TUC. However, they proved to be empty promises. 
As the situation of the workers deteriorated, the opposition PPP held a series of 
meetings throughout the country to condemn the government's economic programme. 
Simultaneously, the government announced that there were three acts of arson 
committed on several acres of sugar cane and a bridge in the sugar industry and 
retaliated by breaking off talks on electoral reforms which had been taking place 
between the PPP and PNC. These talks had started after months of appeals through 
letters by the PPP to the PNC, and the cessation was seen as a penalty imposed on the 
PPP in order to get that party to back away from the initiative to take the issues 
concerning the IMF to the people. The government's position was that the PPP was 
fermenting disorder, promoting racism, maligning Guyana abroad and inviting 
foreigners to meddle into the internal affairs of the country (Chronicle October 23rd 
1988) and that for the talks to continue there must be a halt to those activities. The 
PPP, which was accused of making inflammatory statements and engaging in criminal 
behaviour had therefore to give "evidence that it is prepared to conduct itself 
properly" (Stabroek News October 22,1988). The Ministry of Information charged the 
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opposition party with mounting a campaign of agitation against the government's firm 
decision to enter into an arrangement with the IMF, and that after that party failed to 
incite popular support it was using its industrial arm, the GA WU, to disrupt economic 
activities (ibid). 
The workers' representatives claimed that the government was merely appealing for 
sympathy in view of the worsening conditions in the country. Further, it was the 
government who orchestrated the burning of sugar canes, since the canes were ripe 
and were no loss to the industry. The action was intended to appeal to the sentiments 
of their supporters who were showing signs of open rejection of the government 
policies. Dr. Jagan also claimed that the government statement "was based on 
hysteria. I am not an arsonist. I don't believe in arson ... We don't malign Guyana, we 
give the facts" (ibid). While these charges and counter charges were taking place 
between the two main political parties in the country, the union grouping FITUG 
started a series of public meetings to test the mood of the workers and to prepare them 
for action against the economic policies of the government. 
At several meetings, FITUG took the opportunity to defend GA WU against 
unsubstantiated charges by the government. The labour leaders, for the first time in 
about a quarter of a century, were concentrating their efforts on national issues 
outside their bargaining units. As one official later remarked, bauxite and public 
service leaders were for the first time speaking their minds in the sugar industry and 
elsewhere and the sugar representatives were cheered by bauxite workers as they 
highlighted the need for forging real working class unity (Interview: November 
1994). The police also joined the fray saying that they had evidence to link GA WU 
with the arson in the sugar industry (Stabroek News October 28th 1988), while the 
sugar corporation was less emphatic by stating that agents were afoot to destroy the 
gains made. They mentioned that there were also six acres of young canes ranging 
from 34 to 10 weeks which were burnt at Enterprise, representing a loss to the 
corporation (Chronicle October 28th 1988). President Hoyte, while not naming 
anyone, denounced arson and sabotage which he said will not be tolerated and 
"declared that nothing or no one would prevent the Government entering a Fund 
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agreement"(ibid). Hoyte was speaking at the opening of the GLU Annual Conference 
at which the Union's President, Samuel Walker, praised the relationship between the 
TUC and Government, which he claimed was better than ever before and pointed out 
that the GLU, as the oldest union, would continue to give advice to workers (ibid). 
Despite the statement from the police, no one was charged and this prompted Eusi 
K wayana of the WP A to call on the authorities to lay charges if there were evidence. 
He remarked that he could not rule out the possibility that the canes were burnt by the 
PNC. "We know this Government too well. If they have the evidence they say they 
have, they would certainly prosecute" (Stabroek News October 29th 1988). 
Meanwhile the DLM accused the government of attempting to convert the PPP into 
the principal cause for the collapse of the economy (ibid). The GA WU, in disputing 
the accusations, claimed that it was the intention of the authorities to undermine the 
solidarity of the working class and asserted: 
The media, Guysuco, and the government are yet to inform the public that 
GA WU shop stewards and activists without hesitation, and in the 'wee hours' 
of the morning of October 14 at great risk to themselves and their families, 
who were left unprotected, went to the rescue of Enmore management and 
successfully put out the fire at Good Hope... and avoided the possibilities of 
greater damage to Guysuco's property ... after the fire GA WU shop stewards 
were left to protect the cane fields, which clearly is an expression of 
managements confidence and an exoneration of them from any guilt (ibid). 
While FITUG has been conducting its campaign among workers with significant 
success, the TUC has been pleading with the government to allow it to be involved in 
the discussions with the IMF in order that the views of the workers on the recovery 
programme could be made known. This request went unheeded, and with the 
implementation of the Government /IMF recovery programme, FITUG, having 
analysed the situation in the country, announced that it was an appropriate time to call 
a limited protest strike. 
The FITUG Day of Protest 
FITUG, in announcing the day of protest for February 24th 1989, urged all Guyanese 
242 
workers to stay home on that day (4). In justifying its action FITUG felt that the 
welfare of the workers had been seriously jeopardised by unions whose legitimacy 
could be questioned and who were acting as instruments of the ruling party. As a 
result, a situation had been created in which there has been a constant decline in the 
living standards of the workers: 
The sad situation has resulted in the real wages of the worker declining by 
36% between 1977-1987 and by 45% between January, 1987-1989 September. 
A decline of 64% since 1977 ... that the living standards of the workers have 
been seriously eroded by a rapacious tax system that is not only outdated, but 
designed to perpetuate poverty at all levels of the wage and salary earning 
class. Of interest also, is the increase of 116% in the food index between 
January 1987 and September 1988 ... the time has come for the worker of our 
country, organised in our several trade unions to record their protest over the 
serious decline in their living standards and the erosion of their rights, and that 
of their union .... FITUG therefore call for a day of protest...and call for all 
workers to down tool, stay home from work, or attend their place of worship, 
and pray for the assistance of the Almighty in ending the suffering of our 
people (5). 
During the course of FITUG's successful meetings throughout the country, Mike 
McCormack, a human rights advocate, sounded a note of caution when he wrote: 
the seven unions need to carefully assess, rather than take for granted, the 
level of active support they can expect from among a demoralised population 
.... Demoralisation has provoked a thousand ways of insulating ourselves from 
the problems by isolating ourselves from each other... We have grown 
accustomed to the idea that the powers that be are all powerful, that our every 
word of protest is noted down for future reprisals, that they are in complete 
control. In other words, we have a slave psychology (Catholic Standard, 9-10-
88). 
He further pointed out that the churches, political parties and unions had been unable 
to convert the widespread disillusionment into the indignation required in order to 
effect a change, because of pessimism and the individualistic and passive response 
over changing the political system. There was considerable evidence in support of 
McCormack's analysis, and again he warned: "we all make silent declarations of 
loyalty each time any of us avoids speaking our minds in public because we are not 
sure who may be listening. We silently pledge loyalty each time we socialise with 
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representatives of this intolerant system" (ibid 23-10-88-). Only during the Rodney 
era was there optimism that change would come and people had shown that they were 
prepared to stand up and demand that change. However, many union leaders were 
passive and Rodney did not benefit from the situation as in 1988, where union leaders 
in crucial sectors were standing up. Apart from the sugar industry, other union leaders 
in the Rodney era were not ready for a struggle. As a NAACIE Official remarked, if 
Rodney had had the support of trade union leaders during his period of struggles the 
situation was likely to have been different in the country during the 1980s. 
The situation in 1989 was therefore more favourable for a confrontation. FITUG saw 
that there was a vacuum which had to be addressed. One of its official, reflecting on 
this experience, pointed out that some organisation had to take the chance to create 
that cohesive force. After reflection and appeals by the hardened union leaders, the 
entire group agreed that workers should be allowed the opportunity to benefit at least 
once from decisive leadership. The day of protest was to be an occasion for testing the 
waters to see if the workers were ripe for a massive struggle. The union leaders, 
conscious of likely reprisals from the government, had taken the decision that if any 
worker was victimized the entire grouping would feel aggrieved and give solidarity to 
that worker. FITUG it was felt was therefore "battle ready" (Interview: March 1995). 
In an appeal to the workers at the first meeting in the capital city, FITUG President 
Daniels called on the workers to give themselves a chance by taking a course which 
could ensure hope to this once prosperous country, while Vice President Todd argued 
that the mess in the country could only be remedied through fair and free elections 
(Mirror, January 22nd 1989). Daniels further argued that a trade union organisation 
had to let its strength and power be felt and posited: "Over the years we have not been 
using that power and they have used political and state power against us whenever we 
attempt to speak out" (Stabroek News, January 21st 1989). Other leaders from the 
miners' union also urged the workers to force the government to change course and 
appealed to them to demonstrate their dissatisfaction against what was taking place. A 
NAACIE Official warned that political sanctions by the government must ensure an 
equal political response from the workers. There was also tacit support for FITUG's 
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planned action from the two most influential church leaders in the country. The 
Anglican Bishop, Randolph George and Catholic Bishop, Benedict Singh in a joint 
statement called on the Guyanese to observe February 24th, as a protest against the 
extreme pain and sacrifices that the people were going through. The Bishops stated: 
Such action from a group of responsible Guyanese forces us to note that our 
problems are not fundamentally economic, but have to do with relationships .... 
We will persist until we cause justice to triumph (Catholic Standard February 
26th 1989). 
The GBA issued a call to their members to stay away from Court as a demonstration 
of solidarity. There was, therefore, widespread support for the planned action. 
Unfortunately, two days before the protest, despite the united call and public 
condemnation of the existing conditions by all the unions, the CCWU leaders lost 
their nerve and announced that February 24th was not a convenient day for their 
union's participation in the action. The PSU leadership also changed track and 
decided not to call· out their members. Thus, the day of protest was thrown into 
confusion and only sugar and bauxite workers responded almost in their entirety to 
the call. 
Union officials who were interviewed later pointed out that there was reasonable 
support from some lawyers, taxi drivers and teachers. However, the failure by both 
the CCWU and PSU to stand by a unanimous decision of all the unions merely 
confirmed the degree of indecisiveness among union leaders, and this contributed to 
the poor showing of solidarity in the capital city, Georgetown. (paradoxically there 
was more support in the city from teachers whose union was not part of the FlTUG 
call). It would also appear that since the dismissal of CCWU members in 1979, that 
union became very fearful in calling strikes against the regime. As one prominent 
journalist reported: 
The CCWU, one of the seven, pulled out at a late stage, effectively crippling 
any impact the protest call would have had on the city's main commercial 
stores. CCWU President Mr. Gordon Todd had, on two public meetings in the 
city to build support for the day of protest, thrown his weight behind the call. 
The union's withdrawal ... now casts questions over its further FlTUG tenancy 
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and top alliance sources were yesterday puzzled at the CCWU's position 
(Stabroek News February 25th 1989). 
Business officials explained that they were inclined to join the protest by closing their 
businesses following the Bishops' appeal, but the lack of unity at FlTUG level caused 
them to change their minds. They were scared of the government's reprisals and were 
convinced that they would not have had much support from the unions. They claimed 
that they would have supported any action aimed at putting things right in the 
country, provided that support was obtained from all the other interest groups in the 
country. A leading union representative in the sugar industry remarked later that the 
disunity at the leadership level would always pose problems for the working class, 
and that unions will have to put their act together if their views were going to be taken 
seriously by workers (Interview: November 1994). Following the protest action the 
government began victimizing teachers. Some on the West Demerara were 
transferred, and when they refused to go they were charged with trespass for staying 
at the school at which they were teaching prior to the day of protest. The "ring 
leaders" were identified and dismissed and they received no support from FITUG. 
Leaders from GA WU and NAACIE in a limited way gave them whatever advice and 
support they needed (NAACIE Report: 1990). 
There was also reprisal action against the Bauxite Unions when, on February 27th, the 
management of Guymine informed them that the officers involved in the calling of 
the strike would no longer be accorded official recognition as bargaining agents for 
bauxite workers. Warning letters were issued to some bauxite workers and the 
deduction of union dues to both unions was halted. FlTUG was slow to react to these 
acts of victimization, and while the GMWU and GBSU issued the management with a 
seven days ultimatum to commence talks on the decisions taken by them, it was the 
workers who took the initiative. NAACIE had called on FlTUG to show solidarity 
with the teachers by calling a general strike to put a halt to any further action by the 
government, but the leaders in the other unions wanted time to study the next move 
(NAACIE Report 1990:45). Some shop stewards decided that they were not going to 
sit idly by while management was taking their time to arrange meetings with their 
unions. Hence, on March 3, they instructed all the workers in the mining industry to 
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take industrial action. 
Immediately thereafter FITUG called on the individual uruons to write to their 
respective employers giving them seventy two hours notice of industrial action if the 
situation in the bauxite industry was not restored to normalcy. The decision was again 
taken by leaders of all the unions, and yet again there was a failure by these leaders to 
act in unison. The GPSU and CCWU did not issue any notice to the employers with 
whom they had bargaining rights, while the GA WU varied the decision by calling out 
their members on a protest strike for one day without consulting or notifying the other 
unions. The NAACIE and UGWU, which had complied with the decision of FITUG, 
were instructed not to take any action since talks had started between the Bauxite 
Unions and Company officials the day before the expiration of the strike notice. 
The Guysuco had warned NAACIE that it had taken a serious view of the planned 
disruption in the sugar industry and "holds itself free to take such action as it 
considers necessary to protect the well being of the industry and those who work in it" 
(Chronicle, March 8th 1989). The Bauxite workers waged the struggle alone, and 
when there was no progress in the talks between bauxite unions and the company 
FITUG decided to mount pickets in front of the Company offices in Georgetown. 
The Bauxite workers had travelled some sixty five miles to the capital city and were 
joined by leaders from the GAWU, NAACIE and UGWU on March 17, 1989. There 
was a picketing demonstration in front of the company's head office on Main Street. 
The situation was tense and confrontation between the workers and government 
officials seemed imminent. The peace of the capital city was disrupted by the loud 
chants of the workers. The bauxite representatives claimed that this was the method 
used by the PNC in the early 1960s to destabilize the PPP administration and they 
were going to reverse the situation for the PNC. In response, the government restored 
the status quo with the miners' unions before the day's protest was over. The bauxite 
workers left the city with a feeling of satisfaction that their sacrifices had forced the 
government to retreat from its position of de-recognition to one of seeking dialogue. 
There was also an open admission by company officials that the day of protest had 
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gravely disrupted production in the bauxite industry. These types of revelations were 
not the usual acts by the "oppressive regime", which always had the tendency to 
report that workers have been unresponsive to strike calls. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the workers' militant action in the 1980s was 
precipitated by the government's wage restraint policy. This took place during a 
period of serious economic decline in the country. What was significant also was the 
increased vibrancy among the shop stewards and rank and file in the bauxite industry. 
In an attempt to curb the fighting spirit of the workers, the government resorted to 
taking repressive measures. But the workers found ways of continuing their protests, 
albeit for shorter durations. The vast increase in strike activities in the years 1981, 
1982, 1983, and 1985 were the result of rank and file action. It is evident that the 
union leaders were merely responding to workers' militancy, while there was hardly 
any coordination among the unions. It was not until the impasse at the 1988 TUC 
elections, and the establishment of FITUG, that a serious attempt was made to launch 
a coordinated protest action, the first of its kind since 1979. But again, like in 1979, 
some union leaders broke ranks and solidarity. 
This was done in the wake of widespread public sympathy and support. 1988 was the 
first time since the PNC took office that so many organisations representing a wide 
cross section of the community had openly stated their opposition to the government's 
policies. The opportunity which presented itself for an alliance of trade unions, church 
and professional bodies disappeared by the failure of the unions within the FITUG 
grouping to act in unison. The government meanwhile, benefitted from the apparent 
division in the union movement, and it was able to pursue its anti-working class 
measures based on IMF policies, especially on wages and jobs, because these have 
not been effectively challenged. However, one favourable feature that developed 
during the period was the continued determination of the rank and file in both the 
sugar and bauxite industries to struggle against a well organised state machinery. 
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Endnotes:-
l. The TUC had sent a letter to the Secretary to the Treasury dated March 14,1982 
while the reply from the Secretary to the Treasury to the TUC was sent on May 18, 
1982. 
2. The circular # 8/1982 was sent by the Secretary to the Treasury, who, authorised 
the payments. 
3. Guyana is divided into 10 Regions. However, because of the heavy rate of 
migration to the USA and Canada by Guyanese, these two countries have often 
been referred to as Regions 11 and 12 respectively. 
4. FITUG Press Statement signed by leaders of the seven Unions dated Thursday 
February 9, 1989. 
5. Ibid 
249 
Table 7. 2: National Strike Statistics 1969- 1994 
YEAR No. of WORKERS WorkDays WAGES LOST Av Duration 
Strikes Involved Lost G$ Days 
1969 126 17878 38,660 250,000. 1.9 
1970 159 84056 453,928 2,800,000. 2.1 
1971 199 41447 141,816 623,529. 2.0 
1972 139 32142 81,646 511,791. 1.9 
1973 172 34692 75,955 666,676. 1.8 
1974 136 61932 150,991 1,300,191. 1.9 
1975 467 245199 1,074,761 10,119,456. 1.7 
1976 400 82142 229,480 2,523,379. 2.2 
1977 383 89687 964,282 10,242,111. 2.5 
1978 300 52060 75,791 955,146. .2 
1979 219 106366 324,473 6,387,732. 4.9 
1980 333 40652 67,620 1,167,170. 1.7 
1981 621 87697 125,582 2,552,199. 2.1 
1982 653 81564 140,744 3,346,872. 1.8 
1983 731 103519 220,295 5,142,657. 1.9 
1984 493 60300 152,000 3,361,082. 2.1 
1985 718 93718 209,083 4,363,656. 1.9 
1986 453 47550 138,364 2,944,410. 1.8 
1987 497 57757 131,449 3,823,721. 1.8 
1988 349 39558 232,595 8,104,689. 2.5 
1989 138 113320 686,356 35,877,077. 2.6 
1990 329 61474 244,498 16,856,210. 2.1 
1991 307 98440 110,871 21,510,203. 1.6 
1992 258 69254 126,747 114653,627. 1.9 
1993 473 53455 129,344 79,918,656. 1.8 
1994 468 N/A 90,138 61,626,569 N/A 
Source: Ministry of Labour Records. 
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Table 7. 3: Summary of Strikes In The Sugar Industry 1977-1994 
YEAR NO OF WORKERS WorkDays WAGES LOST 
STRIKES INVOLVED Lost G$ 
1977 N/A N/A 1,500,000 15,600,000. 
1978 241 48,215 72,875 952,282. 
1979 158 91,463 139,091 2,786,201. 
1980 276 35,475 60,593 1,087,767. 
1981 585 84,100 110,318 2,279,129. 
1982 639 80,373 127,987 3,127,186. 
1983 709 94,818 164,308 2,989,335. 
1984 480 58,789 144,157 3,297,965. 
1985 N/A N/A 173,970 3,160,000. 
1986 447 46,957 135,109 2,886,904. 
1987 489 57,052 128,986 3,752,639. 
1988 N/A N/A 255,471 9,200,000. 
1989 134 107,875 594,339 29,309,218. 
1990 315 60,905 229,291 16,856,210. 
1991 297 98,440 110,871 21,510,203. 
1992 237 68,683 126,059 114,654,627. 
1993 448 53,330 126,344 75,231,156. 
1994 446 N/A 71,986 48,804,508. 
Sources: Ministry of Labour Records. 
Guysuco Reports. 
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YEAR NO, OF 
1977 N/A 
1978 6 
1979 15 
1980 17 
1981 18 
1982 4 
1983 12 
1984 -
1985 
-
1986 1 
1987 2 
1988 N/A 
1989 2 
1990 1 
1991 N/A 
1992 1 
1993 2 
1994* 6 
Table 7. 4: Strikes in the Bauxite Industry 
WORKERS WorkDays WAGES LOST 
N/A N/A N/A 
52 128 1,316. 
9562 173,449 3,540,935. 
514 426 7,858. 
2388 7,003 149,025. 
595 9,828 167,974. 
5388 94,883 2,079,715. 
- - -
- - -
212 212 9,721. 
69 88 5,175. 
N/A N/A N/A 
4437 90,001 6,567,859. 
124 62 18,540. 
N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A 
N/A 5,275 7,469,350 
Source: Ministry of Labour Records. 
*includes mining and quarry. 
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Table 7.5: Sugar Production Records: 1948 - 1975 
Year Acres Reaped Tons Cane T.C.A TC.TS T.S.A Tons Sugar Produced 
Reaped ('000) 
1948 54,609 1,531.2 28.04 8.85 3.16 172,991 
1949 55,754 2,011.6 36.08 11.55 3.12 174).27 
1950 64,718 2,162.8 33.41 11.05 3.02 195,651 
1951 66,897 2,453.6 36.68 11.29 3.24 217,306 
1952 72,538 2,672.4 36.84 11.01 3.34 242,692 
1953 71).41 2,756.3 38.69 11.48 3.37 240,176 
1954 78,044 2,745.7 35.18 11.49 3.06 238,922 
1955 73,886 2,713.2 36.72 10.84 3.38 250,111 
1956 74,028 2,788.3 37.66 10.78 3.49 263,333 
1957 81,339 2,901.1 37.60 10.75 3.44 284,973 
1958 84,788 3,406.1 42.30 10.93 3.93 306,361 
1959 87,658 3,167.5 38.10 11.77 3.40 284,425 
1960 96).48 3,677.4 40.10 11.37 3.55 334,441 
1961 105,821 3,507.3 34.80 11.58 3.07 324,745 
1962 98,455 3,381.7 36.00 10.75 3.45 326,023 
1963 95,076 3,352.3 36.00 10.75 3.53 317,137 
1964 93,089 2,936.5 33.11 12.00 2.85 258,378 
1965 103,085 3).97.1 33.50 10.96 3.15 309,445 
1966 99,059 3,183.8 33.70 12.10 2.89 288,869 
1967 102,900 3,758.7 36.53 10.94 3.34 343,922 
1968 107,392 3,502. 32.61 11.05 2.95 316,848 
1969 125,962 4,112.3 32.64 11.28 2.89 364,465 
1970 107,126 3,712.0 34.65 11.93 2.90 311,149 
1971 136,529 4).44.9 31.09 11.51 2.70 368,843 
1972 129,500 3,595.7 27.77 11.43 2.43 314,600 
1973 101,709 3).70.1 29.30 12.31 2.35 265,704 
1974 120,800 4,099. 30.10 11.92 2.52 340,815 
1975 91,408 3,070.7 33.60 11.53 2.92 300,350 
Sources: Extracted from vanous sugar reports. 
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Table 7. 6: Sugar Production Records 1976-1994 
Year Acres Reaped Tons Cane Milled T.CA. TCITS T.S.A Tons 
('000) Sugar Produced 
1976 114,580 3,688 31.60 12.l7 2.60 332,457 
1977 108,304 3,108 28.70 12.87 2.23 241,527 
1978 137,481 4,218 30.68 12.99 2.36 324,805 
1979 134,030 3,892 29.02 13.05 2.23 298,268 
1980 123,143 3,601 29.24 13.35 2.l9 269,634 
1981 136,213 4,125 30.28 13.71 2.31 300,790 
1982 129,609 3,845 29.67 13.36 2.22 287,725 
1983 119,429 3,571 29.90 14.18 2.11 251,870 
1984 125,926 3,469 27.54 14.34 1.92 241,861 
1985 107,526 3,218 29.93 13.24 2.26 243,000 
1986 112,875 3,348 29.66 13.64 2.17 245,440 
1987 106,039 3,100 29.23 14.03 2.08 220,995 
1988 85,823 2,480 28.90 14.80 1.95 167,550 
1989 86,303 2,548 29.56 15.41 1.91 164,800 
1990 91,372 2,019 22.10 15.54 1.42 129,920 
1991 93,307 2,293 24.57 14.36 1.71 159,690 
1992 99,891 3,081 30.84 12.68 2.43 243,010 
1993 98,142 3,172 32.31 13.07 2.47 242,640 
1994 104,670 3,149 30.08 12.47 2.41 252,615 
Source: Guysuco Records 
Notes: TCrrS is the number of tons of cane it took to make a ton of sugar. 
TCA is the yield in tons cane per acre. 
TSA is the yield of sugar per acre. 
254 
Chapter 8 
The 1989 Anti-Budget Strike, its Aftermath and 
the Restoration of Collective Bargaining 
We have already seen that the IMF was in consultation with the Government over the 
restructuring of the economy, and that the latter had already introduced measures 
instigated by the IMF, which were embodied in the so-called Economic Recovery 
Programme (ERP). There had also been earlier measures which had created severe 
economic hardships for workers, resulting in protest strike action. The previous 
chapter discussed the FITUG day of protest and the attack on recognition agreements 
by state entities. Two weeks after the restoration of formal relations between the 
bauxite company and the unions, on March 31st 1989, the government presented the 
national budget. The major impact of the budget was the further devaluation of the 
Guyana currency, which moved the official exchange rate from G$10 for US$1 to 
G$33 for US$I. However, soon after the announcement of the devaluation the dollar 
was traded at Guyana's "Wall Street" at G$62 to US$1 (Stabroek News April 15th 
1989). Wage increases were pegged at 20 per cent, which was seen by the workers as 
unrealistic and not in keeping with the consequences of the devaluation, which 
brought a rapid increase in consumer prices. 
The Guyana dollar, which was stable for many years after independence, experienced 
a spate of devaluations from 1987 to 1989, some at the official level and others 
through the open window system in which it was traded on the black market at up to 
G$50 to US$I, when the official rate in 1987 was G$10 to US$l. Several union 
leaders objected to the IMF conditionalities imposed on Guyana and warned that the 
road to economic recovery through devaluation, as advocated by both the World Bank 
and the IMF, would not work. It had not worked before and only helped to trigger 
further inflation. Just before the budget, the prominent Caribbean economist and 
former Governor of Barbados Central Bank, Courtney Blaclanan, had warned that 
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devaluation was de-railing Guyana's economy. To support his contention he argued 
that " since its 1981 devaluation real GNP in Guyana has declined at a rate of negative 
six per cent per annum ... Between 1981 and 1987 the economy declined at an annual 
average rate of about six percent, unemployment is high and Guyana can't pay its 
foreign debt" (E C News, 18-3-89). 
Response to the Budget 
The budget was seen by workers as "draconian", a phrase also used by the opposition 
parties in parliament. WP A Member of Parliament Eusi K wayana, denounced it as 
"vampire budget" (Stabroek News April 8th 1989). However, the government side 
called it 'economic adjustment with a human face' (Chronicle April 7th 1989). The 
bauxite workers were not prepared to sit idly by and allow for negotiations or debate 
on the budget to take place before doing something. By April 3, the entire bauxite 
operation came to a standstill through strike action by the workers who demanded the 
withdrawal of the budget. As Stabroek News reported: 
With a spontaneity of action never before witnessed in the history of the 
bauxite industry, bauxite workers effected a complete shut down of the 
Bauxite Plant in less than two hours on Monday ... The strike action takes on 
great significance considering the fact that no union official featured in its 
agitation. The workers literally coerced the union officers into the fray (April 
5th 1989). 
The sugar workers, once again without their union endorsement, joined their fellow 
workers in the bauxite industry with a similar demand. By the next day both industries 
were strike bound. FITUG, under whose grouping these bargaining units fell, met on 
April 5th to review the situation, and decided after about three hours deliberation to 
endorse the action of the workers and to call a general strike with effect from the 
following day. This action also included other demands: 
FITUG having had a meeting of leaders of all the affiliated unions and 
examined the situation, including the strike of the bauxite, sugar and other 
workers has unanimously agreed to call on the affiliated unions and the 
general public to take immediate strike action in support of the following 
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demands.(1). The immediate withdrawal of the 1989 budget. (2). The 
withdrawal of price increases on commodities imposed after the budget. (3). 
The restoration of subsidies on essential commodities. (4). The payment of a 
living wage and indexation after a new budget is agreed upon between the 
government and recognised trade unions. (5). The restoration of full trade 
union rights and freedoms, including the right to check off of union dues on 
behalf of recognised unions (1). 
The leaders in FITUG also called on the TUC to support those demands and to take 
decisive action with a view to alleviating the burdens placed on workers. They 
regretted having to resort to strike action but mentioned that this was only done after 
repeated requests for dialogue with the government went unheeded and after the 
unilateral imposition of an oppressive budget. They warned the government of the 
likelihood of a failed recovery programme without the involvement of genuine 
representatives of the working people and urged all sections of the Guyanese society 
to support the strike call in the interest of their common survival (2). Two days after 
the strike call, FITUG was heartened by the response. This drew workers from several 
private and public sector agencies, including private transportation especially by hire 
cars and mini buses. As a result, FITUG announced publicly that it was endorsing the 
two Bishops' statement, made just before the February 24 day of protest, as an 
important and constructive contribution to national reform. 
The organisation went on to invite "all groups of working people, no matter how 
small or large, to signify their support, by publicly declaring themselves affiliates or 
as supporters of FITUG objectives" (3). The intention was to provide an umbrella for 
those who feared the consequences of acting alone, an opportunity to participate in a 
cohesive body. This was intended to forge greater solidarity as people become more 
involved in the work of a larger group. The Guyana Council of Churches also called 
for a review of the Budget (Stabroek News: April 15, 1989), while the GHRA 
condemned the budget and stated that "overnight and without consultation, Guyanese 
have found that the purchasing power of their wages reduced to one third of its 
original value" (ibid: April 19, 1989). These calls were made in the context of the 
arrest of about sixty striking workers mainly from the sugar and bauxite industries, 
who were engaged in a peaceful demonstration in New Amsterdam, Berbice. Hire 
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cars and mini buses which supported the strike were impounded. This took place as 
soon as the owners went on the roads for their private errands. Despite these measures 
the impression gained by the FITUG leaders was that "it is expected that by Monday 
operations throughout the country would be brought to a standstill"(4). But that was 
not to be. 
In a clear breach of the FITUG's decision, to which all the unions subscribed, the 
CCWU and the GPSU once more ordered their members to act differently. The GPSU 
did not call out its members, but instructed them to wait and see how the strike 
developed, while the CCWU decided that it was only going to call out its members for 
a limited one day protest strike on April 11. That was the beginning of the 
disintegration process, of what otherwise appeared to have been the first step towards 
the restoration of trade union and democratic rights. Before the CCWU members had 
concluded their one day protest, over three hundred were sacked, for what their 
employers in the state entities claimed to be unwarranted strike action (Chronicle 
April 13, 1989). The President of the CCWU claimed that the sacking was 
indiscriminate and "if disciplinary action is to be taken against a worker then 
dismissal is the last resort" (ibid: April 18,1989). The government went on the 
offensive, dubbing the strike political and aimed at destabilising the country. 
Meanwhile, the police continued their arrests of demonstrators. On April 10th they 
targeted the Parliament, the central point where the unions had concentrated their 
daily demonstrations. The government had also mobilised its supporters to hold 
counter- demonstrations in front of Parliament Building. Eleven protesters were 
arrested, among them the President, Treasurer and an Executive Member of FITUG, 
who was also the General Secretary of GAWU. Eight of them were charged with 
disorderly behaviour, an offence for which bail was allowed. Their crime was singing 
the union song "Solidarity Forever". Six of those arrested were released the same day. 
However, the President and Treasurer were taken into police custody at separate 
stations where they were kept overnight and taken to court the following day. All 
eight were placed on $200. bail (Stabroek News: April 12th 1989). Both the President 
and Treasurer were scheduled to address a public meeting in the capital city, but 
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Daniels, the President did not show up for the meeting, having left the country. One 
of his close associates claimed that there was a plot by "goons" of the ruling party to 
assassinate him. When they were subsequently tried and their Counsel asked the 
Senior police officer why they were held in prison on such a trivial charge, the court 
was told that the police had information that the two, Daniels and Gopaul, were a 
threat to the security of the state. They were both fined $250 in their absence (Trial 
Notes) though no fines were ever paid by them. 
The church group was targeted the next day when 13 protesters, including three 
Catholic Priests, were locked up overnight and charged like their union colleagues 
with disorderly behaviour. They were engaged in singing Hymns (Catholic Standard 
May 7, 1989). A few days earlier three activists of the PPP were arrested and charged. 
By April 15, the police shifted their operations to the West Coast of Demerara where 
the strike continued to cripple the sugar estates in that region, seventeen marchers, 
including students from a secondary school were arrested and charged with taking 
part in an "illegal procession" (ibid: April 19,1989). Union officials explained that 
one of the heartening developments in the police clamp down on protesters was the 
admirable support given by members of the GBA, to those who were victims of the 
oppression. Many of their colleagues worked beyond the precincts of the courts as 
they sought justice for all victims. Their contributions helped the workers to 
understand that they were not alone in the struggle. 
The repression moved to the air waves when the state radio refused to carry a 
broadcast by the Anglican Bishop, Randolph George on the "Church Calling" 
programme. It claimed that the broadcast was not devotional but political. This action 
drew condemnation from the Bishop and the Anglican Church. Incidentally, the 
programme producer Fr. Gilbert Harris was also the Chairman of President Hoyte's 
Advisory Council on Religious Affairs. The church questioned the authority of the 
sanctioning agency thus: "Are we to assume from the censoring of this programme 
that the Public Communications Agency considers itself a superior source of advice 
on religious matters?" (ibid). 
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Continued Pressure 
The unions had to keep the pressure on if they had any chance of coming out with 
limited success in the strike. Instead of expanding the strike after the dismissals of its 
colleagues, the CCWU retreated into its shell. The despotic actions by the 
government and the retreat of two unions evoked fear in other sections, especially in 
some private stores, whose workers had, until then, been on strike. Those workers 
returned to work. The strike peaked between April 11 and 13. However, by April 14, 
only bauxite, sugar, and the university workers were on strike. They were supported 
by students who had heeded a one day stay home call from the student body of the 
prestigious secondary school, Queens College. The two major earners of foreign 
exchange were effectively crippled and the strike was having its toll on the national 
economy with a reported loss of $33m. a day (ibid: April 15,1989). The government 
also announced that since the strike started and up to April 18, there were acts of 
arson on sugar estates which resulted in an estimated loss of US$ 400,000. worth of 
cane plants (ibid: April 19,1989). Additionally, a main government store on Camp 
Street, the Guyana National Trading Corporation (GNTC), was completely destroyed 
by fire. Police also reported other arson attacks, especially in sugar industry areas. 
Public sympathy for the strike was widespread. The churches and other bodies, 
including large private businesses, professionals, farmers, fishermen, and private 
individuals donated money and foodstuffs to keep the sugar and bauxite workers on 
strike (NAACIE Report 1990). The growing solidarity between the churches and 
FITUG on the question of the budget and the living standards of workers 
strengthened the moral correctness of the strike call. Additionally, the demonstrations 
in front of Parliament buildings were multi- racial, multi- religion and represented 
almost every stratum in society. Some members of the police and army had shown 
sympathy for the strike and when it became clear that they were ignoring the workers' 
demonstrations, especially in the bauxite town, many security personnel from that 
community were replaced. 
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The Government Response 
Several groups had called on the government to engage the leaders of FITUG in 
dialogue. The government did not budge and instead held talks with the GTUC on the 
budget, despite the fact that previous representation on the budget had gone unheeded 
and it was approved in Parliament without any major change. That was an exercise in 
futility. As Mike McCormack pointed out, "a mechanism has to be found to 
incorporate FITUG into any negotiations, otherwise they will be meaningless" 
(Catholic Standard April 16th 1989). The CCL, which was the parent body of unions 
in the Caribbean, called on the government to act with dispatch to ease the sufferings 
of the workers and people of Guyana and to engage both the TUC and FITUG in 
dialogue and consultation (Stabroek News April 19th 1989). FITUG had also written 
to the Minister of Finance since April 6th, seeking a meeting to discuss matters of 
concern to workers in the national budget. Instead of giving consideration to the 
request, the Minister responded by saying that he was meeting with the TUC and 
therefore could not meet with every interest group (5). FITUG responded that: 
unlike several interest groups, FITUG is a Trade Union Federation which has 
over two thirds of organised labour as members, inclusive of the workforce in 
the sugar and bauxite industries, which has been on strike since April 3,1989. 
It would therefore be wrong to treat my organisation as a mere interest group. 
The failure of the government to meet with FITUG so far has already done 
irreparable harm to the economy and one just cannot wish away this reality. 
Our federation has repeatedly stated that we will not be bound by any 
decisions taken on behalf of organised labour by the TUC ... (6). 
FITUG further pointed out that it had no representatives on the TUC negotiating team 
because of the 'undemocratic nature' of that body. Further, it noted that while it had 
not officially withdrawn from the TUC, it would not return until there had been a 
satisfactory amendment to the rules, which had been a source of concern for over ten 
years (7). There was no response to the FITUG's letter. The attitude of the 
government was in sharp contrast with the position taken by its counterparts in the 
neighbouring Republic of Trinidad which was at the same time engaging both the 
TUC and the CPTU in joint discussions over the state of the economy of that country. 
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There were calls by other prominent organisations including the Miners International 
Federation (MIF), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and Solidarity of 
Poland for the Government to meet with FITUG to resolve the problems of the 
workers. It was the cable from the Solidarity leader which came in for special 
ridiculing from President Hoyte. The text to Hoyte was as follows: 
Free independent trade union 'Solidarnosc' expresses solidarity to members of 
FITUG in their struggle for workers' rights and for improvement of living 
conditions of the working people. At the same time we appeal to the 
government...to stop the repression against union leaders and the priests who 
are with them and to start negotiations with union leaders immediately (8). 
The President used the Workers Day to attack labour leaders and the striking workers. 
At the same time his public response to Walesa was obnoxious: 
Comrades, I understand that a certain Mr. Lech Walesa, forgive me if I don't 
call his name right, forgive me, is alleged to have sent me a cablegram calling 
upon me to do two things- to have dialogue with FlTUG. Well I would not 
comment on that.... He didn't say anything about arson and the things I have 
been talking about and what I want to say to him now is that I haven't seen this 
telegram. My secretary has a way of putting those things in the waste paper 
basket where they belong. She is a very competent secretary. But if perchance 
I see this one I think I will enjoy myself and have a little fun by having his 
cablegram replied to. If he had involved in arson and sabotage in Poland 
General Jaruselski wasn't going to allow him to be at large today to send me 
any telegram. I don't think he would have been in the land of the living. I do 
not think the gentleman can find Guyana on the map and if the cablegram is in 
English ... and I would doubt very much that he knows English, well then 
perhaps he is not responsible for what is contained in it...(9). 
Hoyte went on to deem it the greatest treason to invite foreigners to 'meddle' in the 
country's internal affairs and warned that the government speaking to FlTUG was to 
invite confusion and indiscipline. He explained his refusal to speak with FITUG by 
pointing to the fact the government had been holding discussions with the TUC, 
which was the umbrella association for all trade unions in the country. He emphasised 
that the government would not encourage any disorderly procedure by having 
dialogue with the TUC and at the same time with several individual unions or group 
of unions. His view was that "it is a way to chaos and confusion and it offends my 
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own sense of due order and propriety" (10). Touching on the role of unions, Hoyte 
emphasised that trade union militancy could not mean calling strikes since that was 
self defeating. They had to ensure that the conditions were right to increase output 
and efficiency. Those union leaders, he warned, who took a different path did not 
really understand their role or were bent on deceiving workers: 
Today as we embark on the ERP, trade unions as an entity have a decision to 
make, either they identify themselves with the ERP and work along with the 
programme, or face relegation to a marginal and inconsequential role in 
society (11). 
Dealing with the dismissal of workers, Hoyte argued that just as trade unions had 
rights so too did employers. Unions should not believe that they could breach 
agreements and get away with it, for the employers had a right to assert their rights. 
Hoyte warned unions that if they were testing his patience they had better think again. 
They miscalculated, if they believed that he would not act firmly. He charged that 
there were criminal ~ctivities taking place and warned that the police were doing their 
work. "Let us not resort to any kind of self help in this matter. Once you unleash 
violence you cannot control it. So we have to deal with this situation and keep it 
within manageable bounds until we decide to strike" (12). Earlier, he charged that the 
politicians had taken over the strike, moving it away from its industrial base. He then 
attacked the sugar unions for seeking to wreck the industry: 
If the sugar quota is lost the sugar industry will collapse and then J agan, 
Gopaul, and Komal Chand will tell workers how they will eat and feed and 
clothe their children. This government is a firm government, it will not be 
intimidated and it is not going to yield ... (13). 
The government was resolute in its opposition to holding any discussions with FITUG 
despite the strike, nor was it going to move or adjust any part of the budget. It had 
clearly indicated that there was no alternative to the IMF programme. FITUG was 
stunned by the non-civility of the President's response to the internationally acclaimed 
labour leader and his remark that he did not have to ask Lech Walesa for the names 
of priests and trade unionists arrested, he could have got the information from his own 
Police Commissioner. 
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However, the movement also communicated with Solidarity, conveying to the Polish 
labour leader the tremendous inspiration and delight which the cable provoked among 
the working people of all walks of life. The statement went on to emphasise the nature 
of the workers' struggle: 
Like Solidarity, FITUG has insistently and proudly acclaimed the peaceful 
character of the prolonged strike. Not a pane of glass or a bottle has been 
broken by workers. FITUG totally denounces any attempt by the government 
of Guyana to smear the image of the independent labour movement by 
allegations of arson and violence .... We are all the more resolved to insist on a 
dignified solution to the present struggle in which the legitimate 
representatives of the workers are recognised and negotiated with (14). 
While the President was complaining about procedure, and not meeting with FITUG 
because his government was meeting with the TUC, the administration nonetheless 
sought meetings with individual unions in the hope of breaking the solidarity of the 
protest. A meeting was in fact summoned between bauxite unions and the Minister of 
Finance on April 13, at which the unions insisted that the government should meet 
with the seven unions as a bloc (Catholic Standard: April 16th 1989). FITUG had 
taken a decision that any discussion with the government must take place with the 
involvement of the entire grouping. 
The failure of the government to meet with FITUG drew condemnation from workers' 
representatives who claimed that all the government was doing was to worship a 
programme which has imposed unconscionable hardships on workers. They termed 
the ERP 'every race punishing' and 'empty rice pots'. The workers gained the 
impression from the government's actions and statements that the administration was 
not concerned about their welfare, because it did not take a stand on their behalf, as 
was the case of neighbouring governments. They cited the case of Venezuela, whose 
President made a stirring plea to the IMF on behalf of the poor, and whose message 
was made widely known in Guyana in a few of the local media. They referred to a 
letter written by President Perez to the IMF, following the riots in Venezuela just 
about the same time as the strike was taking place in Guyana. Perez alluded to the 
criticisms which had been voiced by many developing countries concerning what they 
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thought were the unjust terms on which the Fund conducted its international relations. 
The argument was that in imposing solutions for these economies due consideration 
was not given to the resultant consequences for the poor as a result of rapid decline in 
social services. This is how President Perez described the IMF conditions: 
... they take no account at all of the international economic environment within 
which they have to be applied or of economic realities in the countries where 
they are implemented .... This conduct on the part of the major countries, which 
have shown us the example of their democratic systems and their prosperity, 
but by their insensitivity and lack of understanding, preclude us from 
emulating them, is incomprehensible and unjustifiable .. . It is the 
impoverished, who are in no way accountable for the errors or mistakes made 
by those who have governed them, who are punished by acute poverty and 
despairing violence .... It is impossible to carry out the necessary and urgent 
measures to adjust our economy and align it with reality in a context in which 
we must payout more than 50 percent of the value of our exports to survive 
the public debt, a debt which increases whenever interest rates rise, new 
protectionist measures are promulgated or maladjustments provoked by 
manipulation of the prices of our exports, require further devaluations, and the 
prices people must pay for their food go up again. At the same time so as not 
to cancel out the results of the adjustments, wages become less and less 
adequate for sustaining family life, and unemployment rises to dangerous 
levels which erupt in violence - the only recourse open to the truly poor, as we 
know (15). 
In response the Fund indicated that it was aware of the need to protect the poor during 
the adjustment phase and it was in recognition of this need that the provisions made 
by Venezuela for direct subsidies on consumer essentials and housing and for new 
welfare programmes had been allowed (16). It is evident from my later interviews that 
the workers knew through the publication of the IMF reply that they could still benefit 
from the retention of some subsidies on essential goods. They felt that the Guyana 
Government just accepted what the IMF proposed, without argument or protest. 
Workers believed that Perez' s action should have been emulated by Hoyte. In 
addition, the representatives claimed that the workers did not wreck the economy -
this was done through the government's mismanagement. Therefore, workers should 
not be asked to bear the brunt of the adjustment programme. They explained that big 
businesses were benefitting through tax holidays and in addition they were purchasing 
state-owned entities at bargain basement prices. Super salaries were paid to all sorts 
of so-called professionals and experts while the workers' labour continued to be 
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undervalued. Some workers indicated an understanding of what the Hoyte 
administration was seeking to do, but the method deployed, they claimed was wrong. 
They were behaving like 'big bullies' (Interviews: October 1994). 
FITUG'S Indecision 
The strike was in its fourth week and despite government reprisals and its adamant 
deportment, the workers in sugar, bauxite and at the University of Guyana continued 
to hold out. Production in the sugar and bauxite industries was at a standstill. The 
country depended on the two industries, bauxite and sugar, for foreign exchange, and 
the continuation of the strike meant that a great deal of imported goods would be 
affected, since there was hardly any reserve of foreign exchange in the treasury. Fuel 
was anticipated to be the first to go and that would have had a crippling effect on 
many other sectors, since the government had no money to pay the fuel bill. The 
Canadian government was assisting by supplying that commodity to the country. 
Talks had taken place between key trade union officials in Canada and FITUG on this 
matter. The latter requested their Canadian counterparts to exert pressure on their 
government, to demand that the Guyana Government engage the democratic unions in 
talks. FITUG was also keeping the diplomatic community informed of the 
justification of the workers' struggles and had dispatched letters to all the Heads of 
Caricom countries and its Secretary General seeking their intervention: 
... As it is now clear that the situation can only be resolved through mediation 
and as the Caricom Treaty has established industrial relations as an area for 
Community cooperation, we are seeking urgently your good offices towards 
this end ... (17). 
While the pressure mounted at the international level, one union official explained 
that the unions seemed to have lost the will to fight and to have forgotten the issues 
which started the strike. They also abandoned previous decisions and their public 
pronouncements about worker victimization. They also decided to take up offers 
made by respective managements for separate meetings. In fact one official 
mentioned that solidarity was broken from day one of the strike, when the CCWU and 
266 
GPSU failed to call their members out when there was a strong possibility that the 
workers were likely to respond positively since there appeared to be momentum for 
an all out struggle. Let us examine what took place. 
Following the departure of Daniels (head of the GPSU and FlTUG) pressure was put 
on the other Executive Council Members of GPSU to break away from FlTUG. The 
government was successful in this. At a meeting of the Executive Council of the 
GPSU a decision was taken to break away from FITUG and to rejoin the TUC. 
Further, the General Secretary of the union, Leslie Melville, made a statement on 
April 13 on behalf of FITUG at a press conference, which was considered by the 
GPSU executive to be "irresponsible, indecent and disrespectful to the President of 
Guyana" (Chronicle: April 20th 1989). He was asked to withdraw the remarks made 
and refused to comply with the request, which prompted the GPSU to terminate his 
services. Melville had previously opposed the Executive Council's decision to put 
Daniels on 'absence without leave' and their order that he should not return to his 
desk unless a satisfactory explanation was given for his departure out of the country 
(Chronicle May 6th 1989).The union then came under the control of a high ranking 
PNC official, a Regional Chairman. 
One GPSU official explained how the government was successful in recapturing and 
maintaining control of that union. He pointed out that the acting President, Farley 
Thompson, was a very close friend and colleague of Daniels and Melville and found it 
very difficult to write to them about the unpleasant decisions foisted on the Executive 
Council by Party hawks. Many of them knew that what they were doing was wrong 
but they were scared to stand up and say so. They were all public servants and having 
seen the type of pressure that was put on Daniels because he stood up for the workers, 
they decided to remain quiet. He claimed that the ruling party was bent on 
maintaining control of the GPSU and was engaged in manipulating the results of the 
elections which were held in June 1989. Following the sacking of Melville, and with 
the Executive coming under the control of the ruling party, the GPSU took the 
decision to grant 'ordinary members' status to persons from whom dues were 
deducted under the agency shop. This change made it possible for the 'ordinary 
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members' to vote in order to counter a serious challenge by PPP supporters at the 
union elections. 
Two high ranking PPP activists who were in the public service made a bid for top 
posts at the elections. Roger Luncheon sought election to the position of a Vice-
President while H N Nawbatt was nominated to contest the position of Deputy 
General Secretary. Both persons later moved to the courts to challenge the results 
(Chronicle: June 21st 1989). However, that did not stop the installation of a PNC 
controlled Executive. The official claimed that Farley Thompson was unopposed for 
the position as President, and after his confirmation the new President realised how 
trapped he was and soon migrated. It was shortly thereafter that the Regional 
Chairman took over as President. 
Three days after the decision to suspend Daniels another decision was taken, this time 
to withdraw from FITUG (Chronicle May 9th 1989) while a statement was issued 
shortly thereafter instructing FITUG to stop interfering in GPSU affairs. The GPSU 
accused FITUG of taking a "political course in which scheme of things the workers' 
welfare takes third place" (ibid: May 12th 1989). The decision by that union 
Executive stunned some FITUG officials, since the resolution to affiliate was 
approved by the General Council whose authority can only be varied by the Congress 
of the Union (Catholic Standard May 14th 1989). But in such matters rules were 
hardly observed and court proceedings rarely changed the situation. 
The CCWU head, Gordon Todd, had also taken over as acting head of FITUG, 
following the departure of Daniels. One official explained that he was never around at 
meetings of FITUG although the meetings were held at their Headquarters, and his 
absence was a constant source of concern to Daniels in the initial stage of the strike. 
He also did not turn up at the FITUG May Day rally for which he was billed to speak. 
The moment Todd took over, the focus of the strike shifted to one of bringing it to an 
end, with attention being given to the terms under which this could be done. Some 
FITUG officials gave unions in the sugar and bauxite industry the green light to 
explore overtures made by the management of those Corporations, with a view to 
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commencmg negotiations. The CCWU was also involved in conciliation at the 
Ministry of Labour over the dismissal of 300 members from state entities and 
, 
apparently had an assurance that the workers would be reinstated once there was a 
restoration of 'normalcy' in the country. 
By this time, FITUG had launched its twelve point recovery agenda (Stabroek News 
May 3rd 1989). This was prepared with the assistance of Clive Thomas of the 
UGWU, who was at the Mona Campus of the UWI. He had flown back from Jamaica 
to lend solidarity to the strikers, including his members at the university. The 
programme outlined FITUG's opposition to the budget and suggested areas where 
improvement in the economy could take place, and on that basis was intended to 
mount more pressure on the government. But instead of putting pressure on the 
government some of the leaders were preparing for resumption of work. The 
government knew of the weakening of the resolve to struggle at leadership level of 
FITUG, hence state ~gencies decided to capitalise on this fragility. 
The Chairman of the Sugar industry wrote appealing to sugar workers to return to 
work as the industry was unlikely to meet its EEC quota. He offered two weeks 
incentive pay if the industry achieved a production output of 75,000 tons, with the 
first 16,000 tons beyond the current output of 49,000 tons attracting one week's pay, 
while another week's pay would be given for a further 10,000 tons. He informed 
sugar workers that up to the 27th April, the industry had lost $56m worth of sugar 
through arson and discarding of canes already harvested but which could not have 
been grounded. Additionally, he pointed out that there was a production loss of 
23,000 tons of sugar amounting to $391m. As he pleaded for a return to work and for 
union discussions he emphasised: "I have to tell you honestly that because of these 
severe losses, and with the continuing strike, a secure future in the sugar industry is 
now gravely at risk" (18). 
Without informing the other uruons m the industry GA WU responded to the 
Chairman's letter on May 3, and requested a meeting to discuss its intent. A meeting 
was arranged for May 4, 1989. NAACIE was invited to the meeting subsequently by 
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GAWU and was informed that Guysuco would like to make an offer which might be 
satisfactory to the unions. The GFF&SU was also invited to the meeting. The 
following extracts from Guysuco's notes give an indication of what transpired: 
Cde. Sankar welcomed members of the unions' delegation and expressed 
appreciation at GAWU's response to the Corporation's letter of 27-4-89. He 
noted the union's request dated 3-5-89 for a meeting to discuss the intent of the 
Chairman's letter which was sent out to workers. Consequently, a meeting was 
arranged for today and it was hoped that something meaningful would flow 
from the discussions. Cde. Chand said that it was subsequent to the 
notification of this meeting he had invited the NAACIE and the GFF&SU to 
attend and ... would like to be advised what was the intent of the Corporation's 
letter, that is, what the Corporation had to offer (19). 
Following clarification, Chand made the following demands before resumption could 
take place. Guysuco must be prepared to increase wages substantially, to look at 
incentive payments with a view to having meaningful adjustment and to improve 
fringe benefits once resumption took place. Further, the unions expected that when 
the package was finalised it would have to be sufficient to enable the workers to take 
care of the increase in the cost of living and live a decent life (20). 
On May 5th, at a meeting of the FITUG, Lincoln Lewis of the bauxite unions reported 
that workers were trekking back to work and as such there should be a resumption call 
by FITU G to ensure an orderly return to work. He further mentioned that if 
resumption did not take place the 'trickle would become a flood'. He reported that 
there was a meeting with the Management of Guymine the day before, as Guysuco 
was meeting with the sugar unions, and the possibility of the workers receiving a 
good agreement existed, including the union securing an educational grant of an 
amount equivalent to 25% of all union dues collected. This had been withdrawn 
several years before by the Burnham administration. Lewis emphasised that, based on 
a 14 point plan submitted by management, there was a likelihood of a satisfactory 
outcome, with benefits taken away previously restored (21). The representatives from 
the GA WU reported to the same meeting that the sugar strike was still effective. 
However, there was a different version to Lewis's assessment of the strike in the 
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mmmg sector, where his colleagues claimed that the strike was still very solid. 
Following the report on the strike situation, it was agreed that since the unions had 
nothing to lose by the meetings, then discussions with their respective managements 
should continue. Further, it was also agreed that there should not be any commitment 
to end the strike unless a unified decision was taken at FlTUG level. The meeting was 
informed that the Bauxite workers would like to hear from the FlTUG leadership 
before they returned to work. As the first round of meetings with the management 
ended: 
NAACIE's N. K. Gopaul says union leaders cannot tell workers to resume 
duty given the current situation. The parties met for about 90 minutes 
Thursday. We have indicated to Guysuco that the workers are very concerned 
with the poor level of wages which they have been offered following the 
budget .. .it will make life harder and impossible (Stabroek News: May 6, 
1989). 
Follow up meetings were held between representatives of both the bauxite and sugar 
industries and the unions in those entities. The GA WU was unhappy with the outcome 
of the meeting with Guysuco, as Chand observed: "that the Corporation has not 
changed its position. Since there was no tangible offer to the workers the unions 
would be unable to persuade them to resume" (22). The bauxite workers had also 
rejected the terms which were put to their unions by their employer. With this 
apparent stalemate: "Guyana's two most prominent Christian churchmen have offered 
to mediate in the six week dispute ... " (Stabroek News May 10,1989). Bishops George 
and Singh felt they could bring the parties together to explore ways of bringing the 
strike to an end. They were worried at the social conditions prevailing in the country. 
This timely intervention by the two Bishops helped to strengthen the resolve of the 
workers to continue their struggle. However, some of the leaders in FlTUG were not 
prepared to explore other possibilities for the continuation of the strike. Instead, they 
were bent on ending the strike. 
At a further meeting of FITUG on May 12, although there was no progress at the 
talks and the strike situation had not changed, the GA WU argued that the strike 
should be brought to an end. A new element was injected into the discussions, 
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something which was of no consequences to GA WU in previous struggles, and which 
was not raised before. It had to do with the fact that the rain season was about to 
begin and the related out of crop benefits the sugar workers could lose. This would 
make the strike ineffective. Chand emphasised that the bulk of sugar workers wanted 
a resumption of work and that the bauxite workers might very well have to go it 
alone if they did not end the strike. He insisted that the strike should be called off 
before the workers became demoralized. The meeting was also notified that, two days 
before, the bauxite workers had rejected management's offer and they were still in a 
defiant mood. The NAACIE and UGWU took the position that the bauxite factor must 
be taken into consideration. Lewis had previously notified FITUG that his union 
could have ended the strike since May 7th, but that it was in the interests of unity that 
the plan was shelved. He wanted a united return to work by workers and insisted on a 
joint statement from FITUG before any resumption of work. He was confident that 
the workers would heed a united call from FITUG. 
The NAACIE emphasised that the unions must not lose sight of the objectives of the 
strike. It felt that the government was in a very vulnerable state and that the unions 
should continue the pressure. The NAACIE cautioned that attempts by the 
Corporations' Heads to meet with the unions were not their doing, but reflected the 
government's strategy of dividing the unions. If enough pressure was put on the 
employers the government would have to change from its tough stance. Moreover, if 
a decision was taken to end the strike then the workers should be consulted, since it 
was the rank and file which had provided militancy and leadership at every stage of 
the strike. But the GA WU insisted that it wanted to sign the terms of resumption as 
early as possible. It argued that no one would talk with FITUG and since the strike 
was not called for the overthrow of the government there should be an orderly retreat. 
It was clear that GA WU had taken the side of the leaders of the bauxite unions, and 
the CCWU, that the strike should be ended. They were all aware that the bauxite 
workers were in no mood to surrender but were sure that, once the leaders ended the 
strike, the workers would go back to work. One FITUG official, reflecting on these 
events remarked that it was evident that the workers were in a mood to struggle on , 
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and their will was undermined by leaders who, without securing any benefits for 
them, just wanted to end the strike. The leaders and workers were 'poles apart' 
(Interview: October 1994). A leading PPP member and sugar representative explained 
that the decision was taken when the opposition PPP assessed the situation, and came 
to the conclusion that the government was likely to fall given the mood of the sugar 
and bauxite workers, and that there was little chance of the PPP becoming a main 
player in any new government since it was not in the forefront of this struggle 
(Interview: November 1994). 
In fact, during the fourth week of the strike many workers and military personnel 
were talking about the formation of a civic interim government. The PPP sensed that 
there was also the prospect of military intervention which could have had serious 
repercussion for parliamentary democracy in the country. Therefore, it was better if 
the strike was ended and for the PPP to work towards securing changes in the 
upcoming elections. Under this scenario it was likely to form a government, since it 
was the most established party in the country. This was therefore seen as a good 
reason for the GA WU to join in advocating the ending of the strike. The CCWU and 
the leaders of the two bauxite unions felt the strike should be ended for different 
reasons. The bauxite unions felt, based on information obtained through the 
grapevine, that they were likely to make a breakthrough at negotiations. Once the 
strike ended, there was a real chance of winning back the educational grant which was 
a commitment at previous meetings. However, this was merely a false promise 
intended to break the unity of the strike. The CCWU's indication that the dismissed 
workers would only be considered for reinstatement if there was normalcy at the 
industrial level was also seen as a motivating factor for the ending of the strike. 
Based on the strong views by the leaders of the GAWU, CCWU, GMWU and GBSU, 
that the strike should be ended, the UGWU and NAACIE conceded on the firm 
understanding that FITUG should end the strike in a united way, as soon as this was 
possible. As a consequence, the following decision was arrived at: 
It was the general consensus that since the bauxite workers were schedule to 
meet on Saturday 13-5-89 and the NAACIE was scheduled to have its 
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Executive Council meeting on the same day, then the issue should be put to 
their membership. FITUG should again meet on Monday or Tuesday 16-5-89 
to review the matter and if it was a consensus to order resumption, then a joint 
appropriate release be issued bearing the signatures of all the respective union 
leaders ordering the workers to return to work to coincide with the signing of 
terms of resumption agreements with the respective companies (23). 
The Ending of the Strike 
When the PPP headquarters received the verdict of the FITUG meeting that the strike 
would end after all the mechanisms were put in place, an official pointed out that its 
leader was not happy that there was a condition attached to the ending of the strike. 
The PPP wanted an immediate end to the strike, so a decision was taken at both the 
GAWU and PPP level to end the strike on Saturday May 13, 1989. The NAACIE 
Executive Council which met on the same day, received information that the Strike 
was going to be called off by GA WU on instructions from the PPP. A delegation 
from NAACIE was authorised to get in touch with Dr Jagan to apprise him of the 
grave danger of such an action. The NAACIE members from the various locations 
had already reported to that union's Executive Council that, contrary to GA WU's 
report that sugar workers would like the strike ended, the workers were adamant that 
the strike should end only with the withdrawal of the budget or an offer of 
substantially higher wages (NAACIE Minutes, May 13, 1989). The NAACIE and 
GA WU representatives were coordinating this activity very closely on the individual 
estates and were meeting with workers on a daily basis. At times they invited leaders 
of FITUG to address workers at different locations. The officers of NAACIE as well 
as the Field Secretaries of GA WU were in daily contact with the sugar workers. So 
they were well aware of the feelings of the workers. They knew that the workers did 
not want to end the strike. 
The NAACIE's delegation visited Dr Jagan at his Freedom House Headquarters, 
where the leaders of GA WU were also present. NAACIE and GA WU had, up to that 
point, enjoyed nearly three decades of close relations and hence the meeting was 
sought by NAACIE so that the union could benefit from the thinking of its sister 
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union. The GA WU confirmed that they were going to sign the terms of resumption on 
that same day. The NAACIE delegation explained to the GA WU officials and Dr 
J agan what had been reported to that union's executive meeting, namely that the 
workers were not in a mood to end the strike. The NAACIE delegation further 
explained that the ending of the strike as contemplated by GA WU was contrary to the 
decision of FITUG. But there was a disagreement over the terms of the decision. 
GA WU said that the decision was that the strike should end immediately while 
NAACIE argued that a unified approach had to be taken in keeping with the decision. 
NAACIE urged an urgent meeting of FITUG to clarify the position, but the GA WU 
leadership was adamant that the strike should come to an end. The situation was clear 
to NAACIE and the UGWU, and was reinforced by a statement which was issued by 
the FITUG publicity officer, Leslie Melville, when he admitted to the press after the 
meeting that an end to the strike was in sight: 
We have assessed the strike situation and heard reports from all our unions 
whose members are on strike, and in respect of the talks we have had with the 
two companies. Everything seems to be pointing to a situation where FITUG 
will advise a back to work call (Stabroek News: Saturday May 13th 1989). 
If there was a decision to end the strike as of May 13, Melville would have said so to 
the press, but he made it known that at the appropriate time FITUG would make a 
back to work call. When it seemed that there was not going to be agreement at the 
meeting with Dr Jagan over the meaning of the decision at the FITUG meeting of the 
12th, the following took place: 
The NAACIE delegation pleaded with him (Dr Jagan) for two or three days in 
keeping with FITUG decision so we could all go back to work unitedly. 
Dr.Jagan said 'we must not allow the tail to wag the dog. We should end the 
strike' he asserted. Our union insisted for time and he said 'we will end the 
strike and we can settle it on the streets if you don't agree with GA WU. We 
appealed to him not to break the solidarity of the workers and he responded 
'we will always get the workers as more and more the objective situation for 
struggle is surfacing. There will be further oppression and with elections 
coming next year, the situation will be ripe for an all out struggle'. He was not 
perhaps conscious about the great harm that could be done to the movement 
when a strike is ended in disarray (NAACIE Report, 1990:49). 
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Thus, the GA WU went ahead and signed the terms of resumption agreement. 
However, the GUYSUCO officials were not prepared for this turn of events, since at 
the last meeting the GA WU was still holding out for a firm commitment on increase 
wages. So there were no officials around and, as a union representative explained 
(Interview: October 1994), they had to search for the leader of the employer's 
delegation, who they eventually found at a cricket club. He then put his team together 
and the agreement to end the strike was signed late on the evening of Saturday May 
13,. Guysuco then allowed the representatives the use of their vehicles with drivers to 
travel through the sugar communities announcing the end of the strike. The nine point 
agreement contained no resolution of the initial demands made by the workers. Five 
of the terms dealt with the usual conditions. "There shall be normal resumption of 
work ... as from Sunday 14.5.89 ... no victimisation ... no break in service ... no 
worker shall be denied his normal work opportunity ... "(Chronicle May 14th 1989). 
The union further agreed that the strike days would not be treated as available days 
and that a special incentive of one weeks' pay would be earned by the workers for a 
production of 16,000 tons of sugar in excess of the 49,000 tons and for an additional 
10,000 tons of sugar a second week of incentive would be paid. Negotiations on 
wages would commence once production had resumed and there would be the normal 
deduction of union dues (ibid) which had been stopped for both NAACIE and GA WU 
when the strike started. 
With the signing of the 'terms of resumption', the GA WU officials argued that the 
union had made a breakthrough for collective bargaining. However, that was not so, 
because it was the defeat of the Labour Amendment Act by NAACIE which had 
paved the way for the restoration of collective bargaining. Additionally, the terms 
agreed upon were in fact offered to the workers by the Chairman of the Corporation 
since April 27th, when he appealed to workers to resume duties. There were also 
concerns about the retrospective payment of wages, since GA WU accepted payment 
from May 14th under the guise of equivalence of treatment, rather than the payment 
from April 1 st which was offered by the corporation, so there was some loss in 
retroactive payments to workers.(24). 
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Workers' Rebellion 
As GAWU was announcing the ending of the strike there was overwhelming rejection 
of the back to work call. The workers were in a rebellious mood. They had, two days 
earlier, rejected a second plea by the Chairman offering the same conditions which 
were agreed upon by GA WU (25). It was the first time that the sugar workers had 
been so defiant. The workers sent all the leaders who went to tell them to end the 
strike, packing. The outraged workers indicated that only NAACIE would be able to 
discuss resumption of work with them. The PPP leader was made aware that a leader 
can be loved by his people, but yet invoke their wrath on a sensitive bread and butter 
issue. When it was clear that there was an almost complete rejection of the back to 
work call, Guysuco issued a statement that the turn out of workers was satisfactory 
and harvesting commenced on all estates (Chronicle May 16th 1989). Two days 
earlier the state media carried the headline "Sugar Workers End Strike" (Chronicle 
May 14th 1989). On day five of the back to work call the story was "Grinding 
resumes on six estates" (Chronicle May 18th 1989), while the following day it was 
"All Guysuco estates now grinding"(Chronicle May 19th 1989). These were all 
intended to sow confusion among striking workers, since up to then only 922 tons of 
sugar had been produced for the week (ibid)n and this represents the production of 
less than a day when Guysuco has all its factories in full operation. It was reported 
that "Despite the confusion, worker instinct appears to have won out and a relatively 
small number responded to GAWU call" (Catholic Standard May 21st 1989). 
As the production figures were released, Guysuco admitted that there was a slow 
response to the back to work call, and that it had only reached the level of 50 to 60 per 
cent. The GA WU made a similar admission, stating that many workers may have 
gone out of their districts (ibid). But the rejection was widespread and GA WU 
officials had been rejected. As Thakur points out, "the sugar belt reported at least a 
dozen incidents of assault on GA WU officers ... " (ibid: June 25,1989). In an apparent 
attempt to save the face of the GA WU leadership, the FlTUG leaders who were in the 
conspiracy to end the strike authorised Melville to issue a statement to the press 
which contradicted his own statement made on May 13th .. Without a meeting or the 
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knowledge of the UGWU or NAACIE, he advised the following: 
FITUG at a meeting on Friday, 12 May, on the recommendation of its 
affiliates, has sanctioned the resumption of work in the sugar and bauxite 
industries and at the University of Guyana. The resumptions follow reports of 
negotiation of acceptable conditions between two of the affiliates on strike , 
and the respective administrations (26). 
It was reported that this statement "was spread in the thousands round sugar estates, 
hoping to persuade the workers that bauxite workers had gone back to work and 
FITUG was calling off the strike" (Catholic Standard: May 21st 1989). 
The bauxite leaders were also trying to get their members to accept the proposals 
which had been tabled by management. They anticipated that, with GA WU signing 
the terms of resumption, it would become easier for them to convince the bauxite 
workers to go back to work. A meeting was arranged with bauxite workers on the 
same day as GAWU's ill-fated act. The workers were given copies of the FITUG 
release as well as the terms which GA WU signed. However, this did not convince 
them to go back to work at that time. They were outraged at what had taken place and 
demanded to see leaders ofFITUG. As the pressure from the workers mounted Todd 
and Melville, again at the behest of GA WU, issued a statement reaffirming the 
correctness of FITUG's decision to call off the strike and advised the public that a 
meeting had been arranged for Wednesday May 17th, "to discuss complaints from 
three of its affiliates about members of the Executive violating democratic decisions ... 
of the organisation ... " (27). Again the UGWU and NAACIE were unaware of any 
release, complaints by anyone, or the reason for such a meeting. The first time they 
heard about the meeting was from the press. The same day in which the release was 
issued, the "unlikely troika" of Todd, Melville and Komal Chand travelled to the 
bauxite community, unknown to the UGWU and NAACIE, with the hope of 
persuading the workers to return to work: 
Unlike the Biblical Daniel, they were not equipped with the qualities needed 
in a lion's den. The bauxite workforce, totally fed up with the leadership 
vacillation, vented its spleen on the hapless trio. Melville was grilled over his 
own behaviour with respect to his union, Todd over his inactivity in FITUG, 
apart from trying to call off the strike and Chand for the blatantly political 
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explanation he gave for calling off the strike. The verbal discomfort of the 
visitors was reinforced by workers in the audience holding up their belts in the 
form of nooses. At the end of the evening Todd stated he had been 
misinformed about the Linden situation and he supported the continuance of 
the strike (Catholic Standard May 21 st 1989). 
While Todd and company left the Bauxite town on the note that the strike was 
continuing, they did nothing to ensure that there was consolidation of the workers' 
struggle. Instead they continued their campaign, arguing that the decision to end the 
strike had been taken on the 12th May. They then concentrated their energies on 
laying the blame for the confusion on NAACIE and UGWU, and accused Fr. 
Rodrigues of the UGWU and the General Secretary of NAACIE of undemocratic 
conduct. No effort was spared by GA WU to castigate these leaders, and leaflets 
bordering on libel and character assassination were in abundance throughout the 
country, all with the intention of saving face and persuading the workers back to 
work. The entire hierarchy of the PPP was also put into the defence of GA WU. The 
visits of these seasoned politicians in the sugar belt also met with serious rebuke. This 
is how one analyst explained the situation: 
The problem for both GA WU and the bauxite leaders lay in the fact that the 
leaders of the two smallest unions NAACIE's N.K. Gopaul and UGWU's Fr 
Malcolm Rodrigues are by far the most prestigious and trusted of the FITUG 
leadership. Their endorsement of a return to work call was essential for the 
credibility of the rest of the leadership and for such a call to be effective. 
Neither NAACIE nor UGWU were prepared to move from their membership'S 
clearly stated position.... The wrath of GA WU then turned on NAACIE's 
Gopaul who in the meantime had issued a statement reiterating the position 
that each union's fundamental duty was to represent its membership and if that 
meant that FITUG had to take different positions on the strike then, 
unfortunately, FITUG had to recognise that fact. ... The workers in sugar and 
bauxite effectively exposed the gulf between the GA WUfPPP leadership and 
the rank and file ... (Catholic Standard: May 21st 1989). 
As the workers rejected the pleadings of PPP and GA WU leaders to return to work, 
they claimed that the strike had to be called off because of lack of funding. They 
accused the Treasurer of FITUG of making small sums available to GA WU while he 
was paying out more to the NAACIE members, and claimed that millions had been 
poured in by imperialist agents to bribe sugar workers to move away from GA WU. It 
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was a dirty campaign that involved the highest in the ranks of the PPP. They were 
engaged in vitriolic attacks against leaders of NAACIE. As one union official 
remarked, if the energies and resources which were put into the back to work effort 
had been put into the promotion of the workers' cause, victory would have been 
accomplished for the workers. The accused union leaders maintained that they had 
acted in keeping with the decisions of the organisation and more so in the interest of 
the striking workers. NAACIE had indicated that the unions were given clear cut 
instructions from their members and any deviation by unions was at their peril, and 
argued that, while unity is a goal to be striven for in FITUG, it could not be pursued at 
the expense of democracy (NAACIE Report 1990:50). The blunders of FITUG were 
assessed by Chase when he remarked that: 
One cardinal mistake was for FITUG to allow individual unions to 
independently negotiate resumption instead of FITUG using the occasion to 
enforce its own recognition by government as a minimum of ending the strike. 
Arising therefrom came the decisions of individual unions to resume work 
when by every principle in the book that decision ought to have been a 
collective one ... NAACIE's policy having been proved right even though at 
times we stood alone, for the future we need to have greater faith and 
confidence in ourselves (28). 
The NAACIE and the UGWU had been left alone to continue the struggle. In the 
meantime, the GA WU officials were involved in identifying to management, those 
NAACIE members whom they considered to be involved in influencing workers to 
stay away from work. They had become the security agents of the employer and 
government, identifying NAAICE members for punishments including dismissals. 
Two Executive members of NAACIE from the Diamond Branch were dismissed 
(NAACIE Report 1990). This was happening despite the fact that, up to that time, 
over 200 activists had been arrested and charged by the police on trumped up 
allegations. Some were even tortured during interrogation. 
As the wrangling among the uruons continued, the University of Guyana (VG) 
workers were targeted for victimisation. Their union had written to the administration 
on May 10, to address a number of outstanding issues. One week later, instead of 
280 
meeting with the union, the administration indicated that they were going to dismiss 
workers for failing to return to work. Hence, notices had been sent to the homes of 37 
non-academic staff whose termination did not require the sanction of the University 
Board. The university claimed that the dismissal letters were issued after the 
administration had come across a press release from FITUG which indicated that it 
had instructed the sugar, bauxite and University workers to resume duties (Chronicle: 
May 20th 1989). The dismissals brought protest demonstrations and militancy on the 
campus, which included students and solidarity from NAACIE. This was in sharp 
contrast to the response of the CCWU when their members were dismissed. The 
teaching staff then put into gear a campaign which resulted in several leading 
academics threatening to resign en bloc if the workers were not reinstated (Stabroek 
News May 24th 1989). The counter offensive of the UGWU severely disrupted 
classes and seriously threatened the examinations for the academic year. FITUG 
leaders Todd and Melville were again forced to explain what they meant by their 
sanctioning of the ending of the strike. "It was therefore expected that the UGWU and 
the University of Guyana would have negotiated acceptable conditions before 
normalcy was restored in the University" (29). These leaders had been so trapped by 
their attempt at deceit that their contradictions were creating turmoil over the graves 
of Critchlow and Rodney. They had shown some courage, however, at the end of their 
statement. In as much as they were aware that workers were already dismissed they 
warned: 
that nothing should be done by the UG. administration to further disrupt an 
already unstable industrial relations climate, unless it is prepared to face the 
consequence of its action. FITUG affirms its solidarity with and support for 
the dismissed workers of the University (30). 
It was a university worker who asked what solidarity the two gentlemen could give 
when by their actions they had destroyed the basis of such solidarity. They were 
"jokers" he claimed. It was the militant mood of the academics and students on the 
campus that eventually forced the university administration to settle with the UGWU, 
on May 26th, with the subsequent reinstatement of the workers. By the first week in 
June the majority of CCWU members were also reinstated. Some who were employed 
in a Branch Store in the mining town refused to take up the offer of reinstatement 
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(Stabroek News June 24th 1989). 
The dismissals at UG coupled with the threat posed to other strikers through their 
colleagues from the GA WU, made it clear to the NAACIE that the disunity at the 
leadership level was making it difficult to continue the strike. Workers had become 
vulnerable to widespread victimisation and hostility from some of their comrades who 
were previously engaged in the struggle with them. The union held discussions with 
the striking workers in sugar and bauxite and the workers agreed that the strike should 
be brought to an end. This was done although the union claimed that the will of the 
workers to continue the struggle was very much intact. But the workers and NAACIE 
equally recognised that a strike of that scale required leaders who did not lose sight of 
national goals for sectional interests, and that the will of the workers had to be 
matched by that of their leaders. There had not been any gain in financial terms, and 
even the production target set for sugar was not accomplished so the bonus agreed 
upon was not paid. The bauxite unions also did not benefit from the promises made to 
reinstate the educational grant nor was any satisfactory agreement obtained. However, 
the workers' rejection of directives from a confused leadership and their assertion of 
political independence were of historical significance. In addition, the multi-racial 
nature of the struggle laid the basis of a new era for racial harmony and integrity in 
the country (ibid: May 24, 1989). 
The manner in which the strike ended, and the internal rift which continued months 
after the strike, left a bitter legacy among workers. Some representatives later 
indicated that it took several months before the GA WU leaders could conduct any 
meaningful dialogue with their members (Interview: August 1994). However, the 
display of unity between bauxite and sugar workers, which prevailed during and after 
the strike, left no doubt that the potential for workers unity was strong, provided there 
was also decisive leadership. The workers were capable of winning their own battles. 
As Chase lamented: 
So the strike on which so many placed such high hopes ended in disarray. 
Worse still, FITUG was not recognised by the government~ none of the 
political demands was secured~ and relations between ourselves and GA WU 
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became sour. We have done what we can and will continue to do whatever 
reasonably can be done to heal this breach. Unity of the sugar workers is 
paramount (31). 
It has equally been the hope of the mass of the workers, who are even up to today 
facing the hardships imposed on them through years of mismanagement, that good 
sense will prevail among the leaders, in order that their interests are protected and 
enhanced. 
Wage Increases 1989 - 1994 
Despite the failures outlined above, it was not until after the 1989 anti-budget strike 
that the wages of the sugar workers made some appreciable movement. There were a 
number of reasons why wages were increased after the 1989 strike. In the first place, 
the sugar workers did not show any interest in working a full week. The low wages 
were seen by employees as a disincentive and unattractive to make them work 
continuously in the industry. The tax regime was oppressive. It had taken its toll on 
workers pay packets and at times 50 per cent of overtime earnings were going back to 
taxation. The workers were therefore refusing to work overtime and many instead 
used the weekends to do private work. More money, free from taxation, was obtained 
by workers if they did odd jobs created largely through the underground economy, in 
and around their communities. The industry was in crisis, and its production output 
began to decline at a rapid rate. It was recognized by the employers that wages had 
to be improved to lure the workers back to full production. Thus, the management 
sought and obtained the Government's permission to increase wages beyond the level 
of the 20 per cent which had been announced in the national budget and which had 
been introduced in the sugar industry from April 1, 1989. 
Furthermore, the unions kept the pressure on management for further increases. The 
GA WU was in direct negotiations with Guysuco, while the NAACIE had moved to 
conciliation, seeking a further increase from its original demand following the 
national budget. The first concession from Guysuco came in the form of tax relief. It 
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offered all employees who performed duties on Saturdays and Sundays tax free 
earnings concessions for those days, commencing August 1,1989 (Guysuco Circular 
IR:017117/89). This had already been granted in the bauxite industry for a period of 
over one year, as an incentive to those workers, and the sugar unions had been urging 
the extension of this facility to the sugar workers. However, it was not until after the 
authorities' failure to encourage workers to work on a regular basis had serious 
repercussions in the sugar industry, that the government allowed the weekend tax free 
concessIOns. 
The unions were then invited to meetings at which they were informed that a decision 
had been taken to increase wages and salaries by a further 22.26 per cent with effect 
from September 1,1989. Despite calls by the GA WU and NAACIE for a more 
substantial increase, the Corporation went ahead and unilaterally implemented its 
proposal to make the increase of 42.26 per cent for the year. When asked why the 
Corporation took that course, after the government had stubbornly resisted any further 
increase beyond what the Minister of Finance had stipulated in his budget, a senior 
Guysuco official pointed out that the sugar industry was in crisis. It faced the 
possibility of falling short of its EEC quota and negotiations with Booker Tate for a 
new management contract were in the making. They were aware that Booker Tate was 
going to increase wages as the first step to try and turn around the industry, so the 
government was asked to allow the management a chance to see if an additional 
increase would lure the workers into the fields once more. With some hesitation, the 
government agreed to allow the increase. Additionally, the international lending 
agencies argued that there must be an increase in wages in the productive sectors 
under public control in order to be able to prevent skilled workers from moving over 
to the private sector, whose wages were far more attractive. 
Bookerrrate in the Driving Seat 
Soon after the increase was decided upon, the President announced that talks were 
going on between the Government and Booker Tate regarding a management contract 
for the sugar industry. This decision was taken without consultation with the unions in 
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the industry. The GA WU, while sympathising with such a management contract in the 
industry, repeatedly announced its opposition to the privatisation of the industry. 
Similarly, the NAACIE has advised caution and warned that privatisation was not a 
panacea for development. It charged that it was the lack of democracy at every level 
which was responsible for the many evils in the country, and that economic 
development could not take place in an atmosphere of fear and electoral fraud 
(NAACIE Report 1990: 37). However, many workers were very jubilant over the 
announcement and argued that "it's a good thing Bookers coming back. At least they 
will save the industry and stop the corruption" (ibid). 
As soon as agreement was reached, a top level delegation from BookerlTate, headed 
by its Chairman Sir Michael Caine, invited the unions to a meeting on May 17th 
1990. They informed the unions of their plans to rehabilitate the industry to the point 
where it could produce once again 250,000 tons of sugar a year. It is ironic that the 
new managers were going to put all efforts and energy to produceing half of what 
Bookers had anticipated they would produce by 1980, that is 500,000 tons (Lowachee 
Report, 1970). The unions were told that BookerlTate was interested in having 
significant ownership of the industry and would like to see the government distances 
itself from its operation. This widening of ownership was likely to give Guysuco a 
better future because there would be greater autonomy in the formulation of policies. 
The management team promised the unions an increased remuneration package and 
greater incentives for workers, while they were looking forward to support from the 
unions. The NAACIE representatives at the meeting identified many areas of 
arbitrary management practices encouraged by the Chairman which resulted in the 
low production level. The union suggested that for the industry to make progress the 
Chairman, Harold Davis, should be removed (NAACIE Report, 1990:38). 
Workers' Views of Booker Tate 
The management of the industry has always been a contentious issue among workers 
and their unions. The nationalisation of the industry had widespread support. 
However, the manner in which the industry operated after it became state owned 
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created enormous difficulties for workers. The turn of event in putting the 
management of the industry in the hands of the previous owners is of profound 
significance to workers, hence I sought their views in my interviews. The eight 
foremen who were interviewed indicated that after nationalisation things degenerated 
considerably. They pointed out that in Bookers' days there was careful planning and 
as such they would be aware of the work to be done long ahead of schedule. 
Harvesting was done on time, except for strike periods, weeding, fertilizing, factory 
maintenance, replanting, and in fact every aspect of the operations were undertaken 
on time and to a time schedule. They explained that after nationalization, and 
especially after the 1977 strike, the situation became chaotic. The twenty per cent 
replanting exercise was never achieved, planned maintenance in the factory was never 
accomplished, spares were always in short supply and everything depended on the 
availability of foreign exchange. In effect, the government squandered money and 
stifled the sugar industry. They could not see the rationale where the biggest earner of 
foreign exchange was starved for foreign exchange to conduct its operation 
efficiently. One concluded, "thank God Bookers came back and things are beginning 
to take shape, with production gradually improving"(Interview: September 1994). 
The maJonty were of the opInIOn that, while the management contract with 
Booker/Tate was necessary, they did not believe that the industry should be 
privatized. "It should be state-owned so long as you can have democracy and proper 
accountability" . They were firmly of the view that there were enough skilled 
Guyanese personnel to manage the industry in a competent manner, and would 
support any position taken by the current government to resist pressure to privatise 
the sugar corporation. The representatives were critical of the "super salaries enjoyed 
by them big boys at the top while the workers get a mere pittance"(ibid). 
The NAACIE representatives who were interviewed claimed that the situation of 
workers had deteriorated tremendously over the years after nationalisation. They 
recognised that massive increases in wages took place over the period, but claimed 
that "the increase in the cost of living has devoured the increases paid and also our 
savings, which we had carefully put aside over the years" (ibid). They all agreed that 
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the industry was facing many difficulties which were brought on "through 
mismanagement and political interference by the previous regime" (ibid). They all 
supported the decision to invite Booker/Tate to manage the industry after it was run 
down by the PNC regime, but they were divided on the question of denationalisation. 
The majority were of the view that the industry should be privatized since they 
strongly believe that the workers were going to receive justice under private 
ownership. The four who opposed privatisation claimed that they strongly supported 
the PPP government, elected in 1992, on the matter. They emphasised that "the sugar 
industry should never be owned by a foreign company. The history of exploitation in 
the industry is still something which we would like to forget" (ibid). 
The representatives of the GA WU claimed that life in the sugar industry had never 
been easy. "It's back breaking. We never get anything without a struggle. Dem Bakra 
had lil understanding but when Burnham tek over the industry, things get from bad to 
worse" (Interview: October 1994). There was need to remove many of the estate 
managers who they claimed were "square pegs in a round hole, and put people who 
knew something about the sugar industry so that things can get going again. All wha 
some a dem big boys who a get fat, fat salary know fo do is suck sugar cane. Dem na 
know A to bullfoot" (ibid). 
Concerning the management contract with Booker/Tate they all agreed that there had 
been overall improvement in the sugar industry. They were concerned over the "super 
salary dem big boys a draw down" but agreed that "there may be need to keep some 
six expatriate managers to ensure some a them local big boys who think dem a king, 
don't get out of line" (ibid). They made this suggestion by revealing that the first 
Chairman after nationalisation used to behave as if he was "almighty god"(ibid). Sixty 
percent of the representatives believed that the government should continue to 
exercise control over the industry. The remainder did not care. Their main concern 
was to be able to meet all their financial obligations at the end of the week. Asked if 
they would continue to support Government ownership of the industry if the PNC 
were to take over power again, they said "definitely not, let Bookers take it back then" 
(ibid). But they were quick to remark that they did not see the possibility of the PNC 
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ever getting back to power. They were not fearful of a PNC under Hoyte, but said that 
"a PNC under Hammie (Green) could be dangerous for Guyana, and it appears as if 
he still has control of a big portion of the PNC" (ibid). The representatives were all in 
agreement that wages under Booker/Tate had increased substantially, to a point that 
would never have been achieved under the PNC administration. 
What should not be overlooked, however, is that in the 1960s the industry was 
charged a 2% commission towards services rendered outside of Guyana (Guya 
Persaud 1968:59). An industry whose pricing and marketing arrangements and 
strategy were determined by external institutions must be competent enough to be 
able to operate in an environment which can be considered to be competitive. Given 
the state of decline of the industry, a management contract proved to be beneficial to 
the industry. Even if the management services rendered would add an additional cost 
of about five percent to the industry, the charge to the industry could be justified. 
Such considerations underline the complexity of the issues facing the sugar unions 
and their members in responding to developments in state policy concerning the 
organisation and management of their industry. 
Wage Increases Under Bookerrrate 
The moment Booker/Tate took over the management of the operations of the sugar 
industry, they kept their promise and informed the unions of their intention to increase 
wages by 50 per cent with effect from October 1990. This was followed by an 
additional increase of75 per cent to all unionised workers in March 1991. A year later 
wage increases of 22 per cent were implemented, with an additional 21 percent taking 
effect from March 1993. "These progressive increases moved the minimum daily rate 
from $50. in October 1990 to $300 in 1993, an increase of 500%" (32). In addition to 
the increases implemented during the period 1990 to 1993, the corporation introduced 
a 40 hour work week for the GA WU categories in July 1992. This matched the 
reduction in the working week which had been achieved, through bitter struggles in 
the 1970s, by the NAACIE members in the clerical sections. The corporation further 
pointed out that it had: 
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implemented a wide range of changes and improvements in other employment 
benefits, social welfare, health, and transportation. Employment costs have 
risen over the period as follows:- 1989 - $515.1m; 1990 - $980m; 1991 -
$2,703.7m; 1992 - $4,873.1m, 1993 cost will exceed the $5 billion mark, 
representing a high proportion of the total costs of the corporation. These 
improvements were made possible by the sharp increases in productivity and 
production which occurred during the period (33). 
However, the Corporation had predicted that the prospects of the industry for 1994 
were much less favourable than the previous years since production was likely to 
remain stable, with a likely fall in revenue due to a reduction in the average selling 
price obtained for sugar. It was hoping to put a brake on wage increases and warned 
that any significant increases in wage costs would pose a serious threat to the viability 
of the industry. It also indicated that there was a need to borrow in excess of $650 
million from the banking system to meet cash flow needs during 1994. Increases in 
wages beyond the projected level would automatically reduce funds available for 
investment in plant and machinery and "directly and immediately have repercussions 
on the national economy, and on the Corporation's ability to maintain existing 
employment, wages and benefit levels"(34). It was against the background of these 
serious precautionary measures that the 1994 negotiations were conducted. 
This was also the first year that any real challenge had been posed to the new 
management on the question of wage increases. The increases which were introduced 
for the previous years were implemented after extensive discussions with the unions, 
though the employer had been able to convince and reach an accord with the GA WU 
more easily than with the NAACIE. For instance, while NAACIE rejected the 50 per 
cent wage offer in 1990 and demanded a higher increase in a joint meeting with the 
GA WU under the new management team, the GA WU General Secretary went public 
and announced that it was unlikely his union would reject the increase which was 
offered (Stabroek News: October 14, 1990). The statement was published the day 
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before the Corporation was scheduled to meet with the umons again at a joint 
meeting. The GA WU's announcement was construed by NAACIE as an unfortunate 
development since: 
it struck at the very root of strong and effective collective bargaining. Our 
grounding in negotiations/ collective bargaining teach us not to telegraph your 
final position until such time that you envisage an impasse, more so, it would 
be disastrous to telegraph such position in the press. The corporation as 
expected took full advantage of the comment and ... stood its ground on the 50 
percent offer (NAACIE Report 1992:23). 
At that same meeting the corporation announced that it would meet the unions 
separately since there were differences in positions on the wage offer. Unmindful of 
the harm which was done to the negotiations, the GA WU General Secretary went to 
the press and accused the NAACIE of making outlandish demands on the 
Corporation. This lack of unity on the part of the unions resulted in no further 
increase being given (ibid). As NAACIE General Secretary Kaisree Takechandra 
explained, much more could have been achieved for the workers if only the unions 
had demonstrated a unity of purpose and not allowed themselves to be divided by the 
employer (Interview :November 1994). The method of negotiating separately was a 
ploy used by Bookers in the past to try to settle wage claims with the weaker unions 
and then seek to impose whatever was agreed upon on the other unions. The separate 
negotiations resulted in different positions being taken by the unions. During the 1993 
negotiations the GA WU agreed to the 21 per cent increase, while the NAACIE opted 
for conciliation and ultimately requested arbitration after failing to reach an accord 
with the employers. However, this request for arbitration was overshadowed by other 
developments with respect to increments. 
The NAACIE General Secretary claimed that, after failing to get Guysuco to increase 
wages beyond the level proposed by them, the union had to concentrate in getting 
increases in another area. Hence emphasis was placed on improving incremental rates. 
The union was able to secure an improvement from the old structure of 4 to 10 per 
cent to 6 to 15 per cent from January 1990, and then again in December 1992 
increased it further to the range of 8 to 17 per cent to take effect from January 1993. 
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With that agreement all NAACIE members would receive increments at the new rates 
from the beginning of each year, based on their performance over the preceding year. 
The rates were also paid to some of the eligible categories in the GAWU membership. 
While the NAACIE was awaiting the setting up of the Arbitration for the 1993 
negotiations, the union was informed by its members that the Guysuco had failed to 
award increments for 1994 in accordance with the collective agreement. The workers 
were given increments between a range of 2 to 5 per cent instead of the agreed 8 to 17 
per cent. Additionally, those workers who had reached the maximum of the scale 
were denied any increment. When the matter was raised with the Industrial Relations 
Department the acting Head indicated that his department was unaware of any 
instructions to vary the agreement, and he asked for time to investigate the matter and 
get back to the union. His failure to communicate with the union resulted in a strike 
by NAACIE members from January 3rd to lOth, 1994. In the course of the strike the 
Ministry intervened, and Guysuco admitted that they had stopped the increments of 
workers who had reached their maximum although they had in the past effected 
payment. They claimed that the time had come for them to rationalize the situation. 
Again they argued that they could not carry the annual increases at such high rates. 
Before the strike came to an end they gave an undertaking that the situation would be 
corrected to ensure that no worker was paid less than the minimum of 8 per cent 
(NAACIE Report 1994). 
The NAACIE General Secretary, Kaisree Takechandra, pointed out that the strike 
showed the GA WU in a particular light because it took place under a PPP 
government, and a leading officer of the GA WU went around the sugar belt informing 
striking workers that NAACIE did not have a case over increments and that the strike 
was politically motivated (ibid). There were even personal attacks levelled against 
officials of NAACIE. The chorus was picked up by field secretaries of GA WU, after 
their members began to agitate for increments along the lines being fought for by 
NAACIE. The GA WU eventually relented in its opposition to the NAACIE action 
and called out it members on a one day protest action some two weeks after the 
NAACIE strike. In response the employer applied a uniform approach to the issue by 
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agreeing to upgrade to 8 per cent all workers who had reached the maximum of the 
scale. They also offered to conduct a joint job evaluation exercise with the unions 
, 
following which increases would be awarded. That prompted NAACIE not to pursue 
Arbitration for the year 1993. 
The 1994 Negotiations 
The 1994 negotiations took place in a climate of disunity among the unions in the 
industry. The Guysuco continued to meet with them separately, thus capitalising on 
the divisions which exist. The GA WU offered initial resistance to the wage offers, 
sensing the fighting mood of its members, but agreed, on August 19th, to an increase 
of 15 per cent from 1 st March and a further 5 per cent with effect from August 1 st 
1994, to be applied to the wages/salaries of the workers as at February 28th 1994. The 
N AACIE continued to demand much more, and rejected the same offers even before 
the GA WU had agreed to them. With GA WU accepting what the Guysuco claimed to 
be their final offer the NAACIE readily conceded that its task, as in previous years, 
would be difficult and would require a great deal of effort on the part of the rank and 
file to force the Corporation beyond the 20 per cent point. 
The NAACIE General Secretary indicated that the branches in the sugar industry 
were alerted and kept informed on every round of negotiations. The workers were 
very dissatisfied with the offer of twenty per cent and more so were unhappy over the 
position taken by their sister union. Further, the toughness and thoroughness with 
which the cases were presented on both sides brought back memories of negotiations 
conducted in the early 1970s, before wage imposition by the State. Takechandra 
sensed that the union's best chance was to opt for Arbitration and so after the talks 
broke down at conciliation the Executive Council took the decision to ask for the 
assistance of the Ministry of Labour, by requesting them to set up an arbitration 
tribunal. The parties met and agreed to the composition of the tribunal, but there was 
an initial delay in arranging the first meeting, when the corporation made a last 
minute attempt to meet with the union and appeal for its understanding of the 
Guysuco's position. The Chief Executive had two meetings with NAACIE officials on 
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the issue and reiterated the corporation's position in being unable to finance additional 
increases. Following this, the NAACIE General Secretary explained that, after long 
and hard deliberations, it was decided as an act of goodwill to sign the package for 
the twenty per cent increase. In addition, the workers had their leave passage 
allowances increased by $3000 per annum (Interview: November 1994) .. 
In many respects the 1994 negotiations could be considered to have taken place in a 
spirit of genuine dialogue, with full restoration of the process of free collective 
bargaining. However, there were divisions amongst the workforce about the 
significance of this return to collective bargaining. To illustrate, when foremen were 
asked if they were satisfied with the negotiations concluded by their Union for 1994, 
they were divided. The majority felt that there could have been some improvement in 
certain other conditions of service, such as passage allowances and better salary 
scales. Two of the foremen, who are known supporters of the governing PPP party, 
indicated that, while they would have been happy with higher wages, they were 
satisfied that the government has the enormous task of "reconstructing" the economy 
and should not be pressured into making bigger pay outs (Interview September 1994). 
When asked individually if the Government should be given a chance to secure an 
agreement, especially in the light of the poor state in which they took over the 
economy, they all agreed. They pointed out that they suffered for "twenty eight 
years under a dictatorship, why should we not give our leader a chance to make things 
right for everybody" (ibid). When they were questioned whether they would like to 
see unions taking a position only in furtherance of a trade dispute or in protecting the 
interests of the members they served, six supported the position while two took the 
view that this "should be the case but because of the present situation in the country 
we have to support the union (GA WU) and the Party". They all condemned the role 
of their former union President, Richard Ishmael, and General Secretary, Cleveland 
Charran, for fighting "the ole man" (meaning President Jagan), when he was Premier 
in the 1960s, instead of vigorously representing their interest against the 'sugar 
barons' (ibid). 
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This they claimed to be the main reason why they wanted to rid themselves of "those 
bloodsuckers". They were happy with the feeling of security they had, belonging to a 
"powerful" union, noting that as foremen they were not known for militancy. 
However, they believed that their cause would be better served by the militant rank 
and file "labourers". Most of them would have preferred to be in one staff Union, 
NAACIE, along with their subordinates, the Charge Hands, but they were satisfied 
with the GA WU. 
The NAACIE members were asked to assess the performance of their union, and 
despite my senior position in the union they appeared quite uninhibited in their 
answers. The majority were satisfied with the services provided and were happy to 
provide reasons. These included the fact that it was the only union which fought for 
the restoration of increments and against the Labour Amendment Act; it was the first 
to win forty hours and paid maternity leave; and it had also gained higher wage 
increases in arbitration awards for the period 1971-1975 (Interview: November 1994). 
Because of these results and the commitment of its officers the NAACIE was 
expanding into other areas outside sugar. They cited electricity, mining, timber, rice, 
telecommunication, and the commercial sectors, where workers have moved over to 
NAACIE since the early 1980s. They further pointed out that, again because of its 
"militancy and track record", the union was able to absorb three staff unions within 
the industry. On the question of salaries and other conditions they were vocal that the 
current poistion was "very unsatisfactory". They claimed that "NAACIE alone could 
not advance the interest of workers, since the wage impositions by the government 
from 1977". Further, "even when the four unions got together and expanded into 
seven unions later on, the situation did not change". They claimed that they and their 
members were engaging the employers all the time, but a "combined reaction from 
the government and the hand picked managers were too much for us to handle alone, 
hence the depressing low salaries" (ibid). 
On the negotiations for 1994 they were all unhappy with the negotiated settlement, 
but the majority expressed a sympathetic understanding of the circumstances which 
forced the union into the accord. However, two very vocal representatives were very 
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critical of the settlement. They claimed that the members were in a mood to struggle, 
but the unions decision saved the day for the government and the sugar corporation. 
This is how the two vented their anger: 
Earlier in the year we had to fight for the right amount of increment to be paid 
to us. Guysuco violated our agreement, and we were not going to take this 
sitting down. We struck and got solid support from all the locations. Even 
Blainnont, which, within recent times had been weak, gave us solid support. 
We had a partial victory and were mobilising for the big issue-negotiations. 
The members were ready to take industrial action to enforce our demands , 
when the General Secretary, Kaisree Takechandra, and his negotiation team 
came to discuss a settlement with us. We could have taken the increases when 
GA WU signed their agreement with Guysuco since they were offering us the 
same increases. Why did we go through this delay to set up machinery for 
arbitration and then decide to accept Guysuco's proposal?(ibid). 
The General Secretary and his negotiating team had successfully obtained the 
approval, after some persuasion, of the rank and file members and the Executive 
Council. As the General Secretary pointed out: 
the two were the ones who were vocal when the matter was discussed at the 
membership level. They accepted the position of the majority but will still 
make their objections known and in a very forceful manner too. The members 
bought the idea of clearing this year (l994) since GA WU had accepted the 
wage offer and it would have been difficult to convince a tribunal to award us 
something more given the circumstances. Additionally, the job evaluation 
jointly conducted between the unions and management had been completed 
and this offered the union a splendid opportunity in making a sound case for 
substantially higher wages at the next round of negotiations (ibid). 
The General Secretary pointed out that he had a scare when he received a copy of a 
letter from the entire membership of Uitvlugt factory informing management that they 
no longer wished union dues be deducted and they were serving notice terminating 
their membership with the Union. It was just a prank intended to express their disgust 
over the signing of the agreement. The letter was never sent to management. The 
workers were disappointed that they did not have the opportunity to launch a struggle 
for higher wages. They felt somewhat defeated. But in the end they knew that it was 
almost impossible for NAACIE alone to succeed in obtaining a satisfactory 
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settlement. The General Secretary explained: 
They knew the difficulties we had in the increment case without the support of 
any other union. The position taken by these representatives is positive since 
political sympathy for the ruling party will not be a consideration when wage 
claims are determined (ibid). 
On the question of whether they thought that the unions should be involved in 
politics, the NAACIE representatives were very clear that "the politicians should do 
their jobs and the trade unions should promote the interest of the workers". They 
argued that trade unions could be involved in political struggles, but to be affiliated to 
political parties could heavily compromise the union. They felt that if the previous 
PNC government had still been in power, GA WU would not have so easily accepted 
the increases which were offered and which created difficulties for NAACIE: 
But you see it's their Party in government so they would not put pressure on it. 
It is wrong, totally wrong for a union to be affiliated or supportive of a 
political party, especially one in government. They compromise the interest of 
the workers (ibid). 
The workers were then asked if conditions had improved since nationalisation in a 
significant way, and again they were unanimous in their negative response. The 
majority were supportive of the idea that both NAACIE and GAWU should merge or 
at least they should conduct joint negotiations, especially on bonuses and wages. They 
claimed that there would be enough pressure on management to raise the level of 
wages to a realistic level. 
Workers from the other sections within the GA WU, fifty-seven people from the field 
and factory areas, were asked if they thought trade unions should be affiliated to 
political parties and this was greeted with a mixed response. Almost sixty per cent 
were of the view that they should not, but that unions should be free to make political 
demands in furtherance of workers' interests. About ten per cent took a position that 
trade unions should desist from being affiliated to the ruling party, and that it would 
be a good thing if some trade unions could work closely with the opposition parties 
without being affiliated, just in case the government decides to take anti-workers' 
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measures. The remainder, thirty per cent, were very supportive of the idea of unions 
being involved in party politics. 
In the light of these responses they were questioned about whether they thought that 
sugar workers' interests would be properly looked after in the light of the closeness of 
their union to the ruling party, since the Honorary President of the union had now 
become the State Executive President, while the union President and General 
Secretary and at least three other senior officers were Members of Parliament. They 
all indicated their loyalty to the ruling party but wanted the union to know that their 
loyalty must not be construed as a willingness to give up their right to struggle for a 
decent way of life. They suggested that whenever they saw things were not going too 
well they would continue to take appropriate measures to correct the situation. 
A number of examples were cited to support their position. In particular, on at least 
three occasions in the first half of 1994 the workers refused to heed calls from their 
union leaders to go back to work, and continued strike action at Wales, Blairmont, 
and Albion Estates. Additionally, they were very conscious that management was 
trying at times to change conditions by "reduce pricing on certain jobs thinking that 
we will accept, because we will not want to strike against our Government. But they 
were surprised because every time they attempted a trick, we took strike action" 
(Interview: September 1994). It is worth noting that in 1993 and up to June 1994 there 
was a higher incidence of strikes in the industry than during the previous two years. 
Indeed, Guysuco expressed its concern over this situation, which it claimed was 
outside of. the "normal procedures for taking industrial action" (press Release, 
February 11th 1994), and gave statistics to highlight its concern. It stated that for 
January 1994 there were 52 incidents of strike with a loss of 10,770 man-days as 
compared to 33 strikes in January 1993 with a loss of 3,251 man-days. This reflected 
an element of workers' independence of action, beyond the 'control' of the union at 
the national level. This is illustrated by the failure of the GA WO to persuade the 
workers back to work at Blairmont, a situation confirmed by the management of the 
industry when it stated: 
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It is understood that attempts by the union (GAWU) to get a resumption of 
work have been without success. Strikes and work stoppages of this sort 
disrupt production, result in production loss and materially affect the 
efficiency of the Corporation (ibid). 
The representatives, however, claimed that they would "work hard to make the 
government succeed but they will not take nonsense from the managers". They 
claimed, that although there were more work stoppages, they returned to work always 
conscious of the targets they had to accomplish. Their aim was always to surpass their 
targets once their concerns were addressed properly. On the question of the last 
negotiation 65 per cent indicated that they were satisfied with what was achieved by 
the union for 1994, while the others believed that Guysuco could afford much more. 
Over eighty per cent, however, were unhappy at the existing level of wages when the 
cost of living was taken into consideration. They were confident that they would be 
able to secure greater benefits once the production level improved. They were all in 
support of the two unions, NAACIE and GA WU, conducting joint negotiations for 
wages and other related matters, claiming that greater benefits would flow out of this 
type of solidarity. About sixty per cent were of the opinion that the government 
should seek to reduce the cost of living before putting emphasis on increasing wages 
every time the cost of living goes up. Some of them spoke on the issue as if they were 
practising economists. 
Against this background Neville Hilary, the Chief Executive of the Corporation, made 
some valuable observations on industrial relations problems which continued to be a 
source of concern to the industry. At the signing ceremony he commended the 
NAACIE and Guysuco for arriving at an agreement for 1994 without recourse to 
strikes or arbitration but through patient discussion and negotiation. He pointed out 
that the agreement represented considerable financial gain for workers and enshrined 
the commitment of the parties to the development and implementation of a new job 
evaluation scheme. It opened a new era of collaboration between the two unions, 
GA WU and NAACIE, and the Corporation. Moreover, it should lay the basis for a 
sound and equitable pay structure for the benefit of both the employees and the 
corporation. Hilary used the occasion to raise his main concern: 
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It is the vexed question of strikes in breach of procedure. Such instances are, 
unfortunately, all too common in our industry. They are very costly in terms of 
lost production for the industry, and lost earnings for employees ... they strike 
at the very heart of the relationship between the corporation and trade unions. 
The recognition and procedural agreement sets out the basis upon which the 
parties will conduct their affairs. In effect, the parties are voluntarily agreeing 
to a set of rules which will enable them to further their interests and maintain a 
mature and constructive relationship. If at any time these rules are not 
respected by either party, a threat is posed to this fundamental agreement (35). 
The Chief Executive appealed to the parties to resolve problems through discussions 
and negotiations and concluded that the signing of that agreement amply illustrated 
the point he was trying to make. Many of the representatives, while agreeing that the 
procedures in agreements ought to be followed, maintained that the biggest violators 
were management personnel. This situation had developed over the long period of 
exploitation in the industry. They were of the firm view that, given the same degree of 
commitment to dial?gue on the part of the new Guysuco personnel, the situation in 
the industry could be dramatically improved. 
All the representatives and management personnel who were asked to identify the 
most crucial period for the Corporation, maintained that the 1995 negotiations which 
was conducted once again jointly by the two unions, could hold the key to sound 
industrial relations in the industry. They were happy over the manner in which the job 
evaluation exercise had been conducted, jointly between the unions and the 
corporation representatives. Further, both management and the unions' representatives 
expressed the opinion that the outcome of the negotiations, which were once again 
jointly conducted between the two unions and Guysuco, would pave the way for 
"either a make or break situation". They believed that the parties would have the 
opportunity to properly price the various jobs, having already assessed their nature, 
and this should enable them to introduce rates and salary scales which were likely to 
operate smoothly over a period of time. 
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Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter establishes once agam the fragile nature of the 
progressive union alliance. The indecisiveness of the leaders resulted in open conflict 
and argument with each other. However, in the midst of this confusion and criticism 
among the leadership, the workers remained resolute and opposed to government 
policies. The union membership's confirmation of their determination came in a 
variety of ways, most notably their defiance of the leaderships of FITUG, the GA WO 
and even its political ally, the PPP. The strike which started over an imposed wages 
settlement and the structural adjustment programme, based on IMF policies, resulted 
in workers in two crucial industries waging the most significant multi-racial workers' 
struggle of the last thirty years in Guyana. 
Instead of capitalising on this show of solidarity by these groups of workers, the 
union leaders once again proved ineffective. Individual leaders lost their sense of 
direction and fell prey to offers made by individual managements. This had the effect 
of dividing and weakening the workers' struggle. The end result was that the workers 
had to return to work without achieving any of their original demands. 
Given the strained relationship among the unions, especially between GA WO and 
NAACIE, the ability of the workers to influence or challenge the employers on any 
significant issue was undermined. As a consequence, it became difficult for unions to 
achieve advances in wage levels via genuine collective bargaining. While both unions 
attempted to maintain strong bargaining positions, they were relatively unsuccessful 
in their endeavours. 
The return of Booker Tate initially reaffirmed the division between the GA WO and 
N AACIE. A new management contract was offered and wages were increased by 
significant amounts. Although collective bargaining was restored, the wage increases 
and tax concessions which were offered to the unions and workers came about 
primarily because of the poor state of the industry, and the attempt by the employers 
to increase workers motivation and to attract workers back to the plantations. 
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Between 1990 and 1994 the problem between the unions was that GA WU adopted a 
policy of accepting company offers quickly, thereby creating difficulties for NAACIE 
who attempted to further improve the offers. This division, however, was partly 
overcome in 1995 when the unions agreed to participate in a job evaluation exercise 
as well as joint negotiations. Whether this can be maintained is a question for the 
future. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This research has addressed almost every major struggle of the sugar workers during 
the period of thirty years up to the end of 1994. It has also dealt with three areas of 
union activity and practice - union rivalry, resistance and wage settlements - in some 
detail. As was pointed out earlier, a number of important national events have been 
emphasised since they also gave a broader picture of the crises confronting unions and 
workers in Guyana. It is not intended to address all of the many themes which could 
be developed out of what is reported here, as this would greatly widen the scope of 
the research. Instead, the focus is on the character and implications of the political 
affiliation of the unions, in particular as this has been related to a decline in the living 
standard of the workers. Thus, throughout the thesis, a major theme has been the 
significance of political affiliation for relations between unions, for their approaches 
to bargaining and to state policy, and in consequence its influence upon their 
effectiveness in responding to and representing their members. The concern of the 
thesis has been with the political and union struggles around these issues. 
Throughout the period covered by the research the positions taken by the parties to all 
the major disputes led to failures to reach satisfactory settlements. The 1964 strike 
revealed that the workers were caught up in a political struggle as part of the strike 
over a genuine industrial relations grievance - trade union recognition. While there 
were occasions when a resc;>lution of the dispute was possible, the opportunity was 
wasted because particular political interests replaced bargaining calculations at the 
bargaining table. What was even worse was that the government undermined itself by 
the continuation of the strike, and as result the country was left racially divided. 
Thus, the recognition dispute continued unresolved for another twelve years. Another 
factor in this dispute was that it was not pursued in an organised manner by the union 
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after 1964. It was the workers who were in the forefront of the agitation, while the 
GA WU was merely responding to the workers and the union it was seeking to 
replace, the MPCA. 
The 1977 strike, which took place under a regime accused of undemocratic conduct at 
elections, witnessed state intervention of an unprecedented nature. The deployment of 
almost the entire state machinery against industrial action, coupled with the 
recruitment of scab labour, resulted in the prolongation of the strike. While the union 
movement was prepared to settle the strike on what many saw as reasonable terms, 
the government was concerned to force the workers into submission. The 
government's response to the strike was based on its perception that the PPP and its 
trade union arm, the GA WU, were engaged in a political struggle aimed at 
destabilising the country. The adamant position taken by the government as it sought 
'to teach the PPP and GA WU a lesson' led to the virtual destruction of the industry, 
and with it the wider economy. The effect was further hardship imposed on the 
workers through the austerity measures introduced by the government. 
The worsening economic crises in 1979 and the early 1980s stimulated further worker 
action, but the lack of coordination at the national and political level, as well as 
between trade unions, resulted in victimisation, retrenchment and dismissals of 
workers. In short, throughout these struggles the workers suffered and made few if 
any gains. Most of their union leaders were either affiliated to the ruling party or 
afraid 'to rock the boat'. The might of the 'vanguard party' was a force which the 
workers had to contend with. The depleted resources of the workers and the lack of 
effective co-ordination of their efforts added to their woes. In fact even when the 
progressive unions took control of the TUC in 1984 they were not able to achieve the 
unity necessary to put an end to the onslaught on the workers. The one union which 
attempted to challenge this situation actively was the NAACIE, but they received 
limited support from leaders in the progressive alliance. Even in its struggles against 
the Labour Amendment Act, the NAACIE was unsuccessful in receiving more than 
token support. 
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Although the rank and file members continued to campaign for improvements and 
used different tactics (in particular hit and run strikes) in protesting harsh economic 
conditions, their leaders gave little leadership and were unable to consolidate their 
struggles. This ended with the ill fated 1989 strike, when the unions and their 
members ended up on different courses. Although the government was able to force 
the workers into submission in the course of these major struggles, it paid a 
substantial price in the form of a battered economy and a sugar industry that in 1990 
had achieved the lowest production level since world war two. 
By the 1990s, there was considerable worker disaffection about negotiations and the 
role of unions in this process. Those interviewed within the GA WU categories were 
dissatisfied over the manner in which the MPCA had negotiated wages on their 
behalf. They were still unhappy over the level of wages they were currently receiving, 
but expressed a willingness to accept what was agreed for 1994 in order to give their 
government 'a chance to put things right'. They also indicated, however, that they 
would not hesitate to take industrial action over any infraction of their conditions of 
work. Again a majority of this grouping supported the position that the industry 
should not be privatised under a PPP government, but supported privatisation if the 
previous rulers were to regain power. The majority of those interviewed in the 
NAACIE categories supported the privatisation of the industry to allow it to expand. 
They were grossly unhappy over their level of wages, and expressed their readiness to 
take industrial action if called upon by their union to improve their lot. The vast 
majority of all those interviewed supported the idea of a merger of the unions in the 
industry or, at minimum, joint participation in negotiations. They believed that 
workers would benefit more if this situation was achieved. It would help to forge 
greater unity and solidarity so as to apply pressure on management for an overall 
improvement of working conditions. 
On the very sensitive issue of the independence of unions, the majority of workers' 
representatives in all three sections were supportive of the position that trade unions 
could be involved in political struggles but they should not be affiliated to political 
parties. The analysis of the role played by some of the politically affiliated unions in 
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Guyana shows how the workers' interests were heavily compromised. The research 
reveals how political interference wreaked havoc on the economy and the industrial 
life of the society. It has emasculated managerial functions, especially through the 
promotion of individuals on the basis of political loyalty above technical competence. 
The unions which gave sustenance to the doctrine of the "paramountcy of the party" 
were engaged in the substitution of a political agenda rather than the promotion of the 
interests of the workers. In this regard, the ruling party aided those unions so as to 
ensure their control of the TUC. In these ways, political interests were promoted 
within the labour movement. 
Guyana and Post-Colonial Industrial Relations 
The problems discussed in this thesis are not unique to Guyana. It has long been 
common to argue that trade unions in post-colonial or 'third world' countries tend to 
be particularly liable to subordination to government and/or political parties and to 
function as much as political agencies as representatives of workers' economic 
interests. 
At least five reasons for this are emphasised in the literature: 
In the nationalist movement, there was often a close involvement between party 
and unions in a common struggle against economic oppression and colonial rule. 
The institutional links formed in the colonial era are difficult to break. 
'The conditions for successful and genuine collective bargaining of the "ideal" 
Anglo-American style are rarely present in the developing countries' (Sturmthal 
1972: 149). Competition from a low economic base within a hostile global 
economy offers limited scope for the improvements in wages and conditions 
which unions in developed countries were able to negotiate for much of the post-
war era. 
The state is often althe main employer in strategic sectors, and in any case wishes 
307 
to control pnces and encourage investment. While such concerns exist for 
governments in developed countries - particularly in a climate of economic crisis _ 
they are more severe in the third world. Thus the state is likely to press for 
particular restraint in union action. If unions resist, this implies a political as well 
as an economic challenge to the state. 
Third world governments often possess weak 'legitimacy' (Clapham 1985: 43) 
and regard autonomous unionism as a threat. Hence they often attempt to co-opt 
and incorporate unions, and if they fail in this, to suppress them. 
Labour market conditions often make it difficult to develop robust and 
independent union organisation; and there is a strong incentive for union leaders 
to co-operate with government - particularly if they share its goals of economic 
development - in return for organisational advantages such as dues check-off 
(SturmthaI1972: 140). 
However, Bates has argued (1970: 368) that while these pressures are strong they are 
not universal. He gives examples of countries where union support for or opposition 
to the government and its policies reflects a primarily economic rather than political 
logic. In the Caribbean a number of trade unions have aligned themselves to political 
parties. However, it is only in the Guyana context under the PNC regime that the 
union movement has been unable to articulate the struggles of the workers fearlessly 
and without having to consider the repercussions that their action may cause in their 
relationship with the 'paramount party'. In Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad, the 
leaders of unions did not hesitate to use the strength of the workers to challenge 
perceived anti-working class measures, even at times against their own party. Not all 
of their challenges have been successful, but the fact remains that in the Caribbean the 
majority of union leaders with party affiliations have boldly put the cause of the 
workers before party politics. The following cases can be cited to illustrate this point. 
In Jamaica under the Seaga administration (Jamaica Labour Party) in the 1980s there 
were several instances where the union of the deputy Prime Minister Hugh Shearer, 
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Bustamantee Industrial Trade Union, took strike action against the government. 
Similarly, under the Manley administration (people National Party) the union which 
is the main support to his party, the National Workers Union, took strike action 
against his government, and leaders like Cilve Dobson, who was a government 
Senator, took the side of the workers. A similar situation has been repeated in 
Barbados, where the Barbados Workers Union (BWU) has taken action against the 
party it supports, the Democratic Labour Party, while that party was holding the 
reigns of Government. Leroy Trotman while General Secretary of the BWU but also 
holding the position of a Government senator, openly supported the workers struggle 
against his own government. Since the PPP became the government in Guyana itself, 
the union movement seems to have been given a fresh lease of life. The militant 
action of workers have been forcing leaders to act independent of their political 
leanings. The increase incidence of strikes in the sugar industry, which place workers 
against their own government, reflect a new thinking amongst the Guyanese workers. 
This supports Waterman's argument (1981: 91) that 'the common tendencies 
discovered across the third world do not imply a common situation.' In other words, 
despite objective pressures and constraints there is some scope for choice by third 
world unions. As the thesis has shown, at a number of decisive moments there were 
alternative options available. This indicates that members and leaders of unions in 
post-colonial societies are not simply victims of circumstance but to some extent can 
influence their own fate. 
Before dealing with the consequences of the politicization of unions in Guyana, it is 
appropriate to mention that several notable writers, Marxists! Leninists in particular, 
have viewed the involvement of unions in political struggles as part of a class struggle 
(Kelly, 1988). The role of trade unions, they argue, is to work side by side with 
political parties to bring about revolutionary change, namely the overthrow of the 
capitalist system and to replace this with socialism. These ideas took on a particular 
significance in countries where unions and political parties became involved in 
struggles for national liberation, such as Guyana. In these particular circumstances 
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political dominance can come to be justified in tenns of national liberation, as 
socialist movements and unions are subordinated to this goal. However, such 
developments do not justify the argument that trade unions have no independent role. 
Workers continue to face subordination and exploitation. In such circumstances, trade 
unions must distance themselves from such fonnal dominance and begin to defend 
workers' interests, though as this thesis shows this can be a long and hard struggle. 
It is, then, the question of the political affiliation of unions with is central to the 
developments documented in this thesis. As is seen in the Guyana context, when 
unions abandoned workers' struggles while remaining loyal to political parties, the 
consequences were the destruction of the collective bargaining process and its 
replacement with centralized bargaining under the control of a puppet labour 
movement. Guyana has thus been characterised by an inter-linkage between party and 
labour leaderships and the domination political and economic life by political 
personalities and employers' organisations, while workers' celebrations such as May 
Ist have been 'hijacked'. This politicisation of the labour movement in partisan ways 
has had major organisational consequences. It has resulted in the failure by unions to 
prepare accounts and reports to their members, the submission of inaccurate 
membership records, the failure to have or to articulate distinct bargaining positions 
and a lack of knowledge of the labour statutes and practices. Moreover, by being 
affiliated to the ruling party, unions benefitted from concessionary loans and 
mortgage facilities from state banks, scholarships and overseas travel. These were all 
used to encourage a dependency on party influence rather than on the vigour of the 
union to promote workers' interests. Additionally union recognition was used by the 
government to promote particular unions against the will of the workers. The granting 
of the agency shop was used to guarantee funding to those unions affiliated to the 
ruling party, while the paper unions which were encouraged were allegedly given 
funding by the Government especially to pay affiliation fees to the TUC. 
The uruons were trapped by these dependent relationship. As the political and 
economic crises deepened, the unions began to distant themselves from their fonner 
enthusiastic support for the ruling party. However, because of their institutional 
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dependency (unpaid loans, mortgages, scholarships, etc.), they were unable to assume 
independent and militant positions. The situation became even more awkward for the 
unions because members who were not supportive of the political party, and who 
were never made to feel welcome or at home with the union, did not trust the leaders 
and would never venture to support any position taken by them, even though it might 
have been a genuinely solid workers' position. One union, the GWU, which openly 
criticised the ruling party to which it was affiliated and then withdrew affiliation from 
the party, received a cruel lesson when it lost its Headquarters and was evicted from 
the premises in an unconventional manner. Its officers were victimised, and one was 
served with a foreclosure notice on mortgage arrears for his house, while union dues 
remittances were unduly delayed. In effect the ruling party was signalling to others 
the consequences of betrayal. Nonetheless, the GWU stood its ground and is now 
trying to rebuild a union with a new outlook. 
In regard to the affiliation or close ties which exist between the PPP and GA WU, it is 
apparent that industrial actions were timed to coincide with party events and 
timetables rather than the workers' interests in such instances as the 1964, 1977 and 
1989 strikes. What is clear in the Guyana context is the degree to which political 
parties in opposition have used workers in protest action to undermine the national 
economy for political mileage. This took place with the PNC when they were in 
opposition in the early 1960s, and it was also adopted by the PPP when it was in 
opposition. The point should be made that many of these industrial actions were 
justified in the sense that they were necessary to pursue industrial grievances, but the 
timing and manner of their pursuit revealed ulterior motives, which clearly reflected 
partisan political interest. Furthermore, the main political parties in Guyana never 
attempted to work on issues together to promote national development, in a way 
which would have served workers' interests. 
The powerlessness produced by party affiliation within the labour movement served 
to discredit the movement in the eyes of many workers, who did not see their real 
interests as being served by the unions. Many unions, for their part, became 
disenchanted with the PNC, because its policies were far removed from workers' 
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interest, but did not know how to get out of the trap they had been drawn into by that 
party. The movement therefore became weakened and disoriented under the present 
system of party affiliation. The emphasis seems to have been placed on controlling 
the movement rather than defending the rights of the workers. So long as this situation 
continues the movement will continue to decline. If other leaders, with close ties to 
another party, were to take the reigns of power, there are no grounds for believing that 
this would end the polarisation of the union movement. Those who have opposed the 
idea of unions being affiliated to political parties need to continue to press for a 
strong, independent and united labour movement, with the right to make political 
demands where necessary. 
While managements' views on wild cat strikes and violation of agreements may have 
been partly justified, the responses by management have been experienced as 
arbitrary. Workers have alluded to what they perceived as high-handed approaches by 
management on these issues. The records reflect the rich legacy of the struggles of 
sugar workers against exploitative working practises under centuries of foreign 
domination and later a ruinous 'dictatorship'. What is also clear from the tables on 
production, is that there were years when workers' best efforts went unrewarded. 
They were given little bonus and no profit sharing, because prices were paid at the 
international levels determined by other external agencies. At times prices paid for 
sugar were insufficient to meet the cost of production. This is a major problem 
confronting agricultural workers and producers in developing countries. 
The inefficiency of factories also led to less sugar being produced, although more 
canes were harvested. Workers were therefore penalised for a situation not of their 
own making. It could be argued that the bonus system should have been changed to 
reflect the actual labour and efforts by workers, with payment based on the tons of 
cane harvested, instead of tons of sugar produced. In such an assessment the struggles 
of Guyanese sugar workers should not be seen in isolation since their sisters and 
brothers world wide also have bitter stories to tell, of misery, oppression and 
exploitation. In addressing the problems of sugar workers in the Philippines this is 
how one delegate described their life to an international sugar conference: 
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In the sugar land the scales of justice lie broken and overturned, the workers 
groan pitifully under the almost unbearable load of oppression. But, there must 
come a day when these people can no longer endure their suffering and 
degradation. If the day of justice does not dawn with sharing, equality and 
brotherhood, it may well be ushered in with blood ( The World of Sugar 
Workers 1977: 82). 
It is not claiming too much to state that the Guyanese sugar workers have paid in 
blood while struggling for change. One possible solution would be for the 
international trade union movement to adopt a more meaningful role in seeking to 
redress the wrongs committed against workers by employers, and especially by the 
state as employer. However, there are difficulties in pursuing such policies, not least 
because the international labour organisations, such as the ICFTU, have been difficult 
to influence. 
One of the important lessons from this thesis concerns the role of unions in relation to 
economic policy. The emerging trend, in which national political parties are moving 
closer to market oriented economics, should also be given active study by the labour 
movement. The role of the labour movement in endorsing political parties should now 
be redefined. Many parties which in the past claimed to have the sympathy for the 
working class have turned a blind eye to assaults which have been committed by 
employers against the workers. In fact many Governments, supported by organised 
labour, have ended up attacking the movement and have sided with employers in their 
attacks on workers in the name of promoting investment opportunities. As this study 
has demonstrated, where unions are affiliated to these governing parties, it is likely 
that vigourous protests will be stifled. 
A central implication of the thesis is that the use of aggressive methods by trade 
unions to build the working class movement should once again be resorted to, if the 
movement is going to raise the level of consciousness of the workers. The 
aggressiveness and militant approach taken by the NAACIE and GA WU unions in 
Guyana, despite the problems of 1989, earned them considerable support among 
workers. In fact, they continue to grow at the expense of other competing unions 
which have been noted for their inactivity. The same could be said of the Service 
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Employees International Union in the USA which, over the last 15 years under the 
leadership of John Sweeney, has doubled its membership "to 1.1 million members, in 
part through aggressive organizing drives that have sometimes used acts of civil 
disobedience to recruit low-paid women, minorities and immigrants" (Reuters, New 
York. October 25, 1995). This is in marked contrast to the massive decline of almost 
50 per cent in union membership in the USA over the last 25 years. That image has no 
doubt helped to make Sweeney the President of the American Federation of Labour/ 
Congress of Industrial Organisation (AFL-CIO) at its first contested elections in it's 
forty year history. 
It is not that this research is advocating indiscipline and unconventional working 
practices by organised labour. Far from that, trade unions ought to ensure that their 
members understand that management also have rights and that rules or procedures, 
which are agreed upon to determine the relations between the parties, should be 
observed. We have seen that frequent cases of violation of procedures in agreements 
for resolving conflicts in the sugar industry in Guyana have been an area of concern to 
the management. It does not make any sense for workers to embark on industrial 
protest action if there exist avenues for continued and speedy discussions. In this 
respect, the practice of striking first and then talking should be replaced instead by 
urgent consultation and mediation. This does not mean that workers should give up 
the option where they can exert some pressure or display their disgust over autocratic 
leaders or managers. This is necessary (Clegg 1970: 107) as a measure to keep the 
leaders in line. Furthermore, as Hyman argues: 
collective bargaining is a meaningless ritual if nothing more is involved on the 
trade union side than the eloquence and statistical finesse of the official 
negotiators. For the employer can always ignore the union's case, however 
solidly documented and cogently argued, unless it is backed up by the 
possibility of sanctions. Serious negotiation involves the overt or implicit 
threat of collective action, the mobilisation of the power of the membership, if 
a satisfactory settlement is not achieved. Strikes and related sanctions are a 
vital weapon of the working class in pursuing its industrial objectives (1975: 
189,190). 
The spirit and intent of agreements are at times not clearly spelt out in the wording of 
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the agreement and care should be taken by the parties to ensure that misinterpretation 
does not lead to a situation in which conflict develops. In the case of Guyana, and 
especially in the sugar industry, many problems and strikes took place because of 
such misunderstandings. It is time the confrontational approach in seeking to settle 
industrial relations matters is put to an end by both sides of the bargaining table. 
However, unions should never lose sight of their main objective in furthering the 
interests of their members. This they must do with all the vigour and aggression at 
their disposal, especially in cases where employers display the 'might is right 
approach'. 
Effective representation in Guyana would require the restoration of technical and 
leadership skills which political affiliation undermined in many unions. To reinstate 
those skills would further require the internal rehabilitation and strengthening of the 
technical capacity of union leaders, both nationally and locally in the fields and 
factories, where trade union life is rooted. Effective representation requires more than 
a mentality of either confrontation with the state, as a major employer of labour, or 
complete servility - two options which are open to forms of politicized unionism. 
What is needed is constructive and mature trade union involvement in reconstructing 
a ruined economy and for the improvement of the general standard of living of the 
workers. This may require unions having to take and support hard decisions from the 
workers' point of view. But, at present in Guyana, this degree of maturity does not 
exist at the level of the national movement, because the roots of unionism were 
transplanted from the field and factory and located in the political parties. The 
political parties which encouraged union affiliation must accept responsibility for 
encouraging a trend which has led to the debilitated and ineffectual unionism 
currently existing in Guyana. 
Another feature which should be eliminated is the tendecny to see party loyalty as a 
major factor in appointments at the managerial level in state entities. This has been 
the case with both the PNC and PPP in government. Freeing industrial management 
from the hold of the party is the first step towards some form of managerial regime in 
which economic rationality can be applied, without which there cannot be free play of 
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ideas or initiatives or divergence from the official line. Whenever the adversary in 
industrial disputes is also the same force which subjects the press, industrial 
management, the workers and the interests of the nation to its own power, then the 
reform of the labour movement is not an isolated issue. What is needed, then, is the 
freeing up of each of the sections to allow it to assert its autonomy, thus forcing the 
dominant party to loosen the hold which threatens to strangle genuine union activity. 
This freeing up process would allow for the creation of a vibrant and autonomous 
labour movement which can advocate change and reassert its role in society. In the 
past too much of the labour movement's energy was wasted on marginal or trivial 
issues, because it was caught up in a political agenda, political time table, and 
political personalities. 
A free and independent labour movement could return to basics and ask some 
fundamental questions such as: is classical trade unionism and trade union action still 
meaningful at the present time, or what kind of leadership are workers really looking 
for? The lesson from this thesis is that genuine solidarity around workers' interests 
can develop once these questions are addressed. It is also desirable to have trade 
union democracy at every level in the movement. Through periodic elections the 
workers can choose the leaders they are comfortable with, and have the confidence in, 
to promote their interest. One thing is clear from the analysis of some of the major 
struggles of the workers in Guyana. This is that they have been initiated by the 
workers who found the situation intolerable, while leaders were very often failing 
them. The cohesive and multi- racial struggles which took place in 1989 in Guyana 
can act as a catalyst in forging real working class solidarity. It is a ripe moment for 
leaders to critically debate the future course of the labour movement. 
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